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Abstract 
After three decades of seemingly insurmountable suspicion and bilateral crises, the post-
Cold War period has witnessed a remarkable renewal and strengthening of Sino-Russian 
relations. Many of the underlying factors and circumstances contributing to the bilateral 
rapprochement of the past two decades remain yet to be analysed. This thesis illuminates the 
role of one of the factors involved in this process: the development of institutional links 
between the two states. Bilateral institutions, which were almost entirely absent until the 
mid-1990s, have now rapidly proliferated into a dense network of commissions and sub-
commissions, working groups, and institutionalised exchanges, encompassing virtually all 
sectors of interaction between China and Russia. In addition, both countries are increasingly 
interacting in the framework of multilateral institutions and international organisations. This 
thesis examines what role the institutionalisation of Sino-Russian relations has played in 
enabling both states to forge a closer working relationship with each other. It begins by 
providing a brief comparative overview of the most common accounts of the factors that led 
to increasing Sino-Russian rapprochement in recent decades, assessing these factors through 
the lenses of relevant approaches in International Relations theory. It points out deficits in 
these common accounts, concluding that bilateral cooperation remained fraught with 
substantial problems and obstacles in all of these dimensions. Hence, these factors alone did 
not provide a policymaking context in which a persistent mutual rapprochement was 
particularly likely, let alone predetermined. The thesis then examines to what extent the 
process of institution-building has contributed to fostering and perpetuating bilateral 
rapprochement. It employs analytical concepts borrowed from Neoliberal Institutionalist 
theory and applies them in the context of several case studies of institution-building between 
China and Russia. It explores the extent to which the newly-created bilateral institutional 
channels have facilitated the implementation of cooperative policies between both countries 
by bringing together relevant stakeholders and rendering each country’s policy towards the 
other more stable, more predictable, and more well-informed. 
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Chapter I: Introduction and Methodology 
 
 
Whoever studies the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation 
confronts a number of superlatives: China and Russia are, respectively, the world’s 
largest and ninth-largest countries by population and the largest and fourth-largest 
countries by total landmass. They are both major global economic players and among 
the world’s leading military powers. Both command extensive nuclear arms arsenals 
and are veto powers on the United Nations Security Council. And both countries 
share one of the world’s longest borders, stretching for more than 4000 kilometres. 
Extremes have also characterised the course of relations between the two 
neighbouring powers: Few bilateral relationships between major states in modern 
history have been characterised by fluctuations as extreme as those that occurred 
between China and Russia. After an initial spell of professed socialist ‘brotherhood’ 
and intense political and economic cooperation in the 1950s, Beijing and Moscow 
rapidly plunged into a bitter strategic enmity. Persistent mutual hostility and 
territorial disputes culminated in an open border war in 1969 and in repeated mutual 
nuclear threats. It was not until 1989 that bilateral relations were finally normalised. 
Since the end of the Cold War, events between the newly-founded Russian 
Federation and a reformist People’s Republic of China have taken a turn in the 
opposite direction, towards a remarkable renewal and strengthening of Sino-Russian 
ties. After four decades of seemingly insurmountable suspicion and bilateral crises, 
which more than once threatened to escalate into all-out armed conflict, China and 
Russia since the late 1990s have forged a close relationship. For both states it 
represents one of the closest relationships with any other great power. 
While the foundations for Sino-Russian rapprochement were laid in the final 
years of the Soviet Union, notable progress towards close bilateral cooperation has 
only been made since the 1990s. Today, Chinese and Russian officials commonly 
assert that relations between their countries are “at their best in history”, 1  and 
analysts have called the development of relations with China the “greatest Russian 
                                                 
1
 See e.g. Mu Xuequan, ‘Chinese Premier: China-Russia Relations at Most Important Stage’, Xinhua 
(2.11.2007), available online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-11/02/content_6995010.htm 
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foreign policy success of the post-Soviet period.” 2  Having expressed persistent 
doubts in the past, outside observers and scholars now commonly acknowledge the 
substantiality and apparent durability of a relationship that had long been regarded as 
predominantly symbolic and fragile. 
While the Sino-Russian relationship has been continuously expanding up to the 
present day, this has happened in spite of the fact that few of the causes of bilateral 
tension in the past have been conclusively resolved, while China’s dramatic growth 
in economic and political power has become a source of disquiet for many of its 
neighbours, including Russia. The two states have shared interests in developing 
their economic ties and coordinating their security policies, but China’s growing 
political and economic power has been perceived by many in Russia as a distinct 
threat to the country’s national security. At the same time, many policy-makers in 
Beijing have regarded Russia as an erratic and unpredictable international actor. It 
was therefore not an evident choice for Chinese and Russian policy-makers to have 
opted for increasing bilateral cooperation. Academic scholarship has recently begun 
to devote more attention to the development of Sino-Russian relations, but many of 
the underlying factors and circumstances contributing to the swift bilateral 
rapprochement of the past two decades remain yet to be analysed. 
Before the background of continuing uncertainty among analysts as to what the 
primary causes of Sino-Russian bilateral rapprochement have been, this thesis aims 
to illuminate the role of some of the factors and circumstances involved in this 
process. Specifically, the role of one such factor is examined through the lens of the 
relevant approaches in International Relations theory: the development of bilateral 
and multilateral institutions between both states. Bilateral institutional links, which 
had been almost entirely absent until the mid-1990s, have now rapidly proliferated 
into a dense network of commissions and sub-commissions, working groups, and 
other institutionalised exchanges, encompassing virtually all sectors of bilateral 
interaction and cooperation. The aim of this thesis has been to examine what role the 
institutionalisation of bilateral relations has played in enabling both states to forge a 
close relationship with each other. The primary focus of my research into these 
dynamics has been the way in and the extent to which institutional channels have 
promoted efficiency in the conduct of bilateral policy making, have rendered each 
                                                 
2
 Bobo Lo, ‘The Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership: Russia’s Evolving China Policy’, International 
Affairs, vol.80, no.2 (March 2004), p.296 
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country’s policy towards the other more stable, more predictable, more informed, 
and less dependent on the acts and whims of individual policy-makers.  
Accordingly, this thesis formally explores the following principal hypothesis: 
‘Trans-national institutional structures – forming a gradually developing ‘mechanism’ 
and ‘infrastructure’ of interaction and cooperation between China and Russia – have 
substantially facilitated and stabilised the implementation of cooperative policies 
between both countries and have provided each government with important 
information and reassurance about the other’s policies and intentions. As a result, 
they have altered the nature of cooperation between Beijing and Moscow in a lasting 
manner.’ 
 
On first glance, the proposition that the development of legal-institutional 
channels has significantly promoted Sino-Russian rapprochement may appear to be a 
truism. However, a common assumption among scholars in the past has been that the 
institutions created between China and Russia – which have never before been the 
subject of any specific academic analysis – have been little more than symbolic 
‘window dressing’. Consequently, this component of the Sino-Russian relationship 
has received minimal scholarly attention in the past. I assume, however, that the 
swift development of a broad network of bilateral (and, to a lesser extent, multilateral) 
institutions may have served as an important means for facilitating the 
implementation of cooperative bilateral policies and for staying informed and 
reassured about each other’s strategies and objectives.  
In terms of its timeframe, this study roughly covers a period of two decades, from 
1992 to 2012. The start date for my investigations was set by the end of the Cold 
War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, since it fundamentally altered the relations 
between Beijing and Moscow. The core of my investigation is devoted to events 
from the mid-1990s onwards, as this is when processes of bilateral institution-
building began in earnest (following the creation of the first major bilateral 
institutions and forums of exchange). The investigation ends in 2012, the year which 
saw another round of leadership transitions, both in China and in Russia. 
 
 
The main research question this thesis tries to answer is the following: To what 
extent has the extensive and continuously expanding trans-national institutional 
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framework constructed between China and Russia since the mid-1990s contributed to: 
a) rendering bilateral interaction more stable, coherent, predictable, and efficient; and 
b) enhancing mutual confidence, understanding, and reassurance? 
Some less central, more specific research questions pursued in this thesis are the 
following: How much concrete political substance is there to the institutional 
channels that have been created between China and Russia? Are important policy 
decisions taken within this institutional framework? Are important insights about 
each other’s outlook and intentions gained through their interaction in these 
institutions? Is the information generated through institutional interaction being 
channelled to the top foreign policy decision makers in Beijing and Moscow? 
 
 
Literature Review: 
 
While the development of Sino-Soviet relations received broad attention in 
academic circles, relatively little in-depth scholarly work initially existed in English 
on the evolution of Sino-Russian relations after the end of the Cold War. This has 
changed since the mid-2000s, and the subject is now again receiving adequate 
scholarly attention, reflecting its great significance for international politics. For the 
most part, however, the existing accounts cover only a small number of major, 
recurring issue areas, which include geopolitics, the oil, gas, and arms trade, the state 
of the Russian Far East, as well as bilateral interaction on Central Asia (and, 
occasionally, North Korea). The analyses rarely go far beyond these ‘stock themes’. 
A small number of substantive scholarly monographs have been published on the 
topic of Sino-Russian relations. The most recent major contribution to the topic is a 
volume edited by Robert Bedeski and Niklas Swanström that focuses on the energy 
and security dimensions of the Sino-Russian relationship.
3
 Another monograph 
focusing solely on Sino-Russian energy relations was recently published by Keun-
Wook Paik.
4
 This follows a collection of studies edited by James Bellacqua that 
provides a comprehensive, but also primarily descriptive account of the ‘stock 
themes’ listed above (with the addition of two studies on Taiwan’s role in the Sino-
                                                 
3
 Robert Bedeski & Niklas Swanström (eds.), Eurasia’s Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics: Rivalry or 
Partnership for China, Russia, and Central Asia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012) 
4
 Keun-Wook Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation: The Reality and Implications (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012) 
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Russian relationship).
5
 Another standard work on the topic was published by Bobo 
Lo in 2008.
6
 While it is comprehensive in scope, Lo’s work focuses particularly 
strongly on geopolitical factors and treats many dimensions of Sino-Russian 
cooperation, such as economic interaction, mutual perceptions and ideational factors, 
in a more cursory manner. 
Older academic books on the topic of Sino-Russian relations include a volume 
edited by Sherman Garnett and a book by Elizabeth Wishnick, both of which analyse 
major bilateral developments up to and during the 1990s, as well as two studies by 
Jeanne Wilson and Akihiro Iwashita that both cover many aspects of the relationship 
up to 2003.
7
 In addition, Natasha Kuhrt published a comparative study of Russia’s 
relations with China and Japan, which primarily covers the decade of Boris Yeltsin’s 
presidency in Russia.
8
 A book by Aleksandr Lukin traced the historical development 
of Russian perceptions of China since the eighteenth century.
9
 
The output on the topic of Sino-Russian relations is becoming increasingly 
variegated, which is primarily due to the addition of numerous up-to-date policy 
reports and studies, published with some regularity by research institutes and think 
tanks. One of the most topical and insightful sources on Sino-Russian relations are 
the summary reports by Yu Bin, published quarterly by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS).
10
 However, the above reservations about the coverage 
of specific ‘stock themes’ particularly apply in the case of policy reports and studies 
                                                 
5
 James Bellacqua (ed.), The Future of China-Russia Relations (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2010) 
6
 Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings, 2008) 
7
 Sherman Garnett (ed.), Rapprochement or Rivalry?: Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia 
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie, 2000); Elizabeth Wishnick, Mending Fences: The Evolution of 
Moscow’s China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001); 
Jeanne Wilson, Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese Relations in the Post-Soviet Era (Armonk, NY: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2004); Akihiro Iwashita, The Sino-Russian ‘Strategic Partnership’: Current Views from 
the Border and Beijing (Sapporo: Hokkaido University, 2003) 
8
 Natasha Kuhrt, Russian Policy towards China and Japan: The El'tsin and Putin Periods (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2007) 
9
 Alexander Lukin, The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia’s Perceptions of China and the Evolution 
of Russian-Chinese Relations since the Eighteenth Century (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003). Also 
worth mentioning is Andrew Kuchins’ chapter ‘Limits of the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership’, in: 
Andrew Kuchins (ed.), Russia After the Fall (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie, 2002). Further important 
monographs on closely related and intersecting topics include Akihiro Iwashita’s very detailed edited 
volume Russia and its Eastern Edge, 2 vol. (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007) and Zhang 
Yunling & Guo Weihong (eds.), China, US, Japan and Russia in a Changing World (Beijing: Social 
Sciences Documentation Publishing House, 2000). Also of relevance are Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko 
Togo & Joseph Ferguson (eds.), Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006) and Judith Thornton & Charles Ziegler, Russia’s Far East: A Region at Risk 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002). 
10
 Available online at http://csis.org/program/comparative-connections   
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(to the extent that many publications consist of little more than near-verbatim 
reiterations of facts and statements already made before). Recent studies on the topic 
have covered the standard issue areas in some detail.
11
 A particular focus of policy 
reports has been bilateral cooperation in the energy sector.
12
 The same basic 
limitation that burdens publications by policy institutes – a focus on mere description 
to the detriment of in-depth analysis, as well as a restriction to a small range of ‘stock 
themes’ – also applies to most articles published in academic journals.13  
                                                 
11
 These include the following: Dmitri Trenin, True Partners? How Russia and China See Each Other 
(London: Centre for European Reform, 2012), available online at 
http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2012/rp_065_km-6285.pdf; 
Bobo Lo & Lilia Shevtsova, A 21
st
 Century Myth – Authoritarian Modernization in Russia and China 
(Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2012), available online at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/BoboLo_Shevtsova_web.pdf; Charles Grant, Russia, China and 
Global Governance (London: Centre for European Reform, 2012), available online at 
http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/report/2012/russia-china-and-global-governance; Linda 
Jakobson, Paul Holtom, Dean Knox & Jingchao Peng, China’s Energy and Security Relations with 
Russia: Hopes, Frustrations and Uncertainties (SIPRI Policy Paper 29) (Stockholm: Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 2011), available online at 
http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=431; Arkady Moshes & Matti Nojonen (eds.), 
Russia-China Relations: Current State, Alternative Futures, and Implications for the West (FIIA 
Report 30) (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2011), available online at 
www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/FIIA_Report_30_web.pdf; Stephen Blank, Toward a New Chinese 
Order in Asia: Russia’s Failure (NBR Special Report 26) (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 
March 2011); Bobo Lo, Russia, China and the United States: From Strategic Triangularism to the 
Post-Modern Triangle (Proliferation Papers 32) (Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 
Winter 2004), available online at http://www.ifri.org/downloads/pp32bobolo_1.pdf; Elizabeth 
Wishnick, Russia, China, and the United States in Central Asia: Prospects for Great Power 
Competition and Cooperation in the Shadow of the Georgian Crisis (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2009), available online at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB907.pdf; 
Richard Weitz, China-Russia Security Relations: Strategic Parallelism without Partnership or 
Passion? (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), available online at 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub868.pdf; Bobo Lo, China and Russia: 
Common Interests, Contrasting Perceptions (Hong Kong: CLSA, May 2006), available online at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/russiachi
namay06.pdf; Dmitri Trenin, Russia’s China Problem (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie, 1999). Another 
frequent contributor of brief reports on Sino-Russian relations is Sergei Blagov for the Jamestown 
Foundation. 
12
 Studies focusing on this particular topic include: Alexandros Petersen & Katinka Barysch, Russia, 
China and the Geopolitics of Energy in Central Asia (London: Centre for European Reform, 
November 2011), available online at 
http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/rp_010-4118.pdf; Igor 
Danchenko, Erica Downs & Fiona Hill, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Realities of a Rising 
China and Implications for Russia’s Energy Ambitions (Brookings Policy Paper 22) (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution, August 2010), available online at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/8/china%20russia%20energy%20down
s%20hill/08_china_russia_energy_downs_hill.pdf; and Stephen Blank, Russo-Chinese Energy 
Relations: Politics in Command (London: GMB Publishing, 2006) 
13
 This is the case for the following articles: David Kerr, ‘Central Asian and Russian Perspectives on 
China’s Strategic Emergence’, International Affairs, vol.86, no.1 (January 2010), pp.127-152; Gaye 
Christoffersen, ‘Russia’s Breakthrough into the Asia-Pacific: China’s Role’, International Relations 
of the Asia-Pacific, vol.10, no.1 (January 2010), pp.61-91; Andrew Kuchins, ‘Sino-Russian Myths’, 
Survival, vol.51, no.5 (October 2009), pp.185-192; Hiski Haukkala & Linda Jakobson, ‘The Myth of a 
Sino-Russian Challenge to the West’, The International Spectator, vol.44, no.3 (September 2009), 
pp.59-76; Rajan Menon, ‘The Limits of Chinese-Russian Partnership’, Survival, vol.51, no.3 (June 
11 
 
The existing studies of recent developments in Sino-Russian relations have 
generally remained more descriptive than analytical, and few have provided a 
consistent analysis of the factors underlying the increasing bilateral cooperation. 
Insofar as these factors have been addressed, there has been a tendency to stress 
shared geopolitical interests, particularly the wish to balance against the United 
States (for instance in Lo’s, Wilson’s, and Wishnick’s analyses). Very few studies to 
date have attempted, beyond brief theoretical excursions, to examine recent Sino-
Russian interaction in the context of International Relations theory. One of the 
exceptions is an article by Robert and John Donaldson,
14
 which applies various 
Realist and Neorealist approaches to Sino-Russian relations in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, albeit with a relatively narrow focus on the bilateral arms trade. An 
article by David Kerr
15
 uses the context of Sino-Russian cooperation in the six-party 
                                                                                                                                          
2009), pp.99-130; Herman Pirchner, ‘The Uncertain Future of Sino-Russian Relations in the Twenty-
First Century’, Demokratizatsiya, vol.16, no.4 (Autumn 2008), pp.309-322; Yu Bin, ‘In Search for a 
Normal Relationship: China and Russia into the 21
st
 Century’, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 
vol.5, no.4 (November 2007), pp.47-81; Andrew Kuchins, ‘Russia and China: The Ambivalent 
Embrace’, Current History, vol.106, no.702 (October 2007), pp.321-327; Kyrre Brækhus & Indra 
Øverland, ‘A Match Made in Heaven? Strategic Convergence between China and Russia’, China and 
Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol.5, no.2 (May 2007), pp.41-61; Lo, ‘The Long Sunset of Strategic 
Partnership’; Frank Umbach, ‘The Wounded Bear and the Rising Dragon: The Sino-Russian 
Relationship at the Beginning of the 21
st
 Century: A View from Europe’, Asia Europe Journal, vol.2, 
no.1 (January 2004), pp.43-62; Wayne Merry, ‘Moscow’s Retreat and Beijing’s Rise as Regional 
Great Power’, Problems of Post-Communism, vol.50, no.3 (May/June 2003), pp.17-31; Elizabeth 
Wishnick, ‘Sino-Russian Relations in a Changed International Landscape’, China Perspectives, vol.43 
(September/October 2002), pp.4-16. Besides this large range of ‘generalist’ studies, among the few 
articles with a more specialised focus are Harley Balzer, ‘Russia and China in the Global Economy’, 
Demokratizatsiya, vol.16, no.1 (Winter 2008), pp.37-48; Nicklas Norling, ‘Russia’s Energy Leverage 
over China and the Sinopec-Rosneft Deal’, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol.4, no.4 (2006), 
pp.31-38; Richard Lotspeich, ‘Perspectives on the Economic Relations between China and Russia’, 
Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol.36, no.1 (January 2006), pp.48-74. While these three articles also 
focus on one of the ‘standard themes’ of Sino-Russian relations, the economic and energy sectors, 
more unconventional contributions were made by Inna Melnykovska, Hedwig Plamper & Rainer 
Schweickert, ‘Do Russia and China Promote Autocracy in Central Asia?’, Asia Europe Journal, 
vol.10, no.1 (May 2012), pp.75-89; Woo-Jun Kim, ‘Cooperation and Conflict among Provinces: The 
Three Northeastern Provinces of China, the Russian Far East, and Sinuiju, North Korea’, Issues and 
Studies, vol.44, no.3 (September 2008), pp.205-227; Mikhail Alexseev & Richard Hofstetter, ‘Russia, 
China, and the Immigration Security Dilemma’, Political Science Quarterly, vol.121, no.1 (Spring 
2006), pp.1-32; and Jeanne Wilson, ‘Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese Relations and the July 2001 
Friendship Treaty’, Problems of Post-Communism, vol.49, no.3 (May/June 2002), pp.3-13. Also of 
relevance is Natasha Kuhrt, ‘The Russian Far East in Russia’s Asia Policy: Dual Integration or 
Double Periphery?’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol.64, no.3 (May 2012), pp.471-493. 
14
 Robert Donaldson & John Donaldson, ‘The Arms Trade in Russian-Chinese Relations’, 
International Studies Quarterly, vol.47, no.4 (December 2003), pp.709-732. Marcin Kaczmarski, 
‘Domestic Sources of Russia’s China Policy’, Problems of Post-Communism, vol.59, no.2 
(March/April 2012), pp.3-17 makes a similar attempt to apply the precepts of Neoclassical Realism to 
Russia’s policy towards China; however, this study is largely restricted to an analysis of how major 
Russian foreign policy actors perceive China. 
15
 David Kerr, ‘The Sino-Russian Partnership and U.S. Policy toward North Korea: From Hegemony 
to Concert in Northeast Asia’, International Studies Quarterly, vol.49, no.3 (September 2005), 
pp.411-437 
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negotiations on North Korea as the background for a meta-theoretical critique of 
hegemony theory, but without drawing specific conclusions about the factors 
underlying Sino-Russian cooperation. Peter Ferdinand published a detailed article in 
2007, which, like the aforementioned work by Lukin, puts particular emphasis on the 
role of mutual perceptions in the formation of Sino-Russian relations.
16
 
The growth and spread of bilateral institutions has been almost completely 
ignored in the existing studies. To date, not a single study has devoted itself to an 
analysis of the institutionalisation of the Sino-Russian relationship, and in the few 
instances where this specific topic has been broached in the academic literature, it 
has never been mentioned in more than a few sentences. No comprehensive list of 
the bilateral policymaking institutions created between China and Russia currently 
exists. In part because of this omission, as well as their common focus on geopolitics, 
the majority of authors to date have described the Sino-Russian relationship as a 
relatively fragile edifice with questionable long-term prospects. Only one multilateral 
institution connecting China and Russia – the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO) – has received a great deal of attention in books and articles. Out of the 
substantial number of studies on the SCO, it is particularly worth mentioning a recent 
book by Stephen Aris,
17
 as well as articles by Joseph Cheng
18
 and Chien-peng 
Chung.
19
  
 
This thesis makes the following contributions to existing research: 
a) It provides the first comprehensive overview of the institutional structures 
constructed between China and Russia since the end of the Cold War, their functions, 
and their modus operandi. 
                                                 
16
 Peter Ferdinand, ‘Sunset, Sunrise: China and Russia Construct a New Relationship’, International 
Affairs, vol.83, no.5 (September 2007), pp.841-867; this article was published as a sequel to Peter 
Ferdinand, ‘Russia and China: Converging Responses to Globalization’, International Affairs, vol.83, 
no.4 (July 2007), pp.655-680. Written in a similar vein to Lukin’s work is Vladimir Shlapentokh, 
‘China in the Russian Mind Today: Ambivalence and Defeatism’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol.59, no.1 
(January 2007), pp.1-21; and Andrey Tsygankov, What is China to Us? Westernizers and Sinophiles 
in Russian Foreign Policy (Russie.Nei.Visions 45) (Paris: Institut Français des Relations 
Internationales, December 2009), available online at 
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b) It conducts the first in-depth assessment of the importance of this component of 
the relationship for the overall process of Sino-Russian rapprochement, particularly 
as seen through the lens of International Relations theory. No previous study of Sino-
Russian relations has examined the emerging institutional structure between both 
states, nor has any ever explicitly regarded this structure as an important aspect of 
bilateral cooperation between China and Russia. 
c) More generally, it represents a contribution to the still rather limited range of 
scholarly studies on contemporary Sino-Russian relations and the various factors that 
have been driving bilateral cooperation. It represents the first study of Sino-Russian 
relations to comparatively apply a range of approaches in International Relations 
theory to this topic. 
 
 
Approaches: 
 
Before focusing directly on the analysis of institutional structures in Sino-
Russian relations and their impact on bilateral cooperation, the context in which 
these structures operate will be presented by providing a brief account of the 
geopolitical, economic, and ideational dimensions of post-Cold War Sino-Russian 
bilateral interaction. Questions of geopolitics and the global balance of power in 
particular have long dominated the public and academic discussion about Sino-
Russian relations. In order to establish the place and significance of bilateral 
institutional interaction among the broad range of factors that have influenced 
decision-making in Beijing and Moscow, it is important to initially assess the relative 
impact of geopolitical factors by subjecting them to a thorough analysis framed in the 
relevant methodological approaches. 
Variants of Realist and Neorealist theory can shed light on the extent to which 
external systemic determinants, as well as geopolitical goals and interests have 
affected Chinese and Russian policy towards each other: Kenneth Waltz’s and John 
Mearsheimer’s Structural Realist approaches,20 as well as Stephen Walt’s balance-of-
threat theory
21
 identify systemic conditions under which both sides would have felt 
compelled to align with each other against a third power (the United States) or, on 
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the contrary, to balance against each other. Randall Schweller’s bandwagoning 
theory
22
 can be employed to assess whether Sino-Russian cooperation was driven by 
shared revisionist objectives. Neorealist approaches provide a valuable baseline for 
examining the strategic calculus of Chinese and Russian policy-makers in their 
mutual relations. 
 
The primary focus of this thesis, however, is on the institutional framework that 
has been created between China and Russia, and the principal theoretical approach 
employed in its analysis is Neoliberal Institutionalism. Neoliberal Institutionalism 
and concepts of ‘complex interdependence’, introduced by scholars such as Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye,
23
 stipulate that international institutions can mitigate 
anarchy and buttress reciprocity and cooperation between states by setting clear rules 
for inter-state interaction, offering a constant forum for bilateral negotiation and 
providing policy-makers with critical information and expertise.
24
 According to 
Neoliberal Institutionalists, institutions make up for a lack of trust between states by 
regularising exchange, ensuring a constant flow of information between governments 
and rendering defection from norms and rules easier punishable, thereby creating a 
climate in which expectations of stable peace develop. Particularly through their 
capacities for monitoring the implementation of agreements, institutions reduce 
incentives to change policies in midstream and instead raise the costs of deception 
and irresponsibility, allowing states to make credible commitments.
25
 As a 
consequence, many credibility dilemmas between states are mitigated when 
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international bargaining takes place in the context of formal international 
institutions.
26
 
The primary function of institutions, according to this ‘rationalist’ perspective, is 
to perpetuate reciprocity and allow it to operate efficiently: Institutions perform this 
function by providing information about the preferences, intentions and standards of 
behaviour of other governments and decision-makers interacting within them, 
whereby mutual beliefs about causalities can be altered.
27
 They thus reduce 
uncertainties and transaction costs, which are the costs of reaching and maintaining 
agreements.
28
  
According to Robert Keohane, institutions “provide information and channel 
behaviors into predictable courses. They do this by creating stable expectations about 
how other actors will behave. Such a setting facilitates the striking of further 
bargains.”29 In Keohane’s words, “institutions serve state objectives not principally 
by enforcing rules […], but by facilitating the making and keeping of agreements 
through the provision of information and reductions in transaction costs.”30 Overall, 
according to Neoliberal Institutionalism, institutions and regimes thus  
create the conditions for orderly multilateral negotiations […]. They increase the 
symmetry and improve the quality of the information that governments receive. By 
clustering issues together in the same forums over a long period of time, they help to 
bring governments into continuing interaction with one another, reducing incentives 
to cheat and enhancing the value of reputation. By establishing legitimate standards 
of behavior for states to follow and by providing ways to monitor compliance, they 
create the basis for decentralized enforcement founded on the principle of 
reciprocity.
31
 
Neoliberal Institutionalism assumes that institutions serve to embody norms and 
rules and thereby instil international interaction with greater certainty and 
predictability.
32
 Institutions do not modify underlying state interests; rather, by 
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changing the informational environment and other constraints on governments, they 
make it easier for self-interested states to cooperate reliably with one another.
33
 No 
sympathy or even trust between actors is required, since defection is unlikely, as long 
as continuous patterns of reciprocity and mutual monitoring of compliance with 
agreements have been established.
34
  
Institutionalisation requires resources and locks in patterns of cooperation, which 
deprives powerful individual actors of the ability to unilaterally change the terms of 
interaction, reducing the costs of oversight, and establishing durable patterns of 
cooperation. In sum, “[m]any theorists have argued that institutions perform 
functions that facilitate cooperation among states facing mixed-motive games […] by 
such means as providing information about others’ incentives and actions, increasing 
the iterative nature of interaction, and setting standards by which to evaluate 
behavior.”35 Neoliberal Institutionalist theories “reveal three distinctive functions of 
international […] institutions: to promote concern among governments; to enhance 
the contractual environment by providing negotiating forums and creating ways to 
disseminate information; and to build national political and administrative 
capacity.”36  
 
A more complex approach to the analysis of Sino-Russian institutionalised 
interaction is that provided by the many variants of Social Constructivism, which 
examines how changing perceptions of self and other and the experience of 
interaction between states shape the course of foreign policy-making. Constructivist 
accounts such as that by Alistair Johnston,
37
 who examines Chinese foreign policy in 
its relation to international institutions, assume that the behaviour of decision-makers 
interacting within institutions can converge due to changes in the normative 
characteristics and identities of the actors, or because of social identity-based non-
material desires to conform. Institutions are seen as facilitating international 
socialisation processes, because they provide an environment of sustained and 
intense interaction among agents on specialised issues and exchanges of specialised 
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information. In addition, they often contribute to the formation of corporate identities, 
traits, missions, normative cores, and official discourses among their members.
38
 In 
contrast to Neoliberal Institutionalist approaches, Constructivists argue that actors 
within institutions do not necessarily need to link any exogenous material incentives 
to their behaviour, but might rely solely on the use of norms to socialise states and 
state agents, leading them to internalise new roles or group-community norms.
39
 
Constructivist theories have commonly emphasised the socialising effects of 
international organisations and institutions on the individuals who participate in 
them.
40
 The social interaction occurring within EU-institutions, for instance, has 
often been characterised as a process of argumentation and learning, wherein 
processes of communication play a central role. Through regular deliberation, the 
very interests and preferences of state agents in supranational settings at the EU-level 
may be transformed. Several analysts have explored the socialising effect of repeated 
meetings over long periods within EU institutions.
41
 According to this so-called 
‘contact thesis’, preference change among agents is little more than a function of 
time. The longer agents reside in contact with each other in a particular institutional 
setting, the more likely there will be a shift in their properties and preferences. A 
substantial body of experimental literature suggests that prolonged exposure and 
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communication can promote a greater sense of common identification.
42
 As Jeffrey 
Checkel states, “[t]hese insights give new meaning to the idea of international 
institutions and organizations as ‘talk shops.’ Arguments and attempts at persuasion 
– ‘talking’, in popular parlance – may change the most basic properties of agents.”43 
The existing body of research on persuasion-socialisation dynamics within 
international institutions holds that the internalisation of new role conceptions in line 
with community norms is most likely when agents act in settings where contact is 
long, intense and sustained, and where their interaction occurs in less politicised and 
more insulated, in-camera settings.
44
 
Another insightful theoretical approach is provided by studies of ‘summitry’, the 
regularised inter-state personal exchanges between leading national policy-makers. 
In recent decades, “casually and without plans summitry has transmogrified from a 
spontaneous event into a new international institution”.45 Institutionalised summitry 
on all levels of political decision-making has also become a core feature of Sino-
Russian relations. Analysts have stressed the important psychological dimension of 
meeting physically, of personal interaction between individual policy-makers in a 
one-to-one environment, for the resolution of international issues of contention.
46
 
Constructivists assume that international institutions can play a central role in the 
inter-subjective process of trust and confidence building between governments. In an 
international agreement, trust is inevitably weak in the beginning, but it can grow 
stronger through a range of practices that include an increased exchange of reliable 
information, greater acceptance of interdependence, and confidence in others’ living 
up to mutual agreements. In reverse, the initial expressions of trust will further 
weaken and potentially disappear if there is no or little exchange of reliable 
information and an unwillingness to accept interdependence, and if mutual 
agreements are not adhered to.
47
  
From a Constructivist perspective, which regards trust as being based on shared 
understandings, institutions may not be so important in themselves, but influential as 
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channels for overcoming (or reaffirming) negative images about one’s counterparts 
and reconstituting perceptions of them.
48
 Tuomas Forsberg, for instance, has argued 
that trust can be established out of processes of inter-subjective communication.
49
 
One needs to know the one who is to be trusted, and personal relationships are 
therefore extraordinarily important in relations between states, since trust in persons 
is often easier to develop than trust in collectives. According to Forsberg, the 
development of trust was crucial in Mikhail Gorbachev’s foreign policy approach in 
breaking down Cold War suspicions: It was established through a string of personal 
meetings between world leaders, which gave each the occasion to investigate the 
other’s sincerity. Gorbachev himself emphasised the importance these had for the 
development of understanding and trust: “I believed that in the new emerging 
international climate, personal ‘compatibility’ and understanding of your partner’s 
motives would become increasingly important in world politics. We could achieve 
such understanding only if we worked together, maintaining regular contacts and 
mutually comparing each other’s words and deeds.”50 According to Forsberg, only 
after having conducted numerous meetings and one-to-one discussions, an 
atmosphere of trust had been created. Gorbachev recalled that they had “three 
meetings, three one-to-one talks with the Chancellor [of West Germany], direct, 
serious, trustworthy. […] All this enabled us to achieve a high degree of mutual 
understanding in all fields of politics.” Simultaneously, however, trust remained 
absent in Gorbachev’s relations with Japan, primarily because of the Soviets’ lack of 
cultural knowledge of and experience with the Japanese, which according to an 
observer was “a product of their past negative relations and the lack of real contacts 
between the two countries and the two peoples”.51 
Constructivist analyses of trust emphasise that the failure of interstate 
cooperation is often caused by incorrect inferences about one’s counterpart’s motives 
and intentions, as well as cognitive psychological mechanisms, such as stress-
induced cognitive rigidity and ‘us versus them’ thinking. 52  Consequently, trust-
building is facilitated in the framework of legal-institutional structures which 
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establish firm patterns of regular interaction, exchange, and mutual verification. They 
do this also by maintaining regularity in the bilateral exchange even when it is 
endangered by inconsistent policy signals and rhetoric, or the vicissitudes of 
leadership changes.
53
 
In a similar vein to Constructivist approaches, theories of ‘epistemic 
communities’54 assume the possibility of a particularly close degree of interaction 
between agents across state borders. ‘Epistemic communities’ are defined as 
networks of knowledge-based experts with recognised expertise and competence in a 
particular domain or issue-area. Through their common analysis of practices in the 
domain of their expertise, they share basic normative and causal beliefs, patterns of 
reasoning, and discursive practices.
55
 Theorists of epistemic communities hold that 
these communities may become transnational over time, for instance through 
transnational conferences, research collaborations, and a variety of communications 
and contacts. They can establish lasting ties between actors in different countries 
with common policy agendas and their ideas are likely to take root in various state 
bodies, from where they exert influence on policy-makers.
56
 
While Neoliberal Institutionalist approaches, with their focus on instrumentally 
rational calculation, have frequently been perceived as alien and opposed to 
Constructivist models, the two are in fact densely interwoven and largely compatible. 
Although both diverge in their assessment of how interaction within institutions 
affects the individuals involved, they ultimately reach very similar conclusions 
regarding the expected outcomes of such interaction. Aspects of both approaches can 
also be found in the work of Neo-functionalists, who have stressed the potential of 
socialisation and the formation of common functions and common needs through 
prolonged exposure and communication within institutions.
57
 Concretely, Neo-
functionalists have employed the concepts of ‘spill-over’ and ‘path-dependence’, 
accounting for the continued growth and entrenchment of institutions above and 
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beyond the initial dimensions of institutionalisation. “Functionalist and neo-
functionalist theories focus on the progressive development of integration and 
therefore emphasise the role of ‘spill over’ effects. They emphasise the relevance of 
early institutionalisation of limited cooperation and expect its later expansion. From 
an institutional perspective, ‘spill over’ amounts to a (positive) feedback mechanism 
stressing the possibility of self-supporting social processes that start modestly, gain 
dynamics and may over time produce dramatic outcomes.” 58  In addition, Neo-
functionalists assume that 
institutional change is a path-dependent process. Once institutional changes are in 
place, actors adapt to them and frequently make significant investments in them. 
Institutional reversal – an unwinding of supranational rules – is possible but difficult 
because it entails writing off those investments (sunk costs). Institutional and policy 
outcomes become ‘locked in,’ channeling behavior and politics down specific 
paths
59
. 
 
All of the different theoretical approaches outlined in this section provide 
plausible accounts of the impact of institutionalising inter-state interaction, and all of 
them have consequently been considered in this study. In conducting the concrete 
analysis of case studies, however, I have focused solely on Neoliberal Institutionalist 
approaches, since the available data on Sino-Russian relations has not been 
sufficiently detailed for an in-depth analysis and verification of inter-subjective trust-
building and socialisation processes, which form the core focus of Constructivist 
theories. 
In applying the Neoliberal Institutionalist approaches outlined above, it is 
essential to clearly define the meaning of the term ‘institution’, as employed by this 
thesis. In spite of the vast output of Institutionalist theory, ‘institution’ remains a 
relatively loosely defined term. The range of what can be termed an ‘institution’ in 
the context of International Relations is very expansive, sometimes to the extent that 
the term retains little substantial meaning. In the words of Thomas Risse, “[t]here are 
at least as many definitions of (international) institutions as there are theoretical 
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perspectives.”60 The same point was made in more depth by John Duffield, who 
observed that: “International institutions are a central focus of international relations 
scholarship as well as of policymaking efforts around the world. Despite their 
importance, our scholarly literature lacks a widely accepted definition of just what 
they are. Instead, scholars have employed a range of largely non-overlapping 
conceptions, contributing to a fragmentation of the literature and hindering 
theoretical cumulation.”61 
Among the broad spectrum of what has been defined as ‘institutions’, this study 
applies a conventional definition of institutions as actual organisational structures. In 
this, it follows a traditional conception of Institutionalist literature, specifying 
institutions as ‘formal organisations’. While in later Institutionalist literature the term 
‘institution’ has often encompassed an expansive range of phenomena, leading 
theorists have frequently continued to employ the more conventional definition of 
institutions as formal organisations.
62
 The definition of ‘institutions’ used for the 
purposes of my research corresponds more closely to what later Institutionalist 
literature has commonly referred to as ‘organisations’, i.e. “material entities 
possessing physical locations (or seats), offices, personnel, equipment, and budgets”, 
as contrasted with “social institutions”.63  
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In applying a limited definition of ‘institutions’ as ‘formal organisations’ and 
‘material entities’, I do not wish to deny the significance of more informal, ‘social 
institutions’ for inter-state interaction, as has been described by a large body of 
Institutionalist literature. However, the study of informal institutions, such as regimes 
or norms, is better suited for a multilateral context (indeed, one arguably can only 
speak of international regimes or norms as such, if these encompass more than just 
one dyad of state actors). In a purely bilateral context, by contrast, the emergence of 
informal, ‘social institutions’, even if it were conceptually possible, would remain 
near-impossible to measure and verify empirically. For the purposes of this study, I 
have therefore resorted to a conventional definition of an ‘institution’ as a material 
entity that fulfils the following four conditions: 
- It has some form of permanent or recurring structure and organisational 
identity. 
- It encompasses a recognisable, more or less clearly designated group of 
members, whose participation in the institution remains relatively constant 
over time. 
- It has a clearly delineated set of responsibilities and operates on the basis of a 
set of rules which are codified in official statutes. 
- It convenes at regular intervals that are not excessively long, so as to allow 
for some constancy in its operation and decision-making. 
 
 
Criteria of Analysis: 
 
China and Russia have increasingly interacted in the framework of multilateral 
international organisations and institutions. However, the most intense and 
noteworthy processes of institution-building between both states occurred in their 
immediate bilateral relations, and this therefore constitutes the primary focus of this 
thesis. Since no suitable methodology exists for analysing the impact of bilateral 
institution-building in particular,
64
 I developed a set of research analysis criteria 
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specifically for the purposes of this study. The following four criteria of analysis are 
based on the methodological premises laid out in the ‘approaches’ section, and they 
have been applied in my case studies with the aim of establishing what particular 
impact on and significance for the development of Sino-Russian relations the newly-
created institutions have had: 
 
1. Structural Development:  
The first criterion of institutional performance relates to the structural development 
of the institution: It encompasses an analysis of how enduring the institutional 
structure has been, the extent to which the institution has grown or contracted over 
the years, whether or not there have been significant changes in the scale and 
regularity of its gatherings, whether there has been a formation of further institutional 
offshoots and how these have subsequently developed. 
Link with theoretical approaches: Apart from providing a general overview of the 
structural development of the institution under investigation, this criterion of analysis 
examines the frequency and regularity of its gatherings. In so doing, it ties in with the 
assumptions of Neoliberal Institutionalism regarding the importance of assuring 
regularity, consistency, and a recurrence of interaction within the institutional setting. 
According to the theoretical premises of Neoliberal Institutionalism, 
institutionalisation is effective if it offers a constant or regularly iterated forum for 
bilateral negotiation and exchange, a continuous pattern of reciprocity and mutual 
monitoring of compliance with agreements, ensuring a sustained flow of information 
between governments. As Robert Axelrod in particular emphasised, purely self-
interested actors may develop effective rules or social conventions spontaneously, so 
long as they expect to interact with each other repeatedly.
65
 Iterated conditions (i.e. a 
situation in which states expect to continue dealing with each other) improve the 
prospects for cooperation – they provide a ‘shadow of the future’ – whereas, in the 
absence of continuing interaction, defection would emerge as the dominant 
strategy.
66
 In addition, this criterion of analysis can also shed light on the extent to 
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which processes of institutional ‘spill-over’ and ‘path-dependence’, as described by 
Neo-Functionalism, have occurred in Sino-Russian relations. 
 
2. Involvement of Senior Officials: 
A further criterion for the assessment of whether and to what extent an institution has 
had a practical impact on the development of Sino-Russian relations is the degree to 
which senior (national and regional) officials and other relevant stakeholders have 
been involved in its activities and have participated in its regular meetings. An 
assessment of the individuals involved in an institution’s activities over time can give 
an indication of whether the institution has been ‘in touch’ with official policy-
making and ultimately of its overall relevance for bilateral relations within its 
particular policy field. For this purpose, it is important to assess not only the 
presence of senior officials, but also whether the institution includes a wide enough 
range of other, non-official stakeholders and power-brokers particularly relevant for 
the specific tasks and goals it is meant to implement (e.g. representatives of relevant 
businesses, in the case of an institution focused on economic interaction). 
Link with theoretical approaches: Some Institutionalist theorists have observed that 
the degree of an institution’s authority and the character of its leading staff greatly 
affect its performance and impact. According to Wayne Sandholtz,  
First, the greater the initial grant of authority to the international organization, the greater 
its ability to lead in new areas. […] Hence, the capacity of an IO to lead depends in large 
part on the nature of its constitution and the independent authority granted to its officers 
and staff. [...] Second, when leaders and staff of the international organization are 
substantively knowledgeable and well-prepared, they can help shape technical 
discussions and agreements. […] Third, the capacity of international organizations to 
exercise initiative depends in part on the personal characteristics of their leaders. 
Personal attributes that enhance the influence of an IO official include charisma, 
expertise, negotiating ability, personal achievement outside the IO, and administrative 
competence. Thus, as Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson suggest, ‘High international 
officials may command information and recognition, which allows them the initiative in 
proposing action or resolving conflict.’67 
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3. Practical and Policy Impact: 
A third criterion for the assessment of whether or not the institution in question has 
significantly facilitated and stabilised the implementation of cooperative policies 
between both countries is its practical and policy impact. This encompasses an 
analysis of the institution’s role in taking concrete steps towards furthering bilateral 
cooperation, i.e. evidence that the institution has been the site where concrete 
obstacles to Sino-Russian cooperation have been identified and removed and where 
practical methods for and approaches to facilitating such cooperation have been 
agreed. In particular, this includes the conclusion of agreements and treaties between 
both states that provide for a better regulation and coordination of bilateral policies, 
as well as the subsequent monitoring of their implementation. This criterion also 
encompasses the institution’s direct input into top-level official decision-making, i.e. 
the degree to which projects, themes, ideas, or initiatives that were first discussed at 
the institution’s sessions have subsequently been transferred to more senior levels of 
bilateral policy-making and converted into official policies. This criterion is of 
particular relevance for establishing how much substance there has been to the 
bilateral institution-building process, i.e. to what degree the newly-created 
institutions have become genuine, substantive policy instruments, rather than a mere 
façade and symbolic representation of a relationship that, in actual fact, may lack 
substance. 
Link with theoretical approaches: This criterion of analysis ties in with central 
premises of Neoliberal Institutionalism: In particular, this includes the important role 
of international institutions in drafting agreements and monitoring their 
implementation, as well as the importance of setting and monitoring clear rules and 
standards by which to evaluate behaviour, thereby rendering defection from norms 
and rules easier punishable. As stated by Kenneth Oye, “[e]xplicit codification of 
norms can limit definitional ambiguity. The very act of clarifying standards of 
conduct, of defining cooperative and uncooperative behavior, can permit more 
effective resort to strategies of reciprocity.” 68  According to some leading 
Institutionalist theorists, 
institutions […] can enhance the quality of the contractual environment and thus 
facilitate the creation and maintenance of international agreements. Institutions 
create bargaining forums in which information is shared and thus reduce the 
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transaction costs of negotiating agreements. Institutions that create ongoing 
negotiating processes help make commitments more credible by ensuring regular 
interaction among participants on the same set of issues. Another way institutions 
can facilitate agreements is to provide monitoring and verification services. 
Frequently, uncertainty regarding the future actions of other countries can restrain 
otherwise willing countries from accepting mutual constraints. Monitoring by an 
institution can help overcome this obstacle […]. In general, institutional activities 
that enhance the contractual environment can facilitate the negotiation of norms and 
principles
69
. 
 
4. Mutual Information Exchange and Reassurance: 
The final criterion for assessing whether and to what extent an institution has played 
a meaningful role in facilitating the further development of Sino-Russian cooperation 
is mutual information exchange and reassurance. This encompasses evidence that 
China and Russia have used the institutional setting to actively communicate their 
respective strategies and intentions on specific policy matters to representatives of 
the respective other side, and to provide them with new and previously unknown 
information. Relevant information includes, for instance, details about specific 
domestic processes and dynamics, or about each government’s motives, plans, and 
preferences. 
A particular indication of an open exchange of information is the candid discussion 
of problematic and controversial bilateral issues. It is in the context of discussing 
bilateral problems and disagreements that an open exchange of information is most 
vital. The presence or absence of the discussion of acute or developing problems and 
points of contention and their inclusion in the session protocols and reports of 
individual institutions gives a valuable indication as to whether an open dialogue, a 
pragmatic and policy-oriented exchange of opinions and intentions, has in fact taken 
place, or if bilateral interaction has essentially been restricted to diplomatic and 
symbolic gestures. A further component of this final criterion, network formation, 
refers to evidence that the participation in an institution has contributed to the 
creation of formal or informal Sino-Russian networks of specialists and stakeholders 
in their respective fields who have sustained contact among themselves and have 
formulated common claims. 
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Link with theoretical approaches: This criterion of analysis harks back to Neoliberal 
Institutionalism’s emphasis on the role of international institutions in providing 
policy-makers with critical information and expertise and thereby creating a 
favourable informational environment for the interaction between governments. 
According to Neoliberal Institutionalists, mutual interaction in institutions can 
provide information about the preferences, intentions, and standards of behaviour of 
other governments. As Robert Keohane observed,  
states’ conceptions of their interests, and of how their objectives should be pursued, 
depend not merely on national interests and the distribution of world power, but on 
the quantity, quality, and distribution of information. Agreements that are impossible 
to make under conditions of high uncertainty may become feasible when uncertainty 
has been reduced. Human beings, and governments, behave differently in 
information-rich environments than in information-poor ones. Information, as well 
as power, is a significant systemic variable in world politics. International systems 
containing institutions that generate a great deal of high-quality information and 
make it available on a reasonably even basis to the major actors are likely to 
experience more cooperation than systems that do not contain such institutions, even 
if fundamental state interests and the distribution of power are the same in each 
system.
70
 
Moreover, “[i]nformation-rich institutions that reduce uncertainty may make 
agreement possible in a future crisis.”71 Keohane further advised, 
that governments should seek to combine reliability of action with the provision of 
high-quality information to their partners. International regimes facilitate both of 
these objectives, by providing rules that constitute standards for evaluating state 
behavior and by facilitating the establishment of contacts among governments that 
help to provide information not merely about policies but about intentions and values. 
[…] Admittedly, there are tactical gains to be made from concealing preferences and 
‘keeping others guessing.’ But such a policy can undermine one’s ability to make 
beneficial agreements in the future. Being unpredictable not only disconcerts one’s 
partners but reduces one’s own ability to make credible promises.72 
Leading Institutionalist scholars, emphasising the importance of international 
institutions for “[i]ncreasing governmental concern” and acting “as sounding boards 
for politicians”,73 have observed that “governments seem to value the exchange of 
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information for its role in reducing uncertainty and in promoting public scrutiny.”74 
They have also emphasised the great “significance of perception, including beliefs 
and cognition” in institutional interaction.75  
 
 
Sources and Research Materials: 
 
As an analysis of Chinese and Russian foreign policy, this thesis encounters a 
number of methodological challenges. Most important among these has been the 
problem of gaining sufficient access to relevant sources. Although a number of 
effective analytical approaches to the study of foreign policy exist, many of these 
depend on the accessibility of government archives or similarly detailed accounts of 
official foreign policy decision-making. For this reason, they remain virtually 
inapplicable to the analysis of all but a small number of states, which permit access 
to this range of detailed official sources. Due to the lack of available archival data on 
recent Chinese and Russian policy-making, certain methodological approaches that 
might otherwise have proven to be valuable means of analysis had to be excluded 
from the present analysis. These include, for instance, Graham Allison’s bureaucratic 
politics approach,
76
 or the governmental politics model.
77
 
In China and Russia, where policymaking processes are notoriously opaque, the 
difficulty of accessing relevant data has posed a significant challenge. However, by 
resorting to a broad range of sources and situating them within the methodological 
framework of a structured case study analysis, I have been able to depict overall 
trends, as well as specific developments within the context of my theoretical 
framework. My principal sources include the following: 
- Primary information about the development and activity of bi- and 
multilateral institutions, including official reports about their creation and 
records of their activity, protocols of meetings, bi- and multilateral 
agreements and accords between China and Russia, and similar documents. 
These sources have been drawn from official press releases, government 
publications, the websites of ministries, embassies, and other official bodies 
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with direct involvement in institutional interaction. They have also 
occasionally been drawn from sources published by corporate or academic 
actors, provided these had a direct involvement in the institutions in question. 
- Secondary information about the development and activity of bi- and 
multilateral institutions. This includes press reports by the leading Chinese 
and Russian news agencies, national and regional newspapers, and related 
media, as well as specialised information services, journals, and databases 
(e.g. in the energy sector).
78
 They also include policy and academic studies, 
i.e. assessments and publications by a variety of Chinese and Russian 
academics, think tanks and policy institutes (whose members occasionally 
acted as foreign policy advisors to the government),
79
 whenever these provide 
direct insight into institutional dynamics. These journalistic and academic 
sources have been used to gather information and trace the creation of new 
institutions, the proceedings of their regular sessions and meetings. They 
were also used to observe what policy changes have occurred in conjunction 
with, or in response to institutional activity, as well as conspicuous instances 
of failed interaction and bilateral tensions. 
- A series of carefully prepared, semi-structured academic interviews in China 
and Russia. Since senior officials in Beijing and Moscow have been difficult 
to approach, these interviews have primarily been conducted with a range of 
academics and policy analysts at leading universities and foreign policy 
research centres. The leading academic institutes in China and Russia tend to 
be closely integrated with official state structures, with many of them being 
directly operated by government agencies such as the foreign ministries. This 
affords some of their members close insight into policymaking processes in 
their respective countries. Several of my interviewees had previously worked 
in an official capacity (e.g. in senior diplomatic service positions), and in 
many cases they had directly participated in sessions of relevant bilateral 
institutions. Interviews were conducted as widely as possible, selecting 
individuals from various institutions and organisations that reflect a variety of 
political viewpoints. 
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- Further sources on which this analysis has drawn include assessments by 
external agencies (such as the U.N. and relevant NGOs) regarding particular 
dimensions of Sino-Russian bilateral cooperation, and opinion surveys 
published by relevant demographic institutes (such as the Levada Centre and 
VTsIOM in Russia). In order to assess the economic dimension of the Sino-
Russian relationship, I resorted to the available macroeconomic data 
pertaining to Sino-Russian trade and reports about bilateral economic projects. 
- On some occasions, as a supplement to the above sources, I have also 
considered authoritative statements by Chinese and Russian foreign policy-
makers, commenting on and assessing the role of bilateral institutions. 
‘Authoritative statements’ are defined to be statements by officeholders in 
positions that give them influence on the conduct of foreign policy. In 
examining these statements, the aim has been to gather official perspectives 
on and assessments of the functions and effects of bilateral institutions and 
their role in bilateral policymaking. Documents studied for this purpose 
include, among others, articles in government publications, press statements, 
and interviews. The limitations of an analysis of authoritative statements are 
clearly recognised, but it is presumed that, in the absence of data providing 
direct insights into foreign policy decision-making in Beijing and Moscow, 
these pronouncements are tentative indicators of policy dynamics and 
priorities. The public statements of those directly involved in Sino-Russian 
relations cannot be relied upon to reflect their true perspectives. This applies 
in particular in political cultures as permeated by a ‘cult of secrecy’ as those 
of China and Russia. For this reason, I have only resorted to authoritative 
statements as evidence to further substantiate observations and dynamics that 
have already been documented with some degree of certainty through the 
various sources listed above. In addition, I have consistently compared these 
statements with the actual policy steps taken by the relevant authorities and 
the outcomes achieved. 
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Case Selection: 
 
The theoretical approaches outlined above have been applied in the form of three 
case studies of the development of institutional links between China and Russia. The 
case study design follows the precepts set out in standard volumes on theory 
development, especially the work of Alexander George and Andrew Bennett.
80
 Case 
studies are essential means for specifying the causal steps and mechanisms that led to 
changes in the variables under examination.
81
 The case studies used for this thesis 
have been designed as ‘structured, focused comparisons’:82 They are structured in the 
sense that case study design follows a consistent framework, whereby each case was 
investigated through the same range of research analysis criteria. They are focused in 
their narrow concentration on the dynamics of the developing institutional 
framework in Sino-Russian relations. This developing institutional framework 
represents the independent variable in this study, while the dependent variable, 
broadly defined, is the efficiency in the conduct of cooperative bilateral 
policymaking. The research questions and hypotheses employed are those listed 
earlier in this chapter. 
Case study-based analysis requires a clear definition of the case study’s ‘unit of 
analysis’,83 including clearly delineated case boundaries.84 For this purpose, I chose 
to structure my case studies around individual institutions operating in Sino-Russian 
relations. Regarding the concrete selection of cases, various methods have been 
advanced in the relevant literature. Perhaps the most prominent method is a selection 
based on ‘most-likely’, ‘least-likely’, or ‘crucial’ cases.85 The growth of the legal-
institutional framework between China and Russia has encompassed virtually all 
dimensions of Sino-Russian cooperation, and all of these larger issue-areas have 
been of great relevance for the development of bilateral relations. But among the 
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various dimensions and issue-areas in which institutional development has taken 
place, it is difficult to discern any evident ‘most-likely’, ‘least-likely’, or ‘crucial’ 
cases of institutionalisation: While there are areas of bilateral interaction that have 
been more intrinsically problematic than others – implying that processes of 
cooperation should have been less likely to develop in them – the impetus for 
institution-building was arguably particularly great in these very areas, precisely in 
order to compensate for the insufficiencies of cooperation.
86
 
Instead, my case selection has been guided by the objective of selecting instances 
of institutional cooperation that are both relevant to and, in particular, representative 
of the broader development of Sino-Russian relations.
87
 This corresponds with the 
case selection methods outlined in a standard volume by John Gerring, who 
“summarized the task of case selection as a matter of achieving two objectives: 
representativeness (typicality) and variation”. 88  Most importantly, according to 
Gerring, “[i]n order for a focused case study to provide insight into a broader 
phenomenon, it must be representative of a broader set of cases”,89 i.e. “cases must 
be representative of the population of interest in whatever ways might be relevant to 
the proposition in question.”90  
Under these methodological premises, from the broad range of existing Sino-
Russian institutions I chose the following as the units of analysis for my three case 
studies: 
- The Sino-Russian Subcommission on Trade and Economic Cooperation 
- The Sino-Russian Energy Dialogue 
- The China-Russia-India Academic Trilateral 
With the aim of representativeness and variation in mind, the aim was to select 
institutions covering diverse issue areas, specifically one institution with an 
economic, one with an academic, and one with a strategic focus. In selecting a 
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strategically focused case, a straightforward choice would have been to opt for an 
institution operating in the military/security sphere. However, this option had to be 
ruled out for pragmatic reasons, since this field of Sino-Russian military/security 
interaction remains too opaque, with too little solid information being publicly 
available to conduct an in-depth analysis.
91
 Instead, I selected the leading bilateral 
institution in the energy sector. Although prima facie a primarily economic field of 
interaction, Sino-Russian energy trade has an intrinsically strategic dimension. In the 
words of one analyst: 
Energy has come to symbolise the geopolitics of the 21st century, reflecting 
countries’ diminishing reliance on military and political power. Today, energy is an 
instrument of geopolitical competition, like nuclear weapons or large armies were 
during the Cold War. […] In different ways energy is fundamental to the rise of 
Russia and China as great powers. For Russia, possession of vast oil and gas 
resources fulfils a function similar to its nuclear weapons in the Soviet era. The post-
1999 boom in world oil prices has underpinned Russia’s re-emergence as a great 
power. […] Energy is seen not simply as an instrument of influence in itself, but as 
underpinning other forms of power: military, political, economic, technological, 
cultural and soft power. Energy is no less vital to China, but from the opposite 
standpoint. China’s modernisation and rise as a superpower depends on securing 
reliable access to natural resources. […] Energy and geopolitics are as closely 
intertwined in China’s case as they are for Russia, except that for Beijing energy is 
not an instrument of geopolitical ambition, but a key driver of an ever more assertive 
foreign policy.
92
 
More importantly, beyond its geopolitical implications for the development of 
regional and global power relations, Sino-Russian energy cooperation is intrinsically 
‘strategic’ in the sense that it involves long-term structural planning and 
commitments and thus has a structural effect of locking China and Russia together, 
both in economic and in political terms. 
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Due to the fundamentally different nature of bilateral interaction in the energy 
sphere (a high-stakes environment infused with geopolitics, involving the top 
Chinese and Russian policy-makers) and the academic sphere (a low-stakes, 
analytical and advisory environment without direct involvement of senior policy-
makers), with the remainder of bilateral economic interaction situated somewhere in 
between, the above choice of cases conforms to the ‘diverse-case’ method of case 
selection, as specified in Gerring’s work. This method “has as its primary objective 
the achievement of maximum variance along relevant dimensions”, 93  for which 
purpose “the researcher is well advised to choose both extreme values (high and low), 
and perhaps the mean or median as well.”94  Gerring goes on to specify that, in 
applying this method, 
the goal of case selection is to capture the full range of variation along the 
dimension(s) of interest. […] Encompassing a full range of variation is likely to 
enhance the representativeness of the sample of cases chosen by the researcher. [… 
T]he diverse-case method often has stronger claims to representativeness than any 
other small-N sample (including the typical case). The selection of diverse cases has 
the additional advantage of introducing variation on the key variables of interest.
95
 
While providing for representativeness and variation across issue areas, the cases 
I have chosen retain important structural similarities, so as to preserve cross-case 
comparability. All the selected institutions have operated for a comparable length of 
time (they were established in 1998, 1999, and 2001, respectively). In addition, the 
focus in selecting cases has been on bilateral institutions. The inclusion of one 
trilateral forum was prompted by the absence of any comparable bilateral Sino-
Russian mechanisms in the academic sphere. The Academic Trilateral is the only 
such institution operating between China and Russia in the field of academic 
cooperation and exchange. It is assumed that, due to the nature of academic exchange 
as a low-stakes, non-strategic field of interaction, whose participants are typically not 
privy to sensitive information and not authorised to make practical policy decisions, 
the inclusion of a third party (India) in this purely academic exchange forum did not 
fundamentally alter the mode of interaction within the institution, and there is no 
reason to presume that the process of exchange between Chinese and Russian 
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academics in a purely bilateral forum, had it existed, would in practice have operated 
very differently. 
The case selection has excluded broader multilateral forums, involving four or 
more state actors. The institution-building process between China and Russia has 
been most central and most active at the bilateral level, and the focus of the general 
investigation has therefore been on bilateral institution-building. China’s and 
Russia’s increasing interaction within various multilateral institutions has been a less 
vital but nonetheless significant part of the general process of the institutionalisation 
of Sino-Russian relations, the most prominent example of this being the development 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). While the SCO and other broader 
multilateral institutions, containing a large variety of state actors, have been excluded 
from the case study analysis in the interest of cross-case comparability, their impact 
is briefly assessed in the concluding analytical chapter (chapter 8). 
Within-case analysis for the above case studies was conducted by drawing on the 
methods of process tracing and the congruence method. Process tracing was applied 
in the form of what George and Bennett have labelled ‘analytic explanation’, in 
which, rather than a detailed historical narrative, the researcher presents an analytical 
causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms.
96
 The aim of this approach 
is to uncover evidence for the role of the presumed independent variable in the 
process leading to the policy outcome and, on this basis, to create contingent 
generalisations, identifying the conditions under which alternative outcomes occur. 
The congruence method, which can be combined with process tracing, requires the 
researcher to assess the validity of a given hypothesis by comparing its predictions 
with the actual outcomes of policy processes. Rather than tracing the causal process 
from the independent to the dependent variables, one centrally looks at the congruity 
and consistency of both.
97
 
 
 
Chapter Outline: 
 
This first chapter of the thesis contains a general introduction, including a 
comprehensive description of the research methodology employed and a review of 
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the available literature on the topic. Chapter 2 outlines the background before which 
recent Sino-Russian cooperation has developed in the period under study. It consists 
of two parts: The first part provides a brief chronology of the historical development 
of relations between Beijing and Moscow until the early 1990s, with a particular 
focus on the reasons for the breakdown of bilateral cooperation in the 1960s and the 
factors that initially rendered a renewed rapprochement impossible. The second part 
offers an overview of the characteristic structures of foreign policy-making in China 
and in Russia, respectively, introducing the central domestic actors and institutions 
involved in foreign policy-making in both countries that form the structural context 
of Sino-Russian cooperation in the post-Cold War period. 
Chapter 3 provides a brief overview of the different dimensions of Sino-Russian 
cooperation, in order to contextualise the role that institutions have played in them. It 
analyses geopolitical and regional security factors, provides an overview of recent 
economic and trade relations, and examines the role of mutual perceptions, 
ideologies, and regime cultures. Assessing these factors through the lenses of 
relevant approaches in International Relations theory (particularly variants of 
Neorealism and Constructivism), the chapter demonstrates that bilateral cooperation 
has remained fraught with substantial underlying problems and obstacles in all of 
these dimensions, rendering the development of strongly cooperative ties between 
both states somewhat puzzling in the absence of additional explanatory factors. 
The remainder of the thesis is devoted to analysing the processes of institution-
building in Sino-Russian relations since the early 1990s. Chapter 4 provides a 
general account of the existing bilateral and multilateral institutions, their 
development, and the essential policy-makers involved in them. While the 
proliferation of institutions alone tells us little about their substantial impact, the 
nature of the newly-formed institutional mechanisms, the personal interaction 
processes that they facilitate, and the high level of leadership-participation in them 
indicate that they are part of the reason why Sino-Russian relations could develop as 
dynamically as they did.  
The hypothesis is then tested by means of three in-depth case studies, probing 
into the dynamics and development of selected trans-national institutions: Chapters 5 
through 7 each present one case study: the Sino-Russian Subcommission for Trade 
and Economic Cooperation, the Sino-Russian Energy Dialogue, and the China-
Russia-India Academic Trilateral, respectively. Chapter 8 assesses the main findings 
38 
 
from the case studies and puts them into the wider context of Sino-Russian bilateral 
institution-building. On this basis, the chapter draws conclusions regarding their 
implications for policy-making and research. 
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Chapter II: The Historical and Structural Context of Sino-Russian 
Relations  
 
 
This chapter outlines the background before which recent Sino-Russian 
cooperation developed in the period under study. It consists of two parts: The first 
part provides a brief chronology of the historical development of relations between 
Beijing and Moscow until the mid-1990s, with a particular focus on the reasons for 
the breakdown of bilateral relations in the 1960s and the factors that rendered a 
renewed rapprochement impossible for more than two decades. The second part 
offers an overview of the distinctive structures of foreign policy-making in China 
and in Russia, respectively, introducing the central domestic actors and institutions 
involved in foreign policy-making in both countries. 
 
 
 
The Dynamics of Sino-Russian Interaction Up to the Mid-1990s: 
 
Bilateral Relations Prior to the Sino-Soviet Split: 
Relations between China and Russia date back to the early 17
th
 century, when 
Russia took possession of Eastern Siberia. The first official Russian ambassador 
reached Beijing in 1655, but was soon expelled from China due to his unwillingness 
to comply with the etiquette of Chinese diplomacy. This first failed encounter set the 
tone for the coming 300 years, throughout which bilateral contacts remained tenuous 
and often adversarial, characterised by a persistent lack of mutual cultural 
understanding. Russian attempts in the second half of the 17
th
 century to take 
possession of the Chinese-administered territories in the Amur River basin were 
forcibly repelled by China’s Manchu rulers. Although both states began to share a 
common border that stretched for thousands of kilometres and established 
commercial relations, diplomatic contact remained extremely sparse. 
Bilateral trade slowly grew, but overall bilateral relations saw few developments 
until the mid-19
th
 century, when Russian settlement recommenced in the Chinese-
administered Amur region. In 1858 and 1860, Russia forced a weakened Qing 
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Dynasty to cede the tributary territories north and east of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, 
more than one million square kilometres in total. This was followed by Russian 
encroachments on Manchuria around the turn of the century. Bilateral relations 
remained poor until the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912 and the 
Soviet Union in 1917. Both countries established formal diplomatic ties in 1924, 
while bilateral tensions (for instance over the status of Mongolia) persisted. 
Nevertheless, from now on the Sino-Russian relationship grew consistently 
closer, and the Soviet Union exerted a key influence on political developments in the 
young Republic of China. From the early 1920s onwards, the Moscow-based 
Comintern helped both the Chinese Nationalist party Kuomintang and the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) to organise and consolidate themselves. During the 
1930s, when the CPC was pushed to the periphery in China, it was mostly ignored by 
the Soviets. Mao Zedong, who gradually emerged as the leader of the CPC, in his 
turn ignored several key Comintern directives regarding the conduct of the ongoing 
war against Japan.
98
 The CPC’s ideological line at the time became more and more 
autonomous and independent from Moscow, although Mao adopted the personality 
cult and purge tactics from Joseph Stalin’s USSR. 
After the Japanese defeat in August 1945, Soviet troops entered Manchuria. To 
the dismay of Mao and the CPC, the Soviets negotiated a treaty with the Kuomintang 
and formally recognised its leader Jiang Jieshi, allowing him to cement his power in 
China. As U.S. policy in 1945 became increasingly anti-Communist, the Chinese 
Communists all the more looked towards the Soviet Union for support. During the 
Civil War, some aid from the Soviet Union kept arriving in Mao’s camps (in some 
areas this help indeed was critical), but Stalin gave no indication that he expected or 
even intended this to help the CPC attain victory. He resorted to dealing with both 
sides in the conflict, aiming primarily to secure the Soviet Union against Western 
influence in its borderlands. Not even when the CPC was on the road to victory did 
Stalin make any substantial investment into it.
99
 When the war was eventually won, 
Moscow offered Mao broad bilateral cooperation, but mutual ties were slow to 
develop. 
The Chinese and Russian leaders did not meet each other in person until 
December 1949 (the first of only two personal encounters between them). On that 
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occasion, both sides concluded a formal alliance and agreed on the provision of 
comprehensive military and economic assistance to China, but significant 
disagreements remained: The Soviets rebuffed Mao’s objective of annexing 
Mongolia, and Stalin asked whether Moscow from now on should sign separate trade 
agreements with Xinjiang and Manchuria, raising the spectre of Soviet encroachment 
on the Chinese periphery. The tensions in bilateral relations continued with the 
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The Soviets supplied substantial military 
assistance to China, with considerable cost to their own production, but Stalin 
demanded that Beijing acquire its supplies on credit. Stalin eventually considered it 
advantageous for the Korean War to continue as long as possible, also when, by late 
1952, the Chinese, who were bearing the brunt of the war, had become eager for a 
settlement of the conflict.
100
 
Although the bilateral relationship was thus beset with countless problems, 
formal cooperation and Soviet assistance to China grew steadily. Soviet economic 
and political support became vital for the consolidation of Mao’s nascent regime. 
Mao continued to keep in close touch with Moscow on all important strategic matters, 
and nearly all of his political initiatives from the period were inspired and sanctioned 
by the Soviet leadership. As soon as Nikita Khrushchev assumed power in Moscow 
after Stalin’s death in 1953, many of the bilateral disagreements disappeared. Under 
Khrushchev, practical economic and defence cooperation with China made real and 
substantial progress.
101
 Unlike under Stalin, the Kremlin was now willing to provide 
the Chinese with what they wanted, including state-of-the-art technology, and to this 
end Moscow was willing to make a significant economic sacrifice equal to ca. seven 
per-cent of the Soviet annual national income in the late 1950s.
102
 The number of 
Russian experts and advisers in China soared, and military cooperation between the 
two sides also flourished from 1954 onwards. The Soviets even helped China start up 
its nuclear research programme, and in October 1957 Moscow went so far as to 
promise China outright supply with a prototype nuclear weapon. 
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The Sino-Soviet Split: 
For a number of reasons the partnership began to unravel after 1957. Practical 
cooperation between the two sides continued, and in some areas, such as military and 
nuclear cooperation, it even intensified. During the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis in 
1958, a cause of significant disagreements between Beijing and Moscow, 
Khrushchev – to Mao’s satisfaction – still gave full public security guarantees to 
China, and in 1958 Mao still repeatedly assured Moscow of his intentions to follow 
the Soviet lead. But Mao’s rejection of a large-scale military cooperation programme 
in June 1958 set off alarm bells in Moscow. The Soviet leadership began to review 
its aid programme and to worry how China would eventually use the transferred 
technologies.
103
 
Khrushchev then decided to slow down the transfer of nuclear technology. In 
June 1959, he informed the Chinese that the USSR was unilaterally scrapping the 
remaining parts of the nuclear cooperation programme. Eventually, in an impulsive 
decision, Khrushchev ordered all Soviet technicians working in China back to the 
Soviet Union, an act that came as a genuine shock to many in the Chinese leadership. 
Even after the withdrawal of all Soviet specialists, Mao was eager not to discontinue 
all cooperation, at least in the defence sector, and there was a lull in the bilateral 
dispute lasting for almost one and a half years. But China and Russia eventually 
descended to a state in which all bilateral ties and communications were abrogated 
and the two sides began to perceive each other as their greatest international nemeses 
– a situation, that was to last for nearly three decades. 
 
That Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated so swiftly and remained unabatedly 
hostile until shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union was largely due to a 
growth of mutual suspicions and a persistent lack of mutual understanding, 
exacerbated in no small part by the scarcity of contacts and exchanges between the 
Chinese and Soviet leaderships. One particular problem that plagued the relationship 
from the beginning was the persistence of cultural barriers and stereotypes that 
complicated day-to-day cooperation between both countries. Even at the height of 
mutual cooperation in the 1950s, cultural interchange between Chinese and Russians 
was partially offset by the fact that both governments remained opposed to close 
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contacts between the Soviet specialists and their Chinese counterparts.
104
 Even minor 
disagreements and perceived slights led the Chinese leaders, especially Mao, to 
suspect that, like the Tsars, the Soviets aspired to win dominance over China. The 
Soviets, in turn, sustained a paternalistic image of their alliance with China as that of 
an industrially advanced state ‘educating’ a backward nation. 
A more crucial dimension of disagreement between Beijing and Moscow was 
ideology. Differences in this regard already began to open up under Stalin, who, 
opposing much of Mao’s activism immediately after the foundation of the PRC, 
advocated Chinese moderation towards the United States and Taiwan. With Beijing 
and Moscow unable to agree on a joint revolutionary strategy for East Asia, Mao’s 
respect for Stalin and for Soviet socialism diminished significantly over time. 
Following Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s ascent to power, the personal aversions 
between the two leaders initially notably lessened.
105
 
Nonetheless, a gradual disenchantment with Soviet communism set in among the 
Chinese, especially after Khrushchev’s condemnation of Stalinism at the XX. 
Communist Party Congress in 1956. Besides shattering the myth that the CPSU had 
always been correct, Khrushchev’s volte-face was seen by Mao as possibly 
endangering his own Stalinist rule in China, and he feared that the Soviets’ behaviour 
could weaken international socialism. Moscow’s ‘revisionism’ increasingly led Mao 
to challenge the Soviet Union’s leadership of the world Socialist movement. Mao 
came to regard Soviet advisers, Chinese studying in the USSR, and others who had 
worked together with the Soviets as potential critics of the CPC’s own disastrous 
development policies. He began to stress a policy of self-reliance and criticised 
excessive dependence on Moscow. 
Mao argued for a reinvigoration of socialist transformation and mobilisation of 
the masses in all socialist countries, and he believed that the Soviets should confront 
the U.S. without fearing war. Khrushchev, who was striving for a reduction of 
tensions with the United States, became increasingly anxious about Mao’s 
determination to speed up the development of socialism through direct confrontation 
with the capitalist world.
106
 The renewed Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1958 and China’s 
escalating tensions with India – a country with which the Soviets had built up a close 
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relationship – led Khrushchev to accuse Beijing of attempting to torpedo global 
relaxation. 
Out of all of Mao’s deviations from Soviet communist thinking, what shocked 
and worried Moscow most were his comments on nuclear war, including his 
professed belief that socialism could be built after World War III, or that it was 
acceptable if half of humanity was to perish in a nuclear conflict. Mao’s seemingly 
erratic and provocative foreign policy conduct and the lack of strategic consultations 
with Moscow led the Soviets to begin questioning his mental stability. Once China 
had developed its own atomic bomb in 1964, the Soviet leaders therefore began to 
consider whether nuclear deterrence alone could prevent China from launching an 
attack against the Soviet Far East: They did rely on it against the U.S., but given 
Mao’s previous comments they were left with lingering doubts as to whether 
strategic superiority was enough to deter a Chinese attack.
107
 
 
 
The Emerging Security Dilemma: 
As the Sino-Soviet split began to cement itself, one of the main reasons why it 
persisted so long was the increasing suspicions on either side about the other’s 
military intentions. The development of a seemingly intractable security dilemma 
between Beijing and Moscow allowed bilateral relations to deteriorate from a mere 
disruption of cooperation to a state in which each side perceived the other as a mortal 
enemy. This security dilemma would have been significantly less pronounced if 
ideological differences and misperceptions had not led key policy-makers on either 
side to constantly overestimate the military threat posed by the other. Although the 
Soviets had never trusted their Chinese allies fully and, unbeknownst to the Chinese, 
had deliberately held back some of their offensive missile technology, they had 
generally provided Beijing with extremely broad strategic assistance throughout the 
1950s.
108
 Once the doubts about each other’s motives grew, however, mutual threat 
perceptions increasingly became a hindrance to further bilateral cooperation. When 
Khrushchev proposed active bilateral military integration in 1958, Mao’s suspicions 
about Moscow’s intentions reached their apex. 
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With the ideological disputes growing, the common border emerged as a focal 
point of the rising tensions between Beijing and Moscow. The issue of border 
demarcation had been a latent problem already in the early 1950s and was raised 
again by Zhou Enlai in 1957, but Khrushchev then refused to discuss it. From 1963, 
the Chinese insinuated that they ‘had not yet accounted’ for the vast amounts of 
Chinese territory acquired by Tsarist Russia in the 19
th
 century. In 1964, a round of 
bilateral talks on the demarcation of the border led to an agreement on most border 
sections, but the matter remained inconclusive. One month before his ouster, 
Khrushchev issued a veiled nuclear threat in response to Chinese claims of the 
illegitimacy of the border.
109
 Shortly thereafter, China tested its first nuclear bomb. 
By the mid-1960s, a genuine paranoia had developed both in Beijing and in 
Moscow regarding each other’s strategic goals. The Chinese government from 1964 
feared that the Soviets might attack China jointly with the U.S.A.
110
 Indeed, as the 
Khrushchev years ended, Soviet representatives were secretly discussing plans with 
the Americans for joint preventive military action against Chinese nuclear 
facilities.
111
 The new Soviet leadership under Leonid Brezhnev grew increasingly 
concerned over the security of the Soviet Union’s Far East. In 1965 the Soviet Union 
began a vast military build-up in the border region, deploying ca. 370,000 men, 
including large detachments of its nuclear forces. Despite a great gap in military 
capacities, the image of ‘Chinese multitudes’ sweeping across Siberia was 
widespread in the Soviet Union during the 1960s. Both sides engaged in a frantic 
building of defence works along the border, China even relocated some of its vital 
industries further inland, and Mao initiated campaigns to build tunnels in case of a 
Soviet attack.
112
 
Constant mutual harassment between Chinese and Soviet border guards 
throughout the 1960s briefly erupted into open fighting along the Ussuri River in 
March 1969, bringing both sides to the brink of an all-out war. In mid-October 1969, 
a full military alert was triggered in China, and senior Soviet personnel at the time 
apparently had concrete intentions for a nuclear strike against China.
113
 The 
moderates in the Chinese leadership then strove to improve relations with 
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Washington (since they had come to regard the Soviet Union as the more dangerous 
enemy), and to use this in order to deter potential Soviet military action against 
China. Military incidents along the border continued after 1969. When the Chinese 
leadership was finally wishing to re-engage in political dialogue with Moscow in 
September 1979, this was again forestalled for several years by the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan, which China fervently opposed, as well as Moscow’s support for the 
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. 
The Soviet leadership likewise intermittently advocated a normalisation of Sino-
Soviet relations: One attempt at mutual rapprochement was made when Alexei 
Kosygin met Zhou Enlai in September 1969, after the Ussuri Crisis. This promising 
step, which initially served to diffuse the military confrontation along the border, was 
obviated by domestic power struggles in Moscow, as Brezhnev used the 
reconciliation attempts made by his internal rival Kosygin to discredit him. After 
Mao’s death in 1976, Brezhnev himself briefly expressed a greater interest in 
improving relations with China, but this was thwarted by the entrenched opposition 
to such a move in the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the CPSU Central Committee. By 
that time, a ‘containment coalition’ had established itself in the Moscow Politburo 
that developed a lasting consensus on the need for sustained political and military 
containment of China. With no effective dialogue mechanisms in place between 
Beijing and Moscow, a number of conservative Soviet officials in charge of China 
policy who acted as the sole ‘gatekeepers’ of bilateral relations, remained 
persistently obstructive towards any attempts at a de-escalation of tensions and 
irresponsive to changes in Chinese policymaking,
114
 contributing to the Soviet 
leadership’s failure to discern developments within China away from staunch 
Maoism since the mid-1970s. 
 
 
The Path to Bilateral Rapprochement: 
Reconciliation between Moscow and Beijing therefore proved protracted and 
difficult. Since no learning process about each other’s motives set in (in part because 
appropriate forums for an exchange between officials on both sides were lacking), it 
was ultimately only leadership turnover that enabled lasting changes in bilateral 
relations. After Brezhnev’s death, Yury Andropov took a more pragmatic approach 
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to China, but mutual containment continued unabated. Among the factors promoting 
the eventual resumption of bilateral relations was increasing pressure from regional 
officials to open some cross-border trade.
115
 A further incentive for normalisation 
was China’s initiation of a programme of domestic economic reform and 
modernisation, which led it to drop its charges of ‘revisionism’ against Moscow. 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s launch of a reform programme in the Soviet Union a few years 
later led to a gradual narrowing of differences in the Soviet and Chinese domestic 
strategies. Only when the two domestic systems thus began to converge in the 1980s 
did both sides initiate a true rapprochement. 
For Gorbachev, improving ties with China became an important foreign policy 
goal. In 1986, Moscow began to take steps to remove what the Chinese had 
identified as the ‘three obstacles’ to bilateral reconciliation: Gorbachev announced a 
unilateral reduction of troop levels at the Sino-Soviet border, as well as a gradual 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, and he pressured the Soviet ally Vietnam to withdraw 
its forces from Cambodia.
116
 This enabled Gorbachev to meet the Chinese leadership 
in Beijing in May 1989. During his stay, bilateral relations were officially normalised, 
and both sides agreed on mutual force reductions and a resumption of negotiations on 
the course of the border. A border agreement was signed in 1991. 
Further rapprochement was initially obstructed by the gradual breakdown of the 
socialist bloc, for which the Chinese leadership blamed Gorbachev personally. 
Nonetheless, progress was made on reducing the troop levels on the border, and 
military linkages between the two sides were resumed. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, relations between Moscow and Beijing briefly stalled. The Chinese 
leadership openly sympathised with the attempted coup d’ tat against Gorbachev by 
orthodox CPSU members in 1991, and it disapproved of Gorbachev’s successor 
Boris Yeltsin. Nonetheless, personal disagreements between Yeltsin and the Chinese 
leadership were eventually overcome, and by 1992 both sides signed an initial 
intergovernmental trade agreement and convoked a Sino-Russian trade commission. 
The border negotiations, now including the Central Asian republics, resumed in late 
1992. Yeltsin visited China in December 1992 and several agreements were signed 
on this occasion, although most of them, especially in the economic sphere, would 
eventually remain unrealised. 
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In the mid-1990s, further rapprochement was hampered again, as resistance in the 
Russian Far East grew against the border agreements of 1991. Popular fears of 
Chinese immigration led the Kremlin to impose harsh visa regulations in January 
1994, which caused a precipitous drop in bilateral trade. Although relations with 
China were rhetorically promoted to a ‘constructive partnership’ in 1994, bilateral 
cooperation progressed slowly until April 1996, when both states signed a joint 
communiqué announcing their commitment to develop a ‘strategic partnership’ and 
inaugurated a large number of functional bilateral institutions.
117
 
 
 
 
The Structure of Foreign Policy Decision-Making in China and Russia: 
 
Due to the close ideological affinity between the People’s Republic of China and 
the Soviet Union, and due to Moscow’s pivotal influence on the PRC’s early political 
development, the political decision-making structures in both states bore many 
similarities. Following the Soviet Union’s demise, however, the foreign policy-
making structures in China and Russia have differed substantially. Both in China and 
in Russia, the exact structures and dynamics of foreign policy-making during the 
1990s and 2000s have remained opaque, but they can nonetheless be sketched out in 
some detail. 
 
 
China’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making Structure: 
In China, foreign policy authority has become increasingly diversified in recent 
decades, and numerous agencies (often with competing agendas) have gained an 
influence on policy decisions, creating an unprecedented degree of pluralism in 
Chinese foreign policy-making. Separate decision-making structures exist for the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Central Government, although some of 
these structures overlap in function and even personnel. The CPC holds supreme 
authority, and some principal political decision-makers are not officially members of 
the Government. The authority and influence of individual policy-makers is 
determined by their Party rank. 
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The supreme policymaking authority is the Paramount Leader (currently Xi 
Jinping, previously Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao), who holds the three key offices of 
CPC General Secretary, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and State 
President. He also chairs the CPC Leading Small Groups (LSGs) that deliberate 
foreign and security policy. Alongside the Premier and 5-7 other top officials, he is a 
member of the Communist Party’s highest institution, the Politburo Standing 
Committee (PSC), which holds the ultimate political decision-making power in 
China. None of the members of the PSC is exclusively in charge of the foreign 
affairs sector. In most cases, the PSC’s task is to give the final approval to a decision 
based on the recommendations of the leading foreign policy agencies.
118
 
The body that appears to take overall charge of Chinese foreign policy is the CPC 
Leading Small Group for Foreign Affairs (FALSG). Headed by a member of the PSC, 
it also includes the top bureaucrats of the government and party foreign affairs 
agencies. Since PSC members are not well-versed in the details of foreign affairs 
decision-making, they rely on the expertise of specialists in the Leading Small 
Groups, who have day-to-day responsibility for all but the most important foreign 
policy decisions. The FALSG supervises foreign policy implementation and 
coordination and submits policy proposals to the PSC.
119
 
Another Leading Small Group that has become an increasingly important player 
in forging China’s foreign economic policy and coordinating its implementation is 
the powerful Financial and Economic Affairs LSG. Other agencies affiliated with the 
CPC Central Committee that exert an influence on foreign policy-making include the 
Policy Research Office (which conducts research, provides advice and drafts policy 
documents ahead of major decisions), the International Communications Office 
(which strives to improve the international perception of China, one of Hu Jintao’s 
foreign policy priorities), and the International Department, which counts responsible 
for the CPC’s ties to foreign political parties.120 
Formally, the highest government body in China is the State Council, headed by 
the Premier (currently Li Keqiang, previously Zhu Rongji and Wen Jiabao). The 
State Councillor in charge of foreign policy formally outranks the Foreign Minister. 
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is today merely one of many actors involved in 
foreign policy-making, but it remains the central actor in the management and 
implementation of China’s foreign policy. The key ‘strategic’ foreign policy 
decisions pronounced by the central leadership are often merely vague concepts, 
broad guidelines, or long-term policy goals, and it is often up to the Foreign Ministry 
to make the ‘tactical’ policy choices and detailed realisation plans. Another major 
task of the Foreign Ministry is to provide reliable information to the central 
leadership, by means of which it can exert great influence on the leaders’ perception 
of developments in the world.
121
 
The Foreign Ministry’s power and influence seem to have declined since 2000, 
and it frequently had to relinquish its traditional leading role in international 
negotiations. One of the reasons for this is that China’s increasing involvement in 
world affairs and the growing complexity of the international environment have led 
to a proliferation of foreign policy decision-making bodies. The Foreign Ministry 
often depends on other agencies for expertise while simultaneously competing with 
them for influence. Within the Chinese government, the Foreign Ministry’s authority 
over foreign policy issues has increasingly been contested by other agencies that 
have expanded their international outreach in their respective fields, such as the 
Ministries of Commerce, Finance, and State Security, the People’s Bank of China, 
and the National Development and Reform Commission.
122
 
The role of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Chinese foreign policy-
making has contracted: The number of military officers in Party positions of power 
has steadily decreased, and since 1997 the PLA has not had a representative on the 
PSC. Nevertheless, the PLA continues to be a highly influential and autonomous 
foreign policy decision-making entity, particularly as regards decisions pertaining to 
territorial disputes, nuclear weapons, and national security vis-à-vis major countries, 
including Russia.
123
 Since the mid-1990s, the PLA has also been active in military 
diplomacy, for instance by hosting international symposia and seminars with foreign 
officers and defence officials.
124
 China’s foreign policy has also increasingly been 
shaped by new actors who are not part of traditional decision-making structures. 
Corporate executives from the energy and financial sectors, regional government 
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officials, experts from academic and research institutions, and leading representatives 
of the media operate on the margins of official foreign policy-making. 
Overall, the changing circumstances under which Chinese foreign policy is made 
in the post-Cold War world have created openings for the increasing participation of 
new foreign policy actors. This process has been promoted by the consensus-driven 
nature of Chinese political decision-making, which requires a great amount of 
discussion and bargaining on any policy item to reach a compromise acceptable to all 
parties concerned. Consequently, decision-making processes on important policy 
items are lengthy and complicated, and interest groups outside of the official foreign 
policy establishment are thus enabled to influence policy by swaying just one top 
leader’s views.125 
More importantly, input from external bodies and individuals into the Chinese 
foreign policy decision-making process has been boosted by the fact that decision-
makers have been facing a steep learning curve due to the rapid expansion of 
Chinese commercial and political interests into every corner of the globe and the 
continuous diversification of China’s foreign policy objectives. Many ministries 
today lack the expertise needed to address the challenges accompanying China’s 
active international expansion. The question of obtaining reliable information on 
various foreign policy matters has become increasingly important. Consequently, 
when deliberating policy decisions, China’s foreign policy leadership has 
increasingly consulted external researchers, leading intellectuals, and senior media 
representatives. While far less influential in foreign policy decision-making than 
other leading actors, these new actors still carry some weight. The writings of 
academics and journalists offer expertise on specific issue areas, but also provide a 
window through which foreign ideas and debates are channelled to the top 
leadership.
126
 
 
 
Russia’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making Structure: 
As in the case of China, policy-making in post-Soviet Russia has developed out 
of a long tradition of autocratic governance and single-party rule, and its overall 
dynamics remain similarly opaque. The foreign policy-making context in Russia 
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differs from that in China, however, in that it experienced two marked rifts: the first, 
cataclysmic one was caused by the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
second, more moderate one by the presidential transition from Boris Yeltsin to 
Vladimir Putin in 2000. Overall, post-Soviet Russian foreign policy has been 
characterised by a proliferation of relevant actors and institutions.  
In nominal terms, with the end of the USSR the primacy of the Foreign Ministry 
as the pre-eminent foreign policy-making institution below the President was 
unchallenged. In practice, however, a plethora of new foreign policy actors evolved 
that side-lined the Foreign Ministry on numerous important issues. Even within the 
administration, the Foreign Ministry regularly found itself contradicted or ignored by 
other ministries or agencies. The Ministries of Defence, Atomic Energy, and 
Economic Development, as well as the Presidential Administration selectively got 
involved in foreign policy-making. The same was true of the Russian parliament (the 
State Duma), the energy monopolies, and the increasingly influential military-
industrial complex.
127
 Independent economic actors (whose interests were often 
intimately associated with those of individuals in the administration) began to exert a 
substantial influence over foreign policy-making.
128
 
While the Foreign Ministry’s authority receded in the 1990s, no alternative 
institution evolved to clearly take over its former coordinating role in foreign policy-
making. At the same time, presidential guidance also remained weak throughout the 
1990s. Consequently, the conduct of external relations became characterised by 
collective indiscipline, conflicting policies and statements, a lack of mutual 
consultation, and maverick acts by individual officials. In the words of a leading 
official, Russia during the 1990s had “several foreign policies”.129 Particularly during 
Yeltsin’s second term, observers of Russian foreign policy increasingly gained “the 
impression of the inmates running the asylum”.130  
The executive tried to minimise acute policy disagreements by establishing 
various interdepartmental structures to improve foreign policy coordination, 
including a Foreign Policy Commission within the Security Council, a Foreign 
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Policy Council, and the President’s Foreign Policy Administration; but far from 
improving government coordination, the formation of such bodies (which proved 
largely impotent and short-lived) generated further confusion and undermined the 
position of existing structures, such as the Foreign Ministry.
131
 Amidst a strong 
demand for a return to professionalism in foreign policy-making, Vladimir Putin 
became President in 2000 and steered Russian foreign policy-making in a direction 
of greater institutional order, predictability and continuity, leading to a renewed 
reduction in the number of relevant foreign policy actors. 
The foremost policymaking authority in post-Soviet Russia is the President. 
Following a violent struggle with parliament in 1993 (which ensured that the 
disproportionate power of the Presidency was enshrined in the Russian Constitution), 
the President also emerged as the top authority on foreign policy matters. Whereas 
Yeltsin was very dependent on a circle of influential individuals and contributed far 
fewer independent ideas or broader conceptions to foreign policy-making than his 
formal authority as President would have warranted, during Putin’s tenure in 
particular the President has emerged as the central decision-maker on all principal 
foreign policy matters. Political power has been recentralised, and several previously 
influential foreign policy agents, such as the legislative branch, the academe, 
regional leaders and the corporate ‘oligarchs’, have lost much of their influence. But 
since the President cannot directly attend to any but the most essential policy matters, 
day-to-day foreign policy-making is delegated to secondary actors. In this, Putin 
principally relies on a narrow, informal circle of loyal associates, rather than formal 
institutions.
132
 
The Russian Foreign Ministry holds little policy-making authority, but it is 
nonetheless more than a secondary actor in the foreign policy-making process. It 
remains the only institution with comprehensive coverage across all issues of foreign 
policy and can draw on unrivalled expertise in terms of area and functional 
specialists. The Foreign Ministry has often functioned as a ‘braking mechanism’, 
exerting a moderating and conservative influence, especially on issues where the 
administration’s policy line remained unclear. Particularly since Putin’s rise to power, 
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however, the Foreign Ministry’s function has principally been to merely implement 
the Kremlin’s policies.133 
The Defence Ministry was among the greatest beneficiaries of the anarchic and 
diversified foreign policy environment of the 1990s, when it often acted without 
consultation with or in contradiction to the Foreign Ministry. In the more ordered 
bureaucratic foreign policy-making context since 2000, the Defence Ministry’s 
opportunities for foreign policy freelancing have become restricted. On most foreign 
policy issues, it is once again subordinate to the Foreign Ministry, and its influence is 
limited to a relatively small number of defence-related issues. However, while the 
influence of the Defence Ministry qua institution has declined, the authority of the 
Defence Minister has grown, which illustrates the distinction between weak 
institutions and powerful individuals in Russian policy-making.
134
 Also, the loss of 
clout of the defence establishment since 2000 coincided with the rise in importance 
of the security and intelligence services (FSB and SVR), whose role had sharply 
decreased during the Yeltsin years.
135
 
The Security Council (established in 1992) has mainly been a forum for drawing 
up broad conceptual documents and an advisory group for the President, designed to 
resolve competing bureaucratic priorities. It was a major participant in security-
related foreign policy issues while it was headed by Sergei Ivanov (1999-2001), but 
thereafter it largely disappeared as a foreign policy player.
136
 The legislature, 
specifically the Duma, which already experienced significant setbacks to its political 
authority during the Yeltsin years, has been unable to materially influence the 
Kremlin’s foreign policy conduct since Putin gained effective control of all major 
parliamentary votes.
137
 
Much the same is true for the Russian regions: Under Yeltsin, the regions were 
able to obstruct some of the government’s foreign policy initiatives (including in its 
relations with China), but also to promote trans-border regional economic schemes. 
Under Putin, by contrast, their influence on foreign policy-making declined to a 
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minimum (not least due to the Kremlin’s assumption of control over the appointment 
of regional governors in 2005). The influence of academic institutions and think-
tanks on foreign policy-making, moderate but sometimes recognisable during the 
Yeltsin Presidency, has further declined in the 2000s. The media, likewise, have been 
more of an instrument of official foreign policy than an influence on it.
138
 
One set of agents whose influence on Russian foreign policy-making has steadily 
increased are the economic ministries. This has not least been due to the growing 
need for specialist knowledge in matters of foreign economic policy that 
accompanied the increasing ‘economisation’ of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy. 
Overall, this sphere of foreign policy-making has remained the most ‘anarchic’, and 
the different economic ministries have continued to pursue different interests and 
agendas. Among non-government actors, none has had more influence on foreign 
policy decisions than large businesses. Major corporations, particularly in the energy 
sector, emerged as the preeminent players in the sphere of foreign economic policy. 
These corporations have usually been closely and personally tied to the government, 
depending on constant access to the leading policy-makers. During the Putin 
presidency in particular, corporate interests became increasingly entangled with 
those of leading state officials. The expanding state sector of the economy, which 
now stands in a ‘symbiotic’ relationship with the government, has become a potent 
foreign policy actor in its own right.
139
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
 
While the high time of the Sino-Soviet alliance witnessed very close foreign 
policy coordination between Beijing and Moscow, even then incidents like the 1954 
Gao Gang affair betrayed a lack of genuine trust between the two governments and a 
failure to exchange vital information. In many ways, however, the foreign policy of 
either country continued to be strongly conditioned by the other. Beginning in the 
early 1960s, the increasing estrangement of both sides, culminating in open 
hostilities, was largely caused by the growth of mutual suspicions and a persistent 
lack of mutual understanding, promoted in no small part by the lack of channels or 
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forums through which lasting contact and exchange between the Chinese and Soviet 
leaderships and the foreign policy establishments in both countries could have been 
guaranteed. 
Today, the overall policymaking environment in China remains highly 
hierarchical and stratified, but the exact lines of power and responsibility are not 
clearly delineated and remain somewhat fluid, which has left some space for the 
emergence of new agencies and institutions. As China’s integration into the 
international community intensifies, the government’s increasing demand for 
external advice has coincided with a growing need to be able to swiftly communicate 
with other states in crisis situations. Before this background and that of the overall 
fragmentation of foreign policy actors and authority since the early 1990s, China has 
become more and more active in international intergovernmental and regional 
organisations. In 2006 for instance, China hosted several international summits and 
conferences that attracted over 60 world leaders, and the top Chinese officials are 
now regular guests at countless international forums.
140
 
In contrast to China, where foreign policy caucuses, councils and foreign affairs 
bureaucracies have become increasingly influential,
141
 post-Soviet Russian foreign 
policy has overwhelmingly been directed by powerful individuals (inside and outside 
of the administration), whose influence has largely been determined by their standing 
in an informal power hierarchy. The primacy of individuals and the contrasting 
relative weakness of institutions has been a key feature of the Russian foreign policy 
arrangement in the post-Soviet period. Under Yeltsin and particularly under Putin, 
the atomisation of individual actors within an informal network of personal loyalties 
and dependencies allowed the President to maximise his authority and prevent the 
formation of a bureaucratic caucus that might constitute an alternative source of 
foreign policy decision-making power.
142
 The influence of foreign policy institutions 
has generally been judged to be more formalistic than real, and many institutions 
(such as the Security Council) have played a role in foreign policy-making only to 
the extent that top positions in them were occupied by powerful individuals. 
Consequently, the traditional foreign policy environment in Russia has not been 
favourable for bilateral institution-building. The post-Soviet Russian political system 
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failed to develop the sturdy institutions that could have lent it a degree of continuity 
and predictability.
143
 On the other hand, the continuously growing complexity of 
foreign policy matters in a country that has become fully integrated into the 
international system, and the attendant growth of the volume of information to be 
processed by the foreign policy apparatus, have encouraged the gradual 
establishment of dedicated forums and dialogue mechanisms with Russia’s 
neighbours and trade partners. At the same time, Russia has gradually increased its 
membership in multilateral institutions and organisations. 
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Chapter III: Conventional Explanations of Bilateral Rapprochement: 
Geopolitics, Trade, and Mutual Perceptions 
 
 
This chapter traces substantial developments in Sino-Russian relations after the 
Cold War, with the aim of further illuminating the background before which the 
institutionalisation of Sino-Russian relations has occurred. For this purpose, it 
comparatively assesses the significance of those factors of bilateral interaction that 
have commonly been assumed to account for the dynamism of bilateral 
rapprochement in this period. These include balance-of-power and security 
objectives, economic cooperation, as well as mutual perceptions and ideas. The 
chapter provides an analysis of the degree to which Sino-Russian cooperation in the 
above fields – commonly judged to be the core dimensions of the bilateral 
relationship – has been beset by substantial structural problems and imbalances. 
 
 
 
Security and Geopolitics: 
 
Balance-of-power and geostrategic objectives have been identified by many 
analysts as the primary and determining factor of China’s and Russia’s mutual 
rapprochement since the end of the Cold War.
144
 To many observers, increasing 
bilateral cooperation seemed to indicate the formation of an anti-hegemonic alliance 
between two revisionist powers,
145
 and the bilateral relationship was therefore 
commonly characterised as “a nexus, in which geopolitics is at the core and 
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opposition to the emerging world order is the raison d'être”.146 During the period 
under study, Beijing and Moscow did indeed cooperate closely on a number of 
geopolitical questions. This was most evident in 1999 when, amid rhetoric about the 
need to create a ‘new international order’, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny 
Primakov approached China with the proposition of forming a ‘strategic triangle’ 
(including India) with the explicit aim of counterbalancing U.S. hegemony. In the 
context of both countries’ firm opposition to NATO’s 1999 military operations 
against Serbia, Boris Yeltsin deliberately used the occasion of his last state visit to 
Beijing for reminding the West that Russia was a nuclear power. At the time, both 
sides also held military consultations about possible joint responses to American 
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) plans. 
Although joint geopolitical opposition to the United States was never again made 
as explicit in bilateral pronouncements, it continued to form an important dimension 
of Sino-Russian cooperation during the 2000s. Thus, China and Russia were united 
in their opposition to U.S. anti-ballistic missile plans – a ‘Joint Statement on the 
Question of ABM’ was issued in July 2000 – as well as the 2003 invasion of Iraq. A 
routine of strategic consultations was initiated between Beijing and Moscow. A 
major bilateral document, the ‘Sino-Russian Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and 
Friendly Cooperation’, was passed in July 2001, stipulating close cooperation on 
international affairs.
147
 China and Russia appeared to hold very similar views 
regarding the desired structure of the post-Cold War international order.
148
 The 
Chinese and Russian leaderships continued to affirm their joint wish to strengthen a 
‘multipolar world order’ in most joint statements and in many comments made by 
high-ranking foreign policy officials. In practice, Beijing and Moscow closely 
cooperated and presented a joint diplomatic front against U.S. interests on countless 
issues of international importance, most importantly on opposing armed 
interventions and regime change. 
The geopolitical dimension of Sino-Russian relations became more pronounced 
again after 2004, as American activity in Central Asia became a cause for concern 
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for both China and Russia. It was occasionally articulated through the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which had been formed in 2001 as a regional 
security organisation in Central Asia. In July 2005, the SCO issued a statement 
urging Washington to set up a timetable for withdrawing its troops from Central Asia. 
Although affirmations by Chinese and Russian policy-makers abounded that the 
SCO is ‘not a military bloc’, it includes a distinct military component (albeit with the 
designated goal of anti-terrorism), particularly in the form of regular joint military 
exercises under the SCO’s aegis. 
But overall, apart from brief episodes in the late 1990s, very little of the rhetoric 
emanating from Beijing and Moscow about their mutual relations since the end of the 
Cold War has referred to concrete geostrategic goals. Even the ambitiously labelled 
Sino-Russian ‘Joint Statement on the 21st Century World Order’ of July 2005, rather 
than expressing an explicit or implicit challenge to the West, was primarily an 
affirmation of territorial sovereignty and an appeal to strengthen regional security. 
While both governments most commonly referred to their mutual relationship as a 
‘strategic partnership’ – its official label since 1996 – this phrase itself has been 
imbued with little meaning, and both Beijing and Moscow have used it rather 
indiscriminately to refer to their relationships with numerous other countries, 
including members of NATO.
149
 
Zero-sum balance-of-power objectives played an important role in promoting 
Sino-Russian bilateral and regional cooperation, with the United States featuring as a 
core reference point for both states; but during the 2000s in particular, Sino-Russian 
security interaction has also increasingly been driven by positive-sum calculations of 
the benefits of jointly tackling regional security threats that endanger the domestic 
stability of both countries. China and Russia have concrete and broadly 
corresponding security interests, particularly in the Central Asian region. Foremost 
among these has been their joint interest in confronting what the Chinese leadership 
labelled the ‘three evils’ in Central Asia: terrorism, separatism, and religious 
extremism. A core reason for both governments to value the benefits of security 
cooperation in Central Asia has been their common concern about the impact of 
regional instability on domestic security and separatist struggles in some of their 
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borderlands.
150
 Regional security and anti-terrorism concerns were also the strongest 
initial motives for expanding the ‘Shanghai Five’-mechanism into the SCO in 2001, 
including the establishment of a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), which 
commenced operations in 2004. 
 
 
The Limitations of Bilateral Security Cooperation: 
Although joint geopolitical and security objectives constitute one of the central 
motives for the enhancement of Sino-Russian cooperation after the Cold War, 
bilateral cooperation in this field – particularly regarding the goal to jointly balance 
against the United States – in large parts remained erratic and incoherent. China 
showed little interest in some of the geopolitical questions of greatest concern for 
Moscow, such as NATO expansion, and initially did little to involve Russia in the 
four-power talks on Korea.
151
 Russia in turn alienated Beijing through recurrent 
episodes of open cooperation with the U.S. The Chinese leadership was concerned, 
for instance, about President Putin’s move to closely align Russia with Washington 
after the events of September 11, 2001, much as his predecessor Yeltsin had initially 
striven to do in the early 1990s.
152
 Putin’s cooperative stance towards the West at 
that time, particularly his initial willingness to cooperate with the American-led anti-
terrorist forces in Afghanistan, caused consternation in Beijing. 
Furthermore, although both sides continued their opposition to American ABM-
plans, the Russian government from 2000 onwards took a number of steps in this 
area that disquieted the Chinese. These included Russia’s move in June 2000 towards 
cooperation with the United States and Western Europe on the question of ABM-
agreements and the signing of the SORT-agreement in 2002,
153
 as well as Russia’s 
earlier proposal to Washington to construct joint theatre-missile-defence systems, 
which the Chinese feared could be used to protect Taiwan.
154
 Beijing also was not 
sympathetic towards Russia’s support of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two 
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breakaway provinces of Georgia, which culminated in a brief war in 2008. These and 
similar instances demonstrated that, from a Chinese perspective, Russia remained a 
relatively unreliable partner in matters of geopolitical and security cooperation. 
For Moscow, however, such cooperation has been much more problematic still, 
due to the extent to which China itself represents a potential geopolitical threat to 
Russia. For most of the duration of the Cold War, China and the Soviet Union faced 
each other as bitter enemies. Their common border was the site of armed clashes in 
the 1960s that involved open threats of the use of nuclear weapons. Since 1964, the 
Chinese leadership had repeatedly laid claim to more than 1.5 million square 
kilometres of land in the Russian Far East. Although the border dispute was officially 
resolved in 2004, this question remains a serious concern in Russia.
155
 Both Chinese 
and Russian experts have noted that the Sino-Russian border could conceivably 
become a renewed zone for tension and instability in the future.
156
 
Russian fears in this regard have been heightened by the fact that the border areas 
are among the structurally weakest and most exposed regions in Russia. The Russian 
Far East is resource-rich but economically stagnant and increasingly under-populated, 
with up to one million people estimated to have fled the region during the 1990s. A 
population of between five and seven million in Far-Eastern Russia faces ca. 104 
million Chinese living in the border regions alone, where the population density is 
more than thirty times as high as on the Russian side.
157
 Russian anxiety about the 
demographic imbalance has been heightened by a significant flow of recorded and 
unrecorded Chinese migrants across the border. Russian journals throughout the 
1990s published roughly one hundred articles criticising Chinese ‘expansion’ into the 
Russian Far East, many of which claimed that Chinese immigration was part of a 
grand design for turning the region into an appendage of China.
158
 Although the 
number of immigrants from China apparently at no point exceeded 150,000-200,000 
– the most comprehensive studies of Chinese immigration estimated the overall 
Chinese presence in Russia by 2000 to number at most several hundreds of 
                                                 
155
 Gilbert Rozman, ‘Russia in Northeast Asia: In Search of a Strategy’, in: Robert Legvold (ed.), 
Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century and the Shadow of the Past (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2000), p.362 
156
 Cf. Aleksei Voskressenski, ‘Russia’s Evolving Grand Strategy toward China’, in: Garnett (ed.), 
Rapprochement or Rivalry?, pp.119, 122 
157
 Trenin, The End of Eurasia, pp.208-209 
158
 Li Jingjie, ‘From Good Neighbours to Strategic Partners’, in: Garnett (ed.), Rapprochement or 
Rivalry?, p.83 
63 
 
thousands
159
 – long-standing fears about Chinese immigration, particularly in the Far 
Eastern border regions, never fully subsided.
160
 Populist politicians (including 
members of the State Duma) and regional governors repeatedly returned to the issue 
and questioned the established border agreements. 
Overall, China’s potential to present a strategic threat to Russia has vastly 
increased since the end of the Cold War, due to a growing asymmetry in economic 
power between both states. In 1980, Soviet GDP was five times as high as China’s, 
but by the end of the 1990s, Chinese GDP (adjusted for purchasing power parity) 
was estimated to be four to five times as high as that of Russia,
161
 and the economic 
gap continued to widen in the 2000s. The contrast of China’s breath-taking economic 
rise and Russia’s relative decline “is perhaps unparalleled among major powers 
during peacetime in modern history”.162 
A similar situation arose with regard to military strength. The Chinese military 
budget has constantly grown since the 1990s. From the early 2000s, for the first time 
in modern history, China’s estimated annual defence expenditure began to outstrip 
that of Russia. According to experts’ estimates, China’s military expenditure in 2000 
roughly equalled that of Russia, amounting to ca. $30 billion. Within a decade, 
however, it soared to ca. $110 billion by 2010, while Russia’s military budget rose to 
a mere $50 billion.
163
 Although China’s military budget lags considerably behind the 
United States in terms of defence spending and military technology, China’s army is 
the numerically largest in the world and, in the case of conflict, is potentially better 
situated than any other fighting force to launch a devastating territorial attack on 
Russia. 
Sino-Russian relations during the 2000s were thus unprecedented, in that Russia 
had never lagged as far behind in terms of conventional military and economic power. 
As a leading academic in the Russian Far East stated, “observed from a classical 
                                                 
159
 Jeanne Wilson, ‘Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese Relations and the July 2001 Friendship 
Treaty’, Problems of Post-Communism, vol.49, no.3 (May June 2002), p.6; Ferdinand, ‘Sunset, 
Sunrise’, p.847 
160
 Viktor Larin, Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskie Otnosheniia v Regional'nykh Izmereniiakh (Moscow: Vostok-
Zapad, 2005), p.299 
161
 Trenin, The End of Eurasia, p.204; the current figure is approximately 5:1. 
162
 Kuchins, ‘Limits of the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership’, p.207 
163
 Anthony Cordesman & Robert Hammond, The Military Balance in Asia: 1990-2011: A 
Quantitative Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), p.7, 
available online at http://csis.org/files/publication/110516_South_Asia-AsiaMilitaryBalance2011.pdf. 
For similar figures, see Anthony Cordesman & Martin Kleiber, The Asian Conventional Military 
Balance in 2006: Overview of Major Asian Powers (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2006), p.30 
64 
 
geopolitics position, the situation of the two countries and the border between them 
objectively provides a basis for antagonism”.164 Unsurprisingly (particularly given 
the history of mutual containment during the Cold War), many Russian analysts, 
politicians and military leaders have long held doubts about China’s long-term 
military intentions. In 1998, a study by the Military Strategic Studies Centre of the 
Russian General Staff, for instance, warned that Chinese economic influence was 
taking control of Russian industry east of the Urals and that China may be tempted to 
use force, if the Russian conventional and nuclear deterrent strength in the Russian 
Far East were to deteriorate further.
165
 
Apprehensions persisted in Russian political and academic circles that China 
would possibly be a much greater long-term source of danger than the United States. 
Influential liberals, such as Egor Gaidar, argued that Russia should re-deploy its 
armed forces from the Western front to face the ‘expansionist peril’ in the East, while 
a spokesman of the centre-right SPS-fraction declared that “in the twenty-first 
century, Russia’s main and most dangerous competitor will be China”.166 Alexei 
Bogaturov, a leading academic, called China “the most formidable geopolitical rival 
Russia has ever had on the Eurasian continent since the Mongol-Tartar invasion”, 
and the scholar and former State Duma deputy Alexei Arbatov regarded it as “the 
only power in the world that can pose a long-term threat to Russia’s security.”167 
Some opinion polls in Russia showed China to rank second among Russia’s potential 
enemies in the public perception.
168
 Alarmist statements about a Chinese ‘concealed 
expansion’ onto Russian territory also appeared in official Foreign Ministry 
communiqués.
169
 President Putin himself, during a July 2000 stay in East Siberia, 
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claimed that “if we don’t develop the Russian Far East, then in the next decades the 
Russian population will be speaking mainly Japanese, Chinese and Korean.”170 
China’s rise also poses a challenge to Russia’s strategic interests in Central Asia, 
which Russian leaders continue to regard as a crucial Russian sphere of influence. 
While the Kremlin’s attention has been predominantly focused on the activities of 
the United States in the region, many analysts agree that “even with the advent of 
limited U.S. military basing nearby, it is difficult to imagine this vast landlocked 
region coming more under the sway of a distant maritime power than of a proximate 
and expansive continental one”, and that “China [will] become the leading external 
force in Central Asia in the years ahead”. 171  Twentieth century Chinese non-
engagement in Central Asia had been an historic anomaly and, due to its strong links 
in the region and its potential for deep economic penetration, China has emerged in 
the 1990s and 2000s as the country with the greatest long-term potential for 
challenging Russia’s regional hegemony.172 
Beijing has increasingly begun to displace Russian economic influence in the 
Central Asian republics (as well as Mongolia
173
), perceiving them as a market for its 
consumer goods and, above all, a promising source of energy.
174
 In addition, Beijing 
has taken first substantial steps towards military cooperation with the Central Asian 
states, including the provision of increasingly large volumes of military aid. In view 
of such developments, a number of Russian and Western scholars regarded Central 
Asia as the most likely theatre for future bilateral tensions between Moscow and 
Beijing.
175
 
China, in turn, has had consistently less reason to regard Russia as a strategic 
threat or geopolitical challenger, as the bilateral balance of power progressively 
shifted in its favour. Already by the late 1990s, “Chinese experts on Russia were 
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nearly unanimous in emphasising the weakness of Russia and the disappearance of a 
military threat from the north for the foreseeable future.”176 But Beijing nonetheless 
has had reasons to be wary of Moscow’s intentions, not least in view of the troubled 
history of bilateral relations throughout most of the Cold War. Chinese policy-
makers are confronted with the risk that a declining Russia, feeling threatened by its 
growing power, might become confrontational, or at the very least uncooperative, 
and might undertake active balancing moves. In the event of an armed confrontation, 
a hostile Russia would remain a powerful adversary.
177
 Not only does Russia possess 
one of the world’s largest militaries with an overwhelming nuclear weapons 
component. Bordering China’s troubled province of Xinjiang (and retaining great 
influence on the Central Asian states, in particular Kazakhstan), Russia also has the 
potential to destabilise China’s vulnerable North-West and to thwart Chinese 
interests in Central Asia. Therefore, Chinese policy-makers, although they have 
progressively less reason to fear Russia’s military power, have had a manifest 
interest in sustaining cordial and cooperative bilateral relations and in allaying 
Russian suspicions to the greatest possible extent. 
Despite all the above-mentioned changes in the regional balance of power to the 
disadvantage of Russia, and despite reasons for either (but particularly the Russian) 
side to believe that the other constituted a potential threat to its security and strategic 
interests, China and Russia have no longer shown any distinct signs of balancing 
against each other, as they had during the Cold War.
178
 On the contrary, while 
Moscow had stationed nearly half a million troops in the Russian Far East by the 
early 1980s and had deployed over 200 strategic bombers and thousands of fighter 
aircraft in Siberia and the Far East
179
 – figures that were paralleled on the Chinese 
side – the 1990s witnessed large-scale bilateral troop reductions along the entire 
length of the border.
180
 Instead of making any moves to balance China’s rapidly 
rising power, Russian exports to China have in large parts (and for a long time 
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almost exclusively) been composed of strategically valuable goods – including 
advanced weapons systems, nuclear technology and vast amounts of natural 
resources, particularly oil. China’s modernisation process, especially its military 
modernisation, has been significantly abetted by an inflow of raw materials from 
Russia and Central Asia, while Russian exports of nuclear technology aided China in 
the extension of its nuclear forces.
181
 Most importantly, continued Russian arms 
exports throughout the 1990s and 2000s, including state-of-the-art weaponry and 
technology-transfers, have enabled China (which, since 1989, has been subject to an 
American and European arms embargo) to continuously upgrade its armed forces and 
military production capabilities,
182
 as well as its space programme. Although 
weapons exports to China dropped in 2006, throughout the preceding years Russian 
deliveries of arms and military technology to China had valued at approximately $2 
billion per year,
183
 and they have recently picked up again.  
 
 
Sino-Russian Security Cooperation Through the Lens of Neo-Realist Theory: 
In analysing what influence geopolitical and balance-of-power factors have had 
in promoting Sino-Russian cooperation, it is instructive to regard the bilateral 
relationship through the framework of structural realist theory, spelled out most 
prominently by Kenneth Waltz. Waltzian Neorealism assumes that the structural 
distribution of power in the international system determines all foreign policy 
choices and, due to a constant ‘security dilemma’ between states, mutual conflict is a 
permanent condition. As a consequence, individual states will constantly attempt to 
balance against perceived challengers within the system, either by enhancing their 
military deterrent or by allying with other states.
184
 From a Waltzian perspective, 
China’s and Russia’s principal reason for seeking mutual alignment would have been 
to jointly balance against the most powerful actor in the international system, the 
United States. 
An attempt to apply the precepts of Neorealist theory to Sino-Russian relations 
up to 2002 – albeit with a focus on one specific element of the relationship, the arms 
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trade – was made in an article by Robert and John Donaldson. In the opinion of 
Donaldson and Donaldson, a Structural Realist explanation remains inconsistent with 
this case: For one, they argue, the military component of the Sino-Russian ‘alliance’ 
has been too weak to render either side certain of the degree of commitment from the 
other needed to effectively balance U.S. power. Secondly, both sides have shown 
intermittent episodes of relatively close cooperation with the United States.
185
 
These observations are accurate. Overall, however, it can be argued that, contrary 
to the findings of Donaldson and Donaldson, Sino-Russian rapprochement is broadly 
consistent with the precepts of Waltzian Neorealism. As outlined above, although 
Sino-Russian cooperation on geostrategic questions has frequently been erratic, 
resistance against American objectives, such as the development of plans to develop 
ABM-systems or the invasion of Iraq, has frequently spurred coordinated Sino-
Russian policy responses. While China and Russia have not taken any further steps 
towards forging a military alliance, the military component of their relationship has 
nonetheless been upgraded, as they have conducted a series of large-scale joint 
military exercises. 
For China, a strategic alignment with Russia would have been an unproblematic 
and even evident choice from a Waltzian point of view. But for Russia the choice 
would have been a more problematic one. Waltzian Neorealism would predict the 
eventual formation of a bipolar world system dominated by the United States and 
China. Arguably, Russia would have had little reason to hasten the formation of such 
a system, in which its own role would be substantially diminished. Beyond that, 
some leading Russian academics and foreign policy-makers have argued that, in the 
foreseeable future, China’s economic and military power would equal and eventually 
eclipse that of the United States,
186
 in which case, from a Waltzian perspective, 
Moscow would have little long-term interest in assisting the relative growth of 
China’s power. 
More importantly, considering the great divergence between the global and the 
regional balances of power, one can question the wisdom of regarding Sino-Russian 
rapprochement solely at the systemic level, as Waltzian Neorealism does. Given that 
China and Russia are contiguous states, it is also worth considering theories that 
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factor in the regional balance of power. This is also suggested by the experience of 
interaction between Beijing and Moscow throughout most of the Cold War: 
Although America’s relative power in the international system was considerably less 
preponderant at that time than it was in the 1990s, in structural terms the United 
States was already the most powerful actor in the international system. Nonetheless, 
instead of forming a stable alliance, both states descended into mutual hostilities after 
1960, and China eventually formed a brief coalition with Washington against 
Moscow. Meanwhile, it continued to amass troops against the Soviet Union and at 
one point escalated the bilateral tensions into a border war. Moscow in turn devoted 
one fifth of its military spending to balance against China (and it did so already long 
before Beijing had sought active rapprochement with Washington in the early 1970s), 
even at a time, when its own military and economic power outstripped that of China 
by a large margin. 
Adapting a regional perspective instead, China, due to its increasing superiority 
of power in the period under study, had little reason not to cooperate closely with 
Russia. Russia, however, has faced an increasingly unfavourable power balance at 
the regional level, with China emerging rapidly as a potential regional hegemon. As 
Bobo Lo observed, to a certain extent Russian policy-makers have viewed China 
regionally as the analogue of the U.S. globally, i.e. a power with too hegemonic an 
agenda.
187
 Russian concerns become obvious, when we regard the Sino-Russian 
rapprochement through the lens of other variants of Neorealist theory that explicitly 
take the regional dimension into account: John Mearsheimer’s ‘offensive’ 
Neorealism, for instance, stipulates that great powers will constantly attempt to 
change the existing distribution of power in their favour through the use of force.
188
 
For Mearsheimer, due to the fact that global hegemony is a virtual impossibility, 
great powers above all strive for hegemony in their region of the world.
189
 In 
Mearsheimer’s conception, one would thus expect China and Russia to view each 
other, rather than the United States, as their primary great power rivals. Indeed, 
Mearsheimer considered it likely that China would make a bid for regional 
hegemony in North-East Asia in the near future, a course that would inevitably be 
pitting it squarely against Russia.
190
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A further variant of Neorealist theory that does include the regional context in its 
analysis is Stephen Walt’s ‘balance-of-threat’ approach, which postulates that states 
tend to balance primarily against perceived threats, rather than material power alone. 
From the perspective of Russia, the inferior of the two powers, China clearly fulfils 
most of Walt’s criteria for being perceived as a primary strategic threat:191 While it 
outweighs Russia vastly in almost all dimensions of conventional power, it even 
exceeds the United States in some dimensions of what Walt termed ‘aggregate 
power’, such as total population.192 China’s ‘offensive power’, which Walt defined 
as “the ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state at an 
acceptable cost”,193 would certainly render it a primary threat in the eyes of Russian 
foreign policy-makers, particularly given the already wide-spread perceptions of 
Chinese territorial encroachment on the Russian border regions. Finally, in terms of 
proximity, China – the only great power that shares a land border with Russia – 
would undoubtedly appear as the single greatest threat to its security. 
The one remaining variable in Walt’s approach that could account for the 
absence of mutual balancing and the intensification of cooperation is Russia’s 
perception of China’s intentions. But the confrontational history of bilateral relations 
during the Cold War gave either side little reason to trust the other’s intentions, and 
although mutual perceptions improved markedly after the Cold War, they remain 
ambivalent (as will be outlined later in this chapter). Russian public perception of 
China remains one of pervasive distrust – and, according to Walt, whenever 
intentions cannot be reliably determined, balancing should always be expected as the 
safer option.
194
 
Applying Walt’s theory, one has reason to believe that Russia should have 
regarded China (rather than the United States) as the most formidable long-term 
great power adversary: Consequently, one would expect balancing rather than 
cooperation to occur between the two. If China and Russia did not substantially 
balance against, but instead chose to closely cooperate with each other, then one may 
expect that another prominent Realist approach, Randall Schweller’s Neo-classical 
Realist ‘bandwagoning’ theory, could account for the development of their 
relationship. According to Schweller, dissatisfied ‘jackal’-powers will tend to 
                                                 
191
 Cf. Donaldson & Donaldson, ‘The Arms Trade in Russian-Chinese Relations’, p.720 
192
 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp.22-23 
193
 Ibid., p.24 
194
 Ibid., p.180 
71 
 
‘bandwagon’ closely with a rising power in order to change the global status quo.195 
Prima facie, a case may be made for interpreting Russia’s rapprochement with a 
rising China along these lines since both powers share certain revisionist aspirations. 
But neither China nor Russia strictly fulfil Schweller’s criteria for being ‘revisionist’ 
powers – a precondition for bandwagoning to occur: In the regional context of 
Central and East Asia, Russia acts fundamentally as a status-quo power, seeking to 
preserve its ‘dominion’ against any potential challenger, global or regional.196 While 
possibly revisionist in some of its policies towards the states bordering it in Eastern 
Europe and the Caucasus, Moscow is status-quo-oriented in Central Asia and with 
regard to its own borders in the Far East, and it has grounds for assuming that these 
areas would be among the first targets of a nascent Chinese revisionism. 
China itself, although it has certainly tried to gain and consolidate additional 
influence in the region and on the global level, likewise cannot be defined as a 
‘revisionist’ power (not least since its economic growth is effectively predicated on 
the stability of the existing international system). A study specifically devoted to this 
question argued that, even if one takes into account Beijing’s persistent objective of 
reintegrating Taiwan, contemporary China cannot be characterised as a ‘revisionist’ 
state according to the common definitions of the term, including Schweller’s.197 
Hence, we should not expect a ‘bandwagoning’ between China and Russia to 
occur.
198
 
One element of Sino-Russian strategic interaction that has thus far been left aside 
is the role of the nuclear deterrent in the bilateral security relationship. A possible 
explanation why the Chinese and Russian leaderships have been able to align 
themselves closely with each other, despite a growing divergence in material power 
and widespread perceptions of China as a threat to Russian security, can be found in 
theories about the role of nuclear weapons in inter-state interaction. According to 
Realists and Neorealists like Robert Art, John Mearsheimer, and Robert Jervis, 
nuclear weapons, acting as effective deterrents against the use of large-scale 
conventional force, have played a predominant role in averting wars between modern 
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great powers.
199
 Viewed from this perspective, foreign policy-makers on either side, 
and particularly in Russia, would most likely have considered their country’s nuclear 
arsenals a reliable deterrent against any aggressive designs on the part of the other, 
even in the face of an overwhelming shift in the regional power balance in favour of 
China in virtually all dimensions of conventional power. 
Such considerations do appear to have played a significant role in Russian 
strategic planning in particular. Russia has kept an extraordinarily large arsenal of 
non-strategic nuclear weapons that could in theory be deployed against its 
neighbours, and it continues to attach great importance to these weapons.
200
 Russian 
military analysts have included China in their assessment of non-strategic nuclear 
force requirements.
201
 As one prominent Russian analyst observed, in the event of 
conflict with China, Russia, due to its relative conventional weakness, would have to 
rely on its nuclear weapons.
202
 Unsurprisingly, mutual assurance of non-first-use of 
nuclear weapons was an important clause in the 2001 Sino-Russian Friendship 
Treaty. 
However, while the Russian government’s reliance on its nuclear deterrent 
appears to have been a necessary precondition for its readiness to cooperate closely 
with China despite a growing divergence in conventional power between the two 
states, it is less clear whether it was also a sufficient one. For one, many Russian 
strategic planners continue to hold the conception that the Chinese ability to tolerate 
losses might neutralise Russia’s reliance on its nuclear forces.203 During the border 
conflicts of the 1960s, China had provoked clashes with Soviet troops despite 
Moscow’s vast nuclear superiority, and the Soviet leadership had deployed large 
portions of its conventional forces on the Sino-Soviet border. Throughout the 1990s 
and early 2000s, Russia’s nuclear arsenal steadily diminished and deteriorated,204 and 
although Russia retains an overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons, China has 
gradually upgraded and expanded its nuclear arsenals as well. Many analysts and 
planners consider the gap between Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities to be 
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narrowing, expecting nuclear parity between Russia and China in the near future.
205
 
Russian foreign policy-makers, such as the former chairman of the Federation 
Council Committee for International Affairs, Mikhail Margelov, have expressed their 
anxiety about Chinese nuclear weapons developments, criticising that “[e]verything 
to do with defence and nuclear weapons in China is shrouded in a veil of secrecy and 
disinformation. […] Yet it is China – the sole of the legally recognised nuclear 
powers – that is building up these weapons.”206 Claiming that Chinese concern over 
Russia’s nuclear forces was among the reasons for its intensified nuclear arms 
programme, Margelov cautioned “that in the nuclear sphere, China has set itself quite 
a feasible task: within the next 15 to 20 years, to draw level with the United States 
and attain superiority over Russia.”207 Overall, the nuclear dimension seems to have 
played a central role in shaping Chinese and Russian strategic perceptions of each 
other and enabling the Russian leadership in particular to regard China’s increasing 
conventional strength with relative equanimity, but arguably this cannot fully 
account for the absence of substantial, open geostrategic tensions in post-Cold War 
Sino-Russian relations, let alone for the rapid and extensive expansion of cooperative 
links. 
 
 
 
Economic and Energy Relations: 
 
Ever since bilateral relations between China and Russia gained momentum in the 
mid-1990s, the economic sphere has held great promises for both sides. Trade and 
economic links have become an increasingly significant component of Sino-Russian 
cooperation. In 1996, China and Russia announced that they would aim to increase 
their overall trade turnover to $20 billion by the year 2000.
208
 But throughout the 
1990s, trade between the two countries all but stagnated at a low level (between $5.1 
and $7.7 billion). At the time, the Chinese leadership had to realise that the Yeltsin 
administration and particularly the governors of the Russian border regions 
ultimately showed few signs of sharing the Chinese economic vision of cooperation 
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and openness and effectively retained much of their previous fortress mentality 
towards North East Asia.
209
 The Russian economic elites also initially showed little 
interest in China.  
The 1998 Russian financial crisis further contributed to the stagnation in bilateral 
trade during the 1990s. Chinese policy-makers and traders at the time were 
constantly irked by seemingly arbitrary and restrictive Russian tariff and visa 
regimes, as well as a general lack of trade coordination on the part of the Russian 
authorities. Moscow also reacted coolly to some of Beijing’s economic plans in 
North-East Asia, such as the Chinese initiative to build an ‘international city’ on the 
T’umen River, through which China would have gained a commercial port on the 
Sea of Japan.
210
 Consequently, trade and economic exchange between China and 
Russia were commonly regarded by Western observers as relatively insignificant and 
came to be seen as ‘the weakest link’ in Sino-Russian relations.211 
In the 2000s, however, bilateral economic interaction rapidly rose to become one 
of the mainstays of Sino-Russian cooperation. Although it remains beset by 
substantial structural problems, bilateral trade has grown dramatically after 1999. 
The total volume of bilateral trade was still lingering at a mere $5.7 billion in 1999, 
far below the initially targeted trade volume of $20 billion. But annual Sino-Russian 
trade volumes subsequently began to skyrocket, rising to $40.3 billion in 2007 (a 
seven-fold increase), with an average annual trade growth of more than 28% since 
1999. Although the growth in trade was temporarily interrupted by the effects of the 
global recession, it swiftly recovered, and the bilateral trade volume reached $88.2 
billion in 2012, leading China to become Russia’s largest trading partner. 212  In 
addition to the official trade figures, ‘unregistered’ or ‘shuttle’ trade across the Sino-
Russian border was estimated to amount to an additional $10 billion annually in the 
early 2000s.
213
 Cross-border trade has proven a vital source of cheap consumer goods 
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for the population in Russia’s border regions and an important impetus for economic 
growth in China’s impoverished North-East.  
Sino-Russian economic cooperation was put onto a firmer organisational basis 
through the drafting of inter-governmental planning papers, the ‘Trade Agreement 
for the Years 2001-2005’, and a ‘Programme for Trade and Economic Cooperation 
for the Period of 2006-2010’. The 2000s witnessed a substantial growth of mutual 
foreign direct investments, which had still been all but insignificant in the late 
1990s.
214
 Geopolitical questions, such as the joint response to American ABM-plans, 
dominated most Sino-Russian joint statements until early 2001, but economic 
concerns subsequently emerged as the area of cooperation which has consistently 
been addressed in most depth. 
But while the Russian leadership began to show much greater enthusiasm to 
expand economic cooperation in the 2000s and has made serious efforts in this 
regard, the development of bilateral economic interaction remains a constant source 
of discontent in Moscow. In particular, the balance of bilateral trade has become very 
one-sided (a problem that became fully visible in the course of the 2000s). Between 
2000 and 2009, the annual growth of Chinese exports to Russia (ca. 41%) was 
considerably greater than the annual growth of Russian exports to China (ca. 23%). 
The Russian export surplus with China (almost three to one in 2000) vanished fast, 
and by 2007, for the first time in the history of Sino-Russian relations, Moscow 
recorded a trade deficit. While some Russian policy-makers complained about 
Beijing’s ‘lack of interest’ in altering structural deficiencies in bilateral trade,215 most 
insisted that the changing trade balance was ‘not critical’216 and continued to stress 
joint efforts at tackling the problem. 
However, an even greater concern for Russian policy-makers than the 
increasingly unfavourable trade balance has been the development of the structure of 
Russian exports to China: The share of machinery and industrial goods (excluding 
arms) in Russian exports, still substantial by 2001, had become negligible later in the 
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decade.
217
 Russia consistently tried to boost the export of high value-added industrial 
goods to China, but (with the exception of the arms trade, which has benefitted from 
the above-mentioned Western embargo on arms sales to China) it has increasingly 
failed in this attempt. China did not seek to upgrade its aging Soviet technology base, 
preferring to acquire Western industrial products instead and increasingly developing 
its own. In 2005, Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov called the 
volume of manufactured goods as a share of Russian exports to China 
‘insufficient’, 218  but they had to observe their share almost halve again in the 
following year. In spite of the constant growth of bilateral trade (and in spite of 
incessant Russian complaints and initiatives), already by early 2007 oil and natural 
gas accounted for almost fifty percent of Russian exports to China, while the total 
share of raw materials had gradually risen to more than ninety percent.
219
 
Statements by the Russian leadership about economic relations with China reveal 
a constant worry of Russia becoming a mere raw-materials appendage to its 
neighbour, and policy-makers in Moscow have become increasingly anxious that 
their export revenues would become overly dependent on fluctuating price levels for 
raw materials. The Russian foreign ministry’s 2007 overview of economic 
cooperation with China bitterly noted that the share of machinery and industrial 
products in Russian exports to China had fallen to a mere 1.31%, while the volume 
of Chinese industrial exports to Russia had begun to constitute a “serious threat” to 
domestic industrial producers.
220
 Similarly, in July 2007 Russia’s Natural 
Monopolies Institute published an analysis warning of substantial economic and 
social risks in trade with China.
221
 While Russian concerns about the composition of 
its exports to China were not so great as to seriously impede bilateral trade 
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cooperation, they rendered Russia less enthusiastic and less cooperative in pursuing 
it than it might otherwise have been, particularly in the energy sector.
222
 
A further source of friction in Sino-Russian economic relations were repeated 
disputes over Chinese tariffs, import quotas, and anti-dumping measures, which 
blocked the flow of Russian exports to China. Chinese tariffs were generally 
withdrawn upon the intervention of the Russian government, but in the face of 
increasing opposition by domestic manufacturers to Chinese economic expansion on 
the Russian market, Russian government sources announced that, since in the past 
“Chinese authorities were never shy about relying on anti-dumping investigations, 
[…] Russia could respond with similar methods”.223 
 
 
Sino-Russian Energy Cooperation: 
By far the most important component of Sino-Russian trade is Russian energy 
exports to China. The energy sector exemplifies the great promises, but also the 
particular setbacks of bilateral economic cooperation. Prima facie, the Sino-Russian 
energy relationship appears to be “a match made in heaven”:224 In the past three 
decades, China, through its meteoric industrial growth rates, has been one of the 
most rapidly growing energy consumers in the world. All the while, with Russia, 
China has one of the world’s largest resource reservoirs at its doorstep. Today, China 
has become the world’s second-largest consumer and importer of oil, behind the 
United States. Already in 1993, China became a net importer of oil. Since 2007, it 
has also been a net importer of natural gas, which is gradually becoming a more 
important building block of China’s overall energy structure, although it continues to 
play a very minor role in it.
225
 Russia, meanwhile, is the world’s largest oil producer, 
accounting for 12% of global oil production in 2011 (in terms of bbl/day),
226
 and it 
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has the world’s largest proven natural gas reserves. Many of Russia’s undeveloped 
hydrocarbons resources are located in proximity to the Chinese border in the Russian 
Far East. In view of these circumstances, China’s resource hunger and Russia’s 
resource riches seem to add up to a natural complementarity in the energy field.227 
In actual fact, however, bilateral energy cooperation has remained problematic 
and has fallen far short of its potential. Russia’s energy exports to China have indeed 
grown substantially. Its oil exports to China, for instance, rose from around 3 million 
tons in 2002 to almost 16 million tons in 2006,
228
 and have since remained at similar 
levels. In relative terms, however, and in view of the speed of China’s economic 
growth and the potential of Russia’s production capacities, these volumes have been 
disappointing. Russia’s share in China’s total crude oil imports rose from 2% in 2000 
to 11% in 2006, but has since dropped again to a mere 8% in 2011, ranking fourth 
among China’s supplier countries (after Saudi Arabia, Angola, and Iran).229 At the 
same time, bilateral natural gas trade, which to this day has been restricted to 
deliveries of liquefied natural gas (LNG), has remained puny, accounting for a mere 
4% of China’s already modest overall LNG imports.230 
This disappointing situation has largely persisted, in spite of great incentives for 
both states to intensify their energy cooperation. In China’s case, these include its 
strategic vulnerability, due to its dependence on overseas oil and gas imports. In 
particular, “despite its efforts to diversify its sources, China has become increasingly 
dependent on Middle East oil. Today, 58% of China’s oil imports come from the 
region. By 2015, the share of Middle East oil will stand on 70%.”231 Aside from the 
region’s volatility, the fact that its Middle Eastern oil imports have to be transported 
along vulnerable sea lanes, particularly the narrow Straits of Malacca, poses 
significant strategic risks for China.
232
 In the case of natural gas, besides having a 
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strategic incentive to increase overland deliveries vis-à-vis seaborne LNG imports, 
China would benefit from an overall increase of natural gas as a portion of its energy 
consumption structure (where it currently accounts for a minuscule 4%). China’s 
abysmal environmental pollution record has long warranted efforts to move out of its 
dependence on coal-generated energy and towards cleaner energy sources, such as 
natural gas. 
Russia, meanwhile, has repeatedly stated its interest in diversifying its energy 
exports away from an overreliance on European customers. This aim was also 
codified in the Russian government’s National Energy Strategy of 2003, which 
stipulated that the share of the Asia-Pacific region in Russia’s total oil exports should 
rise from three percent at the time to thirty percent by 2020, and the corresponding 
share in gas exports should rise to fifteen percent.
233
 The stage was therefore set for 
China and Russia to substantially intensify their energy cooperation.  
Various efforts have indeed been made towards this end, but for the most part 
they remained fruitless. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, energy 
cooperation between the nascent Russian Federation and China was very slow to 
develop. Up to 1993, it consisted merely of a few small and eventually abortive 
initiatives for natural gas cooperation between individual Chinese and Russian 
provinces. Around 1993, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) took the 
initiative to develop schemes for substantial hydrocarbons imports from Russia to 
China. Around the same time, Russia began to draw up plans for developing the vast 
virgin gas fields of Irkutsk Province, as well as to export electricity to China.
234
 
“Between 1993 and February 1999, when three agreements for preliminary 
feasibility study works on oil and gas pipeline development were signed, Sino-
Russian oil and gas cooperation was expanded via a number of key agreements. The 
first was the MOU, signed by CNPC and MINTOPENERGA in early November 
1994, which envisaged the construction of a trans-boundary long-distance natural gas 
pipeline running through Inner Mongolia and Hebei Province and terminating in 
Shandong Province. […] This 1994 MOU could be regarded as the first inter-
governmental level agreement relating to Sino-Russian oil and gas cooperation.”235  
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When China’s Prime Minister Li Peng visited Russia in late December 1996, 
plans to build a gas pipeline from Irkutsk to Rizhao in Shandong province were a 
central item on his agenda. “The anticipated discussion between Prime Minister Li 
and President Yeltsin on this project was expected to open the way to a final contract 
after three years of bilateral negotiations. […] In fact, the first Russia-China inter-
governmental agreement for collaboration in the energy sector was signed in 
1996.”236 At the same time, the establishment of the Sino-Russian Commission for 
the Preparation of Regular Meetings between the Prime Ministers marked the 
beginning of the process of institutionalising bilateral relations. 
Another large-scale bilateral energy contract, the governmental framework 
agreement signed by the Chinese and Russian prime ministers in June 1997, 
stipulated that a 3,000 km gas pipeline would be built, and that Russia would be 
committed to supply an annual volume of 25 bcm of gas to China over 25 to 30 years. 
In November 1997, the prime ministers signed a technical memorandum on the 
construction of a gas pipeline from the Kovykta gas field. Meanwhile, Russia’s 
government-controlled Gazprom corporation announced plans to build a gas pipeline 
across the Western section of the Sino-Russian border – the starting point of the so-
called ‘Altai’ project.237 In February 1999, the Chinese and Russian prime ministers 
signed three feasibility studies for oil and gas pipeline development, including a 
feasibility study on natural gas exports by pipeline from the Irkutsk region to north-
east China, a preliminary feasibility study on gas exports from Western Siberia to 
Shanghai, by way of Xinjiang Province, and a preliminary feasibility study on crude 
oil exports by pipeline from Angarsk to Daqing.
238
 However, none of the above 
agreements provided the necessary impetus to substantially advance bilateral energy 
cooperation. Overall, substantive progress in Sino-Russian energy cooperation in the 
1990s was next to naught. 
In the 2000s, efforts to develop oil and gas cooperation remained highest on the 
agenda of Sino-Russian economic interaction. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, 
Russian oil was exported to China almost exclusively by rail. Plans for constructing 
an oil pipeline from Russia to China had been initiated as early as 1994.
239
 The 
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above-mentioned inter-governmental Agreement on the Joint Development of 
Cooperation in the Energy Sector, signed in April 1996, provided an official 
confirmation for the Russia-China oil pipeline project.
240
 On the Russian side, the 
Yukos corporation became the driving force promoting the project. A route was 
chosen from Angarsk in Russia’s Irkutsk Oblast to Daqing in China’s Heilongjiang 
Province. In July 2001, the Chinese State Development Planning Commission and 
CNPC signed an agreement with the Russian Energy Ministry, Yukos, and Transneft 
(Russia’s principal oil transportation firm), initiating a feasibility study for the 
pipeline. In September 2001, at the meeting of the Chinese and Russian prime 
ministers, a general agreement on the evaluation of the project was signed, 
stipulating that by July 2002, both sides would “determine the investment 
requirements, negotiate tariffs and confirm the legal aspects of their cooperation.”241 
But in spite of countless official declarations of support, the pipeline project was 
initially stalled on the Russian side by a protracted feasibility study, citing 
environmental concerns. This was followed by a dramatic U-turn in 2003, when the 
Russian government decided to re-route the pipeline and opt instead for a pipeline 
from Taishet (ca. 500 kilometres northwest of Angarsk) to the port of Nakhodka on 
Russia’s Pacific coast, bypassing China completely. The plan for this new pipeline 
route was first drawn up by Transneft and gradually garnered support among the 
Russian leadership. The Russian Energy Ministry subsequently proposed to combine 
both pipeline projects, whereby the main pipeline would serve Nakhodka (where oil 
could then be prepared to be shipped to Japan and other markets in East Asia), while 
a smaller branch pipeline was to be built from Skovorodino to Daqing to transport oil 
to the Chinese market.
242
 This concept – which came to be known as the Eastern 
Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline – was eventually realised, and the branch 
pipeline to China became operational in January 2011. 
One of the primary reasons for Russia’s abandoning of the initial plan for a 
shorter pipeline exclusively to China was a fear of becoming overly dependent on 
China as the sole oil customer in East Asia. This was accompanied by massive 
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Japanese lobbying efforts and investment promises in favour of the Nakhodka 
route.
243
 Another important reason was the dominant role played by Yukos in the 
original Angarsk-Daqing pipeline project: “The company’s boss, Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, subsequently fell out of favour with the Kremlin. He had supported 
the political opposition and promoted private oil pipelines that threatened to 
undermine the monopoly of the state-owned pipeline operator Transneft. 
Khodorkovsky was convicted (and re-convicted) on fraud charges, while Yukos’s 
assets largely ended up in the hands of the state-controlled oil company Rosneft.”244 
With the ouster of Khodorkovsky, the Angarsk-Daqing project lost its most 
influential backer. 
When China learned of Russia’s plans to cancel the project, Sino-Russian energy 
relations initially turned very sour. Once it became clear that a spur pipeline would 
be built to Heilongjiang, China remained concerned as to whether Russia’s oil 
production capacities were sufficient to continuously supply the dual pipeline to 
Nakhodka and Daqing. China eventually accepted the new realities it was presented 
with, but Beijing was left with strong doubts about Russia’s reliability in honouring 
bilateral agreements. 
An even greater disappointment were the plans to develop a natural gas pipeline 
between China and Russia. As outlined above, concrete bilateral plans for such a 
project went back as far as 1994. At least two separate gas pipeline routes were taken 
into consideration; one from the Kovykta gas field in Irkutsk region to North-East 
China, and the ‘Altai’ route across the Western section of the Sino-Russian border 
and via Xinjiang to Shanghai. Negotiations about both projects continued for many 
years, but remained inconclusive. An agreement for the first-ever delivery of Russian 
natural gas to China, which stipulated the construction of two pipelines for the 
annual delivery of 30 to 40 billion cubic metres of gas by 2011 was signed between 
CNPC and Gazprom in March 2006, but again nothing came of these plans, and 
bilateral gas trade remained restricted to small volumes of LNG exports. The greatest 
obstacle in developing Sino-Russian gas trade has been a consistent disagreement 
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about the pricing formula. Russia insisted for China to pay gas prices equal or similar 
to those paid by its European customers, while Beijing steadfastly refused to do so.
245 
In spite of continued bilateral negotiations, the resulting impasse has essentially 
remained unbroken for nearly two decades, and no conclusive agreement on the 
construction of a gas pipeline has been reached to this day. 
Besides their projects in the oil and gas sector, efforts have also been made 
between China and Russia to develop other sectors of bilateral energy trade, although 
in absolute terms these remain much less significant than the oil and gas trade. 
Projects for electricity exports to China from Russia’s network of hydroelectric 
plants in Eastern Siberia slowly took shape in the 2000s, and discussions have been 
held about the construction of a large-scale cross-border electric power network 
infrastructure. But bilateral electricity trade has also experienced major setbacks, and 
in practice only relatively minor electricity transfers have actually been realised:
246
 
“In November 2006, Moscow and Beijing reached a deal to raise annual exports of 
electricity from Russia to China to 3.6-4.3 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) per year in 
2008 to 2010, and 18 billion kWh in 2010 to 2015, and eventually up to 60 billion 
kWh. However, [… f]rom February 1, 2007, China refused to import Russian 
electricity, thus leaving Russian hydropower plants without a market to sell their 
surplus electricity. The differences were eventually resolved, and in 2009 Russian 
suppliers exported about 900 million kWh to China.”247 
Exports of Russian coal to China initially grew very slowly, but surged 15-fold to 
11.8 million tons in 2009, accounting for ca. 10% of China’s total coal imports.248 In 
September 2010, China agreed to provide Russia with a $6 billion loan, in exchange 
for annual coal shipments of 15-20 million tons for the following twenty years. 
Another significant project in bilateral energy cooperation was the construction of 
the Tianwan Nuclear Power Station in China’s Jiangsu Province. In 1997, a contract 
was signed for the plant’s first two reactors to be designed and built by Russia’s 
Atomstroyeksport corporation. These reactors began operation in 2007. Following 
prolonged negotiations and insistent lobbying on Russia’s part, the construction of 
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two additional reactor units was finally agreed in November 2010. China’s choice of 
a Russian company to construct the facility was likely motivated at least in part by 
the expectation that Russia would in turn make concessions concerning other 
bilateral projects in the energy sphere.
249
 Overall, Sino-Russian energy projects 
outside of the crucial oil and gas sectors remained relatively insubstantial for the 
general development of Sino-Russian cooperation. 
 
In spite of major setbacks, Sino-Russian energy trade since the mid-1990s has 
steadily and substantially increased, particularly in the oil sector. The greatest 
success in Sino-Russian energy cooperation was the completion of the oil pipeline 
spur in 2011, which allows for the annual transport of up to 30 million tons of crude 
oil from Skovorodino to Daqing. But in spite of the seemingly auspicious initial 
conditions, Sino-Russian bilateral energy cooperation (particularly in the gas sector) 
has for the most part remained disappointing. In addition to disputes about price 
levels, other factors impeding bilateral energy cooperation stem from the nature of 
the Sino-Russian relationship as that between two neighbouring great powers.  
For one, influential circles among the Russian elites have remained wary about 
fuelling China’s continued economic growth and its rapid rise as a great power. 
“Moscow fears that by supplying raw materials to China it could become an 
‘accessory’ of the country’s ascent. Wedded to zero-sum thinking, many Russian 
policy-makers and experts fear that China’s economic growth and geopolitical 
strength might come at Russia’s expense.”250 Such wariness was frequently reflected 
in political decisions regarding the energy sector, such as the Russian Duma’s refusal 
to permit CNPC’s acquisition of the Russian oil company Slavneft’ in 2002. 251 
Moscow has generally remained relatively hostile towards Chinese attempts to 
acquire ‘upstream’ Russian energy assets.252 A further factor complicating the Sino-
Russian energy relationship is Russia’s above-mentioned resistance to becoming a 
mere exporter of raw materials to China. 
Finally, Sino-Russian geopolitical tensions in the energy sector have also been 
nourished by China’s increasing penetration of the Central Asian energy market. In 
1997, China concluded two energy deals with Kazakhstan. Following its express 
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wish to diversify its energy supply, China’s state oil company CNPC in 2005 
purchased the Canadian-Kazakh producer PetroKazakhstan, which the Russian 
Lukoil corporation had wished to acquire.
253
 The most important economic project 
China has pursued in the Central Asian region is the construction of two major 
pipelines. A 1,200km oil pipeline running from Western Kazakhstan to Western 
China went into formal operation in July 2006, and in December 2009 a natural gas 
pipeline was opened linking Xinjiang in Western China with gas fields being 
developed by CNPC in Turkmenistan. By the time it reaches full capacity, the 
pipeline (which runs through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) is expected to carry 40bn 
cubic metres of natural gas per year to China, which is nearly half of China’s current 
demand.
254
  
Turkmenistan was initially the only supplier of gas through this pipeline, but with 
the opening of a second line in 2011 China has been enabled to procure gas from 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as well.
255
 The pipeline project stood in direct contrast to 
an alternative pipeline agreement negotiated by Russia with Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan in 2007.
256
 The pipeline now also gives China more leverage in its gas 
deals with Russia, since it does not have to depend on Russia alone for its overland 
gas supply.
257
 In addition to the pipeline projects, China has also provided the 
Central Asian states with very large-scale loans for energy investments.
258
 
Russia, which has historically dominated Central Asia and remains the most 
influential external political actor there, has grown increasingly wary of China’s 
forays into the region’s energy sector. Russia had in the past retained an effective 
monopoly over energy exports from the region, since Russian pipelines provided the 
only functional outlets for oil and gas exports from the Central Asian states. Moscow 
was able to dictate prices to the Central Asian producers and to sell their energy 
exports on with huge profits. But Chinese economic activities have now rendered the 
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Central Asian states increasingly autonomous vis-à-vis the Kremlin, which has begun 
to lose its economic predominance in the region. 
 
 
 
Perceptions and Ideas: 
 
Another dynamic to consider in the analysis of post-Cold War Sino-Russian 
rapprochement is the role of mutual perceptions and ideational factors. With few 
exceptions,
259
 studies of Sino-Russian relations in the past, while generally referring 
to the role of perceptions and ideas, have rarely analysed these systematically. 
Nonetheless, cognitive and ideational factors have frequently been cited as influences 
on the conduct of Sino-Russian relations, both of a positive and negative kind. This 
seems all the more justified, since ideological disputes were a crucial factor shaping 
Sino-Russian interaction during the Cold War. Both the brief spell of ‘socialist 
brotherhood’ in the 1950s and the ensuing Sino-Soviet split were strongly affected 
by ideological factors and mutual (mis)perceptions. 
Following the end of the Cold War, a gradual improvement of Sino-Russian 
mutual perceptions, which went together with a degree of convergence between 
Chinese and Russian policy-makers on central questions of political governance and 
economic order, has arguably played a role in buttressing mutual rapprochement, 
although the precise extent of this is difficult to specify. In spite of their vast cultural 
differences, China and Russia have a basic ideational and historical affinity. The 
post-1949 development of both countries was strongly intertwined – both shared a 
similar state ideology and a common regime type and went through similar socio-
economic stages. In spite of their fierce enmity from the early 1960s, Beijing and 
Moscow continued to pay constant attention to each other in measuring the prospects 
of their own political and economic system against those of their socialist alter ego. 
After the Cold War, the socio-economic and political developments in China and 
Russia strongly diverged, but both countries shared similar objectives and found 
themselves in comparable international positions. Both were transitional, emerging 
economies and both were increasingly moving towards forms of ‘autocratic 
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capitalism’. While ideological similarity had previously been a crucial source of 
tension rather than cooperation between Beijing and Moscow, after the Cold War 
shared worldviews appear to have facilitated bilateral interaction to some extent. At 
the same time, however, the legacy of a long bilateral conflict and the persistence of 
mutual distrust have continued to nourish mutual suspicions, particularly on the 
Russian side. This has led some analysts to attest the overall irrelevance of ideational 
ties for Sino-Russian relations
260
 and to discount Constructivist approaches to the 
topic.
261
 However, the fact that, from the late 1990s onwards, mutual perceptions 
(particularly regarding policy intentions) gradually became more positive and 
differentiated appears to have played a role in the dynamic development of Sino-
Russian relations in the post-Cold War era. 
 
 
China’s Perception of Russia: 
From China’s perspective, the Soviet Union had long been the crucial ideological 
and political reference point in the world, even during the years of the Sino-Soviet 
split (at the CPC’s 12th Congress in 1982, General Secretary Hu Yaobang lamented 
that Chinese foreign policy in the preceding decades had largely followed the 
practice of ‘yi sü hua xian’: “basing the judgement of an issue or a country on the 
Soviet policy on the issue or toward that country”262). In particular, the Chinese 
closely watched the developments leading up to the collapse of the Communist 
government in Moscow in 1991, which served as a crucial and instructive lesson for 
Beijing. As such, Russia and the Soviet Union have historically been more strongly 
present in the Chinese mind than is often assumed, and much of this ideational 
connection continues to resonate today. At the same time, however,  
[f]or the Chinese there was no basic civilizational attraction that would lead them to 
concentrate particularly closely on collaboration with Russia because of some 
presumed set of shared fundamental social values. According to Trenin, there are 
real problems that prevent close interaction between Russians and Chinese. ‘The 
cultural divide ... is very deep. The experience of interaction at the grass roots level 
is at best mixed.’ [… L]ooking from China, Wang argues that the West and Europe 
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are the ‘home’ to which Russians yearn to return, whilst the East for Russia is only 
for partnership.
263
 
After the Cold War, Chinese suspicions towards Russia gradually subsided and 
perceptions of Russia became more positive. At the same time, however, overall 
interest in Russia has waned. Both the Chinese elites and the population at large are 
now largely disinterested in Russia and are much more fixated on Western culture 
and technology. Many Chinese have also come to regard Russia as an unreliable and 
unpredictable partner that frequently shifts positions.264 
 
 
Russia’s Perception of China: 
While the Chinese elites and public have gradually shed their concerns about and 
simultaneously lost their interest in their northern neighbour, from a Russian 
perspective the process has mostly been the reverse. Starting off from a position of 
relative disinterest in all matters Chinese (other than China’s potential as a regional 
security threat), the Russian policy-making elites have gradually become much more 
focused on China. To the extent that perceptions of China affected Russian foreign 
policy in previous decades, they were most commonly negative: Russians, 
particularly in the border regions, tended to perceive the Chinese at best as culturally 
inferior and at worst as a mortal threat to Russia’s territorial sovereignty. Russian 
central policy-makers’ views of China in the 1990s were generally superficial, and 
betrayed neither much knowledge of, nor interest in, Russia’s largest neighbour.265 
Even as China began its dramatic rise and modernisation, Russians by and large 
continued to view the country condescendingly as a ‘younger brother’. China’s rise 
also further reinforced long-standing suspicions in Russia about its growing power 
and ultimate motives. But at the same time, overall interest in China greatly 
increased in Russia. Russian views of China became more ambivalent than they had 
been in the past. In the words of one observer,  
The past decade has been marked by a noticeable transformation of Russian attitudes 
towards China (which concerns both the elites and the population). In the Soviet era 
and in the first post-Soviet decade, China was considered a ‘younger brother’ and a 
‘strategic partner’, but now the situation is not so unambiguous. The perception of 
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China by the population and the elites is changing quickly in accordance with the 
changing role of the country in the world. In the Soviet era the perception of China 
was characterized by a relative consensus maintained by researchers and experts as 
well as among the population, but these days opinions are cardinally opposed on the 
prospects for bilateral relations.
266
  
 
 
A Move Towards Systemic Convergence?: 
What is undeniable, however, is that the late 1990s and 2000s witnessed a certain 
degree of convergence between Beijing and Moscow on crucial political and security 
questions, with both governments attaching primary importance to resisting ‘external 
interference’ in domestic affairs and preserving the right to pursue an ‘autonomous 
path’ of political development. Already in March 2000, China and Russia, in a joint 
communiqu , asserted “the unacceptability of any actions undermining the territorial 
integrity of sovereign states”. 267  The Sino-Russian Friendship Treaty of 2001 
similarly included as some of its core clauses the “principles of mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression and mutual non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs”, as well as a principled stance against 
“any action of using force to apply pressure or intervene under any pretext in the 
internal affairs of sovereign states”.268 Virtually identical statements could be found 
in almost all official joint declarations in the following years.
269
 
Beyond mere rhetoric, one can detect a certain degree of systemic and ideational 
convergence between Beijing and Moscow since the 2000s, when China began to be 
regarded by large parts of the Russian elites as a model of political and economic 
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reform.
270
 Influential voices in the Kremlin attracted to the Chinese path of 
modernisation have regarded China as moving along the road to a “democracy of the 
Chinese type”, a semi-authoritarian system which in their mind appears closer to the 
Russian style of democracy than the Western type.
271
 Some analysts argued that in 
Putin’s foreign policy, ‘the East’ has emerged as a distinct value system, with Russia 
implicitly adopting an ‘Asian values agenda’, wherein democracy and human rights 
were secondary to economic development and the maintenance of order.
272
 
Whereas throughout most of the 1990s, Russian elites had not perceived 
themselves as sharing many, if any, values with the Chinese, during the Putin 
presidency they seemed to find a growing basis for agreement with China about 
strategies of modernisation and governance that diverge from ‘Western’ precepts. 
Vladimir Baranovsky, Deputy Director of the Moscow-based Institute of World 
Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) argued that “if the Europeans are 
unwilling (or unable) to accept Russia’s right to be specific, there would be other, 
less intrusive interlocutors. The most significant example of how this logic is 
translated into policy is Russian-Chinese rapprochement”, which Baranovsky 
consequently described as a partnership “by default”. 273  Russian foreign policy-
makers during the Putin presidency continuously stressed the congruity of goals and 
outlooks between the Chinese and Russian governments, claiming that “the objective 
basis of the partnership” is a “closeness or concurrence” of Chinese and Russian 
worldviews.
274
  
In practice, “high-ranking delegates from Russia’s ruling United Russia Party 
regularly visit China where they meet their counterparts from the Communist Party 
of China to share experiences. The latest visit took place in mid-May 2010, after 
which Russian participants positively evaluated the Chinese experience of building a 
party system.” 275  Furthermore, Russia published a new ‘Pacific Strategy’ in the 
summer of 2010, which “suggests that the imperatives of the twenty-first century 
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‘offer a new view of Russia as a Euro-Pacific country, not merely European or 
Eurasian. […] One of the key legitimising discourses in the new ‘strategy’ is the 
‘crisis’ of the ‘Euro-Atlantic idea of globalization’. […] Most importantly, attention 
is drawn to the fact that ‘these countries [of the Asia-Pacific] have synthesized 
certain democratic principles with the specifics of their political culture and the 
religious composition of society and the state’.”276 
Beyond a degree of convergence on political principles, some observers have 
also attested an increasing convergence of Chinese and Russian views about the 
basic principles of developing their economies, in a manner diverging from Western 
free-market prescriptions.
277
 In 2001, a government delegation headed by Russia’s 
Minister of Economics German Gref travelled to China with the aim of studying 
China’s experience in the conduct of its social and economic reforms. 278  In a 
significant shift away from the policies pursued by the Yeltsin administration, the 
Russian government during Vladimir Putin’s second term established control over 
key industries and increasingly consolidated them into major state holdings.
279
 
Overall state control over the economy was massively expanded. Whether these 
processes actually led to a systemic convergence between the Russian and Chinese 
economic models is debatable, but the Russian political elites themselves have 
increasingly perceived China as a kindred ‘enlightened authoritarian’ success model 
and emphasised the need to emulate China’s economic policies, putting particular 
stress on economic strategies based on strong governmental control.
280
 Russian 
policy-makers, including Putin himself, have frequently expressed admiration for 
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China’s economic and political modernisation process and stressed that Russia could 
“learn” from the Chinese experience.281 
Consequently, it can be claimed that “over the past three to four years there has 
been a convergence of views in Russia and China over ways of developing their 
economies, particularly their industries, towards an approach that diverges from 
Anglo-American neo-liberal prescriptions for reform that put the main stress upon 
privatization, establishment of secure property rights, and opening to competition 
with the outside world. Russian leaders have also become more sceptical about 
western-style liberal democratization; Chinese leaders always have been.” 282 
According to Peter Ferdinand, there are thus indications that “an important 
dimension in the evolution of Russo-Chinese relations is the environment of 
domestic policy-making, i.e. elite political culture, and that the reforms that have 
been taking place in both countries in recent years have evolved towards a 
convergence of views in both governments over the best ways to develop their 
economies in general and their bilateral relations in particular. This general 
consensus has buttressed more specific policies aimed at developing cooperation.”283 
 
As outlined above, there are signs that a gradual change in Sino-Russian mutual 
perceptions occurred in the post-Cold War years, particularly among the elites in 
both countries. This development invites an analysis of the bilateral rapprochement 
from a Social Constructivist perspective along the lines of Alexander Wendt: 
Adopting such an approach, we would assume that both states’ foreign policy 
objectives towards each other have not been predominantly shaped by the ‘material’, 
structural determinants of the international system, but equally by processes of 
mutual interaction. According to Wendt, the meaning of structural determinants is 
variable and depends on the prevalent ideational and normative assumptions within 
the system, and on the representations formed of others.
284
 A genuinely changed 
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mutual image among policy-makers in Beijing and Moscow could have brought forth 
substantial changes in bilateral policymaking.
285
 
While it is difficult to ascertain to what extent common norms and values have 
played a role in leading Beijing and Moscow towards closer mutual alignment, the 
acts and statements of Chinese and Russian policy-makers do indicate the importance 
of changes in the mutual perception of each other’s intentions and a partial 
convergence of their political and economic systems. Based on the views of 
Constructivist scholars like Ole Holsti, it can be argued that common mindsets and 
‘belief systems’ have influenced Chinese and Russian foreign policy-making towards 
each other by providing cognitive maps, a “set of lenses, through which information 
concerning the physical and social environment is received”.286 By all appearances, 
Beijing’s and Moscow’s shared aversion to ‘Western-style’ democratisation has led 
both to perceive each other’s foreign policy moves as more intelligible and 
predictable and less likely to become antagonistic than those of other great powers. 
This stands in significant contrast to their mutual threat assessments during the Cold 
War period, when one of the catalysts of Sino-Soviet conflict had been a perception 
of each other as ideologically aberrant, irrational and unpredictable. 
In spite of official statements to the contrary, the apparent partial convergence of 
political and economic approaches between Beijing and Moscow should not be 
misconstrued as having a substantial normative grounding. Leading Russian 
academics, such as the director of the Far Eastern Institute of the Russian Academy 
of Sciences, Mikhail Titarenko, have tried to identify a shared normative basis 
between both countries, arguing that Sino-Russian cooperation was in part advanced 
by a “deepening awareness in both countries of the incompatibility of their spiritual 
values with those of the West and a wish by their governments to move away from 
an uncritical adaptation of foreign methods and recipes of the rebuilding of 
society”.287 But rather than undergoing a normative convergence, it was the Russian 
government’s gradual shift towards authoritarianism that led it to approximate 
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Chinese conceptions of governance and non-interference in internal affairs, 
countering Western human rights-based narratives. In this ‘two-level-game’, the 
primary policy rationale has been regime preservation against domestic and external 
challenges to one-party rule. Since this is an interest that is strongly shared by 
Chinese policy-makers, the political elites in Beijing and Moscow have increasingly 
found common ground for cooperation and improved mutual perceptions. 
It is important not to exaggerate the actual extent of political-economic 
convergence between China and Russia. Harley Balzer convincingly claims that, in 
spite of many indicators of systemic convergence between both countries, this 
concept – particularly as it is conceived of by Russian policy-makers – has 
weaknesses. In his account, the Chinese economic model in particular is actually 
much closer to Western economic conceptions than to the corporatist visions of 
Russian policy-makers. In Balzer’s words, 
China has embraced economic globalization and integration on a scale surpassing 
many other Asian countries, while Russia remains wary and peripheral. […] Russian 
analysts have been particularly enamored of an ‘enlightened authoritarian’ 
explanation for China’s success. Official Chinese accounts understandably embrace 
these claims. But attributing China’s economic success to guided gradualism 
misreads the story. […] China’s initial ‘reform’ was less a matter of administered 
policy than a series of experiments that spread rapidly and escaped government 
control.”288 
According to Balzer, “China’s embrace of globalization and the resulting thick 
international economic integration have been the key to its emergence as a 
commercial and manufacturing power. Russian resistance to integration makes it less 
able to overcome resource dependence. When Russian leaders suggest that they need 
to emulate China’s policies, they emphasize policies based on strong governmental 
control, rather than the diverse and independent local and regional economic activity 
that accounts for China’s early success.”289 
Doubts thus remain regarding the substantiality of the process of bilateral 
systemic convergence between China and Russia. The Chinese elites and public, 
while generally remaining sympathetic towards Russia, have shown little genuine 
interest in it and remain fixated on the West. In fact, as one expert observes, “a 
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certain Schadenfreude about Russia’s fall can be detected on the Chinese side”.290 
This has not been made easier by the fact that the fourth generation of Chinese 
leaders who took power in the early 2000s, unlike their predecessors, did not have a 
first-hand experience of the Soviet Union. According to one analyst, “[d]espite the 
long years of the Sino-Soviet dispute, there were still many Chinese leaders in the 
1990s such as Li Peng and Jiang Zemin who had trained as engineers in the USSR in 
the 1950s and who could still relate to Russians on a personal level. Their retirement 
left a big gap, however, and ignorance among their successors exacerbated 
distrust.”291 
In Russia, meanwhile, an increasing tendency to regard China as a political-
economic associate and even a development model has not managed to fully 
supersede traditional condescending views of Beijing as a ‘younger brother’. Chinese 
specialists continue to complain about this persistent tendency in Russia’s perception 
of China. The experiences of bilateral interaction in the past – an important criterion 
for Constructivist scholars like Alexander Wendt – had long been predominantly 
negative. Overall, it can be claimed that  
from a constructivist view of international relations, the basic problem is that there is 
only a limited sense of shared values between Russia and China […]. It is true that 
the mantra of the current Russian leadership is that it is a Eurasian state and so must 
share common values with both Europe and Asia. But in practice the Russian 
leadership presents itself as partly Asian when it is talking to the West, as a way of 
brushing off excessive Western demands for liberalisation and democratisation. 
When Russian officials, especially those in the Far East, are talking to counterparts 
in China or Asia, they easily lapse into thinking of themselves as the last outposts of 
Western civilisation facing the Tartar hordes.
292
 
 
 
Attempts at Managing Mutual Perceptions: 
While the mutual perceptions of the Chinese and Russian elites have gradually 
improved after the end of the Cold War, perceptions among the Chinese and Russian 
publics have consistently lagged behind. The Chinese public has by and large 
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remained indifferent towards Russia, while various threat scenarios of Chinese 
expansion in the Russian Far East continue to agitate the Russian public. An oft-
repeated mantra among Chinese and Russian experts and officials has been that the 
bilateral relationship is ‘warm at the top, but cold at the bottom’ – a circumstance 
that they consider highly problematic. In reaction to this, since the early 2000s the 
Chinese and Russian leaderships have embarked on a conscious policy of ‘perception 
management’ and have made an attempt to proactively enhance each country’s image 
in the public perception of the other. 
Simple efforts for fostering and perpetuating social and cultural exchange, 
including the establishment of Sino-Russian Friendship Societies, had been made 
since the 1950s. But the few institutions thus created ultimately remained little more 
than ineffectual bureaucratic backwaters. According to one analyst, “[u]nlike western 
countries, until recently China paid little attention to its PR promotion in Russia, 
opting instead for direct contacts with officials and business people close to state 
authorities.”293 During the 2000s, however, the broadening of bilateral social and 
cultural links gradually became a discernible priority both for Beijing and Moscow. 
Chinese and Russian senior foreign policy-makers, such as Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov, repeatedly described the deepening of socio-cultural contacts with China and 
the need to “change mutual images” as a precondition for the “irreversibility” of 
good bilateral relations.
294
 Cultural cooperation was emphasised in the Friendship 
Treaty of 2001 and in the accompanying joint declaration, where its purpose was 
stated to be the “strengthening and consolidation of the social basis” of the Sino-
Russian relationship.
295
 
Bilateral cultural events of increasing magnitude were staged during the 2000s. 
In 2003 and 2004, respectively, ‘Days of Russian Culture’ took place in China and 
‘Days of Chinese Culture’ in Russia,296 while the year 2004 was declared a ‘Year of 
the Friendship of Chinese and Russian Youth’, comprising numerous social and 
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cultural events.
297
 Along with this, increasing exchanges of journalists and high-
ranking media delegations were organised. But by far the most notable outgrowth of 
this policy were two successive ‘Culture Years’, the ‘Year of Russia in China’ in 
2006 and the ‘Year of China in Russia’ in 2007. These were nationwide campaigns 
on a very large scale, aimed at enhancing each country’s image of the other and 
encompassing hundreds of individual events. 
Some commentators have regarded these Culture Years as marking a significant 
paradigm shift in Sino-Russian relations, the expansion of ties beyond Realist 
calculations into the socio-cultural dimension. In the words of Peter Ferdinand, 
Implicitly the launching of these years represented an attempt to move beyond the 
realist paradigm which, as has been argued above, has been the dominant approach 
to analyses of Chinese and Russian foreign policy. […] It represents an attempt to 
‘construct’ a thicker relationship, one that rests upon a broader understanding of 
national interests, the groups that need to be involved and the ways that they can be 
pursued. The Year of Russia in China, which ended in November 2006, saw an 
unprecedented amount of contact between Russians and Chinese at all levels. […] 
There were lots of artistic displays, and a great deal of media coverage was devoted 
to things Russian. […] At the closing ceremony Russian Prime Minister Fradkov 
announced that half a million Chinese had personally attended these events, while 
hundreds of millions had watched on television.
298
 
Attempts to enhance mutual perceptions between China and Russia through the 
organisation of ‘themed’ cultural years did not end in 2007. Similar series of mass 
cultural events (albeit on a smaller scale) followed in subsequent years: 2009 was 
declared the ‘Year of the Russian Language in China’, and 2010 was the ‘Year of the 
Chinese Language in Russia’. 2012 was designated a ‘Year of Russian Tourism in 
China’, and 2013 a ‘Year of Chinese Tourism in Russia’. Each of these ‘themed’ 
years reportedly encompassed hundreds of widely broadcast cultural events, 
activities, and mass exchanges. 
What practical outcome, if any, have all these efforts at ‘perception management’ 
had? According to Ferdinand, the organisation of “programmes of mutual 
familiarisation” in the context of the bilateral ‘culture years’  
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was intended to spread cultural as well as business awareness, in addition to 
familiarising middle-level officials at the national and provincial levels with 
opportunities for mutual cooperation. It has had some effect. However, the numbers 
of students from both countries going to study in each other’s country, for example, 
are still dwarfed by those going to study in the West, whether in the US or Europe. 
And provincial officials in the Russian Far East have tended to be less supportive of 
close ties with China – and more ready to mistreat Chinese citizens – than those in 
Moscow, so there is no doubt about the need for a change in their mindset if the 
relationship is to grow.
299
 
Besides the cultural years, Beijing has made other active efforts to bolster its soft 
power and enhance its image in Russia, for instance through the opening of various 
Confucius Institutes in the country, but in doing so it has sometimes faced challenges. 
On occasion, “Russian law enforcement agencies uncovered a threat to national 
security in the activities of these bodies. For instance, in 2010 the Yakutian 
department of the Federal Security Service (FSB) blocked an attempt to open a 
Confucius Institute in Yakutsk as the institute was aiming ‘to promote penetration of 
the Chinese ideology and economic expansion in the Russian territory’.” 300  The 
incident serves to showcase the continuing unease felt by many Russian officials 
about China’s ideational forays in the country. 
 
 
Popular Perceptions in China and Russia: 
Ultimately, the success of the large-scale bilateral cultural promotion campaign 
remains doubtful. Mutual perceptions among the Chinese and Russian publics have 
periodically been recorded in opinion polls. These polls have recurrently affirmed 
that mutual public perceptions, although they have gradually improved, by and large 
remain ambivalent. Opinion polls on this subject have more frequently been 
conducted in Russia than in China. These polls have shown that many Russians 
continue to perceive China as a potential future enemy of Russia, although the 
Russian public has slowly begun to hold more positive views of its largest neighbour.  
Basic attitudes to China initially remained quite hostile. In a 2001 survey, 22.7 
per cent of respondents in Russia had a negative view of China, significantly more 
than of Japan, and the Chinese were commonly associated with various negative 
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personality traits. As many as 20-25 per cent feared China, “although the survey 
showed that the proportion seeing China as a high-level threat decreased from 17 per 
cent in August 1997 to 2 per cent in November 2001. However, in the Far East of 
Russia, more than one third (34 per cent) see China as a hostile country.” 301 
Nonetheless, “67 per cent saw China as a friendly country, and 40 per cent thought 
partnership with China more important than partnership with the USA.”302 
A 2003 survey ranked China fourth among the countries Russians considered as 
friendly and spiritually close to Russia,
303
 and by May 2006 a poll by the Levada 
Centre recorded it at third place among ‘friendly countries’ after Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, replacing Germany.
304
 According to a series of opinion surveys on 
Russian attitudes towards national ‘enemies’ and ‘friends’, carried out by the Fund 
for Public Opinion, 
of the non-CIS countries, Germany continues to be the most popular state, although 
that proportion did fall slightly between 2004 and 2006. But after that come China 
and France. […] By contrast the trend of those thinking of China as an enemy has 
fallen from the peak of 17 per cent in 1997 to much lower figures, although the most 
recent one of 5 per cent represents a slight rebound. Beneath that surface, however, 
relations with China seemed cooler. Other surveys carried out by the same 
Foundation asked Russians whether they regarded particular countries as having 
‘friendly’ or ‘unfriendly’ relations with Russia. […] What is apparent from this is a 
gradually declining perception of China’s relations with Russia as being ‘friendly’ 
(as is true for Russia’s relations with the US), though still twice as many Russians 
thought of relations with China as ‘friendly’ as do with the United States.305 
Overall, all that can be said with certainty about the development of Russian 
perceptions of China over time is that they were persistently variable. As one analyst 
summarised,  
[o]n the whole, the Russian population’s perception of China has been changing 
dynamically over the past decade with some parameters showing sinusoidal motion. 
[… I]n mid-2001 when anti-West sentiments caused by NATO’s operation against 
Yugoslavia in 1999 were still being felt in Russia, some 31% of respondents thought 
that China would be Russia’s ally in the 21st century, while only 3% believed it 
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would be an enemy. […] By 2005 the share of adherents to the allied approach had 
dropped to 22%, although the share of the opposite camp rose insignificantly to 6%; 
the rest of the respondents had more comprehensive points of view. In 2007 at the 
height of anti-Western sentiments (cf. Vladimir Putin’s Munich speech, for instance), 
the share of those who held positive views on China again rose to 28% (the share of 
those that perceived China as an enemy dropped to 4%), but in 2009 the share of 
adherents to the allied approach dropped to 20%. […] In general some 66% of 
Russian respondents believe that the participation of Chinese firms in the 
development of natural resources in Siberia and the Far East is dangerous. In the 
Siberian Federal District their share is 71%, and in the Far Eastern Federal District it 
is 81%, the highest parameter among federal districts.
306
 
The efforts taken at improving mutual perceptions through the bilateral culture 
years do not appear to have led to lasting, measurable changes in mutual perceptions, 
as is illustrated by the results of a series of annual polls conducted for the BBC 
World Service since 2005. According to these polls, the Chinese have consistently 
perceived Russia’s influence in the world as mainly positive and consistently more 
positive than that of the United States, but other Western countries have regularly 
been rated more highly than Russia. As regards the Russian public’s perception of 
China’s influence in the world, the series of polls shows that it was initially 
perceived more negatively than all Western countries bar the United States. Although, 
in relative terms, the perception improved somewhat over time, this by and large 
remained the case throughout all the years covered by the polls, with China’s 
influence in the world being consistently rated more negatively than that of almost all 
Western countries.
307
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 Results compiled from BBC World Service Polls 2005-2013, available online at 
www.globescan.com/  
BBC World Service polls:  
- Russian view of China’s influence in the world: 
2005   Mainly positive: 42    Mainly negative: 27 
2006   Mainly positive: 32    Mainly negative: 33 
2007   Mainly positive: 38    Mainly negative: 31 
2008   Mainly positive: 46    Mainly negative: 21 
2009   Mainly positive: 45    Mainly negative: 18 
2010   Mainly positive: 42    Mainly negative: 31 
2011   Mainly positive: 52    Mainly negative: 18 
2012   Mainly positive: 46    Mainly negative: 21 
2013   Mainly positive: 42    Mainly negative: 24 
BBC World Service polls:  
- Chinese view of Russia’s influence in the world: 
2005   Mainly positive: --    Mainly negative: -- 
2006   Mainly positive: 56    Mainly negative: 16 
2007   Mainly positive: 59    Mainly negative: 12 
2008   Mainly positive: 69    Mainly negative: 14 
2009   Mainly positive: 74    Mainly negative: 18 
2010   Mainly positive: 55    Mainly negative: 19 
2011   Mainly positive: 47    Mainly negative: 40 
2012   Mainly positive: 52    Mainly negative: 27 
2013   Mainly positive: 44    Mainly negative: 27 
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Conclusion: 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to illustrate that the most prevalent conventional 
explanations of Sino-Russian rapprochement, particularly if regarded through the 
lens of International Relations theory, cannot fully account for the dynamic 
expansion of bilateral cooperation since the mid-1990s and the absence of major 
disruptions and crises. Balance-of-power and security objectives have played an 
important part in furthering Beijing’s and Moscow’s mutual rapprochement. 
However, not only has Sino-Russian cooperation on geostrategic objectives been 
erratic. More importantly, it has been constrained by very significant and growing 
structural imbalances at the regional level, as an examination of Sino-Russian 
relations through the lens of different variants of Neorealist theory illustrates, leading 
to persistent concerns on Russia’s part and a hesitation to advance security 
cooperation to its full potential. Overall, there is no basis for a formal Sino-Russian 
alliance along geopolitical lines. Instead, China and Russia seem to be primarily 
concerned with tailoring the bilateral security relationship to give both sides a 
‘comfort level’ of mutual non-suspicion, allowing each to focus its attention 
elsewhere,
308
 but also to jointly engage perceived regional threats. 
Economic interaction has become a crucial factor in furthering bilateral 
cooperation. The prospect of commercial gains through the cooperation of two 
dynamically growing economies has gradually prevailed over the fortress mentality 
of past Sino-Russian interaction. The remarkable change from stagnant bilateral trade 
levels in the 1990s to their rapid rise since 2000 is indicative of a paradigm change in 
Beijing and Moscow. But although the expansion of trade has been of great benefit 
for both China and Russia, the promises of bilateral economic interaction remain 
only partially fulfilled. Economic relations initially fell consistently short of 
expectations and they remain beset by a number of substantial structural problems 
and risks, particularly in the crucial energy sector. The Chinese leadership has often 
been irritated by incoherent and sometimes obstructive policies on the part of the 
Russian authorities. For Russia, potential economic gains have been partially offset 
by sizable structural risks and problems, brought about by China’s relentless 
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expansion. These problems are not so grave as to negate the overall importance of 
the economic dimension in Sino-Russian relations, but grave enough to challenge 
any attempt to explain the great dynamism of Sino-Russian rapprochement 
predominantly or exclusively in terms of economic objectives. 
The development of mutual perceptions and ideational factors is also of 
importance in assessing the expansion of bilateral cooperation. A gradual 
improvement of mutual perceptions can be attested at the level of the policy-making 
elites in particular. Some observers have perceived a growing convergence of 
Chinese and Russian conceptions of domestic political governance and socio-
economic reform, based on the similarity between the Chinese and Russian regime 
cultures and the shared ‘statist’ values of the two leaderships. Gradually improving 
elite perceptions of each other and a degree of ideational convergence seem to have 
buttressed the relationship, providing a firmer foundation for bilateral rapprochement 
and absorbing potentially damaging shocks. To promote a further improvement of 
mutual perceptions among the wider public, Beijing and Moscow have adopted a 
conscious policy of ‘perception management’, trying to employ ‘soft power’ 
mechanisms to enhance mutual popular perceptions. Ultimately, however, the results 
of this policy remain questionable. In spite of improvements in bilateral perceptions 
among the elites, suspicions of China have remained rife in the Russian public, while 
disinterest in Russia prevails among ordinary Chinese. From a Constructivist 
perspective, it should also be added that the historical experience of bilateral 
interaction – which, according to Alexander Wendt, is an important criterion of trust-
formation – has for the most part been negative, sometimes very negative indeed, and 
more recent developments have not necessarily been able to fully offset this. 
Like geopolitical, security, and economic objectives, mutual perceptions and 
ideational factors provide a necessary, but not a sufficient explanation for the extent 
of bilateral rapprochement that could be witnessed in Sino-Russian relations. None 
of these factors has ultimately provided a policymaking context in which a 
continuous and persistently growing bilateral rapprochement was particularly likely, 
let alone predetermined. The environment in which bilateral cooperation in these 
sectors has occurred remains relatively unfavourable, but nonetheless the overall 
bilateral relationship has grown consistently more intense. Most importantly, for the 
first time in history, it has remained without any lasting disruptions. China and 
Russia are closely and effectively coordinating many of their policies in the 
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international sphere, their economic interaction has been growing very dynamically, 
and inter-personal exchanges between ordinary Chinese and Russians (albeit still 
modest) are continuously expanding. Sino-Russian bilateral relations have essentially 
undergone a process of normalisation – that is to say, since the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union, the two great powers have increasingly related to each other in the way 
ordinary neighbouring states do. A stable working relationship has been established 
between them at almost every level of government and across diverse policy sectors, 
which includes increasingly close economic and social contacts, both between 
officials and the wider populace. The notion of a ‘normalisation’, while sounding 
unremarkable, is significant in the context of Sino-Russian relations, which have 
never been ‘normal’ in the past. Since the foundation of the People’s Republic of 
China, its relations with the Moscow leadership have been akin to a rollercoaster ride, 
ranging from euphoric and idealistic to outright catastrophic. 
The normalisation and expansion of bilateral relations has therefore been a 
significant achievement in its own right, and it has proceeded in spite of substantial 
underlying challenges and various unfavourable circumstances. Beyond the factors 
outlined in this chapter, additional explanatory factors have to be considered in order 
to account for the missing variance. One such factor – which forms the core of this 
thesis – is the growth of extensive institutional links and mechanisms, which may 
have played an important, perhaps indispensable, role in stabilising and perpetuating 
close Sino-Russian relations, and in defusing the multiple underlying sources of 
tension in the bilateral relationship. Without the establishment of these functional 
institutions and mechanisms, the environment for bilateral cooperation might have 
remained too unfavourable to result in anything other than stagnation. What concrete 
effects the institutionalisation of the relationship has had on Sino-Russian 
cooperation will be evaluated in the following chapters. 
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Chapter IV: The Institutionalisation of Sino-Russian Relations 
 
 
The previous chapter has outlined the insufficiencies of attempts to account for 
Sino-Russian rapprochement since the early 1990s solely in terms of geopolitical, 
economic, or ideational factors. Conventional explanations of the development of 
Sino-Russian cooperation cannot sufficiently account for the degree of dynamism 
that has developed in the bilateral relationship across countless different issue areas. 
Due to the various complications that continue to mar bilateral relations, geopolitical 
and security, as well as economic or ideational objectives did not provide a 
policymaking context in which a continuous and persistently growing mutual 
rapprochement was very likely. 
In spite of these circumstances, bilateral rapprochement has continued throughout 
the post-Soviet period; bilateral relations have been consistently intensified and 
expanded to encompass virtually every field of policy-making, and, for the first time 
in history, they have remained without any substantial disruptions. Besides 
considering the causes for the intensification of Sino-Russian rapprochement, it is 
also important to study how the means of implementing it have developed and the 
manner in which they have contributed to the rapid development of bilateral relations. 
In this chapter and the remainder of the thesis, I examine the impact of a process 
which, while it does not represent an autonomous cause of mutual rapprochement, 
nonetheless has been a significant contributory factor to the normalisation of bilateral 
relations: the process of extensive institution-building between China and Russia. 
A conspicuous characteristic of Sino-Russian relations since the mid-1990s has 
been the establishment of a multitude of bilateral and multilateral institutions. Sino-
Russian institutional channels, which were largely absent until the mid-1990s, have 
rapidly proliferated into a dense network of commissions and subcommissions, 
working groups, and other institutionalised exchanges, encompassing virtually all 
sectors of interaction and cooperation between the two countries. The remainder of 
this thesis examines what role the institutionalisation of bilateral relations has played 
in enabling both states to forge a close working relationship with each other. It 
explores the extent to which trans-national institutional channels – forming a 
gradually developing ‘mechanism’ and ‘infrastructure’ of interaction and cooperation 
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between China and Russia – have promoted efficiency in the conduct of bilateral 
policy-making, and have facilitated the implementation of cooperative policies 
between both countries by bringing together relevant stakeholders and rendering 
each country’s policy towards the other more stable, more predictable, and more 
well-informed. 
 
 
The Initial Development of Bilateral Links: 
In the past, institutions did not play a major role in the relations between Beijing 
and Moscow. Even during the period of close Sino-Soviet alignment in the 1950s, 
while a multitude of inter-party and inter-agency contacts were established, genuine 
and durable bilateral institutions, particularly those connecting senior decision-
makers in China and Russia on a regular basis, remained for the most part absent. 
Following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, they all but disappeared. Extremely few 
bilateral diplomatic channels remained open after the Sino-Soviet split and 
institutional bodies were practically absent from the relationship until the gradual re-
establishment of bilateral relations in the 1980s. 
One of the remnants of close Sino-Soviet cooperation was the two-branched 
Sino-Soviet Friendship Society. Its Chinese part had been established in October 
1949, the Russian part in October 1957. Both branches established mutual ties but 
remained separate entities. They organised a number of cultural events during the 
heyday of bilateral cooperation in the 1950s, but with the Sino-Soviet split both sides 
severed their contacts in the mid-1960s and their activities all but ceased. Contacts 
between the two branches were only restored in 1983 (following an 18-year complete 
hiatus of mutual interaction),
309
 but it was not until the 2000s that the Friendship 
Societies began to expand their joint activities and to cooperate actively in the 
cultural sphere. 
A single bilateral institution has remained continuously operational since the 
1950s: the Sino-Russian Joint Commission on Border River Shipping, which was 
established in 1951 as a functional problem-solving mechanism and therefore proved 
more resistant to fluctuations in the political and ideological climate between both 
countries. Other than this Commission, virtually no bilateral institutional or 
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diplomatic channels remained open after the Sino-Soviet split. As a consequence, the 
Commission on Border River Shipping temporarily assumed a much broader 
political and diplomatic role than had been intended in its statutes. At the height of 
the Sino-Soviet split, when nearly all bilateral ties had been abrogated, “the Joint 
Shipping Commission provided the sole connecting link between Russia and 
China.” 310  According to a long-time former member of the Commission on the 
Soviet side,  
‘[f]ew people know that, during the time of the riots of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ in 
China, this Commission was effectively a podium that was used for the validation of 
the political positions of both sides, the presentation of complaints and claims[.] 
Today it is already no longer a secret that, during those years, the Commission 
worked under the aegis of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries, and 
it consisted not only of experienced sailors, but also members of the secret services. 
Therefore, we had to resolve not only and not so much the problems of shipping on 
the Amur River, but also conduct a tough political debate on questions related to 
border transit. However, this political dispute was conducted under the cover of 
ostensibly discussing issues of shipping.’ [… I]n those difficult years, when it 
seemed impossible that there could be meetings or negotiations of any kind, the 
Amur sailors, covered by what was then a weak immunity of their diplomatic 
passports, went over to their Chinese counterparts and continued the discussions. It 
turns out that it was the Amur sailors from both countries in particular who managed 
to maintain the communications between both states. At the same time, they tried to 
also resolve the problems related to shipping.
311
 
 
Even when bilateral relations slowly began to warm again in the early 1980s, the 
development of a bilateral institutional structure was a slow process. At a senior 
political level, the very first bilateral intergovernmental consultations after the Sino-
Soviet split were held in late 1979 (between both countries’ deputy foreign 
ministers).
312
 But this was only followed by extremely sporadic meetings in 
subsequent years, as well as initial tentative contacts in the fields of science and 
education, sport and tourism. From 1982, a mechanism of political consultations 
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between both countries’ deputy foreign ministers was established.313  The foreign 
ministers of both countries first formally met in New York in 1984, in the context of 
the U.N. General Assembly,
314
 but meetings at this level remained few and far 
between in the years that followed and usually occurred on the side-lines of 
multinational conferences. 
At the same time, the first intergovernmental agreements were signed between 
both countries. Among other things, these provided for the creation of a bilateral 
Commission on Economic and Scientific Cooperation, headed by the deputy 
premiers, which held its first session in March 1986 and thenceforth met once a year 
(with the exception of 1991 and 1993).
315
 Some channels of political and inter-
parliamentary consultations developed, as well as ministerial visits and a number of 
direct interregional links. It was only in May 1989 that CPSU General Secretary 
Gorbachev visited China and met its paramount leader Deng Xiaoping for the first 
time.
316
 In April 1990, Chinese Premier Li Peng went on an official visit to Moscow, 
the first Chinese delegation at the level of heads of government to visit the Soviet 
Union since 1964.
317
 In May 1991 China’s new leader Jiang Zemin reciprocated 
Gorbachev’s official visit to China and arrived in Moscow for the second meeting of 
the two countries’ heads of state since the Sino-Soviet split.318 Around the same time, 
one more field of bilateral interaction became increasingly formalised: negotiations 
about the demilitarisation and future course of the border. In 1990, consultations 
between the military leaderships commenced. 
Following the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly-gained mutual 
reassurance was once again put in jeopardy, and initially much of the momentum of 
bilateral rapprochement was lost. However, the handful of institutional links that had 
hitherto been established for the most part continued to function. Both states resumed 
their border negotiations in late 1992, and for this purpose a Joint Committee on 
Border Prospecting between China and Russia was established which henceforth met 
annually. In March 1992, Russia’s Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev travelled to 
Beijing for his first official visit to China.
319
 The new Russian President Boris 
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Yeltsin first met the senior Chinese leadership during his official visit to Beijing in 
December 1992.
320
 Several agreements were signed on this occasion, although most 
of them, especially in the economic sphere, eventually remained unrealised.
321
 The 
return visit of Jiang Zemin to Moscow took place in September 1994, the second 
meeting of the two countries’ leaders since the collapse of the Soviet Union,322 
followed by a further visit in May 1995.
323
 Sino-Russian relations were rhetorically 
upgraded to a ‘constructive partnership’ in 1994, and an interdepartmental protocol 
was signed in January 1994, providing for regular consultations between both 
countries’ foreign ministries.324 
 
 
The Onset of Large-Scale Institutionalisation: 
But bilateral cooperation progressed slowly until 1996, when Moscow and 
Beijing began to inaugurate a large number of functional bilateral institutions, 
establishing a mechanism of regular bilateral meetings and exchanges at all levels of 
government and thereby laying the institutional foundation for continued Sino-
Russian rapprochement. In April 1996, during President Yeltsin’s second state visit 
to China, both states signed a joint communiqué announcing their commitment to 
develop a ‘strategic partnership’ (as well as “the decision to establish a telephone 
‘hotline’ between Moscow and Beijing for the rapid exchange of opinions on topical 
questions”),325 and in December Beijing and Moscow held the first regular meeting 
of the Chinese and Russian heads of government. Meetings between the two 
countries’ premiers henceforth became formalised annual events. 
During their first regular meeting in December 1996, in order to ensure the 
smooth conduct of future meetings between the Chinese and Russian premiers, the 
launch of a large-scale, multi-branched bilateral Commission for the Preparation of 
Regular Meetings of the Heads of Government was announced. This Commission, 
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which “resembles the Russian-American Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission” 326  is 
headed by the two countries’ deputy premiers. It formally replaced the small bilateral 
Commission on Economic and Scientific Cooperation that dated back to 1984.
327
 At 
the same time, meetings between the Chinese and Russian heads of state, which had 
previously been very rare events, became increasingly institutionalised, occurring 
multiple times per year. A forum for the frequent, regularised exchange of opinions 
between the Chinese and Russian leaders – i.e. a working process of ‘summitry’ – 
was thus put in place, which has since allowed both leaderships to remain in close 
contact with each other.  
 
The 1996 agreements provided the basis not only for a broadening and 
regularisation of top-level official contacts, but also for the consistent growth of 
subordinate bilateral institutional channels. The newly-launched Commission for the 
Preparation of Regular Meetings of the Heads of Government, has comprised 
numerous bilateral Subcommissions and Working Groups. The Commission, which 
has since come to be regarded as “the basic ‘engine’ of the successful operation of 
the mechanism” of top-level bilateral exchange,328 held its first meeting in June 1997. 
On this occasion, a formal inter-governmental agreement on the principles of 
establishing the mechanism of regular meetings of the heads of government was 
signed that specified its organisational and legal bases.
329
 
In concrete terms, this mechanism gradually took the shape of three major 
institutional channels, each at the level of deputy heads of government, which 
together form the core of institutionalised bilateral interaction between China and 
Russia: In addition to the aforementioned Commission for the Preparation of the 
Regular Meetings of the Heads of Government, this now includes a bilateral 
Commission for ‘Humanitarian’ Cooperation (created in December 2000 and initially 
labelled the ‘Commission on Education, Culture, Public Health, and Sport’), as well 
as a Sino-Russian Energy Dialogue (established in July 2008), both co-headed by 
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Chinese and Russian deputy heads of government. By 2011, a total of 19 bilateral 
subcommissions had been established under the aegis of these three mechanisms, and 
within the framework of these subcommissions more than 40 specialised subordinate 
working groups were created. Most of these bodies have since been meeting 
regularly once a year.
330
 Together, this network of commissions, subcommissions, 
and working groups now covers almost every aspect of bilateral interaction in the 
political, economic, cultural, and other spheres (for a full list of these institutional 
mechanisms, see Appendix 1). 
Outside of the framework of the above commissions, various other bilateral 
institutional channels have been created between China and Russia. One of these, the 
bilateral Commission on Cooperation in the Field of Fisheries, dates back to 1989, 
prior to the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Shortly afterwards, in 1992, a bilateral 
Joint Committee on Border Prospecting was convened that remained active for at 
least eight years. Some of its functions were later assumed by a Joint Sino-Russian 
Border Commission, which has been in operation since 2007. Another important 
bilateral forum that was established in the early 1990s and has been active to this day 
is the Sino-Russian Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation, headed by the 
Chinese and Russian defence ministers and charged with administering Russian 
weapons exports to China.  
In 1997, Beijing and Moscow also initiated annual military consultations between 
the General Staffs of both countries. A Sino-Russian Mechanism for Strategic 
Security Consultations was established in 1999, initially at the level of deputy 
foreign ministers. It held seven session until 2004, when it was restructured; by 2009, 
it had conducted an additional four meetings, now at the level of the Chinese State 
Councillor and the Russian Security Council Secretary. A further step towards the 
institutionalisation of interaction in the security sphere was the creation of a bilateral 
Anti-Terrorism Working Group in 2001, as well as a bilateral Working Group on 
Questions of Migration in 2006.  
In another sensitive sphere of cross-border interaction, the management of the 
water bodies that form nearly the entirety of the Sino-Russian border, a bilateral 
Commission for the Rational Use and Protection of Trans-Border Waters was 
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established in 2008. Institutionalised bilateral forums were also created between the 
non-executive branches of both governments. The first Sino-Russian Inter-
Parliamentary Conference took place in May 2004, and two separate Committees on 
Cooperation between China’s National People’s Congress on the one hand and 
Russia’s State Duma and Federation Council on the other hand were established two 
years later. An annual Dialogue Forum between the Communist Party of China and 
Russia’s governing party United Russia was established in 2009. 
Another sphere of bilateral relations that has increasingly been institutionalised is 
the interaction between regional authorities in both countries (e.g. in the form of a 
Sino-Russian Annual Forum on Inter-Regional Cooperation). The legal basis for this 
interregional cooperation was laid with the signing of a bilateral agreement on the 
principles of cooperation between Chinese and Russian regional/provincial 
administrations in November 1997. By 2004, more than sixty Russian regions and 
territories had reportedly established direct contacts with Chinese provinces.
331
 Some 
other institutional mechanisms created between China and Russia have been 
specifically designed to provide for the inclusion of and exchange between non-
governmental circles. These include the Sino-Russian Business Council, created in 
2004 (whose stated main purpose is to help businessmen of the two countries to 
establish direct contacts) and the Sino-Russian Committee of Friendship, Peace, and 
Development, which dates back to 1997 and has primarily been devoted to 
promoting cultural and civil society exchange. For a comprehensive list of the 
bilateral institutions created between China and Russia since the end of the Cold War, 
see Appendix 1. 
 
 
The Regularisation of Top-Level Meetings: 
At the highest level of bilateral exchange, beginning in the 1990s, meetings of the 
Chinese and Russian heads of state became firmly institutionalised, creating – for the 
first time in the history of bilateral relations – a forum for a truly regular exchange of 
opinions between them. Until the mid-1990s, there was on average less than one 
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personal meeting per year between the Chinese and Russian heads of state.
332
 By 
2000, however, the presidents already met each other three times per year, and since 
2005 this number has further increased to 5-7 personal meetings per year. As one 
analyst observed already by the end of 2002, “[o]ver the previous 10 years, leaders of 
the two countries met on 18 occasions, of which 11 times were between Jiang and 
Putin. In 2002 alone, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers met eight times and 
more than 70 Russian official delegations visited China.”333  Official presidential 
visits have sometimes been accompanied by vast delegations of more than 1000 
people.
334
  
As outlined above, the two countries’ heads of government, who had not 
previously stood in any meaningful regular contact with each other, began to hold 
annual meetings in 1996. While the annual presidential meetings have been used to 
discuss a broad range of political and strategic questions, the premiers’ meetings 
have become the primary vehicle for the coordination of bilateral trade, economic, 
and investment relations.
335
 Meetings between the Chinese and Russian foreign 
ministers likewise became regularised, and their number increased from ca. two per 
year in the late 1990s to 6-8 meetings per year by 2009. In addition to these 
ministerial meetings, consultations at the level of deputy foreign ministers, 
department heads in the foreign ministries (and, to a lesser extent, in other ministries), 
as well as other high-level foreign policy officials have multiplied to the point where 
there are now many dozens such meetings every year:
336
 The Russian Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Aleksandr Yakovenko observed in 2004 that “[p]lanned 
consultations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China are conducted almost weekly: in 
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total, for the current year more than 50 meetings are planned at the level of deputy 
foreign ministers or directors of departments in the Foreign Ministries, not even 
counting the constant working contacts through the embassies and representations of 
Russia and the People’s Republic of China in international organisations.”337 
Just as importantly as regularising bilateral exchange between the heads of state, 
the heads of government, and the foreign ministers, the institutionalisation of Sino-
Russian relations has led to a regularisation of meetings between other Chinese and 
Russian senior officials in virtually every field of bilateral interaction. In each case, 
these are forums of exchange that had never existed prior to the late 1990s. The 
regular participation in institutionalised bilateral dialogue forums has gradually been 
extended to include the heads and top officials of many ministries and government 
agencies. The annual sessions of the various bilateral subcommissions, for instance, 
have typically been co-headed by the relevant ministers or deputy ministers in the 
Chinese and Russian cabinets. 
Within the framework of the bilateral Commission for the Preparation of Regular 
Meetings of the Heads of Government, eight different Chinese ministers, cabinet-
level officials, and directors of major national government agencies have consistently 
been meeting their Russian counterparts on an annual or near-annual basis. The same 
is true for at least sixteen different deputy ministers and deputy heads of major 
government agencies. Within the framework of the bilateral Commission for 
Humanitarian Cooperation, two Chinese directors of major national government 
agencies and at least eight deputy ministers and deputy heads of government 
agencies have been meeting their Russian counterparts on an annual or near-annual 
basis.
338
 In the words of the former Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei 
Borodavkin, “[a]s a rule, the subcommissions are chaired by the heads of the 
respective ministries and agencies, which ensures a high level of interaction between 
them. [...] In this way, the executive bodies of both countries are directly 
incorporated into the process of Russian-Chinese interaction.”339 The annual sessions 
of the two commissions themselves, as well as the more frequent sessions of the 
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Sino-Russian Energy Dialogue, have each been headed by Chinese and Russian 
deputy prime ministers. 
In some cases, the bilateral subcommissions that are now headed by deputy 
ministers were initially – at the time of their foundation – headed by the relevant 
ministers, but the responsibility of leading and attending these forums was soon 
delegated to their deputies. This happened, for instance, in the case of the 
Subcommissions on Education, on Culture, on Health Care, and on 
Telecommunications & Information Technologies.
340
 The initial level of regular 
exchange at the highest level of policymaking in almost all spheres of bilateral 
political interaction has thus not proven fully sustainable in the long term. However, 
a comprehensive regularisation of exchange occurred at the next-highest level of 
authority, in most cases at the level of deputy ministers, and several important 
cabinet members, including the ministers of transport/railways, the 
economy/commerce, energy, and the environment, have continued to meet on an 
annual basis within the institutional framework. 
Today, the newly-created institutional channels bring a large number of Chinese 
and Russian top-level officials from almost every ministry or government agency 
into direct personal contact with their immediate counterparts on a regular basis. 
Since the institutional network now covers almost every aspect of bilateral 
interaction, most top-level Chinese and Russian officials or their immediate deputies 
– serving as the chairpersons of bilateral subcommissions and working groups – are 
meeting their direct counterparts at least once a year. A range of institutional links 
has also been established between Chinese and Russian policy-makers at the regional 
level, and exchanges within the bilateral institutional framework have created further 
occasions for meetings and communication between regional leaders and the national 
leadership of the respective other country.  
In May 2004, for instance, a session of the Sino-Russian Annual Forum on Inter-
Regional Cooperation was attended by the Chairman of the Standing Committee of 
the Chinese National People’s Congress, who then used this occasion to visit the 
Russian cities of Khabarovsk and Irkutsk. This represented the first-ever visit by a 
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high-level Chinese leader to the Russian Far Eastern region, where anti-Chinese fears 
and suspicions have traditionally been very strong. Later that year, Vladimir Putin 
visited China’s northwest provinces in the context of his official presidential visit to 
China in October 2004 and met with regional and provincial leaders. Hu Jintao 
followed suit with a trip to Siberia in July 2005, where he conducted lengthy 
personal meetings with Russian regional leaders
341
 (who, during the Yeltsin period, 
had frequently obstructed the development of bilateral ties). Hu’s visit was arranged 
as an extended stopover between his official state visit to Moscow and his 
subsequent participation in the fifth Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation in Astana, Kazakhstan. 
 
The activity of the various newly-created bilateral commissions and 
subcommissions has not been restricted to their annual or bi-annual meetings. The 
regularity and consistency of the work of these institutions has furthermore been 
guaranteed by the establishment of permanent working secretariats and the frequent 
(usually quarterly) meetings of their national sections. The inter-governmental 
‘Agreement on the Establishment and Organisational Basis of the Mechanism of 
Regular Meetings of the Heads of Government of China and Russia’, for instance, 
which was signed in June 1997, specified that “the ongoing work of the Commission 
is carried out by the working secretariats of the national sections of the Commission, 
which in advance prepare and agree between them proposals on the date, place and 
agenda of the next meeting of the Commission. […] When necessary, both sides, by 
mutual agreement, conduct meetings between the heads of the secretariats of the 
national sections of the Commission.”342 In practice, the Chinese and Russian deputy 
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premiers, acting as co-chairmen of the Commission for the Preparation of Regular 
Meetings of the Heads of Government, have conducted various joint working 
meetings in addition to their regular annual sessions.
343
 
Meanwhile, the decree on the formation of the bilateral Commission on 
Humanitarian Cooperation, issued by the Russian government in December 2000, 
specified that the Russian section of the Commission – including “the chairmen of 
the Russian sections of the Subcommissions established within the structure of the 
Commission and of other permanent and temporary working bodies, the 
representatives of relevant federal executive organs and organisations” – is to 
conduct its sessions as often as circumstances require, but no less than once every 
three months. “When required, representatives of the relevant executive organs of the 
subjects of the Russian Federation can be invited to the sessions. At the sessions of 
the Russian section of the Commission, issues related to the work of the 
subcommissions and other permanent and temporary working bodies are being 
discussed and proposals are made regarding the time, venue and agenda of the 
sessions of the Commission.”344 
In addition, “in order to ensure the activities of the Russian section of the 
Commission”, the decree specifically provides for the creation of a “working 
secretariat which is responsible for the day-to-day work of the Russian section of the 
Commission, coordinates the activity and summarises the proposals of the Russian 
sections of the Subcommissions, prepares documents for the sessions of the Russian 
section of the Commission and fulfils other obligations related to its activities. The 
working secretariat regularly holds meetings in the period between the sessions of 
the Russian section of the Commission. […] The working secretariat of the Russian 
section of the Commission is in constant communication with the working secretariat 
of the Chinese section of the Commission.”345  
Overall, the activity of the newly-created Sino-Russian institutional channels and 
the degree of bilateral interaction within them extends beyond their regular annual or 
biennial sessions. It is to some extent sustained in the intervals between these 
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sessions, through the ongoing work of their separate national sections and working 
secretariats. It can be assumed that this increases the institutions’ effectiveness by 
providing a measure of constancy and regularity in the interaction between the 
relevant officials and foreign policy stakeholders from both countries. 
 
 
The Extension of Bilateral Interaction in the Context of Multilateral Institutions: 
One of the principal reasons why high-level contacts between the Chinese and 
Russian heads of state, foreign ministers, and other senior officials have become so 
frequent is the two countries’ simultaneously growing membership and interaction 
within international organisations. For a long time, the only international 
organisations in which Beijing and Moscow had participated alongside each other 
were the United Nations and its affiliates. While the Soviet Union had been a 
member state of the United Nations since its inception, the People’s Republic of 
China remained formally excluded from U.N. activities (including those of U.N. 
affiliates like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) until October 
1971, when it replaced Taiwan as the recognised Chinese representative in U.N. 
institutions.
346
 Since Beijing also replaced Taipei as a permanent member of the U.N. 
Security Council, it now participated in key U.N. institutions alongside the Soviet 
Union. Although both countries initially remained unabatedly hostile towards each 
other, small lines of diplomatic contact were subsequently opened. It was not by 
coincidence that the first formal meeting of the Chinese and Soviet foreign ministers 
in 1984 was organised in the context of the U.N. General Assembly in New York.
347
 
For a long time, the U.N. and its affiliated institutions were the only major 
multilateral organisations in which Beijing and Moscow both took part, but this 
changed rapidly following the end of the Cold War and the onset of large-scale 
international institution-building in East Asia. Today, such organisations also include 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (established in 1989; China acceded in 1991, 
Russia in 1998), the Asia-Pacific Parliamentary Forum, linked with APEC 
(established in 1993; China was a founding member, Russia acceded in 1994), the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (established in 1994, both China and Russia were founding 
members), the G20 Meetings (established in 1999; both China and Russia were 
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founding members), the Northeast Asia Economic Forum (established in 1991, both 
China and Russia were founding members), the Conference on Interaction and 
Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (established in 1999; both China and Russia 
were founding members), the ‘Shangri-La’ Defence Ministers Dialogue (established 
in 2002, both China and Russia were founding members), and most recently the 
Asia-Europe Meeting (established in 1996; China was a founding member, Russia 
acceded in 2010) and the East Asia Summit (established in 2005; China was a 
founding member, Russia acceded in 2011), which are both linked with ASEAN. 
Both China and Russia have attached great importance to the expansion of these 
multilateral institutional links. When Russia played host to the annual APEC Summit 
in Vladivostok in 2012, for instance, it poured enormous financial resources into the 
event and publicised it extensively.
348
 With reference to China’s and Russia’s 
increasing interaction in multilateral forums, the Russian Ambassador in China, 
Sergei Razov, claimed that “[a]s permanent members of the UN Security Council, 
Russia and China hold similar positions on many international and regional 
issues[. …] In addition to the traditional activities in the framework of the UN and 
such important platforms as the summits of the ‘Group of 20’, APEC, BRICS and 
RIC, these are now also ASEM and, since 2011, the East Asian Summit (EAS). 
Incidentally, in the course of the preparatory work for the inclusion of Russia into the 
activities of the latter two forums, we have invariably felt the strong support of our 
Chinese partners.”349 
Attempts have also been made to institutionalise forms of trilateral interaction 
between China, Russia, and India. As an initial step, a trilateral meeting of scholars 
from the three countries was established in 2001, and has since been held annually. 
Annual meetings between the three countries’ foreign ministers began to be held in 
2002 as informal exchanges on the side-lines of international conferences and were 
converted into formally institutionalised stand-alone meetings in 2005. A first 
summit meeting of the three heads of state was held on the side-lines of the G-8 
summit in St. Petersburg in July 2006. A biennial meeting of business representatives 
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from the three countries (first held in March 2006) was formally institutionalised in 
December 2007. In addition, regular sectoral specialist discussion forums on select 
topics – agriculture, disaster relief, and healthcare (at the level of department heads 
of the respective ministries) – have been held between the three states since 2008. 
Since 2009, trilateral interaction has been complemented by the annual summit 
meetings of the ‘BRIC(S)’ countries, while the autonomous trilateral format has been 
sustained for most of the existing mechanisms. Although there is some indication 
that the BRIC(S) mechanism is bound to remain relatively ineffective, due to the 
diverging interests of its members and its overlap with various other international 
organisations, it has also established itself as a regular forum. 
 
 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: 
Out of all multilateral institutions that China and Russia have joined since the 
1990s, the most important for their bilateral interaction has been the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO has its roots in regular Sino-Soviet talks 
on the joint reduction of armed forces and military confidence-building in the border 
areas that date back to 1990. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these talks were 
continued between China and the newly independent states Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Following the conclusion of a series of border 
agreements within this format, joint committees were established to complete the 
demarcation of the borders.
350
 At the time of President Yeltsin’s second state visit to 
China in April 1996, the five countries signed an agreement to build confidence in 
the military sphere along their borders, later supplemented with a follow-up 
agreement stipulating mutual force limitations. On the occasion, they further 
institutionalised their mechanism of regular talks on confidence-building measures 
and demilitarisation in Central Asia, which was henceforth referred to as the 
‘Shanghai Five’ grouping. Following the inclusion of Uzbekistan in the format in 
June 2001, it officially formed a full-fledged multilateral organisation, the SCO. 
Already prior to the official formation of the SCO, the Shanghai grouping began 
to undergo a broad functional expansion beyond its initial core agenda of mutual 
confidence building and regional security (although these remain the SCO’s most 
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important functional objectives to this day). At their third summit in July 1998, the 
Shanghai Five began to expand their discussion into non-border issues, such as the 
fight against the ‘three evils’ of separatism, terrorism, and religious 
fundamentalism.
351
 Over time, various other areas of multilateral cooperation – 
particularly the economic, financial, and energy spheres, but also social and cultural 
interaction – became part of the Shanghai mechanism’s work. In the words of the 
Russian Ambassador to China, Sergei Razov, “[u]nder the circumstances of dynamic 
change in the contemporary world, both countries are closely coordinating their 
positions on and approaches to a whole range of international and regional issues, 
and are developing new joint initiatives. Thus, we have witnessed that the ‘Shanghai 
Five’ has transformed itself from a mechanism for the resolution of security issues in 
the border region into an authoritative international organisation, the SCO, and the 
sphere of its activity now also encompasses economic, scientific-technical, and 
humanitarian cooperation.”352 The initiative to transform the SCO from a negotiation 
forum on confidence building and border demarcation into a full-fledged regional 
organisation with a broad range of themes and objectives was initially taken by the 
Chinese side.
353
 
In conjunction with the expansion of its thematic range, the SCO has also vastly 
expanded its institutional structure. Within the space of little more than a decade, a 
multitude of specialised organs and committees have been created in the Shanghai 
format. “Although still in its infancy, the SCO has developed an institutional 
structure […] within which there are clear structural design themes, areas of 
concentration and an institutional culture.”354 Since the formation of the ‘Shanghai 
Five’ in April 1996, the heads of state of the participating countries have held a 
summit meeting once every year. Initially, these summit meetings constituted the 
only substantial functional institutional and decision-making element of the Shanghai 
mechanism – and to this day, the Council of Heads of State forms the supreme 
decision-making body of the SCO – but they were soon complemented by other 
forums: 
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At the fourth summit, in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on August 24, 1999, the group agreed 
to institute regular meetings among officials of various government departments of 
the member-states. In November 1999, the heads of law enforcement agencies in the 
Shanghai Five countries met for the first time. The first meeting of defense ministers 
of the group was held in Astana, Kazakhstan, in March 2000. The first meeting of 
the group’s foreign ministers was held on July 5, 2000, just before the fifth summit 
in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The Dushanbe summit mooted the idea of establishing a 
Shanghai Five Council of National Coordinators to foster regularized coordination 
for organizational support, which was eventually realized under the SCO. This set of 
cabinet-level meetings was annualized and institutionalized when the Shanghai Five 
became the SCO in 2001 with the addition of Uzbekistan.
355
 
Separate annual meetings of the SCO’s heads of government have been held 
every year since September 2001 (with the exception of 2002). In 2002, regular 
meetings were also established between the economic and trade ministers and 
emergency ministers of the SCO member states. Subsequently, regular meetings 
have been established between the ministers of energy, transport, health, tourism, the 
environment, education, and culture, as well as the heads of other government 
agencies, such as the Security Council secretaries, the parliamentary speakers, the 
prosecutors general, the Supreme Court presidents, and the heads of disaster-relief 
agencies.
356
 According to one analyst, “the Meetings of Heads of Ministries and or 
Agencies are convened to work out the details and facilitate the policy directions 
agreed upon by the Council of Heads of State, bringing together the relevant 
domestic bodies to form practical and effective policy.”357 In contrast to the top-level 
meetings, most cabinet-level and inter-agency meetings have not been held on an 
annual basis, but at longer, relatively irregular intervals. 
A number of specialised inter-governmental working groups have also been 
established within the SCO framework. Reportedly, “the Ministers from each 
member state responsible for external economics and external trade work together 
like a coordinated body, by holding various working groups on areas of cooperation, 
such as transport, energy, customs, agriculture, electronic trade and statistics”.358 
Other working groups include a joint supervision group on disarmament and 
confidence-building measures (established as early as 1999, it has since been 
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meeting twice a year) and working groups on information and telecommunication 
technology, quality inspection, and investment promotion. Furthermore, “[t]o 
provide further structure to the SCO, the heads of government, meeting in October 
2005 in Moscow, signed agreements to establish a mechanism to provide quick 
reaction and mutual aid to member states for disaster relief and other emergencies. 
They created an SCO Development Fund, a sort of investment bank for joint projects, 
in 2006. […] In May 2006 an inaugural meeting of parliamentary speakers of SCO 
states convened in Moscow.
359
 Other institutional channels created within the SCO-
framework now include an SCO Business Council (inaugurated in 2006 as a forum 
for exchange between entrepreneurs), an SCO Interbank Consortium, and an SCO 
Scientific Forum (which is meant to unite representatives from various professional 
and academic circles and to serve as a research arm for the SCO’s Secretariat and the 
Council of National Coordinators). 
The SCO’s day-to-day activities and functions are coordinated and directed by a 
Council of National Coordinators drawn from the member states that meets at least 
thrice a year.
360
 Two permanent bodies exist within the SCO structure: the SCO 
Secretariat and the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure. The Secretariat, which was 
inaugurated in January 2004, “is the standing administrative organ ‘responsible for 
the provision of organisation, technical and information assistances to activities 
supported within the framework of the SCO’. It provides the bureaucratic backbone 
to the organisation”.361 
The Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS), located in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 
is tasked with the collection and distribution of intelligence on suspected terrorist 
groups operating in Central Asia. RATS formally opened as a permanently 
functioning organ in 2004. RATS comprises an Executive Committee – a permanent 
structure responsible for overseeing “the running of the RATS and the functional 
implementation of its work” – and a Council of Permanent Representatives which “is 
the main decision-making body of the RATS, and is made up of the ministers in 
charge of counterterrorism efforts in the respective member states”.362 By March 
2012, twenty RATS Council sessions had been held. Official meetings also 
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frequently occurred between officials of the law-enforcement agencies and special 
services, police, and security chiefs of the SCO member states. 
A particular form of Sino-Russian interaction that has to some extent been 
‘institutionalised’ – for the most part under the aegis of the SCO – are the repeated 
large-scale bilateral military exercises that have been carried out under the label 
‘Peace Mission’ since 2005. Following a Sino-Kyrgyz military exercise in October 
2002 – the first time in its history that China conducted a peacetime military exercise 
with another state – and a larger set of exercises including all SCO-members bar 
Uzbekistan in August 2003, the first Sino-Russian military exercise (‘Operation 
Peace Mission 2005’) took place in August 2005, involving some 10,000 troops from 
both countries. Representatives of the other SCO member states, as well as Iran, 
India and Pakistan, attended the exercise as observers.
363
  
Subsequently, the SCO member states agreed to organise regular joint military 
exercises. Further ‘Peace Mission’ military exercises took place in 2007, 2009, 2010, 
and 2013, but not all SCO members participated in them. The exact role of the SCO 
in coordinating the ‘Peace Mission’ exercises is difficult to establish: All the 
exercises were officially organised within the Shanghai format, but the 2005, 2009, 
and 2013 exercises were effectively bilateral Sino-Russian exercises (although 
various SCO member states were invited as observers), exemplifying the frequent 
difficulty of distinguishing clearly between the bilateral and multilateral levels of the 
SCO’s activities. In addition to the ‘Peace Mission’ exercises, China and Russia also 
conducted a number of smaller-scale joint drills involving, for instance, their police 
forces and navies. 
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
 
As outlined in this chapter, institution-building between China and Russia since 
the end of the Cold War has been rapid and very extensive. In the words of the 
former Russian Ambassador to China, Sergei Razov, “[o]ver the past decade, we 
have truly achieved unprecedented progress. […] We ensured a high intensity of 
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contacts at the level of heads of states. We established an effective mechanism for 
regular meetings between the heads of government, including an extensive network 
of intergovernmental commissions, subcommissions and working groups which 
encompass virtually all spheres of interaction.” 364  An article published by the 
Chinese state media outlet Renmin Ribao summarised the developments in Sino-
Russian relations as follows:  
Practically in all areas of cooperation there are intergovernmental and interagency 
agreements. The contacts between the Russian and Chinese heads of state have 
grown intense […] (official visits, bilateral contacts within the framework of the 
summits of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and APEC). [...] There is regular 
communication through the telephone ‘hotline’. […] Cooperation has been 
established between the central legislative, judicial, and practically all executive 
organs of government. Interregional relations are developing actively, more than one 
hundred cooperation agreements have been signed between the governments of the 
administrative-territorial units at different levels.
365
 
In very similar words, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Aleksandr 
Yakovenko claimed that 
at the present moment, we have created a unique multi-level mechanism of 
interaction, including regular meetings of the heads of state and government, 
constant contacts between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the heads of key 
departments. Inter-parliamentary exchanges and communication at the regional level 
are developing. I suppose that there is no single sphere in which Russia does not 
have an intensive, equitable, and trustful dialogue with China. A solid legal base has 
been laid for cooperation, numbering more than a hundred intergovernmental 
agreements and in addition a similar number of inter-regional and interdepartmental 
agreements.
366
 
This chapter has merely traced and documented the development of institutional 
channels between China and Russia. In order to analytically establish what the actual 
impact and significance of these rapidly proliferating institutional links has been, the 
following case study chapters will analyse three of the newly created institutional 
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mechanisms between China and Russia in detail, assessing their institutional 
development and their impact on bilateral cooperation. 
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Chapter V: Case Study 1 –  The Sino-Russian Subcommission on 
Trade and Economic Cooperation 
 
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the single most significant bilateral 
institution created between China and Russia has been the Commission for the 
Preparation of Regular Meetings of the Heads of Government, which is co-headed by 
a Chinese and a Russian deputy premier. The Commission (hereinafter referred to as 
the ‘Vice-Premiers’ Commission’) was formed in 1997 and has since held annual 
sessions which always immediately precede the annual meetings of the Chinese and 
Russian prime ministers. Within a year of its foundation, a small number of 
subordinate subcommissions were set up within its framework. 
The Subcommission for Trade and Economic Cooperation was among the first 
five subcommissions to be created within the framework of the Vice-Premiers’ 
Commission, and it has remained its largest and most important subordinate body. 
Bringing together the two countries’ ministers of economy on an annual basis, the 
Subcommission has assumed the responsibility of coordinating the main lines of 
civilian economic interaction between China and Russia, excepting the energy sector 
and the arms trade (these highly sensitive fields of interaction have been coordinated 
through separate bilateral institutions). In order to establish what the 
Subcommission’s impact and significance has been, the criteria of analysis 
developed in chapter 1 will be applied to this case in turn. 
 
 
 
Structural Development: 
 
Over the years, the Subcommission on Trade and Economic Cooperation has 
shown a great degree of structural consistency and expansion. Since its first session 
in 1998, the Subcommission has met every year for its annual session (which takes 
place alternately in China and Russia); there have been no recorded interruptions of 
its work. At the same time, it underwent a substantial structural expansion, producing 
a variety of institutional offshoots in the form of several specialised working groups 
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and economic agencies. These include a bilateral Working Group on Cross-Border 
and Interregional Trade and Economic Cooperation (hereinafter: ‘Interregional 
Working Group’), which was formed in 1998, simultaneously with the 
Subcommission itself. At the second session of this Working Group in the same year, 
a bilateral Coordination Council for Cross-Border and Interregional Trade and 
Economic Cooperation (hereinafter: ‘Interregional Coordination Council’) was 
established.
367
 This body, which brings together representatives of the governments 
and business circles of the border regions, was designed to assist “in the resolution of 
emerging problems in trade and economic cooperation between the two countries’ 
neighbouring regions”.368  
Other subordinate mechanisms of the Subcommission include a bilateral Working 
Group for the Development and Use of Timber Resources, which was formed in 
November 2000 and held its first session in 2001; a Working Group on 
Standardisation, Metrology, Certification and Inspection Control, which was 
established in 2002; a Working Group on Investment Cooperation, which held its 
first session in June 2004; a Working Group on Cooperation in the Protection of 
Intellectual Property and a Working Group on Special Economic Zones, both created 
in 2007. 
Another specialised economic exchange forum, the Russian-Chinese Centre of 
Trade and Economic Cooperation, became a subsidiary institution of the 
Subcommission in 2000. The Centre had initially been established in 1998 as a 
public limited company, but was then formally integrated into the government-
controlled bilateral institutional network.
369
 The Centre is distinct from the 
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Subcommission’s other subordinate institutions in two ways: It is, in spite of its 
name, effectively a unilateral institution operated by the Russian government and 
Russian business circles, without substantial input from the Chinese side; and it lacks 
a forum for regularised exchange, but rather operates on a permanent basis as a 
facilitator and consultancy mechanism for major bilateral business ventures and trade 
events. According to its self-description, “the main focus of the Centre’s work is to 
provide assistance to the Chinese and Russian participants in bilateral trade-
economic relations, to improve the forms, methods, and conditions of interaction, 
[and] to provide consulting, legal, and other professional services to the state and 
commercial organisations of both countries”.370 
The Subcommission’s subordinate working groups have themselves evolved 
further. But in contrast to the Subcommission itself, most of them have operated in a 
more erratic manner and have shown less institutional coherence and regularity. The 
two most recently formed working groups – the Working Groups on Intellectual 
Property Protection and on Special Economic Zones – have been the only ones to 
have met with great regularity in the few years of their existence, holding sessions 
every year. The Working Groups on Standardisation and on Timber Resources have 
likewise operated regularly, albeit with some interruptions.
371
 
A more exceptional case is that of the Interregional Working Group, which, since 
its creation, has met regularly once a year with the exception of a four-year hiatus 
from 2002 to 2005 when no meetings were held and the Working Group was 
effectively suspended.
372
 What caused this long interruption of its activities remains 
unexplained; no clarification was provided in the protocol of the subsequent fifth 
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annual session in 2006 which merely returned to ‘business as usual’.373 In the case of 
the Working Group on Investment Cooperation, no degree of regularity was ever 
attained. Two annual sessions in 2004 and 2005 were followed by a three-year hiatus. 
Another session was recorded in 2009, but no further activity can be observed after 
that, and the Working Group has ceased to operate altogether.
374
 
 
As regards the Subcommission itself, structural coherence and regularity have 
been promoted by the fact that there has been some degree of sustained interaction in 
between the annual sessions. Most importantly, the Subcommission operates a 
permanent secretariat that coordinates its activities throughout the year.
375
 The 
‘Memorandum on the Further Development of Cooperation between the Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of the People’s Republic of China’, which 
was concluded at the time of the Subcommission’s fifth session in May 2002, 
stipulated that “the Parties will strengthen cooperation and information-sharing in the 
work of the Secretariats of the Russian-Chinese Commission for the Preparation of 
Regular Meetings of the Heads of Government, the Subcommission on Trade and 
Economic Cooperation and its Permanent Working Group on Cross-Border and 
Interregional Trade and Economic Cooperation.”376 The Memorandum’s first article 
specified a concrete range of the activities to be jointly performed by the Chinese and 
Russian authorities involved in the Subcommission during the intervals between its 
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annual sessions.
377
 Sino-Russian interaction in the framework of the Subcommission 
is thus not limited to its annual sessions, but is to some extent maintained throughout 
the year. Similar provisions have also been made in the case of the Interregional 
Working Group.
378
 
In sum, the overall balance sheet regarding the structural development of the 
Subcommission on Trade and Economic Cooperation and its subordinate bodies is 
mixed. The Subcommission itself has been operating with great regularity and 
consistency. Its institutional structure has undergone a consistent expansion through 
the formation of new subordinate institutions. In two cases – the Interregional 
Working Group and the Centre on Trade and Economic Cooperation – these 
subordinate institutions have themselves formed subsidiary bodies that became part 
of the institutional mechanism of the Subcommission.
379
 At the same time, some of 
the Subcommission’s subordinate institutions failed to attain a meaningful degree of 
operational regularity. For most of them, a degree of irregularity and institutional 
incoherence has been the rule, rather than the exception. In some cases, problems of 
institutional overlap appear to have contributed to these aberrations. 
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Involvement of Senior Officials: 
 
A further criterion for the assessment of whether and to what extent the 
Subcommission of Trade and Economic Cooperation has had a practical significance 
for the development of Sino-Russian relations is the degree to which senior officials, 
policy-makers, and other relevant stakeholders from China and Russia have been 
involved in its activities. Since its inception in 1998, the annual sessions of the 
Subcommission have been co-chaired by the Chinese Minister of Commerce (until 
2003 this post was referred to as the ‘Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation’) and by the Russian Minister of Economic Development and Trade 
(referred to as the ‘Minister of Economy’ before May 2000).380 Both ministers were 
personally present at each of the Subcommission’s annual sessions. 
The participants in the Subcommission’s annual sessions further included many 
other senior officials and leading business representatives. The Russian delegations 
were typically composed of numerous senior officials from the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Trade, including – for instance at the Subcommission’s seventh 
session – the director, deputy director, and a section head of the Ministry’s 
Department of Foreign Economic Relations, the director of the Department of Trade 
Consultations, and the director of the Department of State Regulation of Foreign 
Economic Activity and Customs.
381
 At another session, the directors of the 
Ministry’s Department of Asian and African Countries and the Department of 
Special Economic Zones and Project Financing were present.
382
  
The Russian delegations furthermore included – in varying compositions – 
representatives of practically all other Russian ministries and federal agencies 
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involved in civilian economic relations with China, including the Ministries of 
Finance, of Regional Development, of Industry and Energy (since 2008 referred to as 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade), the Foreign Ministry, the Federal Customs 
Service, the Federal Service for Veterinary Surveillance, as well as Russia’s Trade 
Representative in China.
383
 The delegations also, on occasion, included senior 
representatives of regional administrations, for instance representatives of the 
administrations of Ulyanovsk and Khabarovsk regions (in 2007),
384
 and a regional 
delegation headed by the deputy administration head of Oryol region (in 2010).
385
 
The Chinese delegations to the Subcommission’s sessions primarily included 
representatives of the Ministry of Commerce,
386
 and the further composition of the 
Chinese delegations largely mirrored that of the Russian delegations. 
In addition to senior government officials, another important set of participants in 
the Subcommission’s annual sessions have been representatives of Chinese and 
Russian corporations and business associations. Through their presence, the sessions 
became a forum of exchange between the governments and corporate sectors of both 
countries. According to one frequent participant, the Subcommission’s meetings 
have frequently been attended by the directors of major Chinese and Russian 
companies.
387
 The fact that the participation in the Subcommission’s deliberations 
has not been restricted to government officials, but has also included influential 
corporate actors, is an indicator of the institution’s potential to have acted as a 
genuine coordinating mechanism for bilateral economic interaction. 
At the Subcommission’s annual sessions, business interests have also been 
represented and mediated by government-affiliated agencies. On the Russian side, 
the most prominent of these have been the Russian-Chinese Centre of Trade and 
Economic Cooperation, its subsidiary, the Russian-Chinese Finance Centre in St 
Petersburg,
388
 and the Association of National Companies for Assisting the 
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Development of Trade and Economic Relations with the People’s Republic of China. 
The president of the Russian-Chinese Centre of Trade and Economic Cooperation, 
Sergei Sanakoev, has typically attended the Subcommission’s sessions and presented 
himself as a spokesman for the interests of entrepreneurs.
389
 Sanakoev has been 
described as an influential power broker, “who has been in the presidential HR 
reserve since 2009, which attests to the serious lobbying potential he and his allies 
possess.”390 
The Subcommission’s subordinate working groups likewise regularly brought 
together senior officials from both countries, although the level of seniority of the 
officials involved varied significantly between institutions. The annual sessions of 
the Interregional Working Group were initially headed by a Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation on the Chinese side and the First Deputy 
Minister of Economy on the Russian side.
391
 From the fifth annual session in 
September 2006 onwards (following a four-year interruption of the Working Group’s 
sessions), the posts of co-chairmen were assumed by a Chinese Deputy Minister of 
Commerce and a Russian Deputy Minister of Regional Development. The sessions 
of the Interregional Working Group have also been attended by very senior officials 
from the regional governments of a large range of Chinese and Russian provinces 
and regions, by officials from different ministries and government agencies, and by a 
small number of business representatives. Although the leading positions at these 
meetings have consistently been held by the same cabinet-rank officials, the number 
and seniority of the other participating officials has sometimes shifted drastically.
392
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Mezhregional'nomu Torgovo-Ėkonomicheskomu Sotrudnichestvu’, Rossiĭskaia Gazeta (23.3.1999), 
available online at http://www.rg.ru/oficial/from_min/mid/331.htm; Tsikanov & Zhang, Protokol 4-go 
Zasedaniia Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskoĭ Postoiannoĭ Rabocheĭ Gruppy po Prigranichnomu i 
Mezhregional'nomu Torgovo-Ėkonomicheskomu Sotrudnichestvu 
392
 From the eighth annual session in July 2009 to the tenth session in July 2011, for instance, the 
delegation size declined from 64 Chinese and 38 Russian participants to a mere 18 Chinese and 16 
Russian participants, indicating a substantial degree of discontinuity in official participation; see 
Travnikov & Gao, Protokol Vos'mogo Zasedaniia Postoiannoĭ Rabocheĭ Gruppy po 
Mezhregional'nomu i Prigranichnomu Sotrudnichestvu, annex 2; Travnikov & Gao, Protokol 
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The annual sessions of the Working Group on Timber Resources have likewise 
been chaired by high-level officials: on the Chinese side by a Deputy Minister of 
Commerce and on the Russian side by a Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade.
393
 
The Subcommission’s other subordinate working groups have been headed by less 
senior, mid-level officials: The sessions of the Working Group on Standardisation 
have been chaired, on the Chinese side, by the deputy director of the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine and the director of 
the Chinese Certification and Accreditation Administration. On the Russian side, 
they have been chaired by the deputy director of the Federal Agency for Technical 
Regulation and Metrology.
394
 The Working Group on Intellectual Property 
Protection was headed, on the Chinese side, by the head of the Legal Department of 
the Ministry of Commerce, and on the Russian side by the director of the Federal 
Service for Intellectual Property, Patents and Trademarks (Rospatent).
395
 
                                                                                                                                          
Deviatogo Zasedaniia Postoiannoĭ Rabocheĭ Gruppy po Mezhregional'nomu i Prigranichnomu 
Sotrudnichestvu, annex 2; Maxim Travnikov & Zhong Shan, Protokol Desiatogo Zasedaniia 
Postoiannoĭ Rabocheĭ Gruppy po Mezhregional'nomu i Prigranichnomu Sotrudnichestvu (Moscow: 
Ministry of Regional Development of the Russian Federation, 2011), annex 2, available online at 
http://www.minregion.ru/upload/documents/2011/07/7492protokol.pdf. In the case of the 
Interregional Coordination Council, its chairmanship has been rotating annually: In any one year, one 
Chinese province and one Russian region – each represented by a deputy governor – have jointly 
chaired the Council’s annual session. 
393
 Other participants in the Working Group’s sessions included, on the Chinese side, representatives 
of the Department of Foreign Investments and Economic Cooperation in the Ministry of Commerce 
and of various departments in the State Forestry Administration, and on the Russian side 
representatives of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the administrations of several Russian regions 
bordering China, as well as corporations in the forestry sector and the Russian Trade Representation in 
Beijing; see ‘Upravlenie Vneshneėkonomicheskikh Sviazeĭ Pravitel'stva Evreĭskoĭ Avtonomnoĭ 
Oblasti Informiruet ob Uchastii Delegatsii Pravitel'stva Evreĭskoĭ Avtonomnoĭ Oblasti v 10-om 
Zasedanii Postoiannoĭ Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskoĭ Rabocheĭ Gruppy po Osvoeniiu i Ispol'zovaniiu Lesnykh 
Resursov’, Information Portal of the Government of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (18.4.2012), 
available online at http://eao.ru/?p=organsnews&newsid=10221. 
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 ‘Zasedanie Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskoĭ Rabocheĭ Gruppy’, Institute for the Certification of Organisations 
(July 2010), available online at http://isorf.ru/Novosti/2011-08-01-16-51-06.html. The meetings also 
included representatives of the host region’s provincial authorities and of state-owned enterprises. 
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 ‘Press-Reliz o Zasedanii Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskoĭ Rabocheĭ Gruppy po Sotrudnichestvu v Zashchite 
Prav Intellektual'noĭ Sobstvennosti’, Press Centre of the Russian Federal Service for Intellectual 
Property (13.8.2007), available online at http://www.rupto.ru/mejd_sotr/sod/dvus_sotr/china.html; 
‘Torgovo-Ėkonomicheskie Otnosheniia Rossii s Kitaem’, Trade Representation of the Russian 
Federation in the People’s Republic of China (8.8.2008), available online at 
http://www.russchinatrade.ru/ru/news/2008-08-08-Russian-China-Trade; ‘Tret'e Zasedanie Rossiĭsko-
Kitaĭskoĭ Rabocheĭ Gruppy po Sotrudnichestvu v Zashchite Prav Intellektual'noĭ Sobstvennosti’, 
Press Centre of the Russian Federal Service for Intellectual Property (22.7.2009), available online at 
http://www.rupto.ru/mejd_sotr/sod/news_ms/zas_china_3.html; ‘4-oe Zasedanie Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskoĭ 
Rabocheĭ Gruppy po Sotrudnichestvu v Zashchite Prav Intellektual'noĭ Sobstvennosti’, Trade 
Representation of the Russian Federation in the People’s Republic of China (21.5.2010), available 
online at http://www.russchinatrade.ru/ru/news/2010-05-21-Rospatent. The annual meetings were also 
attended by representatives of a large range of other Chinese and Russian ministries and agencies. 
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The Working Group on Special Economic Zones was initially co-chaired by the 
deputy head of the European Administration of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
and the director of the Russian Federal Agency for the Management of Special 
Economic Zones (RosOEZ).
396
 Following an upgrade in its institutional significance, 
from its third annual session in 2009 onwards the Working Group has been headed 
by a Chinese Deputy Minister of Commerce and a Russian Deputy Minister of 
Economic Development.
397
 The few, irregular sessions of the Working Group on 
Investment Cooperation, meanwhile, were headed by different officials, ranging 
from very senior to mid-level ranks. 
As regards the involvement of senior officials in the institutional framework of 
the Subcommission for Trade and Economic Cooperation, there has thus been a 
substantial degree of variation between individual bodies. In the case of the 
Subcommission itself, as well as the Interregional Working Group and the Working 
Group on Timber Resources, the annual sessions have been chaired by ministers or 
deputy ministers, and numerous other very senior national and regional officials from 
China and Russia have regularly been in attendance. The remaining working groups 
have typically been headed by less senior, mid-level executive officials. Even in 
those cases, however, the tendency has been for each working group to be chaired by 
the most senior Chinese and Russian officials responsible for the particular policy 
areas it covers, or their immediate deputies. 
Below the level of the chairmen, the sessions of the Subcommission and its 
subordinate working groups have typically been attended by senior representatives of 
most relevant departments and agencies within the respective policy areas, as well as 
numerous representatives from the corporate and business sectors – an important 
prerequisite for such institutions to make a practical impact on trade and economic 
cooperation. What has also been significant to observe in many cases is a relative 
continuity of meetings and exchanges between the same Chinese and Russian 
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 ‘Vizit Delegatsii Kitaia v RosOEZ’, Vestnik Osobykh Ėkonomicheskikh Zon (30.7.2008), available 
online at http://www.vestnikoez.ru/news_full.php?nid=65 
397
 ‘21 Iiulia 2009 Goda Delegatsiia RosOEZ pod Rukovodstvom Zamestitelia Ministra 
Ėkonomicheskogo Razvitiia Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii O.G. Savel'eva Priniala Uchastie v Tret'em 
Zasedanii Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskoĭ Rabocheĭ Gruppy po Voprosam Osobykh Ėkonomicheskikh Zon’, 
INFOLine (21.7.2009), available online at http://www.advis.ru/php/print_news.php?id=A3BD8227-
3544-124B-AE5B-DAE454D58E71; ‘31 Maia 2010 g. Sostoialos' Chetvertoe Zasedanie Rossiĭsko-
Kitaĭskoĭ Rabocheĭ Gruppy po Voprosam Osobykh Ėkonomicheskikh Zon’, Press Service of the 
Russian Ministry of Economic Development (31.5.2010), available online at 
http://www.economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/foreigneconomicactivity/cooperation/economicaa
/doc20100531_06. It also included leading representatives of the Chinese and Russian business 
communities. 
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officials and stakeholders over the space of many years. Overall, the Subcommission 
appears to have been vested with substantial policy-making authority and has 
included a sufficiently wide range of relevant actors to have the potential for making 
a palpable impact on bilateral economic policy-making. 
 
 
 
Practical and Policy Impact: 
 
The Subcommission’s primary task has been to act as a platform for coordinating 
general bilateral trade and economic activity between China and Russia outside the 
spheres of energy and the arms trade. To what extent it fulfilled this task in practice 
is not immediately evident, but a number of practical outcomes of its activities can be 
identified. The available sources indicate that the Subcommission’s first priority has 
been to oversee the general development of bilateral economic relations and to 
prepare proposals and programmes for decision-making by the prime ministers. The 
annual sessions of the Subcommission have consistently been scheduled as part of 
the sequence of institutionalised exchanges preceding and preparing the annual prime 
ministers’ meetings, the highest forum of bilateral decision-making in the economic 
sector.
398
 A senior academic at the Russian Diplomatic Academy, who took part in 
several of the Subcommission’s sessions prior to 2008, described them as 2-3 days of 
intense discussions between ministerial officials, businessmen, and experts from both 
countries, who worked together very closely and ultimately submitted a report to the 
Vice-Premiers’ Commission that prepares the annual meetings of the prime 
ministers.
399
 
Each of the Subcommission’s sessions has included a section for taking stock of 
the general bilateral economic developments since the previous session. In 
                                                 
398
 A report on the Subcommission’s ninth session in 2006, for instance, stated that “the session of the 
Subcommission is [a] regular stage in the preparation of the meeting of the heads of government of 
the two countries.” (‘Mesto Vstrechi – Mariinskiĭ Dvorets’, Public Relations and Information Office 
of the St Petersburg Legislative Assembly (19.9.2006), available online at 
http://www.assembly.spb.ru/manage/page/archive/page?tid=633200226&action=0&nd=458208818) 
Likewise, a report of the Subcommission’s tenth session stated that “the Russian-Chinese 
Subcommission on Trade and Economic Cooperation is the key element in the mechanism of the 
preparation of the regular meetings of the Russian and Chinese heads of government.” (‘24 Avgusta 
2007 g. v g. Pekine Ministr Ėkonomicheskogo Razvitiia i Torgovli Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii G.O. Gref 
Prinial Uchastie v Rabote Desiatogo Zasedaniia Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskoĭ Podkomissii po Torgovo-
Ėkonomicheskomu Sotrudnichestvu’). 
399
 Personal interview with Prof. Aleksandr Lukin, Russian Diplomatic Academy, 3.4.2012 
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coordinating and supervising general economic developments, the Subcommission 
has commonly reviewed the progress made by the relevant national authorities in 
implementing the decisions of its deliberations in the intervals between its annual 
sessions.
400
 The Subcommission has also acted as the main coordinating mechanism 
for the activities of its subordinate working groups, has verified the resolutions 
reached at their meetings and instructed the relevant government agencies to put 
these resolutions into practice.
401
 
The Subcommission’s activity has been most perceptible in its work towards 
launching and supervising large-scale bilateral economic projects and trade events 
and the preparation of foundational agreements. One of the projects for which the 
Subcommission served as a key coordinator is the ‘Programme for the Development 
of Sino-Russian Trade and Economic Cooperation in 2006-2010’. This foundational 
bilateral economic programme was jointly developed by the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce and the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, aiming to provide a 
structure and planning basis for bilateral economic interaction. The Programme first 
featured on the Subcommission’s agenda at its eighth session in 2005402 and its ninth 
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 At the Subcommission’s tenth session in 2007, for instance, “the session assessed the current state 
of Russian-Chinese trade and economic cooperation, and also the course of the implementation of the 
Russian-Chinese agreements reached during the ninth session of the Subcommission.” (24 Avgusta 
2007 g. v g. Pekine Ministr Ėkonomicheskogo Razvitiia i Torgovli Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii G.O. Gref 
Prinial Uchastie v Rabote Desiatogo Zasedaniia Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskoĭ Podkomissii po Torgovo-
Ėkonomicheskomu Sotrudnichestvu’) 
401
 All available protocols of the Subcommission’s annual sessions explicitly state that, following its 
discussion of the activities of the individual working groups, “the Subcommission instructs the 
responsible authorities of both sides to insure the realisation of all agreements reached during the 
sessions of the working groups” (see e.g. German Gref & Bo Xilai, Protokol Sed'mogo Zasedaniia 
Podkomissii po Torgovo-Ėkonomicheskomu Sotrudnichestvu Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskoĭ Komissii po 
Podgotovke Reguliarnykh Vstrech Glav Pravitel'stv (Beijing: Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 
21.9.2004), art.3, available online at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20110925022744/http://www.crc.mofcom.gov.cn/crweb/rcc/info/Article.js
p?col_no=32&a_no=2222; German Gref & Bo Xilai, Protokol Desiatogo Zasedaniia Podkomissii po 
Torgovo-Ėkonomicheskomu Sotrudnichestvu Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskoĭ Komissii po Podgotovke 
Reguliarnykh Vstrech Glav Pravitel'stv (Moscow: Russian Ministry of Economic Development, 
24.8.2007), p.13, available online at 
http://www.economy.gov.ru/wps/wcm/connect/18fb7d8040a012e58af6ceb1e9ba48ef/protokol.doc?M
OD=AJPERES&CACHEID=18fb7d8040a012e58af6ceb1e9ba48ef; Elvira Nabiullina & Chen 
Deming, Protokol Odinadtsatogo Zasedaniia Podkomissii po Torgovo-Ėkonomicheskomu 
Sotrudnichestvu Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskoĭ Komissii po Podgotovke Reguliarnykh Vstrech Glav Pravitel'stv 
[Moscow: Russian Association of Builders, 2008] available online at http://www.a-s-
r.ru/DesktopModules/Mirax.StandaloneFileManager/files/750647166_43_%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%
BE%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BB%20%D1%80%D1%83%D1%81.pdf). 
402
 On the occasion, Minister of Economics German Gref “proposed to render the Programme as 
practical as possible and to develop a list of specific activities for implementing the key provisions of 
the Programme.” (Press Service of the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, ‘O 8-
om Zasedanii Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskoĭ Mezhpravitel'stvennoĭ Podkomissii po Torgovo-Ėkonomicheskomu 
Sotrudnichestvu, Pekin, 12-13 Avgusta 2005 g.’, Russian Foreign Ministry Information Bulletin 
[16.8.2005], p.7, available online at 
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session in 2006.
403
 During the latter session, Russia’s Minister of Economics and 
Trade German Gref pointed out that “[t]his is the first time that a long-term 
programme of the development of these relations between the two countries is being 
developed.”404 It was also mentioned that the Programme contained the target of 
raising the volume of annual bilateral trade to $60-80 billion by 2010.
405
 This target 
subsequently became a fixture of Sino-Russian economic projections and was 
frequently reiterated at the meetings of top-level officials from both states, including 
the Chinese and Russian presidents. Memorandums on the Programme for the 
Development of Sino-Russian Trade and Economic Cooperation in 2006-2010 were 
signed at the tenth and eleventh meetings of the Chinese and Russian premiers, who 
announced the completion of the Programme’s development.406 
A more specialised economic development programme in which the 
Subcommission played a central role is the Sino-Russian Regional Programme for 
Timber Extraction. This Programme first appeared on the agenda of the 
Subcommission’s seventh session in 2004, where the participants expressed the need 
for “the development of a Russian-Chinese Long-Term Plan of Cooperation in the 
Development and Use of Timber Resources, and also the implementation of projects 
for the harvesting and processing of timber”.407 The Programme featured in the Joint 
Communiqué of the ninth meeting of the Chinese and Russian prime ministers in the 
following year.
408
 In the process of its further development, the Programme was 
transformed into a ‘Regional Plan for Forestry Cooperation in Tomsk Oblast’ 
(several other Russian regions were to be incorporated in subsequent stages of the 
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04b25a1/$FILE/16.08.2005.doc)  
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 ‘Mesto Vstrechi – Mariinskiĭ Dvorets’; ‘Kitaĭ Budet Sodeĭstvovat' Resheniiu Problem v Torgovom 
Sotrudnichestve s RF’, RIA Novosti (19.9.2006), available online at 
http://nw.ria.ru/economy/20060919/81492288.html 
404
 ‘Tovarooborot mezhdu Rossieĭ i Kitaem za 3 Goda Uvelichilsia Vtroe’, RBK Daily (19.9.2006), 
available online at http://top.rbc.ru/spb_sz/19/09/2006/116177.shtml 
405
 Aleksandr Zhukov & Wu Yi, Protokol Deviatogo Zasedaniia Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskoĭ Komissii 
(Beijing: Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 5.12.2006), available online at 
http://www.crc.mofcom.gov.cn/crweb/rcc/info/Article.jsp?col_no=32&a_no=30108 
406
 ‘Sovmestnoe Kommiunike po Itogam Desiatoĭ Reguliarnoĭ Vstrechi Glav Pravitel'stv Kitaia i 
Rossii’, Chinese Information Internet Centre (5.11.2005), art.1, available online at 
http://russian.china.org.cn/russian/203742.htm; ‘Informatsionnoe Kommiunike po Itogam 11-ĭ 
Reguliarnoĭ Vstrechi Glav Pravitel'stv Kitaia i Rossii’, Renmin Ribao (11.11.2006), available online at 
http://russian.people.com.cn/31521/5026897.html 
407
 Gref & Bo, Protokol Sed'mogo Zasedaniia Podkomissii po Torgovo-Ėkonomicheskomu 
Sotrudnichestvu Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskoĭ Komissii po Podgotovke Reguliarnykh Vstrech Glav Pravitel'stv, 
art.2.9 
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 ‘Sovmestnoe Kommiunike po Itogam Deviatoĭ Reguliarnoĭ Vstrechi Glav Pravitel'stv Kitaia i 
Rossii’, Renmin Ribao (26.9.2004), art.2.16, available online at 
http://russian.people.com.cn/31519/2809132.html 
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Plan).
409
 The Programme’s subsequent development was delegated to the 
Subcommission’s Working Group on Timber Resources, while first projects were 
already being implemented on its basis.  
The protocol of the Subcommission’s tenth session in 2007 noted that “in 2006, 
the implementation of ten key projects on the deep processing of timber that had 
been jointly specified by the Parties successfully moved ahead, [and] the work on the 
preparation of the ‘Complex Programme of Russian-Chinese Cooperation on the 
Development of Timber Resources in Tomsk Oblast’ was successfully completed. 
The Subcommission instructs the Permanent Working Group on the Development 
and Use of Timber Resources to accelerate the start of the work on the second stage 
of the Programme on cooperation in the forestry sector.”410 In the protocol of its 
subsequent eleventh session in 2008, the Subcommission again commended “the 
successful development of the work towards realising the ‘Russian-Chinese Complex 
Plan for the Development and Use of Timber Resources in Tomsk Oblast’”.411 The 
Programme was subsequently discussed at the highest level of regular economic 
exchange, at the 14
th
 and 16
th
 meetings of the Chinese and Russian premiers.
412
 
Yet another large-scale economic programme coordinated within the framework 
of the Subcommission is a bilateral programme for economic cooperation between 
Chinese and Russian regions, which has been supervised by the Sino-Russian 
Interregional Working Group. During the third session of the Interregional Working 
Group in March 2000, “an agreement was reached on conducting a series of 
consultations, including on defining the principles and content of cross-border trade 
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 See Guo Weidong, ‘Priderzhivat'sia Strategii Dolgovremennogo Razvitiia Aktivno Stimulirovat' 
Kitaĭsko-Rossiĭskoe Sovmestnoe Osvoenie i Ispol'zovanie Lesnykh Resursov, Press Service of the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce (15.11.2007), available online at 
http://www.crc.mofcom.gov.cn/crweb/rcc/info/Article.jsp?col_no=866&a_no=95581  
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 Gref & Bo, Protokol Desiatogo Zasedaniia Podkomissii po Torgovo-Ėkonomicheskomu 
Sotrudnichestvu Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskoĭ Komissii po Podgotovke Reguliarnykh Vstrech Glav Pravitel'stv, 
p.7 
411
 Nabiullina & Chen, Protokol Odinadtsatogo Zasedaniia Podkomissii po Torgovo-
Ėkonomicheskomu Sotrudnichestvu Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskoĭ Komissii po Podgotovke Reguliarnykh Vstrech 
Glav Pravitel'stv, p.5. The Cooperation Plan appears to have had a palpable economic impact, as 
Chinese investment in timber processing in Tomsk Oblast strongly increased in the following years 
(see Olga Konovalova, ‘China Sets Up Shop in Russia’s Forests’, Marchmont News [11.2.2009], 
available online at http://marchmontnews.com/News/Features/6251-China-sets-up-shop-Russias-
forests.html). 
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 ‘Sovmestnoe Kommiunike po Itogam Chetyrnadtsatoĭ Reguliarnoĭ Vstrechi Glav Pravitel'stv 
Rossii i Kitaia’, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Russia (18.6.2010), art.3.11., available 
online at http://ru.china-embassy.org/rus/zgxw/t709799.htm; ‘Sovmestnoe Kommiunike po Itogam 
Shestnadtsatoĭ Reguliarnoĭ Vstrechi Glav Pravitel'stv Rossii i Kitaia’, Embassy of the Russian 
Federation in China (12.10.2011), art.2, available online at 
http://www.russia.org.cn/rus/2827/31294063.html 
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with the aim of developing a bilateral agreement.”413 At the fourth session in the 
following year, “the Permanent Working Group noted that the existing legal and 
contractual foundation of bilateral cooperation needs to be improved”, and the 
participants again resolved “that they will consider the practicability of the 
conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement on border cooperation and will send 
their proposals to the leaders of the national sections of the Permanent Working 
Group.”414  
However, due to the four-year hiatus in the Working Group’s operations, no 
progress was made on the project until the sixth session in August 2007, where the 
draft agreement was tabled again.
415
 It was restructured into a programme of 
cooperation between the border regions, and in this form it appeared as one of the 
main items on the agenda of subsequent sessions of the Interregional Working 
Group.
416
 At the eighth session in July 2009, it was observed that “in the period after 
the seventh session of the Permanent Working Group the Parties have carried out a 
considerable amount of work on the preparation and coordination of the draft 
Programme of Cooperation between the Far East and Zabajkal’ya Regions of the 
Russian Federation and the North-East of the People’s Republic of China […]. The 
Parties agreed to complete the coordination of the Programme and to move towards 
its ratification in the course of one of the next summit-level meetings in 2009.”417 
Indeed, the ‘Programme of Cooperation between the Far East and Eastern Siberian 
Regions of the Russian Federation and the North-East of the People’s Republic of 
China (2009-2018)’ was formally approved by the Chinese and Russian presidents 
during their meeting in September 2009. 
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Rabocheĭ Gruppy po Mezhregional'nomu i Prigranichnomu Torgovo-Ėkonomicheskomu 
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 See e.g. Travnikov & Yu, Protokol 7-go Zasedaniia Postoiannoĭ Rabocheĭ Gruppy po 
Mezhregional'nomu i Prigranichnomu Sotrudnichestvu, art.4. The Programme was also discussed at 
the eleventh session of the Subcommission, which took place only a few days later (Nabiullina & 
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Mezhregional'nomu i Prigranichnomu Sotrudnichestvu, pp.3-4 
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Subsequent sessions of the Interregional Working Group continued to monitor 
the progress of implementing the inter-regional cooperation programme. At the ninth 
session, the delegations observed “that the governments of both countries and also 
the regional authorities have taken a number of practical measures and have initiated 
active work for the realisation of the Programme for Cooperation between the 
Regions of the Far East and Eastern Siberia of the Russian Federation and the North-
East of the People’s Republic of China […]. More specifically, the Russian Ministry 
of Regional Development has defined eight projects of the Programme whose 
realisation will have priority.”418 The protocol of the tenth session stated that “a 
number of consultations have been held on the events and projects of the Programme 
of Cooperation between the Regions of the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia and 
North-Eastern China (2009-2018). […] The Permanent Working Group notes that the 
governments of both countries and also the regional authorities are undertaking 
practical measures for the implementation of the Programme”.419 At that point, the 
Programme was also regularly being discussed at the highest levels of bilateral 
exchange. At the 15
th
 meeting of premiers in 2010, it was observed that “the practical 
implementation of a number of projects contained in the […] ‘Programme of 
Cooperation between the Far East and Eastern Siberian Regions of the Russian 
Federation and the North-East of the People’s Republic of China (2009-2018)’ has 
begun”, including the construction of transport infrastructure, the development of 
border crossing points, the creation of modern industrial plants and tourist facilities 
in border areas.
420
 A Chinese academic and former diplomat, who has frequently 
                                                 
418
 Travnikov & Gao, Protokol Deviatogo Zasedaniia Postoiannoĭ Rabocheĭ Gruppy po 
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taken part in bilateral working group sessions coordinating the implementation of the 
inter-regional cooperation programme, described it as relatively successful, including 
more than 200 individual projects.
421
 
 
The inter-regional cooperation programme, although it took nearly a decade for it 
to fully take shape, has yielded some palpable results in stimulating and facilitating 
bilateral business ventures. The Programme for the Development of Sino-Russian 
Trade and Economic Cooperation in 2006-2010 and the Programme of Sino-Russian 
Cooperation on the Development of Timber Resources have likewise facilitated 
bilateral coordination, regulation, and planning in important sectors of economic 
interaction. In the case of the latter two programmes, however, it ultimately remains 
questionable how great their effect on the progress of practical economic projects has 
actually been.  
Much the same is true for the Sino-Russian Economic Forums, a series of large-
scale bilateral trade events in whose organisation the Subcommission on Trade and 
Economic Cooperation and its subordinate bodies have played a key role. At the 
Subcommission’s eighth session in August 2005, it was first announced that “an 
agreement was reached to jointly host a Russian-Chinese Economic Forum in 
2006.”422 The Forum subsequently became an annual event, organised jointly by the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the Russian Ministry of Economic Development 
and Trade. One of the Subcommission’s subordinate institutions, the Russian-
Chinese Centre of Trade and Economic Cooperation, acted as the operating body for 
three of the annual Economic Forums on the Russian side.
423
 The Economic Forums 
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featured particularly strongly in the deliberations at the Subcommission’s twelfth 
session in 2009, where the “progress in preparing the Fourth Russian-Chinese 
Economic Forum” in October was debated at length.424 One report about the session 
went as far as to claim that “as a whole, the session of the Subcommission […] was 
organised for the preparation of the IV Russian-Chinese Economic Forum”. The 
report went on to emphasise the importance of this event for individual corporations 
and financial institutions, “since it will allow them to present projects to the widest, 
professionally interested audience, not even to mention the fact that the event will be 
held at the highest possible government level.”425 
The bilateral Economic Forums were attended by the Chinese and Russian heads 
of state and (on most occasions) by the heads of government. Their progress was 
discussed at the highest forums of exchange between both states, including the 12
th
, 
13
th
, and 15
th
 meetings of the two countries’ premiers. On paper, very significant 
results were achieved at these Forums: At the fourth bilateral Economic Forum in 
October 2009, for instance, Chinese and Russian companies reportedly signed 
economic contracts with a cumulative value of more than $3 billion, and at the fifth 
Economic Forum in November 2010 the corresponding sum was reported to be $8 
billion.
426
 
These reports notwithstanding, it remains questionable how great the practical 
outcome of these high-profile Economic Forums has actually been. Senior Russian 
and Chinese analysts stated that, in practice, the Forums have primarily been “a PR 
campaign” and “a show” for signing pre-agreed high-value investment contracts in 
the presence of top-level policy-makers.
427
 In their opinion, these contracts, as a rule, 
had been worked out and agreed during prior, separate rounds of negotiations and 
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would have been signed in any event. When a high-level delegation of the Russian 
Association of Builders visited China in 2009, for example, agreements about 
bilateral business ventures that were reached on this occasion (concerning 
construction projects in Chelyabinsk and Moscow) were not signed on the spot, but 
their signing was postponed until the fourth Sino-Russian Economic Forum later that 
year. Similarly, the signing of a memorandum on cooperation between the Chinese 
and Russian ministries of transport that was finalised at the 13
th
 session of the Sino-
Russian Subcommission on Transport in September 2009 was postponed until the 
fourth Economic Forum.
428
 It can therefore be assumed that the function of these 
Forums has in large part been symbolic. 
While the above-mentioned plans, programmes, and events appear to have 
provided some impetus to bilateral economic cooperation and infused it with greater 
regularity, their track record has for the most part been sobering. On many occasions, 
the practical outcomes of the deliberations in the framework of the Subcommission 
and its subsidiary working groups have evidently been very meagre. A particularly 
glaring example of this is the project of constructing a bridge across the Amur River 
between the border cities of Heihe and Blagoveshensk. This project was laid down in 
two intergovernmental agreements as early as 1995 and 1997. In April 1996, Beijing 
and Moscow signed documents concerning the first phase of construction work, but 
no work was subsequently carried out.  
The implementation of the agreement on building the bridge was then discussed 
at the first meeting of the bilateral Coordination Council for Interregional and Cross-
Border Cooperation in January 1998.
429
 The project was subsequently put on the 
agenda of most of the annual sessions of the Interregional Working Group. The 
protocol of its fourth session in July 2001 recommended “to continue the work of 
examining the technical and financial issues connected with the construction of the 
bridge across the Amur River between Blagoveshensk and Heihe”. 430  At its 
subsequent fifth and sixth annual sessions, the Working Group made 
recommendations to the bilateral Subcommission on Transport and to the responsible 
authorities and business circles of both countries on reconsidering the construction of 
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the bridge,
431
 but the issue remained unresolved. At its ninth and tenth sessions, the 
Working Group stated its intention to continue the interaction on the realisation of 
cross-border infrastructure projects, including the bridge between Heihe and 
Blagoveshensk.
432
 All of these prolonged efforts notwithstanding, the project 
remained unfinished, apparently due to persistent opposition on the part of regional 
officials in Russia. In March 2012, a pontoon bridge was finally opened to connect 
the two cities,
433
 but a permanent structure has yet to be built. Among the Chinese 
analysts interviewed for this thesis, the abortive project to complete the Heihe-
Blagoveshensk bridge has been the single most commonly referred-to example of the 
complications persisting in bilateral relations with Russia.
434
 
A similar disappointment have been the Subcommission’s various efforts to 
initiate bilateral projects geared towards the promotion of trade in high value-added 
machine-technical goods between the two countries (an issue of great concern for the 
Russian government). At its seventh session in August 2004, for instance, the 
Subcommission formally instructed “the Ministry of Economic Development of 
Russia and the Ministry of Commerce of China to develop and approve an Annual 
Plan of Activities for the Promotion of Trade in Machine-Technical Products, 
including the provision of measures for assisting in the organisation and conduct of 
business seminars, the presentation of goods and technologies”. 435  Following an 
exchange of correspondence between the two ministries, the ‘Plan of Activities for 
Inter-Ministerial Cooperation in the Promotion of Trade in Machine-Technical 
Products for 2005’ was then signed in December 2004. 436  Reportedly, the Plan 
contained “such activities as conducting a series of business seminars, the 
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organisation of a specialised exhibition of Russian machine-technical production in 
Beijing, the organisation of an exhibition hall for Russian machines and equipment at 
the Harbin International Trade and Economic Fair, the development of corresponding 
expositions at the International High Technologies Fair in Shenzhen and the 
International Industry Fair in Shanghai, etc.”437  
The Plan of Activities for 2005 was later followed up by another inter-ministerial 
‘Plan of Activities for the Promotion of Bilateral Trade in Machine-Technical 
Products’, covering the period of 2006-2007, which was signed into effect at the 
eleventh meeting of premiers in November 2006.
438
 Again the Subcommission 
played an important part in its drafting and implementation. Overall, however, while 
the Subcommission has generated a fair amount of planning, concepts, and trade 
events with the specific aim of stimulating the export of machines and engineering 
products from Russia to China, this overall objective has remained an evident failure: 
Instead of attaining any palpable results in diversifying the trade structure, the share 
of machinery among Russia’s exports to China consistently declined and eventually 
stagnated at negligible levels. This is particularly notable since the Subcommission’s 
leadership on the Russian side had repeatedly defined this as the Subcommission’s 
single most important objective.
439
 
 
Such evident failures notwithstanding, the Subcommission’s work is apparently 
frequently taken into account by the relevant policy-makers and economic 
stakeholders. A number of occasions can be identified when relevant authorities and 
business associations in China and Russia explicitly structured their activities in 
accordance with the outcomes of the Subcommission’s deliberations and 
implemented its decisions. In May 2009, for instance, a special meeting was 
organised between the president of the Russian Association of Builders, the chairman 
of the Russian-Chinese Centre of Trade and Economic Cooperation, and the 
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governor of Primorsky Krai, as well as a number of senior Russian regional officials. 
The topic of this meeting was the course of the implementation of the decisions 
reached at the Subcommission’s eleventh session in the previous year (particularly 
regarding the construction of housing and infrastructure and the question of inviting 
Chinese companies to undertake these construction projects).
440
 
At the Subcommission’s 13th annual session in 2010, the chairman of the 
Russian-Chinese Centre of Trade and Economic Cooperation reported that the Centre, 
together with the China International Contractors Association, had undertaken 
substantial work in the development of large-scale bilateral infrastructure projects “in 
accordance with the decisions of the 11
th
 and 12
th
 sessions of the Subcommission”.441 
In the course of this work, dozens of agreements with a cumulative value of several 
billion dollars were reportedly signed and working relations were established 
between the Russian side and a large number of Chinese construction companies.
442
 
Another example of how the decisions of one of the Subcommission’s subsidiary 
institutions were taken as guidance by the relevant authorities is a prikaz [order] 
issued by the director of the Russian Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and 
Metrology in February 2007 ‘On the Implementation of the Decisions of the Protocol 
of the Fourth Session of the Permanent Russian-Chinese Working Group on 
Standardisation, Metrology, Certification and Inspection Control of the 
Subcommission on Trade and Economic Cooperation’. In this document, the director 
instructs several department heads within the Agency to take specified practical steps 
towards the implementation of the decisions taken by the Working Group at its 
session in July 2006.
443
 
While most of the topics of the Subcommission’s deliberations remained very 
broad, involving the monitoring of overall economic activity between China and 
Russia, others have been highly specific, including the direct supervision of 
individual bilateral business projects. Representatives of major businesses were 
typically present at the Subcommission’s sessions, which provided them with an 
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opportunity for direct interaction with the Chinese and Russian top officials in the 
economic sphere. The available protocols of the Subcommission’s sessions all 
include a final section outlining a range of individual bilateral economic projects that 
are being “supported” by the Subcommission, as well as the state of implementation 
of major bilateral investment projects (many of the listed projects have featured at 
several consecutive sessions, indicating a sustained interest in their development).
444
 
What exactly this “support” implied was not specified. However, it can be 
assumed that, in a business context (both in China and in Russia) that relies 
immensely on personal access to influential policy-makers, such a formal 
prioritisation and endorsement by a key bilateral policymaking body has been 
advantageous for those pursuing bilateral business ventures. It indicates that the 
Subcommission, beyond drafting broad economic programmes and policies, has 
provided a platform for active interaction between influential businessmen and 
policy-makers. Due to the presence of some of the most senior economic decision-
makers from both countries, the Subcommission’s sessions provided a rare forum 
where individual economic ventures could swiftly be translated into official policy. 
In practical terms, this has perhaps been the most important function of the 
Subcommission’s work.  
According to a senior Russian academic, who took part in several of the 
Subcommission’s sessions, bilateral institutions such as the Subcommission have 
provided a useful forum for the participating Chinese and Russian businessmen to 
meet each other and to create personal connections: In his opinion, businessmen “like 
this opportunity; it is not very easy to be on the list of this group or delegation, so 
they think that it is a good opportunity for representatives of companies to meet their 
Chinese counterparts, to meet Chinese bureaucrats, and for the Chinese to meet 
Russian bureaucrats, talk with them, and maybe even [to] solve some problems.”445 
This quality of providing a dialogue forum between the business communities and 
top policy-makers from both countries is also reflected in the comments made by the 
chairman of the Russian-Chinese Centre of Trade and Economic Cooperation, Sergei 
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Sanakoev, at the Subcommission’s 13th session. In addressing the representatives of 
the Chinese and Russian governments, Sanakoev claimed that such sessions provided 
“an opportunity on behalf of the business community to make proposals for your 
consideration and to express wishes on the most topical issues and the further 
development of bilateral trade-economic cooperation. […] Such a format of meetings, 
along with the practice of carrying out the Russian-Chinese Economic Forums, 
serves to strengthen the interaction of the two countries’ governments and business 
circles in drawing up the current daily agenda and identifying the most important 
directions of cooperation for a specific time period.”446 The Subcommission’s 13th 
session in 2010 included a ceremony of signing investment agreements and contracts 
between Chinese and Russian companies with a cumulative volume of $700-800 
million.
447
 It is unclear, however, how many of these contracts, if any, were actually 
concluded during the meeting of the Subcommission.
448
 
 
On the side-lines of the Subcommission’s sessions, separate rounds of specialised 
consultations have often been conducted between government officials or business 
representatives from China and Russia who otherwise might not have had an 
occasion to establish contacts with each other. As part of the work of preparing the 
Subcommission’s tenth session in 2007, for instance, specialised preparatory 
meetings were organised between delegations of China’s Ministry of Commerce and 
Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development (as well as other relevant government 
agencies), in order to hold preliminary discussions “concerning the removal of 
restrictions on the trade in agricultural products”. At the same time, another round of 
specialised preparatory consultations was held between representatives of China’s 
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Ministry of Commerce and Russia’s Ministries of Finance and Economic 
Development, in order to prepare the Subcommission’s deliberations “on the 
progress of implementing the intergovernmental agreement on the final settlement of 
the debt of the USSR and Russia to China.”449 Likewise, in August 2010, the Chinese 
Minister of Commerce Chen Deming paid an official visit to Irkutsk oblast, in the 
course of which economic joint ventures in fields such as tourism, forestry, transport, 
and energy were discussed with the regional authorities. This visit occurred en route 
to (and in connection with) the Minister’s subsequent participation in the 13th session 
of the Subcommission in Moscow on August 20
th
.
450
 The results of the visit were 
also presented by the Chinese deputy minister of commerce at the ninth session of 
the Interregional Working Group in the following month.
451
 
An example of a Russian business association that has structured many of its ties 
with China around the activities of the Subcommission and its subordinate bodies is 
the Russian Association of Builders (ASR). In September 2009, for instance, ASR 
organised a working visit to China in collaboration with the Russian-Chinese Centre 
of Trade and Economic Cooperation. The visit was timed to coincide with the annual 
sessions of the Subcommission for Trade and Economic Cooperation and the 
Subcommission for Transport. The delegation included the Association’s president, 
the director of its Department of Construction and Infrastructure Projects, as well as 
“the heads of leading Russian construction companies.” Reportedly, the working 
visit was organised with the aim of selecting general contractors for construction 
projects in Russia.
452
 
The delegation took part in the twelfth session of the Subcommission on Trade 
and Economic Cooperation. It was noted that “in order to achieve concrete results in 
the Subcommission’s work in the implementation of projects, the Russian 
Association of Builders and the Russian-Chinese Centre of Trade and Economic 
Cooperation have prepared proposals for inclusion in the summary protocol of the 
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session, including the designation of specific projects”.453 The working visit also 
provided the occasion for a meeting between the ASR’s President Nikolai Koshman 
and the President of the China International Contractors Association, Diao Chunhe, 
in Beijing. Both discussed the planning and implementation of joint business projects 
in the construction sector and agreed “to jointly organise a sectoral meeting on 
‘Construction and Investment’ […] which will be attended by the leading Chinese 
engineering contractors, investment and financial institutions, as well as suppliers of 
equipment and building materials.”454  
One can thus observe some functional ‘spill-over’, in that the Subcommission’s 
annual sessions, beyond merely serving as occasions for the deliberation of large-
scale bilateral economic programmes and agreements, also served as catalysts for 
separate rounds of specialised consultations between officials or corporate 
representatives from both countries. The regular sessions of some of the 
Subcommission’s subordinate working groups likewise commonly served as 
occasions for the organisation of such separate rounds of consultations between 
interested entrepreneurs and officials from both countries.
455
 The large-scale 
economic programmes initiated by the Subcommission appear to have had some 
relevance for providing groundwork agreements and establishing basic parameters 
for bilateral interaction in specific sectors of the economy. Ultimately, however, their 
practical impact has often remained questionable. A more important function of the 
Subcommission’s sessions has arguably been to provide a regular forum for practical 
interaction, deliberation, and communication between relevant policy-makers and 
entrepreneurs from China and Russia. 
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Mutual Information Exchange and Reassurance: 
 
Occurring at a very high, official level, the discussions at the Subcommission’s 
sessions appear to have been relatively frank and open. The aforementioned senior 
academic at the Russian Diplomatic Academy, who took part in several of the 
Subcommission’s sessions, described the deliberations there as frank, and “very, very 
business-like”, focused on the discussion of specific questions of the promotion of 
trade and investment, and also debating problems in bilateral economic 
interaction.
456
 A Chinese academic and former diplomat who attended many 
consultations and working group meetings on inter-regional cooperation claimed that, 
within these forums, both sides talked very seriously and very openly with each other 
and even had some serious debates (for instance regarding the exploitation of an 
island in the Amur River). He further stated that, besides the official part of the 
negotiations, there were also frequent occasions for unofficial discussion (such as 
formal dinners), where ideas could be exchanged more openly, and overall he came 
out of these meetings with a better understanding of the opinions and concerns of the 
Russian side.
457
 
The bilateral deliberations at the Subcommission’s sessions appear to have 
involved an active mutual exchange of information about each side’s policies and 
objectives, with the aim of rendering them more intelligible to the respective other 
side. The available reports and protocols of the Subcommission’s sessions contain 
frequent statements indicating that detailed information has been exchanged about 
each side’s stance and policy plans on specific items of discussion, particularly 
regarding planned and on-going economic projects and developments in the domestic 
sphere, as well as the exchange of practical suggestions and expectations on how to 
further proceed in bilateral economic cooperation. Perhaps most importantly, the 
Subcommission has acted as a forum for the identification, discussion and resolution 
of disputes and disagreements in the sphere of bilateral trade, particularly when these 
were still in their early stages. 
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In practice, evidence for an open exchange of relevant information has been most 
visible with regard to those policy items where bilateral interaction has proven 
problematic: While a bilateral dialogue about uncontroversial and unproblematic 
themes, whenever it features in the available session protocols and reports, is very 
difficult to distinguish from the common diplomatic narrative (which invokes the 
image of a constantly open and amiable dialogue between both countries), 
disagreements and the discussion of problematic issues cannot be expected to be part 
of this official, public narrative. In order to obtain a reliable insight into the degree to 
which relevant information has been exchanged between both sides, it is therefore 
most instructive to study the communication of perceived problems or concerns 
about each other’s policies, as well as, in turn, mutual reassurances as to how these 
problems would be addressed. 
Indeed, such discussions frequently feature in the relevant protocols and reports 
on the Subcommission’s annual sessions, indicating that an open and frank dialogue 
and exchange of opinions and intentions in the economic sphere has taken place. The 
majority of the problems discussed at the sessions concern trade disputes and 
disagreements over the market access of individual goods. There are indications that 
the criticisms and concerns expressed in this format were in many cases 
acknowledged by the other side, which in turn explained its own stance and gave 
assurances that the problem would be addressed in an appropriate and timely manner. 
The protocol of the Subcommission’s seventh session in 2005, for instance, 
provides a detailed account of several topical conflicts of interest that were openly 
discussed between both countries: At the session, Russia expressed serious concerns 
about China’s imposition of anti-dumping tariffs against Russian steel exports. In 
response, China announced that it had organised hearings into the matter and pledged 
that it would urgently make the decision to cancel its protective measures. The 
Russian delegation also expressed concern about the failure of Chinese and Russian 
manufacturers of specific chemicals to settle outstanding trade conflicts between 
them. The Chinese delegation, for its part, “expressed serious concern” about certain 
protective measures taken by the Russian customs authorities against Chinese 
imported goods. They clarified that they considered it necessary for the Russian side 
to improve the process of defining customs charges and to enhance the level of 
transparency of its customs procedures. In response, the Russian delegation 
expressed its readiness to apply an objective and flexible approach in the customs 
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control of Chinese imports. Both sides agreed to continue their consultations on this 
question.
458
 
At the Subcommission’s eighth session in 2005, the head of the Russian 
delegation, Minister of Economics German Gref, voiced “serious concerns” about 
the situation surrounding the import of Russian chemical goods into China by rail. 
The Chinese participants in the session responded by expressing their understanding 
of these concerns and their readiness to work towards a normalisation of bilateral 
trade in chemical goods.
459
 Similarly, in the course of the discussions at the 
Subcommission’s tenth session in 2007, the Chinese delegation criticised Russia for 
having increased its export duties on round timber and cautioned that this measure 
would adversely affect bilateral trade by raising the price of import and manufacture 
for Chinese businesses. The Chinese delegation expressed its hopes that Russia 
would lessen restrictions on the export of timber and other raw materials. The 
Russian delegation proceeded to explain that, from its perspective, the stage-by-stage 
increase of export duties on round timber corresponded to the long-term objective of 
promoting the Russian timber industry, since it served as a means of increasing the 
proportion of processed goods among Russian timber exports to China.
460
 
At the same session, Russia expressed serious disquiet about the sharp growth of 
Chinese exports of metal and steel pipes into Russia and the pressure that this created 
for Russian manufacturers of these goods. The Russian delegation stated that it 
expected China to apply effective measures in order to not allow a trading dispute to 
erupt over these goods, and both sides agreed to continue the relevant negotiations.
461
 
This notwithstanding, the issue had to be revisited at the subsequent eleventh session 
of the Subcommission, where the Russian side again emphatically declared its 
concern about the growth of imports of Chinese metal pipes. This led the 
Subcommission to conclude rather irresolutely that ongoing consultations between 
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the relevant business associations of both countries on the regulation of the bilateral 
trade in these goods should be further intensified.
462
 
At the eleventh session in 2008, trade disputes were once again an important 
subject of the discussions. With the aim of preventing them, the Subcommission 
urged to renegotiate the procedures of market protection in order to render the 
conditions of the access of goods into the markets of both countries more stable and 
more predictable. Specifically, the Chinese delegation suggested that the Russian 
authorities consider possibilities to grant the responsible Chinese import-export trade 
chambers and business sector associations the right to partake in the procedures that 
precede the introduction of market protection measures, as well as the right to 
represent their business sector during the estimation of the losses to be incurred. The 
Russian side formally agreed to this request, albeit with a number of conditions. 
Other points of contention discussed at the eleventh session included the allocation 
of labour services, the need to improve the bilateral information exchange about 
investment policy and to provide an effective protection of the legal rights of 
investors from both countries.
463
 
The fact that several of the above-mentioned problems and disagreements 
affecting bilateral trade were recurrently discussed at several consecutive sessions 
indicates that the Subcommission was not very successful in initiating measures to 
rectify and resolve them. One controversial issue, for instance, that was first 
discussed at the tenth session and was then placed on the agenda of all of the 
Subcommission’s subsequent meetings was Russia’s frustration about the growing 
“disproportions” in the structure of bilateral trade (i.e. the diminishing share of 
machines and technology products among Russia’s exports to China and the shift in 
the overall trade balance in China’s favour).464 This issue was continuously raised by 
the Russian delegations and was also discussed at length at the 11
th
, 12
th
, and 13
th
 
annual sessions,
465
 but no progress was achieved on the matter. This notwithstanding, 
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the Subcommission does seem to have provided a setting where an open and 
extensive dialogue about various problems and disagreements could take place and 
where, at least on some occasions, common understandings on these issues could be 
reached.  
There is evidence that an open and frank exchange of information and mutual 
reassurance between China and Russia regarding problematic and potentially 
contentious policy items has also occurred at the level of the Subcommission’s 
subordinate working groups. This is particularly well-documented in the case of the 
Interregional Working Group. At its fourth annual session in 2001, for instance, the 
Russian delegation informed the Working Group about its stance regarding the 
Chinese authorities’ introduction of additional control measures for the import of 
timber products into China. As a result, the Working Group recommended that the 
responsible authorities in both countries conduct consultations about the proper 
implementation of the relevant Chinese legislation on the import of timber products. 
Meanwhile, the Working Group also acknowledged information provided by the 
Chinese delegation on the detection of radioactive and explosive substances among 
metals exported from Russia, leading to a recommendation for tighter controls by the 
relevant authorities.
466
 
Other problematic issues that were raised at this session included the visa regime: 
The Working Group discussed information provided by the Chinese delegation on 
the problems that businessmen had been facing when crossing the border due to 
changes to the Russian visa regime, leading the participants to propose that the 
responsible authorities improve bilateral visa regulations. The Russian delegation, 
meanwhile, expressed the necessity of establishing constant ecological monitoring of 
the border rivers Argun and Amur and an exchange of information between the two 
countries’ ecological control authorities – a stance that was “taken into consideration” 
by the Working Group.
467
 
The Russian side also used the setting of the Interregional Working Group (in 
particular the sixth session in 2007 and the ninth session in 2010) to criticise the low 
level of bilateral investment cooperation and the lack of major projects in this 
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sphere.
468
 As in the case of the Subcommission, Moscow also used the Working 
Group’s sessions to discuss the problematic development of the bilateral trade 
structure. Overall, much like the Subcommission, the sessions of the Interregional 
Working Group appear to have involved an open and active exchange of information 
and reassurances between both sides, particularly with regard to the long list of 
problems and disagreements routinely arising in bilateral trade and economic 
interaction.
469
 The extent to which these deliberations, above and beyond the mere 
exchange of opinions and concerns, led to resultant changes in policy, appears to be 
limited. Nonetheless, since each of these concerns and disagreements, if left 
unaddressed, had the potential of causing severe disruptions to the further course of 
bilateral economic interaction, the regular sessions apparently offered an opportunity 
to communicate concerns and defuse them before they could escalate into open crises. 
 
Very little concrete evidence is available to suggest that the participation in the 
work of the Subcommission and its subsidiary working groups, beyond being a 
forum for information exchange and policy coordination, has also contributed to the 
formation of formal or informal Sino-Russian networks of specialists and 
stakeholders who have sustained contact among themselves and have formulated 
common claims. The institutional setup of the Subcommission has not been 
unfavourable to such a development: Its sessions have regularly brought together 
officials of the same ranks and responsibilities. The Chinese and Russian officials 
present at the Subcommission’s sessions consistently ‘mirrored’ each other, i.e. they 
were in charge of largely equivalent portfolios. Another factor that has likely proven 
conducive to an intensification of personal exchange between the two countries’ 
officials is the fact that there has been some degree of sustained interaction in 
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between the Subcommission’s annual sessions, especially through the work of the 
Subcommission’s permanent secretariat. 
However, unlike in the case of the Academic Trilateral conferences, for instance 
(see chapter 7), which have continuously gathered the same core group of individuals, 
there has been greater variation and fluctuation regarding the individuals active in the 
framework of the Subcommission on Trade and Economic Cooperation, due to the 
periodic rotation of personnel within the Chinese and Russian ministries and 
government agencies (including the ministers themselves). The personal ties created 
during these sessions were therefore temporary, rather than permanent. More 
importantly, since most of the individuals involved in the sessions have been acting 
in official capacities within two relatively closed political systems, the extent to 
which they could have engaged in sustained personal interaction has likely been very 
limited. 
While there is no concrete evidence of bilateral networks having formed between 
officials from both sides as a result of the Subcommission’s work, it can be assumed 
that the activities of the Subcommission and its subordinate institutions were helpful 
for businessmen and entrepreneurs from China and Russia in forming connections 
with each other. The inclusion of delegations of entrepreneurs and corporate 
representatives into each of the Subcommission’s sessions provided them with 
opportunities for an open exchange and interaction with relevant officials and policy-
makers from both states and with each other. As outlined above, separate rounds of 
specialised consultations and working meetings at the side-lines of the 
Subcommission’s annual sessions have frequently brought together government 
officials and business representatives from China and Russia who otherwise might 
not have established contacts with each other. The Subcommission’s assistance in 
organising bilateral economic forums, exhibitions, and trade events further promoted 
the establishment of links and lines of communication between Chinese and Russian 
entrepreneurs. In the case of one of the Subcommission’s subordinate institutions, the 
Russian-Chinese Centre of Trade and Economic Cooperation, the establishment of 
sustained contacts between businessmen from China and Russia has been its declared 
raison d’etre 
Although the Subcommission has thus provided a conducive environment for the 
formation of long-term networks between some of its participants, there is little 
concrete evidence that this actually happened. In practice, network formation 
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between Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs, to the extent that it occurred, is likely to 
have happened for the most part outside of the scope of the Subcommission and 
comparable institutions. This is not least due to the fact that the presence of 
government officials in all of these institutional settings, while potentially 
advantageous for the promotion of economic projects, could also be perceived as a 
constraint on the free interactions between entrepreneurs. 
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
 
Applying the criteria of analysis employed in this thesis to the case of the 
Subcommission for Trade and Economic Cooperation, the picture that emerges is 
mixed, but it reinforces the assumption that the Subcommission has developed into a 
forum for genuine and productive policy exchange. In terms of its structural 
development, the Subcommission itself has been operating with great regularity and 
consistency, and its institutional structure has undergone a consistent expansion 
through the formation of new subordinate institutions. Regarding the structural 
development of its subordinate working groups, there has been substantial variation 
in the consistency and regularity of their activity. Some of them failed to attain a 
meaningful degree of operational regularity – which, according to the precepts of 
Institutionalist theory, is one of the key preconditions for institutions to affect the 
behaviour of actors within them. For most of them, a degree of irregularity and 
institutional incoherence has been the rule, rather than the exception. This 
notwithstanding, most of the working groups, much like the Subcommission itself, 
have developed into functional and productive channels of bilateral economic 
exchange. 
As regards the involvement of senior officials in the Subcommission’s 
institutional framework, there has been a substantial degree of variation between 
individual bodies. However, each of these bodies has usually been chaired by the 
most senior Chinese and Russian officials responsible for their particular policy areas, 
or their immediate deputies. In the case of the Subcommission itself, as well as two 
of its working groups, the annual sessions were chaired by ministers or deputy 
ministers. Below the level of the chairmen, sessions of the Subcommission and its 
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subordinate working groups have typically been attended by senior representatives of 
most relevant departments and agencies within the respective policy areas, as well as 
numerous representatives of the corporate and business sectors – an important 
prerequisite for such institutions to make a practical impact on trade and economic 
cooperation. Overall, the Subcommission has been vested with considerable policy-
making authority and has included a sufficiently wide range of relevant actors to 
have the potential to make a substantial impact on economic policy-making. 
In spite of this, the practical and policy impact of the Subcommission’s activities 
has apparently been modest. It has initiated a number of large-scale bilateral 
economic programmes and framework agreements, as well as trade events. The 
Subcommission has also regularly coordinated and overseen individual bilateral 
business ventures and provided a separate forum for businesses and sectoral 
authorities to meet and discuss projects and strategies. Its activities have found 
resonance at the highest levels of bilateral economic policy-making.  
The large-scale schemes and programmes initiated by the Subcommission appear 
to have had some relevance for establishing basic parameters and regulations of 
bilateral interaction in specific economic sectors. Ultimately, however, their practical 
impact has often remained questionable, and in some cases they have been evident 
failures. Arguably, a more important function of the Subcommission’s sessions has 
been to provide a regular forum for practical interaction, deliberation, and 
communication between relevant policy-makers and businessmen from China and 
Russia, as well as to serve as a catalyst for separate rounds of specialised 
consultations between officials and/or entrepreneurs. 
The Subcommission and its subordinate working groups appear to have provided 
a setting where an open and active mutual exchange of information and reassurances 
– particularly with regard to problems and disagreements arising in bilateral 
economic interaction – has taken place, and where on some occasions common 
understandings on these issues could be reached. The extent to which these 
deliberations, above and beyond the mere exchange of opinions and concerns, have 
led to resultant changes in policy appears to be limited. Nonetheless, since each of 
these concerns and disagreements had the potential of escalating into deeper 
disagreements or even crises, it has been important to provide a regular forum for 
communicating and defusing them at an early stage. 
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Chapter VI: Case Study 2 – The Sino-Russian Energy Dialogue 
 
 
As was outlined at length in chapter 3, Sino-Russian bilateral energy cooperation 
has proven to be a crucially important but extremely difficult terrain to navigate for 
the Chinese and Russian leaderships. As was the case with other fields of Sino-
Russian interaction, serious attempts to institutionalise bilateral cooperation in the 
energy sphere have been made since the late 1990s. When the Sino-Russian 
Commission for the Preparation of Regular Meetings of the Heads of Government 
(the Vice-Premiers’ Commission) was formed in 1997, among the first three 
subcommissions established under its remit was a Subcommission on Cooperation in 
the Field of Nuclear Power, which subsequently became the key channel for bilateral 
negotiations on all matters related to the trade and usage of nuclear energy. Two 
years later, in 1999, a Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Energy was set 
up, again as a subordinate body of the Vice-Premiers’ Commission. In formal terms, 
this Subcommission became the most important forum for the management and 
coordination of bilateral energy cooperation. Together with the subsequently 
established mechanism of the Sino-Russian Energy Dialogue, which it formally 
became a part of in 2008, the Energy Subcommission is the central focus of this case 
study. 
 
 
 
Structural Development: 
 
From its inception, the Energy Subcommission operated with great consistency 
and regularity, holding one formal session per year. Its first session was held in 
January 1999, and its twelfth and final session took place in August 2010, 
establishing a pattern of regularised exchange in bilateral energy negotiations. This 
regularity, however, was not entirely free from arbitrary interruptions. The 
Subcommission’s fifth annual session, for instance, which was scheduled to take 
place in late August 2003, was cancelled on short notice at the request of the Russian 
side – a highly unusual step in bilateral institutional interaction. A mere five days 
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before the scheduled session, “Minister of Energy Igor Yusufov (the co-chairman of 
the Subcommission on the Russian side) sent a letter to the Chairman of the National 
Development and Reform Commission of the PRC Ma Kai (the co-chairman on the 
Chinese side) with the proposal to postpone the meeting to a later date.” All other 
bilateral subcommissions began their work as scheduled in the weeks prior to the 
annual prime ministers’ meetings, “[e]xcept for one – the Energy Subcommission. 
When it will begin its work is not known in the Energy Ministry either.”470 Initially, 
no replacement date was set. 
The cancellation was due to Russia’s foot-dragging in announcing its decision 
about the route of the projected oil pipeline to China
471
 (see chapter 3). However, the 
Subcommission’s session was not conclusively cancelled, but was eventually 
rescheduled to be held in mid-September, less than three weeks after the originally 
scheduled date and still prior to the annual premiers’ meeting.472 Ultimately, both 
Beijing and Moscow seemed intent to keep the mechanism working and to not 
disrupt the regularity of discussions in the energy sphere. The Chinese side in 
particular may have pressured Moscow to sustain the regular dialogue, in order to 
continue lobbying for construction of the Angarsk-Daqing oil pipeline. The episode 
showed that, although the regularity of the Subcommission’s operation in providing a 
routine dialogue forum could easily be disrupted by situational factors and political 
calculations, the momentum to sustain the institutional exchange ultimately remained 
strong even under these circumstances. 
Owing to the particular importance of the energy sphere for bilateral relations, 
the Energy Subcommission’s annual meetings were longer than those of most other 
bilateral subcommissions, usually stretching over several days. The relatively long 
duration of the sessions indicates that they involved substantive and most likely 
contentious negotiations between the delegations. The Subcommission’s institutional 
structure included three subordinate working groups (on oil and gas, on electricity, 
and on the coal industry). Unlike in the case of other bilateral subcommissions (such 
as the Subcommission on Trade and Economic Cooperation), whose subordinate 
working groups often operated very autonomously, the Energy Subcommission’s 
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working groups appear to have had very little, if any, institutional autonomy. Their 
activity was limited to sessions directly coinciding with the sessions of the 
Subcommission (and largely involving the same individuals). As in the case of other 
bilateral subcommissions, the Energy Subcommission’s institutional structure also 
included a permanent working secretariat (which, on the Russian side, was headed by 
a section head of the Department of International Cooperation in the Russian Energy 
Ministry).
473
 
 
The structure of institutionalised energy cooperation between China and Russia 
was eventually radically reshaped in 2008. During Dmitry Medvedev’s first 
presidential visit to China in May 2008, it was formally decided to create a new 
superordinate bilateral mechanism in the energy sphere, the ‘Sino-Russian Energy 
Dialogue’. Reportedly, the proposal to form such a mechanism came from the 
Chinese side at the time of Medvedev’s visit. 474  The decision to upgrade the 
institutional setting for bilateral exchange in the energy sphere may at least in part 
have been prompted by the prior change of leadership in Russia and the intention of 
bringing about a ‘fresh start’ in bilateral energy relations. Conceivably, China 
initiated the Energy Dialogue in reaction to the various problems that had previously 
arisen in the field of oil and gas cooperation between both countries (especially the 
highly problematic development of the ESPO pipeline project), with the aim of 
finally creating an accountable and authoritative forum for regular exchange on 
energy questions. Notably, all meetings within the framework of the new mechanism 
have taken place in China, in contrast to other bilateral institutional mechanisms 
which strictly adhere to the rule that the venues for the annual sessions are to 
alternate between both countries. 
While the term ‘energy dialogue’ had occasionally and informally been used in 
previous years to describe the complex of Sino-Russian interaction in the energy 
field as a whole, it now attained a formal, institutional meaning. The Energy 
Dialogue was established as the highest formal consultative mechanism between 
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both countries on all issues pertaining to the energy sphere. It has operated at the 
level of the Chinese and Russian deputy heads of government responsible for the 
energy sector within their respective country. This formally put the Energy Dialogue 
at the same administrative level as the Commission for the Preparation of Regular 
Meetings of the Heads of Government and the Commission on Humanitarian 
Cooperation – that is, it became one of the three most authoritative Sino-Russian 
bilateral institutions. 
Upon its formal establishment in July 2008, the Energy Subcommission and the 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Power were formally 
transferred from the administrative structure of the Vice-Premiers’ Commission to 
that of the newly-founded Energy Dialogue.
475
 This represented the most substantial 
restructuring of Sino-Russian bilateral institutions since 2000. The Energy 
Subcommission’s twelfth session in August 2010 remained its last formal meeting; 
the Subcommission was officially disbanded in late 2012, and all of its functions 
were transferred to the Commission for Energy Dialogue.
476
 
While the Energy Subcommission, prior to its dissolution, had attained a great 
level of structural consistency and regularity, the newly-established Energy Dialogue 
operated at highly irregular intervals. The first two rounds of negotiations took place 
in 2008, followed by three rounds in 2009, one round in 2010, one round in 2011, 
and again two separate rounds in 2012. Each round of meetings typically stretched 
over several days. In addition to these official sessions, at least two irregular 
meetings between the Energy Dialogue’s chairmen on the Chinese and Russian sides 
took place in November 2010 and in October 2011. In practice, the Energy 
Dialogue’s sessions occurred in a very irregular, ad hoc fashion that seemed for the 
most part to have been dictated by whichever issues arose and had to be dealt with in 
bilateral energy policy at a given point in time. 
The Energy Dialogue eventually, in December 2012, underwent another radical 
restructuring, when it was converted into a formal Commission for Energy 
Cooperation. Following leadership transitions in China and Russia, the impulse for 
this restructuring might again have been the wish to ‘start afresh’ in the most 
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important sphere of bilateral interaction. The Commission continues to be headed by 
officials at the rank of deputy premier (its first session was conducted by the same 
individuals who had previously headed the Energy Dialogue). A working secretariat 
was established and clear terms were set for the organisation of the Commission’s 
annual sessions.
477
 What used to be the Subcommission on Energy Cooperation was 
effectively transformed into a bilateral working group operating under the newly-
established Commission. 
 
 
 
Involvement of Senior Officials: 
 
When the Sino-Russian bilateral institutional mechanism was first set up in the 
late 1990s, the structure of personal authority and responsibilities in bilateral energy 
cooperation gradually became more well-defined. The circle of participants in the 
sessions of the Energy Subcommission remained very constant throughout the years 
of its operation. On the Chinese side, the Subcommission was initially headed by the 
Chairman of the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) Zeng Peiyan 
(sessions 1-4), then by the Chairman of the now renamed National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) Ma Kai (sessions 5-9), and eventually by the Director 
of the National Energy Administration and Deputy Chairman of the NDRC, Zhang 
Guobao (sessions 10-12). On the Russian side, the Subcommission was headed by 
the Minister of Fuel and Energy Sergei Generalov (session 1), his successors on this 
post Viktor Kalyuzhny (session 2), Igor Yusufov (now referred to as the Minister of 
Energy; sessions 3-5), Viktor Khristenko (now referred to as the Minister of Industry 
and Energy; sessions 6-9), and Sergei Shmatko (now again referred to as the Minister 
of Energy; sessions 10-12). 
In addition, the Chinese and Russian delegations to the Subcommission’s 
sessions included senior representatives from almost all relevant departments and 
agencies in both states involved in energy and trade relations (including senior 
representatives of regional governments), as well as senior management figures from 
most leading corporations in the energy sector. The Russian delegation to the 
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Subcommission’s sixth session in 2004, for instance, consisted of more than forty 
individuals. Besides various officials from the Ministry of Industry and Energy and 
the Foreign Ministry, it included the vice-president of Transneft, the first deputy 
director for oil trade and transportation of Yukos,
 
and senior representatives of most 
other leading Russian corporations in the energy and related sectors, including 
Gazprom, TNK-BP, RAO Unified Energy System, Sakhalin Energy, Sakhaneftegas, 
RUSIA Petroleum, Zarubezhneft, Irkutskenergo, Tiazhpromeksport, 
Tiazhmasheksport, Siloviye Mashiny, Russian Railways, VTB Bank, and 
Vnesheconombank.
478
 The Chinese delegation to the Subcommission’s twelfth 
session in 2010 included representatives of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Ministry of 
Commerce, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, People’s Bank of China, 
China Development Bank, the State Grid Corporation of China, China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Shenhua Group, and various coal corporations, 
while the Russian delegation included senior representatives of “about 20 different 
agencies and companies”, including the Ministry of Energy, the Foreign Ministry, 
Transneft, Gazprom, INTER RAO Unified Energy System, and Mechel, as well as 
the Governor of Amur Oblast.
479
 
 
The Subcommission’s sessions thus included senior representatives of an 
unusually broad range of relevant agencies and corporations in the energy sector. 
They were conducted by high-level officials on either side, who de jure would have 
had the authority to make executive decisions on bilateral projects in the energy 
sphere. In practice, however, these individuals were not influential enough in the 
Chinese and particularly the Russian informal power hierarchies to make substantial 
decisions in the crucial oil and gas sectors, where decision-making powers remained 
solely within the remit of a very small circle of top-level policy-makers. In the 
Russian case, final decisions on matters pertaining to bilateral oil and gas trade could 
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only be made by President (intermittently Prime Minister) Vladimir Putin, in 
conjunction with his closest circle of associates. As a consequence, the Energy 
Subcommission’s work for the most part remained limited to non-binding and 
preparatory negotiations, while actual, conclusive decision-making largely remained 
outside of its responsibility. 
Although the Subcommission was staffed with senior officials and corporate 
representatives on either side, it did not include the small group of power brokers 
who (on the Russian side in particular) had the de facto final say on matters 
pertaining to bilateral oil and gas cooperation. This circumstance severely limited its 
ability to reach authoritative decisions in this sector. A Chinese academic and former 
diplomat who was present at one of the meetings between the Director of China’s 
National Energy Administration Zhang Guobao and his counterpart, the Russian 
Energy Minister, reported that they were not in a position to make any substantive 
decisions. Their activity at the meeting was effectively limited to exchanging 
information and making suggestions, since the final decisions regarding energy 
cooperation between China and Russia had to be taken by the countries’ leaders.480  
At the critical time when bilateral disagreements about the course of the 
projected oil pipeline from Russia to China reached their apex in 2003, the Energy 
Subcommission’s scheduled fifth session could have had the potential to contribute 
to a constructive dialogue between both sides about the issue and might have 
provided the Russian representatives with the necessary forum to ‘calm the waves’ 
and dispel some of Beijing’s apprehensions. Instead, as noted above, the session was 
first cancelled and then postponed to an initially unspecified later date.
481
 This was 
due to the fact that the final decision regarding the routing of the pipeline was yet to 
be made by officials more senior than those assembled in the Subcommission. 
Consequently, the Subcommission’s session (which one might otherwise have 
assumed to open a path towards resolving the issues at hand through open dialogue) 
was apparently not perceived by Moscow as a valid forum for interaction with China 
on this critical matter. 
 
The lack of substantial policymaking authority in the Energy Subcommission 
was undoubtedly part of what provided the impulse to upgrade institutionalised 
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interaction in the energy sector through the establishment of the Energy Dialogue. 
Once this new framework had been set up, it included some genuinely authoritative 
decision-makers. As its co-chairmen, Beijing and Moscow appointed “the Vice-
Premiers of the governments of both countries who are coordinating the fuel and 
energy complex”,482 Wang Qishan and Igor Sechin. Wang Qishan has frequently 
been referred to as one of China’s most powerful and influential economic policy-
makers.
483
 In November 2012, he was promoted to become a member of the 
Politburo Standing Committee, China’s highest policy-making body. Igor Sechin’s 
influence in the Russian energy sector has been second only to that of Vladimir Putin 
himself, and he has commonly been regarded as being the person “within Vladimir 
Putin’s government in charge of the country’s oil and gas complex”. 484  Sechin 
simultaneously served as the chairman of the board of directors of Russia’s state oil 
company Rosneft. Unlike the Energy Subcommission, the new mechanism of the 
Energy Dialogue was thus from the start imbued with very substantial decision-
making authority. 
At the Energy Dialogue’s first round in Beijing in July 2008, Igor Sechin not 
only met with Wang Qishan, but also held talks with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. 
Other interlocutors in the talks included the leaderships of CNPC and SINOPEC, the 
China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation, and officials from China’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.
485
 At the second round in October 2008, the delegations again 
included “the leaders of the energy agencies of both countries and of Russian and 
Chinese energy companies”,486 including, on the Russian side, Minister of Energy 
Sergei Shmatko, the head of Rosneft Sergei Bogdanchikov, and the head of 
Transneft Nikolai Tokarev.
487
 The third round of the Energy Dialogue in February 
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2009 once again featured a meeting between Sechin and Wen Jiabao, as well as the 
Director of China’s National Energy Administration, Zhang Guobao, and 
representatives of CNPC and the China Development Bank.
488
 
At the Energy Dialogue’s sixth round in September 2010, the Chinese delegation 
included, among others, CNPC General Director Jiang Jiemin and the president of 
China National Coal, while the Russian delegation included Energy Minister 
Shmatko, Russia’s ambassador to China Sergei Razov, the directors of Rosneft and 
Transneft, two deputy directors of Gazprom, the directors of INTER RAO Unified 
Energy System, RusHydro, Federal Grid Company, Siberian Coal Energy Company, 
the IDGC Energy Holding, Atomstroyeksport, the chairman of the board of directors 
of Mechel, as well as the heads of other leading Russian energy companies.
489
 
As the above examples show, the circle of participants in the Energy Dialogue’s 
sessions was similar to that of the Energy Subcommission, but unlike the latter it 
typically included the most senior representatives of all the agencies and corporations 
involved in bilateral energy cooperation (e.g. general directors of energy companies, 
rather than more junior representatives). The Energy Dialogue thus brought together 
the most high-level decision-makers in the energy sphere, short only of the Chinese 
and Russian presidents themselves. 
Already from the Energy Dialogue’s eighth round in June 2012, however, its 
leadership on the Russian side was no longer in the hands of Igor Sechin, who had 
stepped down from the post of deputy premier in the previous month to become the 
executive chairman of Rosneft. During his time as Russian vice-premier, Sechin had 
played a crucial role in every aspect of energy negotiations with China. Besides 
heading the Energy Dialogue, he also conducted energy-related talks at other 
important venues of Sino-Russian interaction, for instance on the side-lines of the 
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SCO Summit in June 2009.
490
 Observers of Sino-Russian energy cooperation 
described Sechin as “the locomotive of the oil negotiations”.491 
The Energy Dialogue’s leadership on the Russian side was instead assumed by 
Deputy Premier Arkady Dvorkovich. Dvorkovich’s rank was nominally identical to 
Sechin’s previous position. But in the highly personalised power structure of the 
Russian government and the energy sector in particular, where authority emanates 
primarily from individuals rather than the official positions they occupy, this 
personnel change de facto meant a loss of decision-making authority for the Energy 
Dialogue.
492
 Notably, on the Chinese side, the leadership of the Energy Dialogue 
continued to reside with Wang Qishan, even after Wang had been promoted from 
deputy premier to a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. When the Energy 
Dialogue was eventually transformed into the newly-founded Energy Commission, 
its leadership and personnel structure largely remained the same,
493
 and the 
Commission continues to be headed by Wang Qishan and Arkady Dvorkovich. 
Tellingly, although Igor Sechin no longer occupies a leading position in the 
Commission, just ahead of its first regular session in February 2013 Sechin went to 
Beijing to conduct separate negotiations in his capacity as head of Rosneft. Rather 
than a similarly ranked corporate official, Sechin’s interlocutor at the talks was once 
again Wang Qishan.
494
 At the Commission’s subsequent session, Dvorkovich 
expressly drew attention to Sechin’s preceding negotiations with Wang495 and stated 
that, “in the course of last week’s visit of the head of Rosneft Igor Sechin to Beijing 
‘the two sides reached important agreements concerning the increase of crude oil 
supplies to China’”.496 All this indicates that Sechin has continued to play a crucial, 
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most likely the decisive role among policy-makers on the Russian side in direct 
energy negotiations with China, in spite of the fact that, in institutional terms, he no 
longer occupies a senior position in the official bilateral structure of the Energy 
Commission. Informal authority has continued to trump formal institutional 
hierarchies. 
 
 
 
Practical and Policy Impact: 
 
The sessions of the Energy Subcommission, and especially those of the Energy 
Dialogue involved senior officials and were consistently held prior to scheduled 
meetings between the Chinese and Russian top decision-makers, with the express 
intention of preparing these. Consequently, the decisions that were reached in these 
forums could in theory be swiftly transferred into official policy-making. Until 2008, 
the Energy Subcommission was a direct subsidiary of the Commission for the 
Preparation of Meetings of the Heads of Government and was therefore one of the 
institutions tasked with preparing the items on the agenda of the annual Sino-Russian 
premiers’ meetings. The Subcommission usually held its regular sessions within a 
month prior to the premiers’ meetings, and its deliberations have commonly been 
described as preparatory negotiations for the premiers’ talks. The joint communiqués 
published at the premiers’ meetings made frequent references to the 
Subcommission’s work and proposals. The Subcommission’s resolutions and 
recommendations were also regularly referenced in official decrees issued by 
Chinese and Russian ministries and regional administrations. 
However, while the Energy Subcommission’s institutional links to the Vice-
Premiers’ Commission and the annual premiers’ meetings rendered it very likely that 
its decisions would be taken into account at these forums, they may ultimately have 
aggravated its practical irrelevance for substantial decision-making in the oil and gas 
sectors, since these sectors by and large remained the preserve of the Chinese and 
Russian presidents, rather than the premiers (this changed only in 2008, following 
Vladimir Putin’s ‘demotion’ to prime minister in the new Russian government). As 
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outlined above, in July 2008 the Energy Subcommission was transferred from the 
administrative structure of the Vice Premiers’ Commission to that of the Energy 
Dialogue. Through this, it lost its immediate ties with the bilateral premiers’ 
meetings, and by the time of the Subcommission’s twelfth and final session in 
August 2010, it had in effect become a preparatory meeting for the sessions of the 
Energy Dialogue. 
The extent to which the Sino-Russian Energy Subcommission served as a venue 
where concrete steps were taken for improving bilateral cooperation in the energy 
sector varies across different issue areas. As regards the development of the single 
most substantial project of bilateral economic cooperation – the construction of an oil 
pipeline from Russia to China – the Subcommission apparently, in its initial years, 
served as an important forum for the relevant negotiations, and some basic 
agreements were reached there. The pipeline project was first discussed in the mid-
1990s and, from its inception in 1999 onwards, it featured in the session protocols of 
the Energy Subcommission.
497
 
Following the Subcommission’s second session in March 2000, a bilateral 
agreement was signed between its co-chairmen, SDPC head Zeng Peiyan and the 
Russian Energy Minister Viktor Kalyuzhny. “Included in this agreement was a 
transnational oil pipeline designed to move 30 mt/y of oil from West and East Siberia 
to China.”498 The pipeline project also featured in a major bilateral energy treaty, the 
‘Agreement between the Governments of China and Russia on the Continuation of 
Cooperation in the Energy Field’ of July 2000, “in which the ‘Russia-China oil 
pipeline was recognised as one of the key projects of bilateral energy 
cooperation”.499 The Agreement, which was adopted for a period of three years, 
explicitly designated the Chinese and Russian sections of the Sino-Russian Energy 
Subcommission as the “plenipotentiary agencies” for its implementation in their 
respective countries. It was further clarified that “[i]n the course of implementing this 
Agreement, the plenipotentiary agencies of both sides are governed by the decisions 
of the Commission for the Preparation of Regular Meetings of the Heads of 
Government of Russia and China, as well as the decisions included in the protocols 
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of the Subcommission on Cooperation in the Energy Sector”.500 In purely legal terms, 
the Energy Subcommission had thus been designated as a central actor in the 
coordination of the oil pipeline project. 
At the third session of the Subcommission in July 2001, the delegates deliberated 
about the drafting of a feasibility study for the oil pipeline project.
501
 This led to the 
signing of the ‘Sino-Russian General Agreement on the Development of a Feasibility 
Study for the “Russia-China” Oil Pipeline Project’ between Yukos, Transneft, and 
CNPC at the annual premiers’ meeting in September 2001.502 Yet another contract 
based on the Subcommission’s work was the ‘Declaration of Intent for the 
Construction of an Oil Pipeline from Russia to China’. This document was prepared 
by Giprotruboprovod, the Russian Institute for the Planning of Trunk Pipelines, “in 
the framework of the decisions of the Russian-Chinese Subcommission on 
Cooperation in the Energy Sector”, and its formal implementation was subsequently 
approved by the Russian regional authorities.
503
 
The above treaties and declarations were part of a series of inter-governmental 
agreements on the oil pipeline project that were negotiated at different levels of the 
bilateral institutional structure. In effect, the Subcommission’s sessions were only 
one in a series of regular and irregular bilateral events and negotiations where the 
fate of the pipeline was discussed over the years. But in spite of the plethora of 
agreements and declarations on advancing the project, their stipulations for the most 
part remained without practical consequences, as the Russia-China pipeline project 
gradually lost the support of the Russian leadership. An analyst observed at the time 
that “the obligation to inter-governmental agreements is one of the reasons that 
prevent the Russian side from openly abandoning the project of the ‘Russia-China’ 
oil pipeline”. Nonetheless, “over the past year, under the influence of large-scale 
investment promises from Japan, the Russian side has been issuing statements that 
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are in no way consistent with the inter-governmental agreements with China, and 
some Russian officials go so far as to allow themselves to openly declare that ‘the 
Russian government has not entered into commitments of any kind with regard to the 
‘Russia-China’ oil pipeline’”.504 
The relative impotence of the Energy Subcommission as a venue for resolving 
basic problems arising with regard to the oil pipeline project was more clearly 
demonstrated at its fifth session in August 2003, where “the final construction variant 
for the oil pipeline from Angarsk (Irkutsk region) to the Chinese Daqing was 
supposed to have been agreed. On September 22
nd
, this project [was] supposed to be 
the main topic of the talks between Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and the 
Chairman of the Chinese State Council Wen Jiabao in Beijing.” Instead, as outlined 
above, the Subcommission’s session was postponed at the request of the Russian side, 
due to Russia’s decision to re-route the pipeline towards the Pacific Ocean, the 
details of which it wanted to present to China at a later date. The ministerial officials 
in the Russian delegation to the Subcommission, including Energy Minister Igor 
Yusufov, were apparently not considered senior enough to negotiate the fate of the 
pipeline, let alone to take any conclusive decisions. Confirming that the adjournment 
of the session was due to Russia’s plans to change the route of the pipeline, a source 
in the Russian Ministry of Energy claimed that “the Energy Ministry has nothing to 
do with this […]. Such an initiative was taken by more senior government officials 
than Igor Yusufov”.505 
Formally, the oil pipeline project continued to be discussed at the 
Subcommission’s subsequent sessions, its progress was nominally assessed and 
alternative courses of development were deliberated.
506  Thus, for instance, “[i]n 
accordance with the instructions of the co-chairmen of the Subcommission”, a 
protocol was signed between CNPC and Transneft in October 2005 on joint work 
studying the design and construction of the pipeline. The document was expressly 
endorsed by the Vice-Premiers’ Commission, 507  and the implementation of its 
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provisions continued to be assessed at subsequent sessions of the Subcommission.
508
 
But apparently the sessions were merely used to debate very basic features of the 
pipeline’s development, and the members of the Subcommission do not appear to 
have had the requisite level of authority to play a substantial role in the further 
development of the project. 
At the Subcommission’s sixth session in 2004, in the wake of the Yukos 
controversy and the concomitant interruption of oil supplies from Russia to China, 
the Chinese delegation suggested to sign an agreement on that day to increase 
Russian oil deliveries to China to 10 million tonnes in 2005 and 15 million tons per 
year from 2006.
509
 The Russian Energy Ministry declared its readiness to do so. 
Effectively, however, an agreement for oil deliveries at these volumes from Russia to 
China was only conclusively reached years later, at a session of the Energy Dialogue 
in 2009, at a time when cash-strapped Russian energy companies desperately needed 
Chinese loans (see below). 
At the Subcommission’s twelfth and final session in August 2010, both countries 
discussed “16 inter-governmental and inter-corporate documents for the further 
development of energy cooperation. The most important of these are draft inter-
governmental and inter-corporate agreements that are essential for the operation of 
the ‘Russia-China’ oil pipeline.”510 At the Subcommission’s session itself, however, 
this set of agreements was merely “prepared”, in order to then be further discussed at 
the session of the Energy Dialogue in Beijing in September. In addition, on many of 
these items “agreements had already been reached, in a number of cases there are 
still some differences” which were now to be “resolved along the way”.511  This 
indicates that, by this point, the Subcommission’s sessions were mainly used for 
trouble-shooting problems arising in the finalisation of pre-decided agreements, 
rather than substantive negotiations about the core projects of bilateral energy 
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cooperation. Overall, while the Energy Subcommission does seem to have played 
some role in negotiating framework agreements for the oil pipeline project between 
China and Russia, more commonly than not these were disregarded and ultimately – 
particularly during and after the controversy about Russia’s rerouting of the pipeline 
towards the Pacific – the important decisions pertaining to the pipeline project were 
negotiated and concluded at higher levels of decision-making. 
As regards Sino-Russian cooperation in the natural gas sphere, the Energy 
Subcommission’s sessions initially served as venues for the discussion of substantial 
cooperation projects. Already at its first session in January 1999, the topic was high 
on the agenda, and both sides discussed scenarios for the export of natural gas to 
China from various different gas deposits in Eastern and Western Siberia. These 
scenarios were regularly revisited at the Subcommission’s subsequent sessions. At 
the second and third sessions in 2000 and 2001, respectively, both sides debated 
concrete options for the routing of gas pipelines from Russia to China (these plans 
now also incorporated gas deposits on the Sakhalin shelf).
512
 
However, already at this stage it could be observed that important decisions 
concerning Sino-Russian interaction in the gas sector were for the most part made 
outside of the structure of the Energy Subcommission. In 2001, for instance, 
important projects in the gas sector, including the joint development of oil and gas 
fields, the construction of gas pipelines, and other forms of gas deliveries from 
Russia to China, were deliberated in direct negotiations between CNPC Vice 
President Chen Geng and Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller. In May of that year, 
Gazprom and PetroChina discussed the transport of natural gas (25-30 billion m
3
 
over thirty years) along the ‘Altai’ route. And when Gazprom was excluded from a 
seemingly promising international tender in connection with China’s West-East Gas 
Pipeline project, “[t]his question had to be settled at the highest level. One of the 
outcomes of the July meeting of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin was the inclusion of Gazprom in the circle of potential 
participants in the ‘West-East’ project.” 513  In all of these cases, the Energy 
Subcommission was not the venue of choice for resolving these important issues in 
the bilateral gas trade. 
                                                 
512
 Vladimir Kucherenko, ‘Sostoitsia li Ėnergeticheskiĭ Soiuz Medvedia i Drakona?’, Rossiĭskaia 
Gazeta (4.4.2000), available online at http://www.rg.ru/anons/arc_2000/0404/5.htm   
513
 ‘Kitaĭ – Perspektivnyĭ Partner Gazproma’, Ekonomika Rossii: XXI Vek, no.4 (October 2001), 
available online at http://www.ruseconomy.ru/nomer4_200110/ec13.html  
177 
 
At the Subcommission’s sixth session in August 2004, representatives of CNPC 
and Gazprom discussed the possibility of signing an agreement on strategic 
cooperation, with the aim of strengthening their interaction in the gas sector. “As a 
result of the session of the Subcommission, both sides decided to elaborate in detail 
the issues related to the preparation of an inter-governmental agreement on deliveries 
of Russian natural gas to China.”514 However, the plans for cooperation between 
CNPC and Gazprom were marred from the start. While their talks on strategic 
cooperation did begin in the course of the Subcommission’s sixth session, Gazprom 
was not represented there by any sufficiently senior executives. According to a 
source within the Russian delegation, Gazprom was supposed to be represented at the 
talks by “the Director of the Department of Foreign Relations Stanislav Tsygankov, 
but instead of him the Deputy Head of the Department of Future Development, 
Science, and Ecology Aleksei Mastepanov came. Consequently, no fundamentally 
new agreements of any kind will be reached this time.”515 
Indeed, no conclusive results were reached in the negotiations between both 
companies, and these were to continue for years without tangible results. At the 
Subcommission’s eighth session in October 2006, CNPC and Gazprom were again 
“recommended to continue negotiating the terms for the supply of natural gas from 
Russia to China, so that a pre-contract agreement on the basic principles of supply is 
signed before the end of 2006.” 516  At the ninth session in the following year, 
Russia’s Energy Minister Khristenko once again “emphasised that during the session 
of the Subcommission an agreement was reached to intensify the negotiations 
between Gazprom and CNPC”, but as before he was unable to announce any 
concrete results of these negotiations.
517
 Ultimately, the negotiations between CNPC 
and Gazprom were still on-going and remained inconclusive at the time of the 
Energy Subcommission’s final session in August 2010. At this stage, any important 
bilateral agreements in the gas sphere were concluded at forums other than the 
Subcommission. 
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In the crucial oil and gas sectors of Sino-Russian cooperation, the Energy 
Subcommission thus, for the most part, proved an ineffectual mechanism. 
Agreements and treaties of some substance were discussed at the Subcommission’s 
early sessions, but they largely remained sweeping, vague, and inconsequential. 
Towards the end of the Subcommission’s activity in 2010, oil and gas cooperation 
had largely shifted off the agenda of its annual sessions and was primarily negotiated 
in other forums, especially the Energy Dialogue, which was in operation since 2008. 
However, other fields of Sino-Russian energy cooperation, which had been of very 
little relevance at the Subcommission’s earliest sessions, became more prominent 
items of discussion at later sessions. 
Barring several non-committal declarations of intent, the promotion of 
cooperation and trade in electricity was largely absent from the Subcommission’s 
agenda until its seventh session in 2005, where steps were taken for the conclusion of 
an ‘Agreement on Long-Term Cooperation between RAO Unified Energy System 
and the State Grid Corporation of China’, with the intention of promoting the 
expansion of interaction between the two countries’ businesses in the electricity 
sector. As a rule, however, the Subcommission’s sessions – such as its ninth session, 
where the expansion of electricity cooperation, “in particular questions of the supply 
of electricity to China” were discussed518 – ended without any concrete results on 
these matters. The potential for coal exports to China, meanwhile, had already been 
discussed in the aforementioned bilateral ‘Agreement on the Continuation of 
Cooperation in the Energy Field’, concluded in Beijing in July 2000. In this 
agreement, China and Russia “for the first time stipulated a cooperation of the 
countries in the coal sector”.519 As stated above, the Chinese and Russian sections of 
the Energy Subcommission were officially designated to be the “plenipotentiary 
agencies” for the Agreement’s implementation.520 In practice, however, it took until 
the Subcommission’s tenth session in October 2008 for bilateral coal cooperation to 
feature in any depth in its work. Russia used the context of this session to acquaint 
China with its ‘Eastern Energy Ring’ project for large-scale energy development in 
the Russian Far East, which projected the creation of a large number of new facilities, 
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including in the coal sector.
521
 In the short term, however, the concept remained 
unrealised. 
It was only at the Subcommission’s twelfth and final session in August 2010 that 
truly substantial commercial agreements in the coal sector were in fact concluded. At 
this point, coal exports from Russia to China had skyrocketed within the space of two 
years,
522
 since China had become a net coal importer in 2009. At the session, both 
sides reached a long-term agreement providing for coal deliveries from Russia to 
China of no less than 15-20 million tons per year. In return, “[i]n order to ensure 
long-term and stable deliveries of coal, the Chinese side plans to provide a special-
purpose loan of around six billion U.S. dollars, which will be used for the 
development of coal deposits on Russian territory, in exchange for guaranteed 
Russian coal deliveries to China”.523 In addition, it was reported that “the Protocol of 
the Subcommission’s session endorses the creation of a Russian-Chinese joint 
venture for the development of the Ogodzhinskoe coal deposit in the Amur region, 
including the development of the necessary energy and transport infrastructure.”524 
The project of creating this joint venture was pursued further in the following year, 
when it was announced that an agreement to this effect had been signed between 
China’s Shenhua and Russia’s Rostopprom, on the basis of the accords previously 
reached at the Subcommission’s session in 2010.525 
At the same session, the Subcommission also issued numerous formal 
instructions and recommendations to individual corporations in the field of electricity 
trade, in particular regarding the project of constructing high-capacity power lines for 
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electricity exports across the Chinese border.
526
 Although these recommendations 
were apparently taken into account – reportedly, the construction of the power 
transmission lines was begun “[i]n accordance with the recommendations of the 
previous session of the Subcommission”527 – the key negotiations and conclusion of 
agreements regarding these corporate collaboration projects occurred elsewhere and 
not within the framework of the Subcommission. 
Another item on the session’s agenda was the projected construction of a thermal 
power station near Novorostovsk, for which a framework agreement had already 
been signed with the China National Machinery Import & Export Corporation CMC 
in March 2010. Again, the Subcommission’s actions apparently did not go beyond 
expressing support “for the realisation of the project to construct the Novorostovsk 
thermal power station as a Russian-Chinese pilot project in the sphere of electricity 
innovation development”.528 On this and many other energy-related bilateral projects, 
substantial decisions and resolutions were made outside of the institutional 
framework of the Subcommission. 
 
In contrast to the Energy Subcommission, the bilateral Energy Dialogue, 
established in 2008, proved relatively effective from the outset in taking concrete 
steps towards furthering cooperation in some sectors of bilateral energy interaction. 
This was primarily owed to the fact that, as stated above, it brought together the two 
countries’ crucial decision-makers in the energy field and was thus imbued with the 
requisite authority to have a substantial policy impact. In view of the previous 
impasses in bilateral energy cooperation, which were particularly frustrating for the 
Chinese, a source close to the leadership of CNPC stated at the outset of the Energy 
Dialogue that “[t]he Chinese side hopes that the establishment of the mechanism of 
the Sino-Russian Energy Dialogue will facilitate resolving the problems that are 
arising in the cooperation between both countries in this area”.529 
The sessions of the Sino-Russian Energy Dialogue, as a rule, were held as 
preparatory forums “on the eve of summit-level talks”,530 which all but guaranteed 
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that their resolutions would be taken into account by the Chinese and Russian 
leaderships. The results of the Energy Dialogue’s first round in July 2008 reportedly 
formed part of the basis of bilateral energy talks during Russian Prime Minister 
Putin’s visit to China in the following month.531  The Energy Dialogue’s second 
round was organised in the days immediately prior to the premiers’ meeting in 
October 2008. The head of the Chinese delegation, Wang Qishan, stated that, as a 
result of the negotiations at the Energy Dialogue “we have already reached a mutual 
understanding on a number of key projects, which creates the preconditions for the 
two countries’ top leadership to make decisions”.532 The sixth round of the Energy 
Dialogue in September 2010, was conducted “on the eve of the visit of President 
Dmitry Medvedev” to Beijing. 533  On this occasion, Wang Qishan once again 
clarified “that today’s meeting is a preparation for the summit of the two heads of 
state”.534 
From its inception, the Sino-Russian Energy Dialogue was intrinsically wedded 
with the Chinese and Russian centres of power in the energy sector. Consequently, 
whenever both sides were able to reach conclusive decisions and agreements at the 
Energy Dialogue’s sessions, these were virtually assured to be adopted and 
implemented by the relevant authorities. According to the Russian Ministry of 
Energy, “[o]n the basis of the results of each round of the Energy Dialogue, its co-
chairmen issue instructions to the authorities and companies of both countries 
regarding the implementation of further steps towards the development of concrete 
projects.”535 Agreements prepared within the context of the Energy Dialogue were 
typically signed into effect at the following top-level bilateral meetings. 
From its first session in July 2008, the main item on the Energy Dialogue’s 
agenda was the resolution of bilateral disagreements on the construction of a spur 
from the ESPO oil pipeline to China
536
 (another central topic at this session, the plan 
to construct the ‘Altai’ natural gas pipeline from Russia to China, was left unresolved, 
apparently without any substantial progress made). Negotiations about the oil 
                                                 
531
 Cf. ‘Putin Pobyvaet v Pekine na Otkrytii Olimpiady i Vstretitsia s Bushem’, RIA Novosti 
(6.8.2008), available online at http://ria.ru/politics/20080806/150121898.html 
532
 ‘RF i Kitaĭ Postroiat Nefteprovod ot Skovorodino do Granitsy s KNR’, Vesti (26.10.2008), 
available online at http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=218797  
533
 Kira Latukhina, ‘Kamen' Sotrudnichestva’, Rossiĭskaia Gazeta, no.213/5292 (22.9.2010), available 
online at http://www.rg.ru/2010/09/22/zavod.html  
534
 Natalia Zhuravleva, ‘Ostalos' Nazvat' Tsenu’, Vzglyad (21.9.2010), available online at 
http://vz.ru/economy/2010/9/21/434061.html  
535
 ‘Ėnergodialog Rossiia-Kitaĭ’ 
536
 Ibid. 
182 
 
pipeline – up to this point the most divisive issue in Sino-Russian energy relations – 
continued to dominate the early sessions of the Energy Dialogue. At its second round 
in October 2008, it was again the main item of discussion. On the occasion, the 
participants in the negotiations announced a ‘breakthrough’ on this issue,537 in the 
form of the preparation of a Memorandum on Mutual Understanding and 
Cooperation in the Oil Sector.
538
 At this point, it was reported that the Russian 
company Transneft had already prepared a plan for the branch pipeline, while its 
technical parameters were still being negotiated with CNPC.
539
  
According to press reports, the fate of the branch pipeline remained in question 
almost until the final moments of the negotiations.
540
 Some important issues 
regarding the project did in fact remain unresolved at the session, most importantly 
disagreements between CNPC and Rosneft on the pricing of oil
541
 and between 
CNPC and Transneft on the financing of the pipeline’s construction (for which 
Transneft proposed to draw a loan from Chinese banks).
542
 These persistent 
complications notwithstanding, following directly from the Energy Dialogue’s 
negotiations, the Memorandum on Mutual Understanding and Cooperation in the Oil 
Sector was signed at the subsequent 13
th
 regular meeting of the Chinese and Russian 
heads of government, alongside an Agreement on the Principles of the Construction 
and Operation of the Oil Pipeline,
543
 which affirmed that both sides had resolved the 
principal engineering-technical problems.
544
 
Natural gas cooperation was also among the topics discussed at the Energy 
Dialogue’s second round, but despite individual reports that a ‘breakthrough’ had 
been achieved in the gas sphere as well, all that could eventually be reported was that 
progress had been made in specifying “the principles of gas price formation, the 
organisation of its export to China, as well as the possibility of establishing a joint 
venture between Gazprom and CNPC for the sale of Russian gas on Chinese 
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territory”. 545  These modest agreements (none of which appeared to entail any 
substantial progress in promoting bilateral gas trade) were apparently largely reached 
in separate corporate negotiation rounds between Gazprom and CNPC, rather than at 
the Energy Dialogue’s session itself. 
The Energy Dialogue’s third round in February 2009 served to finalise the 
development of the oil pipeline. On the basis of the aforementioned Memorandum on 
Mutual Understanding and Cooperation in the Oil Sector, both sides conclusively 
agreed that China would provide the Russian companies Rosneft and Transneft with 
loans of $15 billion and $10 billion, respectively. The funds were “provided in 
exchange for long-term oil deliveries to China by Rosneft and the construction of a 
branch to China from the ESPO oil pipeline.” 546  The bilateral negotiations on 
providing the credit had been on-going since the previous autumn and had been 
adjourned several times.
547
 In accordance with the agreement now concluded, in 
exchange for the loans Russia committed itself to delivering 300 million tons of oil 
to China within the space of 20 years. 
The finalisation of the new bilateral credit agreement at the third session of the 
Energy Dialogue enabled Wang Qishan and Igor Sechin to initial the formal 
Intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in the Oil Sector, as well as to 
conclude and sign a range of documents, which together provided for the 
organisation of oil deliveries to China and the construction of the branch pipeline.
548
 
Finally, at the Energy Dialogue’s fourth session in April 2009, the previously 
initialled Intergovernmental Agreement was ceremonially signed into effect by Wang 
Qishan and Igor Sechin, officially bringing the decade-long travails to negotiate an 
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oil pipeline between Russia and China to a successful conclusion. The Agreement 
provided the final legal confirmation for the construction of the branch pipeline from 
Skovorodino to Daqing. Beyond concluding the project of future oil transfers to 
China by pipeline, the Agreement on Cooperation in the Oil Sector also provided for 
a ‘downstream’ cooperation of Chinese and Russian companies in the refining and 
sale of oil.
549
 
The conclusion of this Agreement within the format of the Sino-Russian Energy 
Dialogue marked a milestone in bilateral energy relations. Commenting on the 
signing of the Agreement, Sechin claimed that the establishment of the Energy 
Dialogue played a crucial role in its conclusion: “I would like to confirm that the 
decision to organise the energy dialogue has allowed us within a short time to 
conduct the necessary consultations with our partners. We can say that today’s 
signing establishes a new foundation for our cooperation in the energy sector”.550 
Ultimately, however, the fact that the long-standing pipeline dispute could finally be 
resolved arguably owed less to the institutional setting than the fact that Rosneft and 
Transneft had amassed very substantial debts in the course of the World Financial 
Crisis and were acutely in need of the Chinese loans, in order to stay afloat 
financially. 
With the oil pipeline issue largely resolved, the Energy Dialogue again expanded 
its deliberations beyond cooperation in the oil sector. In June 2009, the two chairmen 
of the Energy Dialogue signed separate Memorandums of Understanding on 
cooperation in the natural gas and coal sectors.
551
 The Memorandum of 
Understanding on Cooperation in the Coal Sector, which contained a number of 
specific provisions and policy directives, had a swift and palpable impact. According 
to the Russian Energy Ministry, “[t]he interest of the Chinese companies in the 
designated issues is confirmed by the concrete work that began almost immediately 
after the signing of the Memorandum. Already in June 2009, a delegation of the 
Russian Ministry of Energy visited China, and in September this was followed by a 
return visit. The Chinese experts familiarised themselves with the major coal-mining 
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regions of the Far East and Siberia and visited a number of businesses”, where they 
also conducted talks with senior Russian ministry and regional officials.
552
 The 
Memorandum was also referred to in the corporate strategy papers of major energy 
companies. 
By the time the Energy Dialogue held its fifth round in October 2009, its focus 
had shifted markedly towards deliberating cooperation in the field of natural gas. As 
a supplement to the above-mentioned Memorandum of Understanding on 
Cooperation in the Natural Gas Sector that had been signed in June, the Chinese and 
Russian delegations at the Energy Dialogue’s session adopted a ‘road map’ on 
natural gas cooperation.
553
 They also discussed the Framework Agreement between 
CNPC and Gazprom on the basic conditions of natural gas deliveries from Russia to 
China
554
 (which had been initialled in separate negotiations in September) and 
finalised it to be officially signed at the fourteenth annual prime ministers’ meeting 
the following day.
555
 
In practice, however, neither of these two documents advanced bilateral gas 
cooperation in a substantial way. A separate round of commercial talks between 
CNPC and Gazprom in July 2010 reportedly achieved a rapprochement of positions 
between the two sides on the projected ‘Altai’ gas pipeline from Russia to China. 
“Based on the results of the negotiations, a timetable was specified for the joint work 
of Russian and Chinese experts as part of the preparation for the next round of the 
Russia-China Energy Dialogue.” 556  At the Energy Dialogue’s sixth round in 
September 2010, the Deputy Chairman of the Board of Executive Directors of 
Gazprom, Aleksandr Medvedev, clarified that “the volumes of gas selection, the 
sampling points, and other terms have already been specified”,557 while Igor Sechin 
pledged, rather vaguely, that “[b]y the time of the President’s visit we will complete 
the negotiations about the designation of the basic parameters of cooperation in the 
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gas sector”.558 In actual fact, however, nothing substantial appears to have come out 
of the negotiations, and no major agreement on natural gas was drafted or signed. 
At the time of the Energy Dialogue’s sixth round in September 2010, its agenda 
had become as diverse as to encompass almost all spheres of bilateral energy policy. 
Cooperation in the oil sector once again was one of the most important topics on the 
agenda, especially the joint project of CNPC and Rosneft to construct a large-scale 
oil refinery near the Chinese city of Tianjin, the first major project of Sino-Russian 
cooperation in oil refining. An agreement was signed on conducting a feasibility 
study of the refinery project. It was also decided that, in the context of constructing 
the refinery, a CNPC-Rosneft joint venture, the ‘Eastern Petrochemical Company’, 
would be established.
559
 The new company was reported to be the largest Sino-
Russian joint venture to date. 
At the sixth session, major corporate agreements were also signed in the coal 
sector, including an Agreement between China National Coal and Mechel, who 
cooperate on projects for the supply of coal mining technologies, and a 
Memorandum of Understanding between Shenhua and Inter RAO Unified Energy 
System on the establishment of a factory for the production of synthetic liquid fuel 
from coal.
560
 Another document concluded during the session, the ‘Road Map’ on 
Cooperation in the Coal Sector,
561
 laid the legal and political foundations for major 
bilateral cooperative projects in the coal trade. These included, for instance, a 
Chinese investment project in the coal industry of Russia’s Kuzbass region, which 
“was included in the so-called ‘road map’ of the Energy Dialogue between Russia 
and China, which altogether comprises 18 projects to be implemented until 2015. As 
planned, these projects stimulate the development of the Russian coal industry and 
significantly increase the sales volume of Russian coal on the Chinese markets. […] 
All projects of the ‘road map’ receive support at the federal level, for example in the 
form of state guarantees.”562  
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On the whole, although it failed to break the bilateral impasse in the field of 
natural gas, the Energy Dialogue proved to be a significantly more effective 
mechanism than the Energy Subcommission for advancing practical Sino-Russian 
cooperation in the energy sector. 
 
 
 
Mutual Information Exchange and Reassurance: 
 
The Subcommission on Energy Cooperation and later the mechanism of the 
Energy Dialogue appear to have played a substantial role in facilitating mutual 
information exchange and mutual reassurance between China and Russia in the 
energy sector. This process took different forms in practice, including the exchange 
of information about major projects and developments in either country’s domestic 
energy industry, the communication and exchange of practical suggestions and 
expectations on how to proceed in bilateral energy cooperation, the direct and open 
communication of perceived problems or concerns about each other’s policies, as 
well as mutual reassurances as to how these problems would be addressed. 
The sessions of the Energy Subcommission were actively used for the mutual 
exchange of information about major planned and on-going projects and 
developments in each country’s domestic energy industry. Such information 
exchange is of particular relevance in oil and gas trading, where both trading partners 
need to have a long-term perspective and to be familiar with the other side’s plans. A 
Russian report about the Energy Subcommission’s second session in 2000 
emphasised that “the energy business is such that it needs to plan twenty years ahead. 
And even thirty”, and it went on to point out that “[i]t is precisely for this reason that 
we urgently require China’s fuel and energy balance: then we will be able to know 
which oil to deliver, and from where.”563 
The Energy Subcommission acted as a venue for taking stock of general 
developments in the energy sector and allowed each side to explicate domestic 
processes and developments in its energy industry. On some occasions, the 
Subcommission’s annual sessions provided the venue where major new projects, 
plans, and strategies were first presented to representatives of the other side. This 
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sometimes led the other side to suggest a coordination and linkage of these schemes 
with its own national and regional development plans in the energy sphere. 
Frequently, information on the subsequent progress and implementation of these 
projects continued to be exchanged at later sessions. 
Already at one of the Energy Subcommission’s first sessions, for instance, the 
Russian delegation informed the Chinese about the development of a National 
Energy Strategy. According to a report of the session, the Russian delegation 
“immediately announced that Russia is preparing an energy strategy for the years 
2000-2020. The Chinese partners responded that they are also drafting a strategy for 
the regional development of the Western, Central, and North-Eastern parts of the 
country. And then it was proposed to Beijing to join these plans with our plans for 
the development of the Fuel and Energy Complex in Eastern Siberia.” 564  This 
coordination was never fully implemented, but the session apparently led to a 
detailed exchange of information about each country’s respective plans. 
Similarly, at the Subcommission’s third session in July 2001 Russian Energy 
Minister Igor Yusufov announced that “Russia has taken the decision to develop 
long-term programmes to advance a unified gas supply system for the country in the 
regions of East Siberia and the Far East. Their development and implementation, as 
well as the coordination of gas export deliveries within their framework, including to 
China, will be carried out by Gazprom.” 565  The session apparently provided the 
venue where China was first informed about this Programme. Two years later, at the 
Subcommission’s fifth session in September 2003, the Russian side again addressed 
this Programme, providing the Chinese delegation with updates on the progress of its 
implementation:  
According to the Press Service of the Russian Energy Ministry, I. Yusufov informed 
the Chinese side about the work on the government programme for creating a unified 
system for the production, transportation, and supply of gas in East Siberia and the 
Far East, taking into account the possible export of gas to the market of China and 
other Asian-Pacific countries. The role of coordinator of the programme was 
assigned to the Ministry of Energy. I. Yusufov also told the Chinese colleagues 
about the work carried out by Russian experts to analyse possible export routes for 
hydrocarbons to China and the Asia-Pacific markets, in accordance with the 
                                                 
564
 Ibid. 
565
 ‘Sotrudnichestvo s Kitaem v Oblasti Ėnergetiki Oformleno Protokolom’  
189 
 
decisions taken by the Russian Government within the framework of the approved 
Energy Strategy of Russia until 2020.
566
 
A similar but more comprehensive programme for the development of the energy 
sector in Russia’s Far East, the ‘Eastern Energy Ring’, was first presented to the 
Chinese side at the Subcommission’s tenth session in October 2008. According to a 
press report, “Inter RAO UES has drafted a project for energy development in the 
Russian Far East – the ‘Eastern Energy Ring’ – and introduced it at the session of the 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Energy Sphere of the Russian-Chinese 
Commission. […] The company’s Board Member Yury Sharov told journalists about 
this today, clarifying that the project was being presented for the first time, [and that] 
it involves the development of a large number of new facilities, including for 
hydroelectric, coal, and nuclear power generation, and the creation of additional grid 
infrastructure, particularly on Chinese territory.”567 Sharov further explained in detail 
the conditions of implementing the programme. 
The exchange of plans and development projections did not always lead to a 
consensus between the Chinese and Russian sides, and sometimes the information 
provided was outright rejected. At the time of the Subcommission’s second session 
in March 2000, for instance, a Russian government newspaper reported that  
[t]he amount of gas that China can purchase from all Russian sources is also still 
unclear. At the meeting on March 20
th
, [the head of the Chinese delegation] Zeng 
Peiyan insisted: we need 20 billion cubic metres per year. All questions about the 
consumption prospects were invariably followed by this same reply. Meanwhile, the 
Gazprom representatives were shaking their heads: 20 billion – that is on the verge 
of being unprofitable. And in general, according to our calculations, China will be 
needing three to four times more gas in the coming years. […] This notwithstanding, 
the dialogue on this topic continues.
568
 
The information exchange about domestic plans and projects at the 
Subcommission’s later sessions was particularly focused on issues relating to the 
construction of the oil pipeline between Russia and China. Mutual communication 
about this project was grievously inadequate at the time of Moscow’s sudden 
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decision to re-route the pipeline in 2002/03. Following this, however, the mutual 
exchange of relevant information at the Subcommission’s sessions appears to have 
been somewhat more consistent and substantial. At the sixth session in August 2004, 
Russia’s Minister of Energy and Industry Viktor Khristenko announced to the 
Chinese 
that Russia does not rule out the possibility of constructing a branch from the 
Taishet-Nakhodka oil pipeline to China. Until very recently, such an option was not 
even being considered. However, Viktor Khristenko stated that, in order to discuss 
this question, it is necessary to first proceed to the stage of developing investment 
solutions. ‘Today it is premature to talk about this’.
569
 
Khristenko also revealed further details on the pipeline’s planned construction 
stages
570
 and reported that the Transneft pipeline feasibility study had been presented 
to relevant state agencies for evaluation. At the same time, Khristenko clearly 
reaffirmed that, from the position of the Russian government, “there was no 
alternative to the Taishet Nakhodka line.” 571  On the occasion of the 
Subcommission’s ninth session in July 2007, Khristenko reported on the progress of 
the first stage of the pipeline, which was constructed on Russian territory, and 
provided his Chinese counterpart with a timeframe for its completion.
572
 
Overall, the sessions of the Subcommission appear to have served as a venue 
where both sides were able to communicate to each other what their foremost 
domestic priorities, development strategies and plans are and, at least theoretically, to 
coordinate these with each other. Importantly, they also provided a rare opportunity 
for gathering most of the relevant agencies and corporate actors involved in the 
energy sector on either side – including government departments, state-owned, and 
private corporations – which presumably allowed for a more well-coordinated 
communication with the respective other side. 
Part of the mutual information exchange at the Subcommission’s sessions 
consisted in providing clarifying information about the corporations and government 
agencies responsible for particular aspects of bilateral energy cooperation. Thus, for 
instance, “in July 2001, at the third session of the Subcommission, it was first made 
known that Gazprom had been designated to be the coordinator of all gas 
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projects”.573 More precisely, at the session the Subcommission clarified “that the 
responsibility for the coordination of Russian gas exports to China shall reside with a 
single company – Gazprom. At the same time, the function of national coordinator of 
all export projects is assigned to the Russian Ministry of Energy.” 574  Such 
clarifications regarding the corporate and state actors responsible for bilateral 
exchange in the energy sphere continued to be provided at later sessions. 
The mutual information exchange about the activities and responsibilities of 
corporate actors assumed particular importance around the time of the 
Subcommission’s sixth session in August 2004, due to the problems arising from the 
Russian government’s factual expropriation and dissolution of the Yukos corporation. 
At the time, Beijing was urgently looking for further information and particularly 
guarantees regarding Russia’s contractual oil deliveries to China. Up to that point, 
Yukos had been responsible for handling all Russian oil exports to China, an 
arrangement that had previously been established by the Subcommission itself. 
However, once the Russian government began to target Yukos and its senior 
management, temporarily disrupting the flow of oil from Russia to China, Beijing 
demanded a clarification regarding the further course of events. In the words of one 
analyst, “[t]he Chinese began with a bet on the wrong horse on Khodorkovsky and 
Yukos. The ‘Yukos affair’ taught the Chinese government that it should only 
negotiate cross-border pipeline projects with Russian state companies that have the 
clear backing of the Kremlin.”575 As pointed out by a report on the Subcommission’s 
sixth session,  
one of the main topics that will be discussed in China are guarantees for the stability 
of Russian oil deliveries to China by railroad. [… A]t the meeting, the Chinese side 
plans to discuss the future of Yukos, which is currently the only supplier of oil to 
China. […] At the same time, the [Russian] Ministry of Industry and Energy is 
responsible for ‘coordinating the development of oil resources and designating the 
Russian oil-exporting companies that have the support of the Russian government.’ 
[…] At the moment, the only company supplying oil to China by rail is Yukos, [but] 
it is unlikely that it can be counted among the companies that ‘have the support of 
the Russian government’.576 
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Consequently, at the scheduled session of the Subcommission in China, the 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao wanted to personally address the Subcommission’s 
head on the Russian side, Minister of Industry and Energy Viktor Khristenko, in 
order to “raise the question to what extent China can rely on the stability of future oil 
deliveries by Yukos, and about the future of the oil company. He plan[ned] to discuss 
these questions with his Russian colleague”.577 Another report on the session noted 
that  
Viktor Khristenko travelled to China yesterday, in order to convince the country’s 
government of the uninterrupted operation of Yukos’ oil deliveries. The formal 
occasion for the visit was provided by the session of the Russian-Chinese 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Energy Sector, which traditionally precedes 
the meeting of the Russian and Chinese heads of Cabinet. Already at the airport, Mr 
Khristenko announced that the volume of oil exports to China will not be reduced, 
but on the contrary will be increased to 10 million tons per year and more. ‘China 
receives constantly growing amounts of Russian oil, irrespective of what is 
happening at the local level’, Mr Khristenko stated ahead of the meeting with the 
Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission, Ma Kai.
578
 
Indeed, as an outcome of the Subcommission’s session, the Chinese 
representatives declared that they felt reassured about the issue. Liu Guchan, China’s 
then-ambassador to Russia, stated that “at the session of the Sino-Russian 
Subcommission in Beijing, the Russian side declared that it will make every effort to 
bring the volume of Russian oil exports to the level of 10 million tons in 2005, and 
15 million tons in 2006.” Following the discussions, Liu reportedly felt “convinced 
that the Russian partners will ensure the implementation of the plan of oil deliveries 
to the Chinese market”.579 
As is exemplified by the deliberations surrounding the dissolution of Yukos and 
the dynamics of constructing the oil pipeline more generally, the Energy 
Subcommission’s sessions were frequently used as venues for either side to voice 
open disapproval and concern about specific issues and perceived problems in 
bilateral energy interaction. The intention was to ensure that the other side 
appreciated the gravity of these concerns and addressed them appropriately, so as to 
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avoid a further escalation of mutual disagreements. While these criticisms and 
concerns frequently went unheeded, in many instances the participants in the 
Subcommission’s sessions were able to provide each other with concrete 
reassurances and guarantees regarding certain specific problems or contentious issues 
arising in bilateral energy interaction.  
This was the case, for instance, in the course of the Russian government’s 
takeover procedures of the Yukos subsidiary Yuganskneftegas. China played a 
peripheral role in assisting this takeover, by providing Rosneft with the necessary 
funds in the form of a $6 billion loan. At the time of the sixth session of the Energy 
Subcommission in August 2004, Chinese officials, who had previously expressed an 
interest in bidding for Yugansneftegaz, assured the Russian government that Chinese 
oil companies were not planning to contend for the company’s shares, stating that 
“[t]he problem with ‘Yukos’ is an internal matter of Russia. The Chinese side has no 
intention whatsoever to interfere with it. We are convinced that said problem will 
have no negative effect on the process of cooperation in the energy sector between 
China and Russia.” 580  Russian observers interpreted this announcement as a 
‘goodwill gesture’, indicating China’s willingness to play by the Russian 
government’s rules and to resign itself to the role of an ordinary oil client. 
The single most important issue on which mutual reassurances and guarantees 
were exchanged during the Subcommission’s sessions was the troubled project of the 
Russia-China oil pipeline. Mutual assurances (particularly Russian assurances to 
China) regarding its progress remained a common feature at the Subcommission’s 
later sessions, not least due to persistent problems affecting the project’s 
development. These included vested interests and ‘rent-sharing’ arrangements 
between different branches of the Russian energy industry (in particular between 
Transneft and Russian Railways), which continued to delay the construction of the 
branch pipeline.
581
 Prior to the Subcommission’s ninth session in July 2007, for 
instance, “Russian media reported that the Skovorodino-Daqing branch of the ESPO 
pipeline, which was planned to transport oil to China, will not be built, and oil 
deliveries will instead be carried out by rail. Last November, the Russian Minister of 
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Economic Development German Gref also did not rule out that Russian oil will 
continue to be supplied to China by rail, rather than through a spur from the ESPO 
pipeline.” 582  At the session, however, Viktor Khristenko dispelled these reports, 
assuring the Chinese delegation that the construction of the branch pipeline would 
begin in 2008, and also spelling out a concrete timeframe for this process.
583
 On the 
occasion, Khristenko also once again guaranteed that “Russia ‘strictly and 
persistently fulfils its contracts’ for the supply of crude oil to China”584 and also that 
“the increase in the cost of building the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline 
cannot affect the price formation of oil exported to China.”585 
 
Once the new institutional mechanism of the Energy Dialogue had been 
established in 2008, the exchange of relevant information and mutual reassurances 
also became a substantial feature of its activities. From the beginning, particular 
hopes were attached to the Energy Dialogue’s potential for enhancing information 
exchange (as well as practical steps) regarding the bilateral oil and gas pipeline 
projects. Prior to its first session in July 2008, a source close to the CNPC leadership 
claimed that “the Chinese side hopes that the creation of the Sino-Russian Energy 
Dialogue mechanism will help resolve the problems that are arising in the two 
countries’ cooperation in this sector”, stressing in particular that “it is very important 
for both sides to gain a deeper understanding of each other’s positions”.586 
At the session, the Russian side then provided assurances regarding their 
commitment to the construction of the oil pipeline spur to China, and it was 
reaffirmed “that all technical and financial problems related to the construction have 
already been resolved”.587 These assurances were reportedly of great importance for 
the Chinese delegates, who explicitly sought a guaranteed commitment on this matter 
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from their Russian counterparts.
588
 The representative of CNPC clarified that, in this 
respect, Beijing expected “that the Russian government should play a more active 
role in facilitating the resolution of the problems of cooperation, together with the 
relevant Russian companies. [….] Our corporation hopes that by means of the 
Dialogue mechanism with the participation of a representative of the Russian 
government, it will be possible to move closer to beginning the construction of the 
ESPO spur to China”.589 
Subsequent sessions of the Energy Dialogue were used by the Russian 
delegations to provide a persistently sceptical China with reassurances regarding 
developments in the construction of the oil pipeline. At the third round in February 
2009, Russia gave China guarantees concerning the timeframe of pipeline 
construction. A senior Transneft representative pledged that “all facilities envisaged 
as part of the first phase of ESPO will be completed on schedule by December 
2009”.590 At the fifth session in October 2009, “the Chinese side was informed that, 
in order to fill the oil pipeline, Russia has launched a new oil field”, with the 
intention of ensuring security of supply in the future.
591
 The need for mutual 
information exchange and reassurance, and the utility of the Energy Dialogue 
mechanism for this purpose, were reaffirmed by various Chinese and Russian 
officials. The Russian Energy Minister Aleksandr Novak, for instance, stated in an 
interview that the Energy Dialogue “has proven its effectiveness for the discussion of 
problems causing concern to the Chinese side or the Russian side regarding our 
cooperation in the energy sector”,592 and their eventual resolution. 
China and Russia also frequently used the sessions of the Energy Dialogue for 
the exchange of practical suggestions and expectations on how to proceed in fields of 
bilateral energy cooperation other than the oil and gas sectors and to explore new 
directions of energy interaction. At the Energy Dialogue’s fourth round in April 2009, 
for instance, China expressed its interest in the large-scale import of Russian coal.
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At the same time, Russia voiced its interest in renegotiating the price for the long-
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stalled construction of the second stage of Tianwan nuclear power station, and Igor 
Sechin assured his Chinese counterpart that Russia was “prepared to show a 
reasonable flexibility” regarding the price of the project. In response, Wang Qishan 
specified conditions for such a cooperation, stating in particular that “we hope that, 
under the new market conditions, Russia will opt for a more competitive price”.594 
The Energy Dialogue’s sixth round in September 2010 was used by various 
corporate representatives and officials on the Russian side to present proposals for 
cooperative ventures. They included representatives of the administration of Russia’s 
Amur region, who were “actively lobbying for the revival of an agreement on the 
step-by-step increase of [electricity] exports to China to 60 billion kWh per year, 
which requires the construction of a large number of ‘export-bound’ power 
plants”.595  
Meanwhile, there is no evidence suggesting that, beyond an open exchange of 
information at the sessions, any formal or informal networks were formed between 
the Chinese and Russian participants in the Energy Subcommission or the Energy 
Dialogue as a result of their joint work in these institutions. In both cases, the 
negotiations at the regular sessions remained contentious and politically highly 
sensitive, conducted by a periodically rotating line-up of policy-makers and 
corporate officials with tightly circumscribed mandates. Special forums for 
communication and negotiation between individual corporations, such as that 
between CNPC and Gazprom, were at times created through the work of these 
institutions. These separate inter-corporate forums had the potential to develop their 
own dynamics and to formulate common claims vis-à-vis the relevant policy-makers 
in China and Russia. However, very hard bargaining remained the rule in them, and 
both sides were continuously engaged in zero-sum pricing struggles. Meanwhile, 
their interests remained so tightly interwoven with those of the highest levels of 
government that no meaningful independent Sino-Russian corporate networks could 
form in the energy sector. 
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Conclusion: 
 
As in the case of all other sectors of bilateral interaction, the momentum of 
institution-building has also taken hold of Sino-Russian energy relations. However, 
institutionalisation processes in this sector have differed from those in most other 
areas. Energy relations have not only been one of the most important, but also one of 
the most divisive spheres of Sino-Russian interaction. The bilateral energy 
relationship has remained intrinsically problematic, due to the extremely high 
economic and strategic stakes attached to it and the exceedingly strong influence of 
individual actors on the policy-making process. For these reasons, bilateral energy 
relations have ultimately been a rough terrain for the establishment of durable 
institutions. As a recent study pointed out, “[d]espite extensive bilateral discussions 
and official dialogues over the past 10 years, China-Russia energy cooperation has 
experienced ‘many twists and turns’. It is revealing that some Chinese analysts 
describe the mere existence of continued negotiations as a feat in itself and an 
illustration of the usefulness of the strategic partnership.”596 
Overall, the process of institution-building between China and Russia in the 
energy sector has been characterised by radical restructurings and ad hoc, irregular 
interventions. Structural consistency and coherence have been temporary at best. The 
institution-building process in the energy sector underwent some unusual 
interruptions. Twice, in 2008 and in 2012, the leading bilateral institution was 
restructured and ultimately replaced. This was a very atypical process that stands in 
contrast to institutional development in practically every other sphere of bilateral 
interaction. 
On the other hand, the institutionalisation of the energy sector never fully 
unravelled but, on the contrary, was formally upgraded over time. Ultimately, a 
bilateral Energy Commission at the level of deputy premiers was created, in order to 
‘do justice’ to the importance of this critical field of bilateral interaction. Its 
institutional predecessor, the Energy Subcommission, operated in a highly regular 
fashion until 2010, but this did not prevent it from growing increasingly redundant 
over time. This was primarily due to the fact that it lacked the requisite policy-
making authority that was essential for rendering it a credible actor in this 
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strategically sensitive policy field, which ultimately remained under the direct 
personal control of the major political players, both in China and in Russia. 
The Energy Subcommission included some of the most senior policy-makers and 
corporate representatives in the energy sphere, but it did not include a small number 
of critical decision-makers who had the ultimate authority for making decisions 
pertaining to the oil and gas sectors. This circumstance and the fact that the 
Subcommission consequently proved to be an ineffective mechanism for conducting 
negotiations in the oil and gas spheres in particular, were likely what prompted the 
eventual decision to disband it. To date, it remains the only Sino-Russian 
Subcommission to have been abolished. The same institutional template that has 
apparently operated well in most other spheres of bilateral interaction proved 
unsuitable for the strategically vital field of energy cooperation. 
The newly-created Energy Dialogue was in many ways the opposite of the 
Energy Subcommission: It operated at irregular intervals and did not have a clearly 
defined structure; it did, however, reflect the crucial informal power hierarchies and 
included the most influential policy-makers in the energy sector. Tellingly, for as 
long as bilateral institutional development in the energy sector was very regular and 
consistent, it also remained ineffective. The much more flexible and personality-
driven Energy Dialogue proved significantly more effective for practical policy 
implementation, although it also failed to achieve significant progress in the natural 
gas sector. 
Overall, in Sino-Russian energy interaction, personal allegiances and influence 
have continued to trump formal institutional hierarchies, particularly on the Russian 
side. In this respect, the process of bilateral institutionalisation in the energy sector 
was left incomplete. This corresponds with the fact that legal stipulations and 
bilateral agreements on energy relations were frequently ignored and typically 
proved to be of little worth. Processes of bilateral institutionalisation have been more 
effective in issue areas that do not, like the energy sector, have extremely high 
political and economic stakes attached to them and are not as strongly dominated by 
powerful individuals. 
The practical and policy impact of the institutions created in the energy sphere 
has been mixed. The Energy Subcommission’s record on removing concrete 
obstacles to bilateral cooperation in the energy sector and agreeing on methods for 
facilitating such cooperation was for the most part disappointing. In the crucial oil 
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and gas sectors, which are by far the most important spheres of Sino-Russian energy 
cooperation, the Subcommission did not play an important role in reaching 
substantive decisions. The most significant bilateral agreements reached in the period 
under study were not conclusively negotiated at sessions of the Energy 
Subcommission, were not finally approved there, and were not signed there either. 
Apparently, the Subcommission’s sessions (although they had some value as venues 
for trouble-shooting and the monitoring of corporate activities in the energy sector), 
only constituted transitional and ultimately non-vital settings in the process of 
negotiating and concluding bilateral agreements in the oil and gas sectors, i.e. they 
were only one out of many meetings in the course of the year where topical issues 
and important developments in the oil and gas sectors were discussed. At the 
Subcommission’s later sessions, more technical agreements and contracts were 
concluded in less vital fields of energy interaction, in particular corporate treaties 
between individual companies. However, the details of these treaties were in large 
part negotiated at other venues. 
Unlike the Energy Subcommission, the Energy Dialogue proved a valuable 
mechanism for taking concrete steps towards furthering bilateral cooperation in the 
energy sector. It provided the necessary forum to finalise the bilateral agreement on 
the construction of an oil pipeline from Russia to China and the long-term delivery of 
oil in 2009 – a major achievement that finally broke the lengthy gridlock in Sino-
Russian oil pipeline development. Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev pointed out 
that “[t]his deal, amounting to a total sum of about $100 billion, was the largest 
agreement ever concluded between our countries”.597 In general terms, the Russian 
delegation leader Igor Sechin “noted that the Energy Dialogue mechanism has 
allowed for the coordination between the Russian and Chinese companies to be 
strengthened in all areas of cooperation in the energy sector. ‘Our energy cooperation 
began to have a more systematic, planned, and focused character, taking into account 
the mutual interests of both countries’, said the Russian Vice-Premier.”598  
Due to the Energy Dialogue’s high-profile leadership, many of the agreements 
reached in its format appear to have been directly translated into policy-making. The 
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Energy Dialogue also fulfilled the function of monitoring the implementation of 
existing bilateral agreements and, more generally, keeping stock of activities and 
projects at the inter-corporate level. All this notwithstanding, even the agreements 
reached in this very authoritative forum did not prove water-tight. The landmark ‘oil-
for-loans’ agreement was subsequently put in question in early 2011, shortly after the 
pipeline from Skovorodino started operation, when Rosneft accused the Chinese of 
unilaterally cutting prices and threatened to take legal action.
599
 The ensuing serious 
contractual disagreements about oil delivery price levels brought both sides close to 
filing a lawsuit before an international court. However, the issue was eventually 
resolved within the framework of the Energy Dialogue, and the original terms of the 
agreement remained in place.
600
 
Even more problematic was the persistent gridlock on natural gas trade. Here, the 
establishment of the Energy Dialogue mechanism did little to resolve the existing 
impasse in bilateral negotiations. The project of constructing a natural gas pipeline 
has so far remained unrealisable, in spite of the countless official documents on the 
matter that were prepared at the sessions of the Energy Dialogue and in other 
bilateral settings. New bilateral agreements and memoranda continued to be drafted 
and signed at the Energy Dialogue’s sessions, but the most crucial sticking point, the 
disagreement about price levels, remained unresolved and its discussion was 
continuously postponed. The establishment of the Energy Dialogue did little to 
change this. 
While the Energy Subcommission in particular has not proven an effective 
mechanism for practical policy implementation and appears to have essentially 
remained a ‘talking shop’, even as such, the Subcommission (and, by the same token, 
the Energy Dialogue) seems to have been a valuable forum for bilateral discussions, 
negotiations, the provision of mutual guarantees, and especially for a mutual 
exchange of information, with the aim of enhancing mutual comprehension. This in 
itself has arguably been a task of considerable importance for fostering bilateral 
cooperation, considering the difficulties China and Russia have faced in trying to 
gain clarity about each other’s very opaque energy sectors. As some analysts have 
noted, given the unpredictability of Russia’s moves in the energy field, such insights 
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were particularly important for China: “Uncertainty about Russian legislation and 
Russia’s lack of transparency are major concerns of Chinese enterprises trying to 
gain a foothold in Russia. ‘Russia has a tradition of “legal nihilism”’[. …] ‘In order 
to reserve projects for itself … with better oil and gas quality and more profitability, 
Russia always finds all kinds of reasons to terminate or alter contracts and change 
laws unexpectedly’.”601 
It was therefore of some importance to have a forum where these issues could be 
discussed and negotiated, all the more so since the Energy Subcommission and the 
Energy Dialogue were settings that provided a rare opportunity to assemble most of 
the relevant (state and corporate) actors and agencies on both sides operating in the 
energy sector ‘under one roof’. Following the establishment of the Energy 
Subcommission, the Russian government newspaper Rossiĭskaia Gazeta claimed 
already in early 2000 that “[t]he situation changed radically when, at the current 
negotiations, Russia actually appeared as Russia, and not as a host of isolated 
companies. [...] What was most striking was the fact that this is a completely 
changed tactic of negotiating,” including concerted attempts to conduct an 
information exchange or the coordination of long-term strategies with China.
602
 A 
forum including such a broad range of actors was particularly important due to the 
plethora of vested interests at play in the corporate energy sector and the Russian 
energy sector’s proclivity towards ‘rent-sharing’ arrangements between different 
actors. A bilateral forum for open information exchange with most of the actors 
involved could improve mutual transparency to some extent and provide some 
important clarifications for the respective other side. However, its usefulness should 
not be overstated, as many profound disagreements on bilateral energy interaction 
remained essentially undiminished over the years. 
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Chapter VII: Case Study 3 – The China-Russia-India Academic 
Trilateral 
 
 
A small number of institutional mechanisms have been formed to promote 
interaction between China and Russia in the field of science and academia. One of 
these is the Sino-Russian Subcommission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, a 
subordinate body of the Commission for the Preparation of Regular Meetings of the 
Heads of Government. Established in 1997, the Subcommission conducted thirteen 
regular sessions until August 2009. It focuses mainly on promoting cooperation 
between the two countries’ science and innovation centres. Another newly-created 
institutional mechanism in the field of scientific and academic cooperation is the 
SCO Scientific Forum. Designed as a research arm for the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation’s Secretariat and Council of National Coordinators, the SCO Scientific 
Forum first met in Moscow in May 2006. By April 2013, the SCO Forum had held 
eight regular sessions, bringing together academics, foreign policy and corporate 
officials. Participants have described the Forum as being devoted to a wide spectrum 
of research work, focusing in particular on means of improving the efficiency of the 
SCO and the establishment of scholarly cooperation between the SCO member 
states.
603
 
While it remains difficult to assess the extent to which these two mechanisms 
have stimulated scientific interaction, the most active Sino-Russian institution in the 
field of academic cooperation has been a trilateral academic exchange, involving 
political science scholars from China and Russia, as well as India. This mechanism 
was inaugurated in September 2001 and has since convened annual conferences. The 
‘Academic Trilateral’ (as it is customarily referred to) was not initiated by the three 
countries’ scholarly communities themselves, but originated as a project at the 
official level. The Russian side in particular, especially Yevgeny Primakov during 
his tenure as Russian prime minister in 1998-1999, was interested in establishing 
cooperative links in the China-Russia-India format. In December 1998, Primakov 
proposed a “strategic triangle” including India, as a means to counterbalance U.S. 
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hegemony at a time when strong geopolitical rhetoric pervaded Russian elite 
discourse on foreign policy.
604
 The trilateral initiative, which initially met with tepid 
Chinese and Indian responses, was thus founded with primarily geopolitical 
objectives in mind. 
At various occasions during the Academic Trilateral conferences, the participants 
acknowledged that the initial impetus for the establishment of trilateral contacts went 
back to Primakov.
605
 Already at the first conference in Moscow in September 2001 – 
where Primakov himself addressed the participating scholars – some of the 
academics recalled that the official reaction to Primakov’s initial proposal of 
advancing trilateral relations had been cautious and reluctant, a stance that only 
changed as a result of the NATO military intervention in Serbia in March 1999.
606
 
The fact that, in spite of the self-affirmed geopolitical nature of its founding motives, 
the first incarnation of the trilateral project took the form of a forum of scholars 
indicates that – in view of the tense strategic situation between China and India (but 
also, to a lesser extent, between China and Russia) – the three governments initially 
wished to ‘test the waters’ by means of a neutral and politically commitment-free 
exchange mechanism. 
From an official perspective, the role of the trilateral academic exchange was 
most likely envisaged to primarily be that of a catalyser for other forms of trilateral 
political cooperation, and it seems initially to have been valued primarily for its 
symbolic potential. In the words of one of the participants, “the fact that the end of 
the bipolar divide had led to the emergence of a single hegemonic power-dominated 
world order was also instrumental in shaping the nature and direction of the proposed 
exercise. Recognition of the importance of the US for each of the three countries and 
the need to transform cold war mindsets were, thus, the twin motivations underlying 
the academic initiative.”607 
In spite of this inauspicious beginning of having been born out of a largely 
geopolitically motivated diplomatic project, the Academic Trilateral gradually 
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assumed institutional momentum of its own and appears to have evolved into a 
forum for dynamic academic debate. Meanwhile, its initial symbolic function was 
gradually rendered obsolete, as the political exchange at the trilateral level became 
institutionalised in its own right. As much as its initial intention may have been to act 
as a catalyst for broader geopolitical ambitions, the format quickly became 
predominantly functional and pragmatic. Compared to other Sino-Russian 
institutional exchanges, the activity of the Academic Trilateral is well-
documented.
608
 Over the years, the degree to which the conference proceedings have 
been published and disseminated has steadily increased. 
 
 
 
Structural Development: 
 
Since 2001, the trilateral academic conferences – each of 2-3 days’ duration – 
have been held once every year; the 12
th
 annual conference was held in November 
2012. Since its inception, the Academic Trilateral has been organised by scholars 
from the same three research institutes, in close association with official foreign 
policy channels: the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences (IFES RAS) in Moscow (which hosted the first annual conference in 2001 
and played the most central role in initiating the Academic Trilateral),
609
 the China 
Institute of International Studies (CIIS) in Beijing, and the Institute of Chinese 
Studies in Delhi. Both the IFES RAS and the CIIS are simultaneously also involved 
in the SCO Scientific Forum. The annual meetings of the Academic Trilateral are 
hosted by each of the three institutes in rotation. 
There is no clear indication that, when scholars from China, Russia, and India 
first congregated in Moscow in 2001, they expected this conference to emerge into 
an institutionalised series of academic exchanges. Before the conference ended, 
however, the participants agreed to the proposal of the Chinese delegation to 
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continue the exchange in Beijing in the following year.
610
 Although it is unclear 
whether the Academic Trilateral was initially envisaged as a permanent institution, it 
has displayed great consistency from the start, and its institutional setup has 
remained remarkably constant up to the present day.  
In the twelve years that it has been active, the Academic Trilateral has neither 
contracted nor expanded. Over the years, participating academics have made 
repeated and consistent suggestions for institutional expansion, but none of these 
came to fruition: Already at the third conference in 2003, the proposal was made (but 
not followed up) to set up trilateral ‘task forces’ on selected issue areas that would 
operate throughout the year, in order to facilitate scholarly cooperation on a 
continuing basis, rather than restricting it to the annual conferences.
611
 Similar, more 
detailed proposals arose at the seventh conference in 2007, where much attention was 
devoted to ‘taking stock’ of the process of trilateral academic cooperation: On that 
occasion, it was remarked that “ever since the initiation of the third round of the 
academic conferences in 2005, participants have been occupied by the crucial 
question of filling the gaps in between conferences and identifying the steps and 
action required to take the conference beyond the initial level of academic 
exchanges.”612  For this purpose, a Chinese delegate suggested to “set up a task 
force”,613 more specifically “a virtual Trilateral Working Group, which could play a 
steering role. This group, chaired alternately by the three countries, would coordinate, 
organise, prepare and approve the projects for research and collaboration.”614 
Again, this proposal never materialised, nor did that of another Chinese delegate 
at the seventh conference who suggested that, in between conferences, “regular 
workshops on themes of trilateral concern [should] be organised in the three 
countries, which could play a coordinating role”. 615  The suggestion to organise 
intermittent workshops and trilateral study groups was reprised at the ninth 
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conference in 2009,
616
 where the participating scholars continued to lament the lack 
of continuous cooperative work between the annual conferences.
617
 It was only at the 
end of this conference that, due to “the need to maintain continuity between the 
annual conferences […] it was agreed that virtual Joint Working Groups would be set 
up for periodic consultation on the following themes: World Economy, Environment 
and Disaster Management and Education and Knowledge Society.”618 
The absence of structural expansion of the Academic Trilateral itself stands in 
contrast to the emergence of other functional institutional channels in the trilateral 
format, particularly in the late 2000s: Annual meetings between the three countries’ 
foreign ministers began in September 2002 as informal exchanges on the side-lines 
of international conferences and were converted into formally institutionalised stand-
alone meetings in June 2005. A first trilateral summit meeting of the Chinese and 
Russian presidents and the Indian prime minister was held on the side-lines of the G-
8 summit in St. Petersburg in July 2006.
619
 A biennial meeting of business 
representatives from the three countries (first held in March 2006) was 
institutionalised in December 2007. In addition, regular sectoral specialist discussion 
forums on select topics – agriculture, disaster relief, and healthcare (at the level of 
department heads of the respective ministries) – have likewise come to be 
institutionalised between the three states since 2008. Since 2009, trilateral interaction 
has gradually been supplemented by the annual summit meetings of the ‘BRIC(S)’ 
countries, while the autonomous trilateral format has been sustained for most of the 
existing mechanisms, including the annual academic conferences. 
In terms of its structural development, it can thus be concluded that the Academic 
Trilateral has remained stable and consistent. One of the participating scholars 
described this as an achievement in itself, particularly since the creation of BRIC and 
later BRIC(S) had raised the question if a mechanism in this trilateral forum was still 
needed.
620
 Ultimately, even in the face of an increasing momentum towards 
expanding trilateral cooperation into the broader BRIC(S) format, the Academic 
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Trilateral was retained and has continued to operate as a separate trilateral institution, 
which testifies to its perceived usefulness as a mechanism of academic exchange.
621
 
On the other hand, in spite of the repeated efforts of its participants, the 
Academic Trilateral has not experienced any institutional growth in more than a 
decade since it was first established. This finding indicates that the Academic 
Trilateral, while remaining institutionally stable and coherent, has remained an 
institution of secondary significance, unable to muster the diplomatic backing and 
material resources necessary to expand its institutional scope. On the other hand, as 
the first institutionalised forum at the trilateral level, it has contributed to and 
facilitated the creation of a number of subsequent forums and institutions in the 
trilateral context, including trilateral summit meetings, regular meetings of the three 
countries’ foreign ministers (as well as other cabinet ministers), and other forms of 
specialist discussion and research forums. The extent to which the Academic 
Trilateral has promoted the creation of further (‘track-one’) trilateral institutions will 
be addressed in the section on its practical and policy impact below. 
 
As the institutional structure of the Academic Trilateral remained virtually 
unchanged since its foundation, it is instructive to evaluate its structural development 
by means of examining its thematic development as well: Analysing the genealogy 
of the themes and topics covered at the Academic Trilateral’s conferences can give 
an indication about its institutional development, and in particular about the extent to 
which it has come to represent more than a symbolic and peripheral body and has 
instead pursued substantial and autonomous research. The development of the 
themes and topics of its deliberations can provide important information regarding 
the Academic Trilateral’s practical importance, particularly with regard to the crucial 
question whether its development and activity has followed a primarily symbolic 
trajectory, or whether (and to what degree) it has had genuine substance as a platform 
for academic exchange. 
The exact agenda of themes and topics covered at each of the annual trilateral 
academic conferences (which typically included 4-5 thematic sessions, composed of 
numerous individual lectures and presentations) has largely been set by the 
respective host institute, reflecting the priorities of the host country. At the Academic 
Trilateral’s founding session in 2001, the themes and topics of discussion were 
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centred around geopolitically and security-focused observations about the 
international system, staking out the initial possibilities and potential for cooperation 
between the three countries, and exchanging basic information about the three states’ 
respective positions on major international issues and on their mutual relations. The 
topics of the sessions, as well as the contributions of individual researchers, were 
very general, abstract, and non-committal, surveying the listed themes in a relatively 
superficial manner. The conference summary, like most of the individual 
contributions, remained very proclamatory and formulaic, resembling a diplomatic 
communiqué. At this stage, the discussants identified particular potential for 
furthering trilateral cooperation in the practice of opposing U.S. ‘hegemony’ and of 
tackling international security issues.
622
 
From the third conference onwards, more thematic variety and more focused 
investigations became the rule, although the deliberations overall remained at a 
rather generalist level. The opening session of the conference continued to be 
devoted to reflections on the international geostrategic and security situation, but this 
was then followed by focused examinations of the WTO and world economic 
development, energy security, science and technology cooperation, and cultural 
cooperation. The conference thus brought a notable expansion of ‘soft’ policy issues, 
which had previously largely been absent from the discussions, as opposed to ‘hard’ 
geopolitical and security issues. It was reported that these issues had been identified 
at the previous conference as subjects for in-depth discussion, and for the first time a 
number of subject specialists external to the organising institutes were invited in 
order to facilitate this.
623
 The gradual shift in emphasis represents a movement 
towards themes and topics that are more adequate for productive discussion in a 
scholarly meeting of this kind than the sensitive questions of geopolitics and security, 
which are more difficult to analyse in an academically satisfactory manner due to 
their inherent lack of transparency and the veil of secrecy that surrounds them. 
By the time of the sixth conference in 2006, the range of topics had become very 
diverse (with a distinct shift away from reflections on international geopolitics and 
security, which had dominated many previous conferences). Almost all sessions and 
individual contributions had transcended the level of abstract and proclamatory 
generalisation that had characterised previous debates and had shifted towards 
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specific and narrowly focused subject areas, indicating that the Academic Trilateral 
had begun to pursue a more genuinely academic analysis of individual topics with 
the aim of initiating a serious exchange and transfer of specialist expertise. This 
tendency was further reinforced at subsequent conferences. Another novelty and a 
potential step towards enhancing the scholarly impact of the deliberations was the 
fact that the closing session was now explicitly devoted to summing up the 
deliberations and making practical policy recommendations, which were then to be 
forwarded to the relevant policy-makers in China, Russia, and India – an 
arrangement that was continued at subsequent conferences. 
Thus, a definite shift had occurred in the Academic Trilateral’s thematic structure 
from very abstract themes towards narrow, in-depth, “nuanced” 624  analyses of 
specialised topics, and towards an increasingly eclectic range of topics which, on the 
whole, appeared to be more reflective of the participating academics’ proficiency and 
expertise. This was accompanied by increasing attempts to make focused, realisable 
policy recommendations. The Academic Trilateral’s thematic development indicates 
that it emerged into more than a purely symbolic and inert diplomatic instrument and 
instead developed the potential for substantive and productive academic exchange on 
relevant themes between subject specialists from the three countries. 
 
 
 
Involvement of Senior Officials: 
 
The core group of scholars participating in the Academic Trilateral has remained 
the same over the years, while external academics and specialists on particular issue 
areas have also frequently been invited to join the discussions. Since the Academic 
Trilateral is a so-called ‘track-two’ institution, acting government officials do not 
play an open role in it. However, the Academic Trilateral was originally organised at 
the behest of and in close coordination with the three countries’ foreign ministries. 
At its early sessions, it remained closely interwoven with official trilateral policy-
making – so much so that the participants initially did not always find it easy to 
simultaneously adhere to the agendas and expectations of their respective foreign 
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ministries and a commitment to open scholarly exchange. Over time, the latter 
objective appears to gradually have prevailed over the former. 
The China Institute of International Studies, which represents the Chinese side in 
the Academic Trilateral – is distinguished from its Russian and Indian counterparts 
by the fact that it is being administered by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
625
 
indicating that the Institute’s contributions to the academic conferences are being 
closely coordinated with ministry officials. The Chinese and Indian delegations to all 
of the trilateral conferences have been led by former ambassadors. Over the years, it 
was observed that among the participants in the Academic Trilateral there “are quite 
a few former high-ranking diplomats”,626 and the conferences have been described as 
“gatherings of political scholars and retired diplomats (as a rule, ambassadors 
extraordinary and plenipotentiary)”.627 
At the time of the first conference, the academic delegates noted that the 
“[p]reparations for the conference were made in close cooperation with the foreign 
policy departments of the three countries.” 628  Over time, formal government 
involvement in trilateral cooperation grew consistently stronger, leading most 
notably to the institutionalisation of annual trilateral foreign minister’s meetings. As 
was stressed at the Academic Trilateral’s seventh conference in 2007, “while the 
conference was begun at the academic level with the objective of exploring common 
grounds and areas of cooperation, trilateral interaction had now come to be seen in 
political terms also, as a demand of the times.”629 Since the seventh conference, 
participating academics have frequently spoken of the “close synergy” that has 
developed between the ‘track-two’ academic forum and the ‘track-one’ official 
level.
630
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Foreign policy officials from all three states have typically been present at the 
academic conferences and have apparently been receptive to their deliberations. 
When the Academic Trilateral was inaugurated in 2001, the opening session was 
joined by a large number of senior officials. Those present included the Russian 
foreign minister, Chinese and Russian deputy foreign ministers, and the chairman of 
the Duma Committee for International Affairs, as well as many senior diplomats 
(including Russia’s former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov). 631  At the second 
conference, the official presence had already significantly lessened; the delegations 
were merely received by the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Yi, while the 
Russian Ambassador joined them during the opening ceremony. However, the 
Chinese delegation was reported to include many official observers.
632
 
On the occasion of the third conference in New Delhi in 2003, the delegations 
were met by the Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal, who expressed his hope 
“that this scholarly exercise would result in the emergence of fruitful ideas for the 
consideration by the respective governments.” 633  This pattern was sustained at 
subsequent conferences. Regarding the sixth trilateral conference in 2006, 
participating scholars observed 
that the hosts tried to maintain an extremely high representative level at the 
conference. […] Several dozen representatives of the Indian academic and political 
community, employees of the Indian Foreign Ministry, and extraordinary and 
plenipotentiary ambassadors of Russia and China to India took part in the opening 
ceremony held on the eve of the working part of the conference. In the break 
between meetings on the first day, a luncheon was arranged […] by the India’s [sic!] 
Foreign Secretary Shiv Shanker Menon in honor of the conference participants. 
According to the Russian diplomats in Delhi, this is an extremely rare, if not unique, 
case of such attention being paid to scientific conferences.
634
  
At the seventh conference in 2007, after the deliberations had concluded “the 
Russian side arranged for the Indian and Chinese delegations to call on V.M. 
Likhachev, Vice-Chairman of the Committee for International Affairs, Council of the 
Federation, RF Federal Assembly, and later on Losiukov Alexandr, the Vice-Foreign 
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Minister who had attended the Harbin Trilateral meeting [between the three countries’ 
foreign ministers].”635 Furthermore,  
Likhachev, who himself has served as Russia’s ambassador to the EU, was 
accompanied by the well-known Russian diplomat (former ambassador to China), 
Igor Rogachev, also now a Member of the Council of Federation and a member of 
its committee for Foreign Affairs. After being briefed by the heads of the three 
delegations on the discussions at the conference, Likhachev began by expressing 
great interest in furthering the dialogue between the three countries. He suggested 
that as the leader of the Russian parliamentary delegation, he would try and hold a 
meeting with the Indian and Chinese delegations to exchange views and discuss 
various proposals under this ambit.
636
 
On the same occasion, “[t]he Vice-Foreign Minister [Losyukov] narrated some of 
the details of the third ministerial meeting at Harbin.”637 The conference participants 
also had a meeting with another Russian deputy foreign minister, Andrey Denisov.
638
 
Similar opportunities for personal exchange between the delegates and senior foreign 
policy officials were also documented at the eighth, ninth, and tenth trilateral 
academic conferences. Reports of the eighth conference in 2008 noted that 
“[m]embers of the PRC Foreign Ministry and representatives from the RF Embassy 
to the PRC were also present at the conference.”639 At the ninth conference in New 
Delhi in 2009, the official opening session was attended by the heads of the Chinese 
and Russian embassies,
640
 and “[a]t the end of the conference, the participants were 
received by India’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Shashi Tharoor. […] Tharoor 
pointed out the importance of regular trilateral meetings held in academic circles and 
the demand for joint work by them that would give a ‘long-term view’ of the 
prospects for trilateral cooperation.”641 Similarly, the tenth conference in Moscow in 
2010 was attended by officials of the Russian foreign ministry and the Chinese and 
Indian embassies in Moscow,
642
 and “[w]ith the conference still under way, the heads 
of the three delegations were received by A. Borodavkin, Russia’s Deputy Foreign 
Minister. The detailed discussion that followed focused on problems confronting [the] 
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continued development of RIC partnership”.643 Over the years, there have thus been 
frequent opportunities for the participants in the trilateral academic conferences to 
interact with senior foreign policy officials from all three countries. 
 
 
 
Practical and Policy Impact: 
 
Since the Academic Trilateral is not a body with autonomous policymaking 
authority – in Sino-Russian diplomatic parlance, it is a ‘track-two’ rather than a 
‘track-one’ mechanism – its policy impact can only be measured in terms of its input 
into official decision-making, i.e. the degree to which themes, ideas, or initiatives 
discussed at the academic conferences have been transferred into high-level official 
policy-making. The regular presence of Chinese and Russian foreign policy officials 
at the Academic Trilateral’s annual conferences and the participants’ recurrent 
opportunities for dialogue with senior policy-makers indicate that the potential for 
the academic gatherings to have led to such input into official decision-making was 
strong. Equally important as their documented direct exchange with foreign policy 
officials at the trilateral conferences is the fact that the participating academics 
quickly made it their declared goal to arrive at practical and workable policy 
propositions and to communicate these to the relevant policy-makers – particularly 
once the trilateral meetings of foreign ministers had become formally 
institutionalised in 2005. 
Already at the first trilateral conference in 2001, the participants expressed 
concern about resolving “the difficulties of practically implementing” the idea of 
trilateral cooperation.
644
 At the second conference, it was announced that, on the 
basis of the scholars’ deliberations, the three participating institutes would make 
formal recommendations to their respective governments.
645
 At the third conference, 
it was reported that “all three [sides] agreed to disseminate the ideas presented at the 
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conference to the larger public through articles in journals and magazines and to 
convey them to their respective governments as well.”646 
By the time of the sixth conference in 2006, the leader of the Chinese delegation 
stated unambiguously “that the objective of such academic exchanges should be to 
promote realistic, practical and workable ideas, not abstract formulations, which 
could pave the way for mutual accommodation on a host of issues and eventually 
culminate in government policies.”647 It was also observed that, for the participating 
scholars, “[t]he effort has been to focus on specific sectors […] and provide practical 
inputs to policy.”648 In an article, a participating Chinese academic urged that the 
three countries’ scholars systematically formulate their respective proposals for 
trilateral interaction: A “set of proposals agreed to by all three delegations must then 
be presented by each delegation to their respective governments. The delegations 
would then have to prevail on their governments to consider, adopt and implement 
this set of proposals.”649 Unlike at previous conferences, the closing session of the 
sixth conference was entirely devoted to drawing up policy recommendations 
regarding further steps for developing trilateral cooperation,
650
 an arrangement that 
was retained at most subsequent meetings. According to the Joint Statement that 
emerged from the deliberations, “the following recommendations were made at the 
concluding session: (i) the proceedings of this Conference should be published by the 
three participating institutes in an appropriate manner; (ii) the proceedings of the 
Conference should be conveyed by the three institutes to their respective 
governments”.651 The joint statements published at subsequent trilateral academic 
forums contained near-identical recommendations. 
A report of the seventh trilateral academic conference stated that “[f]rom the very 
beginning the key task of these forums, among whose participants are quite a few 
former high-ranking diplomats, was to analyse practical prospects, opportunities and 
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spheres of cooperation between Russia, India and China. This analysis provides a 
basis for recommendations put forward by the delegations to government bodies of 
their respective countries.”652 One of the Chinese scholars present at the conference 
likewise emphasised that  
[a]s a Track Two dialogue, we shall prioritise our discussions on how to promote 
pragmatic cooperation as well. We have, over the past six years, put forward lots of 
excellent ideas and proposals. We need to organise them and sort out those feasible 
and practical for further study and better planning. We shall also improve our 
communications with competent departments of the three respective governments to 
seek their views.
653 
Another scholar suggested that, with regard to the conclusions drawn at the 
academic conferences, “[a]bove all, serious thought has now to be given to the 
implementation aspect – there are already some extremely worthwhile ideas, which 
need to be concretised. This would involve preparing clear, concise and complete 
suggestions to the policy makers. It is indeed a measure of the distance travelled by 
this exercise that each conference ends with the plea that the various imaginative and 
useful suggestions for cooperation that have been made should be followed up far 
more rigorously.”654 
At the eighth conference in 2008, the leader of the Russian delegation Mikhail 
Titarenko “upheld the objective of the academic exchanges as offering suggestions 
and ideas for further cooperation, operating as a sounding board for the governments 
of the three countries and also by turning the academic and intellectual spotlight on 
critical issues of the day.” In his words, “[a]s always, the task ahead was how to 
implement the ideas generated in this dialogue. […] The crucial aspect was how to 
introduce the ideas of the scholars into the agendas of the respective governments. 
There was no communiqué at the end of the eighth round but each side agreed to 
formulate their respective reports to be forwarded to the appropriate quarters.”655  
In the following year, Titarenko “remarked that in view of the regularity acquired 
by the Track I meetings, the task before the scholarly/academic community has 
acquired even more significance. It is, therefore, important for this Track II to 
maintain close linkages with the institutions/think tanks and official mechanisms 
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involved in policy making, so as to be able to continue to play an interventionist 
role.” 656  By the time of the tenth conference, the delegates went beyond their 
previous efforts to ensure the communication of their recommendations to their 
respective governments, in that “[t]hey adopted a joint decision binding the 
delegations to inform the government authorities of their countries about the results 
and conclusions of the discussions held.”657 
 
In spite of all these efforts, the degree to which the deliberations of the Academic 
Trilateral have actually informed official policy-making has apparently been very 
modest. It is worth pointing out that the trilateral foreign ministers’ meetings that 
were held informally from September 2002 and formally from June 2005, while they 
were loosely linked with the Academic Trilateral conferences, were frequently held 
prior to these conferences and were thus typically concluded before the Academic 
Trilateral could issue any policy recommendations. The 2007 meeting of the three 
countries’ foreign ministers, for instance, took place one day prior to the start of the 
seventh Academic Trilateral conference. Likewise, the ninth trilateral academic 
conference in December 2009 was preceded by the ‘BRIC’ (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) Summit at Yekaterinburg in June and by the ninth meeting of the foreign 
ministers of China, India and Russia in October of that year. 
Rather than promoting the adoption of the scholars’ recommendations into 
official policy making, this setup arguably served to ensure, on the contrary, that the 
scholars’ own deliberations remained close to the agenda set at the official level. 
Indeed, already at the second trilateral academic conference in 2002, the leader of the 
Chinese delegation stated that the first informal meeting between the Chinese, 
Russian, and Indian foreign ministers in the previous month had arrived at a broad 
understanding that was “providing a road-map” for the academics’ meeting.658 At the 
sixth conference it was similarly suggested “that the academic trilateral exercise 
should follow the spirit of the declaration issued by the ministers for foreign affairs 
of the three countries in 2005 at Vladivostok.”659 At the seventh conference “the 
Joint Communiqué of the meeting of the foreign ministers of the three countries on 
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23 October at Harbin, provided a substantial impetus to the deliberations.”660 By the 
time the tenth academic trilateral conference took place in 2010, it was scheduled a 
month ahead of the trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting. Nonetheless, it must be 
assumed that the information flow between the Academic Trilateral and the official 
‘track-one’ policymaking mechanisms has in practice proceeded primarily in a ‘top-
down’, rather than a ‘bottom-up’ fashion. 
This notwithstanding, however, the participants in the Academic Trilateral have 
frequently given positive assessments of the input of their deliberations into official 
policymaking in the three countries. One of the participating academics claimed in an 
article that “the trilateral conferences have helped in bringing to the fore the voice of 
the scholarly/academic community, in all countries, before the policy makers. In fact, 
these conferences are unique in the sense that as Track Two initiatives, they have 
actually led to some concrete steps at the official levels – many decisions for 
cooperation in some important areas are actually being informed by the discussions 
at the academic level. Once again, therefore, the linkages between the academic and 
policy levels that the trilateral exercise has been able to forge need to be appreciated 
and further promoted and strengthened.”661 While painting a very positive picture of 
the Academic Trilateral’s policy impact, the author did not specify which ‘concrete 
steps at the official levels’ and ‘decisions for cooperation’ had been taken on the 
basis of its recommendations. 
Another participant in the annual conferences published a detailed comparative 
study of the Academic Trilateral and another regional exchange mechanism, the 
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Forum for Regional Economic 
Cooperation. In her view, “[t]hough both forums are so-called ‘Track Two’ ventures, 
the dynamics of the two exercises are rather different. As of now, the ‘Trilateral’ is 
rated relatively successful in so far as it has shown more substantial progress from 
‘Track Two’ to ‘Track One’.” She also demanded, however, “that academic 
cooperation should be seen to have value in and of itself, and not merely as the 
mechanism that propels a speculative, academic exercise into state-to-state 
policy.”662 Nonetheless, she observed that  
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[a]ccording to received wisdom, success in the context of such Track Two 
transnational, multilateral and regional organisations is to be measured by the degree 
of progress from the level of Track Two (non-official) to Track One (official). 
Several examples of such evolution are customarily cited. In the case of the 
Trilateral, the progress is visible. A rather speculative exercise has now achieved 
visible official endorsement in successive meetings of the foreign ministers of the 
three countries […] and more conspicuously in a Summit Meeting of leaders in St. 
Petersburg on the sidelines of the meetings of the G-8 and Outreach Countries in 
July 2006. […] This gratifying responsiveness at the official level has not been the 
case with BCIM, which has seen relatively little movement towards official 
endorsement – at least, not to the extent that some players – especially the Chinese 
(Yunnanese) – would wish.663 
At the seventh trilateral academic conference, one of the participants suggested 
that “[t]he most fascinating aspect of the exchanges has been the ever-expanding area 
and agenda of cooperation, and the conferences have actually led to some concrete 
policy decisions as well as the regular ministerial meetings between the three”664 – 
implying that the Academic Trilateral paved the way for the subsequent 
institutionalisation of ‘track-one’ trilateral interaction. A report of the ninth trilateral 
academic conference noted that “[t]hese gatherings of political scholars and retired 
diplomats (as a rule, ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary) are not only an 
important academic venue for the exchange of opinions; they also (as has repeatedly 
been noted by representatives of the governments of Russia, China, and India) serve 
as a source of expert input for trilateral contacts at the highest official levels.”665 A 
delegate at the conference likewise claimed that “Trilateral Track 1 had officially 
taken up many of the ideas which had been earlier discussed in Track 2 and had also 
formulated some policies with regard to those issues”,666 but no specific examples 
were provided. 
One of the most explicit assessments of the Academic Trilateral’s input into 
official policymaking came from a Russian academic, who recalled that  
the tripartite academic forum was launched in 2001 when delegates from the China 
Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and the Indian Institute of Chinese Studies 
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(IICS) arrived in the Russian capital for the inaugural first forum initiated and 
organized by the Institute for Far Eastern Studies. To remind, the three countries’ 
foreign ministers also first met at the 57th Session of the UN General Assembly in 
New York a year later, and the sequence of these two events was not accidental. 
Rather, the actual institutionalization of the annual tripartite academic conferences in 
Moscow in 2001 as the outer track for talks had a definite role to switch the three 
countries’ forums soon enough to a practical government level, the official inside 
track.
667
 
In his opinion, the Academic Trilateral  
is, in commonly accepted idiom, the scientific support for tripartite cooperation. […] 
The results of their [the three countries’ scholars’] efforts take the form of regular 
detailed summaries and conclusions that each of the delegations submits to its 
country’s authorities. Their efforts do not end up in the wastepaper basket, as is 
frequently believed, and are given their due by acknowledged authorities. In the 
words of Russia’s Vladimir Putin, the efforts of the three countries’ political 
scientists are ‘a serious intellectual backup’ for practical cooperation and 
recommendations ‘for the political echelon’ regarding ‘the way interaction could be 
built in the tripartite format in the short, medium, and long runs.’ In 2007, Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called the tripartite academic conferences ‘a strong 
science arm’ that accompanies from the expert ‘angle’ the three countries’ 
movement ‘toward one another’.668 
Government officials and diplomats from China, Russia, and India also 
frequently gave positive assessments of the Academic Trilateral’s impact on official 
policy-making. Comments to this effect began to surface around the seventh trilateral 
academic conference in 2007. The opening session included “a message from the 
Russian Foreign Minister appreciating the role of the intellectuals and academics in 
taking forward the idea of trilateral cooperation to highly constructive and creative 
levels. He added that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs looked forward to receiving 
further inputs into the discussions at the future meetings of the three foreign 
ministers.”669 On the occasion, it was also noted that the three countries’ foreign 
ministers, at their preceding meeting in Harbin, “had specifically appreciated the 
academic conferences and their contribution in creatively charting an agenda for 
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trilateral cooperation”.670 The Russian President Vladimir Putin was also cited as 
having stated that “the work of the three countries’ political scientists is a ‘major 
intellectual companion’ to practical cooperation, providing recommendations ‘for 
politicians’ with regard to ‘how cooperation might be structured in the trilateral 
format in the near, middle, and long terms.’”671 
The Academic Trilateral’s input into official policymaking was more explicitly 
lauded by the group of senior Russian diplomats that met with the academic 
delegations after the conclusion of the seventh conference. On this occasion, Russia’s 
former ambassador to China Igor Rogachev, who was then active as a member of the 
Federation Council’s Committee for Foreign Affairs, expressed “his appreciation of 
the contribution of the scholars in terms of the inputs in policy making and in the 
discussions at the ministerial and summit level, and hoped that this exercise would 
continue and grow from strength to strength. The fact that the meetings between the 
foreign ministers was now a regular event testified to the foresight and sagacity of 
the scholarly initiative.” 672  The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr 
Losyukov found similar words of praise: “According to Losyukov, the work of the 
scholars was greatly appreciated and their ideas and thoughts – channelized [sic!] 
through their respective ministries – would be part of the preparatory process, before 
the 2008 [trilateral foreign ministerial] meeting. […] Scholars could prepare concrete 
proposals, which would be taken up for consideration. The academic conferences and 
the ministerial meetings could be parallel activities with different agendas.”673 
Addressing the scholars at the time of the tenth conference in 2010, the Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared with reference to the forthcoming trilateral 
meeting of foreign ministers in Wuhan that he was “certain that your forum will 
make a major contribution to endeavors to broaden the horizons of cooperation 
between our countries and help to fill it with new content.”674 On the same occasion, 
his Indian colleague Somanahalli Krishna stated that  
Governments sieged by the concerns of the moment often do not have the time and 
the energy to pay attention in sufficient measure to unfolding events which 
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nevertheless have immense impact on an inter-connected globe. Successive IRC 
[India-Russia-China] Foreign Ministerial Meetings have commended this Forum for 
its significant contribution in stimulating scholarly discourse on political and 
strategic issues of relevance to our three countries. We would continue to rely on the 
excellent suggestions and ideas that emerge from these Conferences. And we 
continue to hope that the thinkers would think out of the box as they confront 
complex policy issues.
675
 
 
Both the participating scholars themselves and senior officials have thus 
frequently asserted that the deliberations of the Academic Trilateral informed and 
influenced official foreign policy-making between the three states, at least to a 
limited degree. But in spite of these numerous positive assessments, some 
participating academics have expressed their disappointment about what they 
consider an insufficient transfer of the Academic Trilateral’s recommendations into 
official policy-making. A report of the seventh conference, for instance, observed 
that “[i]n the six rounds of academic conferences which have taken place since 2001, 
the experts of the three countries have identified an impressive list of subjects which 
they feel are fit for trilateral cooperation. Similar exercise has taken place at the 
Track One level too. However, it had to be admitted that there had been rather slow 
progress in trying to convert this wish list into actual cooperative action.”676 The 
conference report observed that in general, “there was concern regarding the 
sluggishness in the pace of concretising specific cooperative projects”.677 The leader 
of one of the delegations “concluded his remarks by calling on his fellow participants 
to collectively ponder on the reasons why many of the excellent proposals advanced 
in earlier conferences, both at academic and official level, have not yet been 
translated into action.”678 These sceptical assessments are consistent with the fact 
that the appeals made at the end of each conference for communicating the scholars’ 
recommendations to the relevant foreign policy departments have grown increasingly 
more emphatic over the years. 
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Meanwhile, some participants in the Academic Trilateral remained sceptical 
about the degree to which a proximity and cross-fertilisation with official policy-
making bodies should be aimed for in the first place. Around the time of the seventh 
trilateral academic conference, a participating scholar remarked in an article that 
“one hears this opinion from several quarters, both academic and non-academic – 
Track One status may end up being a ‘kiss of death’, smothering innovative and 
futuristic thinking and rendering the project hostage to diplomatic niceties and 
narrow and immediate considerations of national interest and geopolitical 
strategizing.”679 According to this scholar, the Academic Trilateral may feel itself  
faced with conflicting expectations – between research qua research, according to 
disciplinary protocols and professional expectations, and narrowly policy-related 
prescription; between futuristic thinking, and the immediate and practical translation 
of official policy into action. Indeed, many academics will be sensitive to the 
judgment of their colleagues that the research agendas of Track Two efforts like […] 
the Trilateral are essentially ‘contrived’ or opportunistic, produced by political 
exigency and to be laid aside with equal opportunism once Track One status is 
attained. Alternatively – and those of us located in research institutions would like to 
think in this way – we should trust that academic cooperation is not merely the 
mechanism that propels a speculative, academic exercise into state-to-state policy 
and towards the institutionalisation of new geopolitical, strategic or economic 
alignments. Research agendas may have intrinsic merit (and also practical relevance) 
regardless of movement from Track Two to Track One, and ‘success’ or ‘failure’ 
measured in these terms.
680
 
 
Most relevant comments by academics and policy-makers alike indicate that 
there has been at least a limited transfer of themes, ideas, and initiatives from the 
academic conferences into official policy-making. However, these comments were 
usually made without providing any concrete examples of such ideas and initiatives. 
Since the participating academics and officials both had an interest in portraying the 
Academic Trilateral as successful and relevant to policymaking, their comments 
alone do not allow for an objective judgment on the degree to which the conferences 
have successfully provided input into official policy-making. If the comments that 
describe the academic conferences as the ‘science arm’ of trilateral cooperation are at 
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all justified, then it should be possible to identify some themes or proposals that were 
first discussed at the Academic Trilateral and later appeared in official policy-
making.
681
 
Overall, not many themes and proposals can be identified that are distinctly 
traceable from the academic discussions to official policymaking, but some 
important ones can. From the first conference in 2001, it was noted that the 
participants in the Academic Trilateral presented and discussed “specific initiatives 
and proposals for the further development of trilateral cooperation.”682 Participants 
later recalled that it was particularly “[d]uring the second round of conferences in 
2004 to 2007” that “efforts were centered on identifying the most promising areas, 
forms, and mechanisms of interaction. […] Proposals were advanced on forms of 
RIC institutionalization, above all in the context of improvements to be made in the 
real mechanisms of the RIC format.”683  
Early on, the participants in the Academic Trilateral strongly urged that the 
meeting of the three countries’ foreign ministers be periodically continued and 
upgraded into a regular consultative mechanism, which it eventually was. They also 
emphatically proposed the arrangement of further trilateral ministry consultations in 
other ministerial portfolios.
684
 This was also eventually realised, when the three 
countries resolved to create “trilateral consultative mechanisms at the 
section department head level of the three countries’ ministries operating in the fields 
of agriculture, medicine and health care, and emergency services.” 685  Another 
frequent proposal at the academic conferences has been to expand trilateral 
cooperation further into the ‘BRIC’ format, incorporating Brazil as well, and to make 
BRIC-cooperation a greater issue for official trilateral cooperation.
686
 Indeed, issues 
of trilateral cooperation were increasingly merged into the emerging format of 
quadrilateral talks among the BRIC-powers. 
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Another recurring proposal at the trilateral academic conferences was to organise 
and conduct joint research projects and other joint research forums – a proposal that 
was eventually put into practice through the establishment of regular trilateral expert 
forums in various disciplines. At the sixth conference in 2006, for instance, the 
scholars expressed their hope “that the three governments will build a platform to 
communicate information, encourage exchanges between scientists and technicians, 
and build a trilateral cooperation mechanism as soon as possible.”687 They further 
suggested that “[t]rilateral interaction between professionals from various fields 
could also be organised.” 688  In particular, one of the senior participants at the 
conference “suggested that joint research projects could be a good way to bring about 
a cross-fertilisation of these ideas. There was an urgent need for a new paradigm on 
security, and therefore some possible themes for joint research could be different 
perspectives on security, multilateralism and multipolarity.”689 This precise concept 
was implemented in March 2008 when, “as a new initiative, a ‘Track One-and-a-Half” 
Russia-India-China (RIC) Trilateral Seminar on ‘Evolution of Geopolitical Strategic 
Trends’ involving both officials and non-officials from all three countries’ was 
premiered, which primarily reflected on the current international situation”.690 This 
so-called “geostrategic seminar” between the three countries “followed the format of 
‘A Course of 2+1,’ in which topical discussions were held with the simultaneous 
participation of academic experts and high-ranking representatives from the three 
countries’ foreign ministries.”691 
Around the same time, as pointed out above, regular trilateral expert forums were 
created in three specific areas of cooperation: agriculture, the management of natural 
disasters, and health care. All of these topics had previously been highlighted at the 
trilateral academic conferences. Agriculture and medicine, for instance, had been 
among the major topics discussed during the second round of conferences in 2004-
2006.
692
 At the sixth conference in particular, the scholars proposed that “[t]he 
scientific and scholarly community in the three countries could then initiate steps to 
pool their research findings, embark on joint research projects and joint papers, 
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which could then become part of a jointly created and accessed research database.” A 
small number of research areas, among them “agriculture and health, were identified 
as major areas with tremendous scope for trilateral cooperation.”693 The first official 
trilateral expert meetings in agriculture and medicine/public health were organised in 
2008.
694
 
The response to and management of natural disasters had already been discussed 
in some depth at the third trilateral academic conference in 2003, where it was 
recommended that a “concrete start to functional cooperation between the three 
countries would be drafting a special document for preventing and dealing with the 
consequences of accidents and catastrophes affecting the natural environment”.695 At 
the sixth conference in 2006, it was suggested to enhance trilateral interaction and 
“establish institutional mechanisms for trilateral cooperation” and a dialogue forum 
on the prevention of environmental catastrophes.
696
 The first trilateral meeting of 
specialists in the field of natural disasters control was then held in July 2008. By 
September 2011, four trilateral expert meetings on disaster management had been 
held.
697
  
Overall, the Academic Trilateral did apparently make a substantial contribution 
to the establishment of various other forms of trilateral cooperation. A participating 
academic claimed that the conferences provided a strong impetus for the creation of 
all other institutions in the trilateral format, particularly specialist meetings such as 
those on agriculture, or the trilateral meetings of business circles.
698
 Beyond this, 
however, it is difficult to identify many examples of a concrete input of themes, ideas, 
and initiatives into official policy-making, the enthusiastic statements of participating 
academics and policy-makers notwithstanding. 
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Mutual Information Exchange and Reassurance: 
 
From the available reports, little concrete evidence emerges that a substantial 
exchange of previously unknown information and reassurances about each side’s 
policies and intentions on specific policy matters has taken place in the course of the 
Academic Trilateral’s annual conferences. This is in spite of the fact that the 
exchange of perceptions and viewpoints between the different delegations and the 
enhancement of mutual understanding had been designated as one of the Academic 
Trilateral’s central goals. As a ‘track-two’ institution, the participating scholars were 
not commonly in a position to reveal previously unknown details of their countries’ 
policies, strategies, and intentions. The participants did, however, report a gradual 
growth of mutual understanding through their exchanges in the trilateral format, as 
well as further insight into each other’s general positions on important international 
policy issues. 
At the third conference in 2003, for instance, the speakers referred to “the 
distance travelled from the rather hesitating start in 2001 to the present well-
established mutual understanding and trust, making possible candid discussions in a 
friendly atmosphere”.699 Another four years later, at the seventh conference in 2007, 
one of the participating scholars wrote in an article: “As one who has been a 
participant in this exercise from the very first conference, I have been struck by the 
positive change that has come about in the nature of the views, discussions and 
standpoints. [The Russian delegation leader] Academician Titarenko’s opening 
remarks at the commencement of the second round in Moscow come to mind that 
many prejudices that had been apparent at the first conference were no longer in 
evidence.”700 Looking back at the series of conferences in 2009, an Indian participant 
“pointed out that an important rationale of the annual China, India and Russia 
Trilateral Academic Conferences has been a regular and periodic review of the 
dynamics of the international situation and, thereby, explore [sic!] the 
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assessments/approaches by the scholars from the three countries on issues of 
common concern.”701 In her opinion,  
[t]he awareness of the differences among the three countries helped to strengthen the 
process of exploring the commonalities, which are gradually expanding faster than 
the divergences. They now range from exchanging perceptions and views on the 
changing international scenario to exploring areas for cooperation, to studying each 
other’s experiences in the developmental process, to understanding how each is 
responding to the challenges of globalisation and to exploring the possibilities of 
taking common stands at the global and regional levels on issues of common 
concern. […] Paradoxically, this has also manifested the lack of information and 
knowledge about the other countries, especially the critical developmental issues and 
thus underscored the need to know each other better.
702
 
On some issues of discussion, the participants reported that the annual debates 
provided them with further mutual reassurance in that “the debaters demonstrated 
just how close their approaches and assessments were.”703 According to one of the 
Russian participants at the tenth trilateral academic conference, for instance, the 
“[d]iscussion of the global agenda demonstrated a high degree of coincidence 
between the Indian and Chinese scholars’ approaches and the Russian delegates’ 
fundamental points about the main trends and challenges of world development, […] 
and forms of their cooperation in foreign policy.”704 
Another senior Russian academic, who has attended the trilateral conferences 
since 2003, reported that, at the first meetings, some of the delegates were very 
‘official’ and reluctant to talk with each other, but this gradually changed. Over time, 
while differences of opinion have clearly remained, the atmosphere of the meetings 
has become very good and the participants have become “a good team”.705 In his 
opinion, the exchange of opinions has become much more open and frank than it had 
been in the beginning, mutual understanding has improved, and if a delegate now 
voices criticism of another country’s position this no longer ensues in an immediate 
confrontation. This notwithstanding, the discussion of some more sensitive questions 
has generally been avoided. The scholar affirmed that the personal, face-to-face 
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interaction with the Chinese and Indian representatives has been very useful in 
dispelling misperceptions and in comprehending each others’ motives and 
intentions.
706
 
Participants in the Academic Trilateral have often affirmed that the discussions at 
the annual conferences have provided an environment for a general enhancement of 
mutual understanding through the sharing of relevant specialist expertise between the 
participating scholars. In the words of one report, “[t]he China-India-Russia 
Trilateral Academic Conferences have facilitated an open and objective exchange of 
ideas among scholars from the three countries. […] These conferences have attracted 
the attention of scholars from numerous areas of expertise and have generated a 
highly productive trilateral discourse.”707 A Russian participant likewise claimed that 
“the scholars’ meetings have value in themselves from the perspective of 
opportunities they offer for productive discussions, in-depth examination of the 
subject matter, and exchange of experience and methodologies. Specialized subjects 
[…] are at times discussed at conferences […]. Discussions of this variety help 
broaden the participants’ overall scientific horizons.”708 
 
Beyond a mere information exchange and reassurance at the annual conferences, 
there is some evidence that the activities within the framework of the Academic 
Trilateral have contributed to the formation of more lasting informal networks 
between the academics involved. Unlike in the cases of the other institutions studied 
here, the Academic Trilateral provided very favourable circumstances for an 
informal formation of networks and lasting personal links between its participants: 
Over the course of more than a decade, its conferences have consistently been 
convened by the same three academic institutes and have brought together the same 
core group of researchers from these institutes. A further factor promoting an 
intensification of cooperation among these researchers has been the fact that all of 
them have similar academic backgrounds and foci: The scholars present at the 
Academic Trilateral conferences have typically included political scientists, 
economists, and historians performing similar kinds of research at their respective 
institutes. On the other hand, a number of senior participants – particularly from the 
                                                 
706
 Ibid. 
707
 ‘The China-India-Russia Trilateral Academic Conferences in Retrospect’, p.125 
708
 Uyanaev, ‘The Russia-India-China Forum’, p.16 
229 
 
Chinese side – have a background as former high-ranking diplomats, which 
distinguishes them from their Russian colleagues in particular. 
The development of a certain degree of common identification among the 
different groups of scholars is reflected in some of the reports on the annual 
conferences. A Russian scholar’s account of the sixth conference in 2006, for 
instance, states that “the general mood was also conducive to creating an atmosphere 
of positive well-being at the conference. And this is not surprising, since its 
participants, who as usual were largely represented by academics of the RAS 
[Russian Academy of Sciences] Institute for Far Eastern Studies, the Chinese 
Institute of International Affairs, and the Indian Institute of Sinology Studies (IISS), 
have known each other for a long time, and many of them initiated this forum.”709 In 
the following year, the conference report remarked that  
[m]uch work has been done during the past years, and close scholarly and personal 
contacts have been established. Among the participants in the 7th conference, who, 
as before, represented the RAS IFES, the Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS) in New 
Delhi and the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) in Beijing, there were 
quite a few scholars well acquainted with one another, who have taken part more 
than once in frank exchanges of views, which has a favourable influence on the 
atmosphere of these conferences. There are the ‘veterans of the movement’ in each 
delegation – T. L. Shaumyan (Institute for Oriental Studies – IFES, RAS), Dr. Alka 
Acharya (ICS), and Professor Ma Jiali (China Institute of Contemporary 
International Relations) – who took an active part in all conferences.710 
The development of more permanent links between the three countries’ 
researchers has consistently been a proclaimed goal of the Academic Trilateral 
exchanges. At the third conference in 2003 the participants agreed that there should 
be “greater people-to-people contact and exchange, especially among scientists and 
technical intelligentsia”, beyond the subcommissions active at the bilateral 
governmental level. This was to encompass such measures as the sharing of 
databases, scientific literature and information, academic joint ventures, and the co-
authorship of scientific papers.
711
 By the time of the sixth conference in 2006, “it was 
unanimously felt that preparation and collaborative research […] should continue 
throughout the year, and not merely in the run-up to the trilateral meeting. Without 
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instituting such concrete activities, it was felt that the academic trilateral engagement 
would be a limiting and limited exercise.”712 
Consequently, the joint statement published after the conference formally 
recommended that “joint and collaborative research projects may be undertaken by 
the three institutes on problems of mutual concern.”713 It became a common belief 
among the participants of the Academic Trilateral that “[t]he top priority now is to 
identify two or three projects for cooperation”, 714  and one of the Academic 
Trilateral’s proclaimed goals has since become to initiate concrete, longer-term 
shared research projects on individual issues of common concern.
715
 
During the seventh conference in the following year, “joint studies and joint 
research papers were stressed as vital in the process of institutionalisation”, and it 
was noted that “this suggestion attracted strong and positive endorsement from all 
participants, which was a change from the earlier comparatively mild and tentative 
response.”716 Various proposals were made on how to improve the communications 
and “strengthen the interaction between the three focal point institutes of the three 
countries”,717  and the participants remarked that, within the Academic Trilateral, 
“[s]cholars engaged on similar projects independently could very usefully combine 
energies, resources and insights and new directions to the benefit of all.”718 The 
academics expressed agreement about the fact that “the move to pool intellectual 
resources in longer-term projects and bring strategic dimensions to the academic 
deliberations, has to be decisively taken forward.”719 
The extent to which any of these declarations of intent were implemented is hard 
to assess. There is no compelling evidence of any permanent formal or 
institutionalised links forming between the participating researchers from different 
countries beyond the annual trilateral conferences. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, in spite of numerous announcements and suggestions of establishing more 
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permanent academic exchange mechanisms, no progress has been made in this 
regard. However, one long-time participant affirmed that, in spite of the lack of 
visible manifestations of formal interaction beyond the annual conferences, in some 
cases sustained informal and personal links and contacts have developed between the 
scholars involved in the Academic Trilateral.
720
 
No conclusive evidence can be found, however, that indicates the formation of 
more extensive ‘epistemic communities’ between the three countries’ researchers. 
Although, following their annual sessions, the participants in the Academic Trilateral 
routinely formulated common expectations and recommendations for policy-makers, 
they apparently have not engaged in any consistent joint lobbying for specific causes 
or claims. Nonetheless, as a result of the regular meetings in the format of the 
Academic Trilateral, close personal and professional connections seem to have been 
established on a more permanent basis between some of the scholars involved. The 
Academic Trilateral appears to have involved some level of deeper association than 
that established through its annual gatherings alone. 
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
 
The Academic Trilateral is one of the less important institutional mechanisms in 
Sino-Russian relations. However, although the available evidence regarding its 
significance for the development of official policy-making is mixed, it has certainly 
had more than a purely symbolic function for bilateral relations. Applying the criteria 
of analysis set out in chapter 1 of this thesis reinforces the assumption that the 
Academic Trilateral has to some extent developed into a forum for genuine and 
productive academic exchange. 
In terms of its structural development, while it has remained stable and consistent, 
the Academic Trilateral has not experienced any significant institutional expansion 
since it was first established. However, as the first institutionalised forum at the 
trilateral level, it apparently contributed to and facilitated the creation of subsequent 
trilateral forums and institutions. As regards the themes and topics discussed at the 
academic conferences, there has been a discernible shift away from very abstract 
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themes towards narrow, specialist ones, as well as a shift towards an increasingly 
eclectic range of topics which, on the whole, appears to be more reflective of the 
participating academics’ proficiency and expertise. 
There has been a relatively close coordination and information exchange with 
senior foreign policy officials from all three countries, and the Academic Trilateral 
has actively tried to communicate the results of its deliberations to the relevant 
foreign policy authorities in the form of focused policy recommendations. There is 
some indication that the academic conferences have been valued by the relevant 
officials as an advisory body and that at least some of the ideas and proposals 
discussed there eventually found their way into official foreign policy-making, albeit 
not nearly to the extent wished for by the participating scholars. Overall, however, 
this has apparently been the exception, rather than the rule. 
The available reports provide little evidence that a substantial exchange of 
previously unknown information and reassurances about each side’s policies and 
intentions on specific policy matters has taken place in the course of the trilateral 
academic conferences – not least since the format had no actual policy-making 
authority and its participants were for the most part not privy to confidential 
information. However, the exchanges in the format of the Academic Trilateral have 
apparently played a role in enhancing mutual understanding over time, minimising 
mutual misperceptions, and enabling a greater insight into each other’s positions on 
central international policy issues among important ‘track-two’ actors, who enjoy a 
measure of access to relevant policy-makers in their respective countries. In spite of 
the scarcity of visible manifestations of formal academic interaction beyond the 
annual conferences, there is some evidence that, over the years, some more durable 
informal, personal links have developed between the Chinese, Russian, and Indian 
scholars involved in the Academic Trilateral. Overall, while it undoubtedly has not 
had a substantial impact on the development of Sino-Russian relations, the available 
evidence suggests that the Academic Trilateral has emerged from a mere instrument 
of trilateral diplomacy into a forum which, at the very least, has the potential for 
substantive and productive academic exchange on relevant themes between 
influential subject specialists from China, Russia, and India. 
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Chapter VIII: Assessment and Conclusion 
 
 
One of the most remarkable features of the development of Sino-Russian 
relations after the Cold War has been the creation of an extremely varied network of 
bilateral and multilateral institutional links, encompassing every major sector of 
bilateral interaction. After decades of mutual mistrust, in which there was virtually 
no contact at all between decision-makers on both sides, the regularisation of 
exchange slowly began in the 1980s, but it was only from 1996/97 that it rapidly 
assumed a solid institutional shape. For the most part within the space of fifteen 
years, a comprehensive mechanism of regularised exchange between Chinese and 
Russian policy-makers in virtually all sectors of political and economic interaction 
and at most levels of government has been created that continues to be extended 
today. In addition to this, both countries have gradually increased their involvement 
in multilateral organisations and regional institutions. 
Before this background, as stated in chapter 1, this thesis has explored the 
following hypothesis: ‘Trans-national institutional structures – forming a gradually 
developing ‘mechanism’ and ‘infrastructure’ of interaction and cooperation between 
China and Russia – have substantially facilitated and stabilised the implementation of 
cooperative policies between both countries and have provided each government 
with important information and reassurance about the other’s policies and intentions. 
As a result, they have altered the nature of cooperation between Beijing and Moscow 
in a lasting manner.’ 
 
In what way is the rapid process of institution-building between China and 
Russia significant? From its onset, both governments seem to have been equally 
active in promoting this process (although some individual institutions have been 
more strongly promoted by one side than the other). Chinese and Russian analysts 
have traced the impulse for advancing bilateral institution-building to the experience 
of the Sino-Soviet split and a joint wish to prevent a similar breakdown of relations 
from recurring.
721
 For the Chinese leadership, the integration of institutional 
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networks and caucuses as foreign policy instruments in its relations with Russia 
would appear to be a somewhat natural move: Although the Chinese government has 
traditionally been extremely averse to forming formal alliances with other states, 
processes of institutionalisation have characterised the development of its 
intergovernmental links with other countries across the world since it first began the 
process of opening up to the world markets. The changing circumstances under 
which Chinese foreign policy has been made in the post-Cold War world have 
created various openings for the increasing participation of new foreign policy actors. 
This process has been promoted by the consensus-driven nature of Chinese political 
decision-making, which requires a great amount of discussion and bargaining on any 
policy item to reach a compromise acceptable to all parties involved.
722
 As China’s 
integration into the international community intensifies, the government’s increasing 
demand for reliable information on various foreign policy matters has coincided with 
a growing need to be able to swiftly communicate with other states. 
Before this background and that of the overall proliferation of actors and 
fragmentation of authority in foreign policy-making since the early 1990s, China has 
become increasingly active in international inter-governmental and regional 
organisations. However, the degree of institutionalisation established with Russia, 
particularly through the joint formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 
has been a novel move for the Chinese leadership, which in the past has consistently 
shied away from any form of firmly institutionalised security cooperation with other 
countries – particularly one that includes a military component (as does the SCO, in 
the form of the joint military exercises carried out under its aegis). It is worth 
remarking that the SCO is the first primarily security-focused international 
organisation that China plays a key part in and is also the first international 
organisation that is based in China. In the opinion of one Chinese researcher, China’s 
relations with Russia have now attained a greater degree of institutionalisation than 
those with any other major state.
723
  
 
In Russia’s case, the intensity of institution-building with China has been an even 
more remarkable move. As in China, Russian foreign policy since the end of the 
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Cold War has been characterised by a proliferation of actors and institutions.
724
 But 
in the conduct of day-to-day foreign policy-making, the Russian president has 
principally relied on a narrow circle of loyal associates, rather than formal 
institutions.
725
 As outlined in chapter 2, as opposed to China, where foreign policy 
caucuses, councils, and foreign affairs bureaucracies have become increasingly 
influential,
726
 Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policy has predominantly been directed by 
powerful individuals, whose influence has largely been determined by their standing 
in an informal power hierarchy. By contrast, the influence of Russia’s foreign policy 
institutions has generally been judged to be more formalistic than real, and many 
institutions play a role in foreign policy-making only to the extent that top positions 
in them are occupied by powerful individuals. At the same time, Russia has generally 
shown somewhat less enthusiasm than China in participating in international and 
regional institutions.
727
 Consequently, the traditional foreign policy environment in 
Russia has not been favourable for bilateral institution-building,
728
 which makes the 
extent of institution-building with China particularly remarkable. 
Russia has not created an equally dense and sophisticated network of institutional 
exchange with any other country outside of the post-Soviet space.
729
 As Russian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losyukov stated already in 2002, “Moscow 
doesn’t have such a comprehensive mechanism with any other country of the world. 
[…] It includes regular meetings between the heads of state and government, regular 
contacts between defence and foreign ministers, the heads of other key agencies, as 
well as the activities of 12-branch inter-governmental bodies coordinating 
cooperation and the work of more than 10 permanent working groups and 
commissions.” 730  A list of intergovernmental commissions on trade, economic, 
scientific, and technical cooperation between the Russian Federation and 84 foreign 
countries, published by the Department of External Economic Relations of the 
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Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade in December 2007, reveals 
that no less than eleven specialised bilateral institutions (including subordinate 
subcommissions) had by that time been established to coordinate this range of issues 
in Russia’s relations with China, whereas Russia’s bilateral relations with each of the 
other countries listed featured no more than one or two such institutions.
731
 No 
institution at all is listed in the key relationship with the United States. 
A U.S.-Russian intergovernmental commission – commonly referred to as the 
‘Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission’ – had in fact existed from 1993 to 2001 and 
played a very important role in the development of bilateral relations during that 
period. When the administration in Washington changed, however, the Commission 
was disbanded. According to analysts, “the commission was able to promote more 
positive relations, but it could not build a lasting foundation for working-level U.S.-
Russia cooperation independent of the two countries’ leaders”,732 and one of the 
main reasons for its ultimate failure was the persistence of “an emphasis on personal 
rather than institutional relationship-building” within it.733 The Gore-Chernomyrdin 
Commission was not replaced by a similar formal and regularised inter-governmental 
institution until July 2009, when the presidents of both countries launched a new and 
very comprehensive bilateral Presidential Commission which – consisting of various 
specialised working groups – resembles the Russian-Chinese bilateral institutional 
network. It has since become a key mechanism for U.S.-Russian bilateral interaction. 
 
What remains to be determined in this chapter is whether the process of 
institution-building between China and Russia has been a mere symptom of, or a 
contributory factor and stimulus for bilateral rapprochement, and what its practical 
impact on the conduct of bilateral relations has actually been. To the extent that the 
public comments and statements of officials on either side can give any indication, 
they reinforce the assumption that the process of bilateral institution-building and 
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particularly the institutionalisation of high- and summit-level meetings between the 
Chinese and Russian leaderships have substantially enhanced bilateral cooperation. 
Russian and Chinese officials have recurrently affirmed the importance of the 
bilateral institutional framework for facilitating cooperation and ensuring continuity 
in their bilateral relations. In the words of Konstantin Vnukov, the director of the 
Russian Foreign Ministry’s First Asia Department, for instance, “[t]he expansion of 
diversified communications between Russia and China helps to develop the 
cooperation of our peoples, to strengthen the foundation of political trust and 
strategic interaction even further, to give the current friendly, good-neighbourly 
relations between our countries an irreversible character.” 734  According to 
information provided by a Chinese government news agency in 2003, “[o]ver the 
past seven years, the established mechanism with its highly branched structure of 
subcommissions and working groups, has demonstrated a great efficiency and 
flexibility in the resolution of issues of bilateral interaction in various fields. In the 
course of the seven regular meetings of prime ministers [...], the elaboration and 
implementation of major bilateral projects, the development of trade relations at all 
levels, and the creation of an effective infrastructure for maintaining collaboration 
were given a powerful stimulus.”735 
Nonetheless, among the few scholars who have taken any note of the 
development of institutional channels between both states, a common assumption has 
been that the institutions created between China and Russia have primarily been 
symbolic and insubstantial, lacking the capacity of playing a significant practical role 
in bilateral policy-making. According to one leading analyst, “[t]he proliferation of 
inter-governmental commissions, subcommissions, and working groups since the 
1990s – though reliable communicating and interfacing mechanisms – has yet to 
generate fresh impetus in real issue areas and therefore appears to be window-
dressing.”736 Likewise, in the words of the authors of a recent study, “Russia-China 
economic relations are currently reduced to individual business projects with no clear 
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framework or direction. While this resembles Russia’s cooperation with other 
countries, the approach is in striking contrast to the rules and institutions-based 
approach which characterises (naturally in relative terms) China-US or China-EU 
economic relations.”737 This verdict is also reflected in the occasional comments 
analysts have made about individual institutions: The prominent Russian analyst 
Dmitri Trenin claimed, for instance, that “[i]t is emblematic that the Russian-Chinese 
Friendship Committee created in 1997 is a bureaucratic backwater, totally 
ineffectual.”738 
What, then, has the actual impact of bilateral institution-building been? In order 
to determine this, it is necessary to once again apply the four criteria of analysis set 
out in chapter 1. Within the framework of each of these criteria of analysis, the 
findings from the three case studies can be compared and more general observations 
about the development of bilateral institutional links can be made. 
 
 
 
Structural Development: 
 
Regarding the structural development of bilateral institutions, the case studies 
provide a somewhat ambivalent picture: The Subcommission for Trade and 
Economic Cooperation can be regarded as a microcosm of Sino-Russian bilateral 
institution building: Since its establishment in 1998, it has operated in a regular and 
persistent fashion. It went through a gradual structural expansion, with more and 
more subordinate mechanisms being added under its remit. However, these 
subordinate mechanisms were not as structurally consistent as the Subcommission 
itself, but were more susceptible to interruptions. One of the working groups went 
through a lengthy interval of inactivity, while another one ceased its operations 
altogether (although this remained a very unusual process in Sino-Russian bilateral 
institution-building). Overall, however, the Subcommission and its subordinate 
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bodies underwent a substantial institutional development and displayed great 
structural persistence and regularity. 
The second case study, which analysed the Sino-Russian Energy Dialogue, 
provides a diverging picture: Although an equally strong drive towards 
institutionalisation is discernible in bilateral energy relations as in virtually every 
other field of Sino-Russian interaction, the structural development of the newly-
created institutional mechanisms in this sector has remained highly erratic: The work 
of the first major institution created in this sphere, the Subcommission on Energy 
Cooperation, was constrained by irregularities, and it was eventually abolished. 
Within the space of several years, the institutional framework in the energy sphere 
was twice fully restructured, and it has yet to attain a lasting structural consistency. 
This has mainly been due to the persistent primacy of powerful individuals and 
personal allegiances over institutional, functional regularity. 
By contrast, the case of the Academic Trilateral again presents a picture of 
structural consistency. While it has operated with great regularity, the Academic 
Trilateral has not undergone any institutional expansion since it was first established. 
However, as the first institutionalised forum at the China-Russia-India trilateral level, 
it apparently contributed to and facilitated the creation of a number of subsequent 
trilateral forums and institutions covering different fields of policy-making, in a 
manner that corresponds with Neo-functionalist theories of institutional spill-over. 
As a mechanism that was originally initiated by Russia with geopolitical motives in 
mind, the Academic Trilateral proved very adequate as a forum for pragmatic 
academic exchange, and it soon began to facilitate the formation of various other 
institutionalised forms of trilateral interaction. 
 
The case studies thus represent different facets of the structural development of 
Sino-Russian institutional channels. While the development of institutions has 
remained abortive in some sectors, due to particular circumstances affecting these 
policy fields, institutional growth has for the most part been persistent and has led to 
a great regularity of bilateral exchange. Regarding the structural development of 
bilateral institutional interaction more generally, it has been characterised by a 
remarkable institutional proliferation within the space of little more than a decade. 
As was outlined in chapter 4, by 2012 three bilateral commissions had been 
established at the level of deputy premiers, comprising a total of 19 bilateral 
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subcommissions. Within the framework of these subcommissions more than 40 
specialised subordinate working groups have been created. Most of these bodies have 
since been meeting regularly once a year. Beyond their regular sessions, the bilateral 
commissions and subcommissions also typically include permanent secretariats or 
similar permanently operating components, which provide for some measure of 
sustained interaction throughout the year.  
Taken together, this network of commissions, subcommissions, and working 
groups now covers nearly every aspect of Sino-Russian bilateral interaction in the 
economic, political, cultural, and other spheres. In addition to these bilateral links, 
the various multilateral organisations that China and Russia have joined since the end 
of the Cold War provide further opportunities for sectoral consultations and 
negotiations between Chinese and Russian officials on a large variety of topics of 
regional or global concern. The most important of these multilateral organisations for 
the context of Sino-Russian relations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, has 
itself spawned a range of subordinate institutional structures, covering various 
different policy fields. 
Some of the newly-created bilateral institutions have in practice operated in a 
highly irregular manner. While the bilateral commissions and subcommissions have 
been meeting very regularly, at lower levels in the institutional network – particularly 
at the level of bilateral working groups – the regular annual meetings have frequently 
been paused and interrupted, sometimes for several years at a time. Some of the 
newly-founded bilateral institutions completely disappeared again not long after their 
inception.
739
 Others, such as the Sino-Russian Working Group on Migration, took 
many years and prolonged negotiations to finally become operational, even after its 
creation had repeatedly been announced within the space of several years.
740
 
In some other cases, there has been an evident overlap between different 
institutions with regard to their thematic range and intended functions, raising doubts 
about the effectiveness and substance of the work performed by each of these 
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institutions individually. This has been the case, for instance, regarding the 
protection of intellectual property rights (two separate but identically named bilateral 
working groups exist for this purpose) and the monitoring and protection of trans-
border waters (part of which falls under the remit of the Subcommission on 
Environmental Protection, while a separate bilateral commission solely for this 
purpose exists, including two identically named but separate working groups). 
Although the Chinese and Russian authorities have made attempts to improve the 
coordination between bilateral institutions with an overlapping or identical spectrum 
of tasks,
741
 it ultimately remains unclear how exactly these bodies divide their 
practical work between them. The problem of institutional overlap also affects some 
of the various specialised organs and committees that have been established within 
the SCO, many of which closely mirror those already created bilaterally between 
China and Russia
742
 (although, unlike the latter, they are focused specifically on the 
geographic space of Central Asia). 
However, while many of the bilateral working groups have operated irregularly, 
lacking the element of constancy and predictability that forms an important 
precondition for rendering international institutions an effective tool of inter-
governmental policy-making, the vast majority of bilateral institutions have become 
permanent fixtures, have operated with great regularity, and have thus served as 
platforms for bringing the decision-making elites of both countries into close contact 
with each other at fixed intervals, irrespective of the political contingencies and 
vicissitudes of the moment. The outcome of creating this multitude of regularised 
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forums of exchange in the Sino-Russian context appears to have been the attainment 
of greater regularity and predictability in overall bilateral interaction. 
 
 
 
Involvement of Senior Officials: 
 
The case studies indicate that the presence and involvement of senior officials in 
the institutional processes between China and Russia has consistently been very high. 
Once again, the Subcommission on Trade and Economic Cooperation mirrors the 
development of bilateral institution-building more generally: The Subcommission 
and many of its subordinate bodies have been co-headed by very senior Chinese and 
Russian policy-makers, commonly the most senior officials in their respective 
domains or their immediate deputies. The officials present at individual sessions 
have been drawn from a broad variety of ministries and agencies. The number and 
background of participants in the institutional activities sometimes varied widely 
from session to session. What is notable, however, is the inclusion of a broad range 
of relevant non-governmental stakeholders, particularly from among Chinese and 
Russian business circles. 
The case of the Energy Dialogue represents one of the most strategically 
sensitive, high-stakes sectors of bilateral interaction, and it exemplifies particularly 
well to what extent the presence of senior officials with genuine policy-making 
authority (in this case involving two of the most powerful Chinese and Russian 
officials) can determine the success or failure of an institution’s activity. It serves as 
an example of the great significance of involving top-level decision-makers in 
institutional activities. But it also exemplifies the danger that institutional dynamics 
can be stifled if they are consistently rendered subordinate to individual authority and 
personal allegiances, leading to a situation where very little authority resides in the 
institutional mechanism itself (even if this mechanism, like the Energy 
Subcommission, has a well-defined institutional structure and operates with great 
regularity). 
The case of the Academic Trilateral, by contrast, showcases that even in this 
peripheral, low-stakes sector of Sino-Russian cooperation there has been a relatively 
close coordination and exchange with senior foreign policy officials. This was also 
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consistently the case at later conferences, when trilateral interaction had already been 
institutionalised in various other forums at the inter-governmental level. In addition, 
many of the participating scholars themselves have an official background as retired 
senior diplomats. 
 
In general, the process of institution-building in Sino-Russian relations has led to 
a regularisation of meetings between the majority of Chinese and Russian senior 
officials in virtually every field of bilateral interaction. The participation in 
institutionalised bilateral dialogue forums has gradually been extended to include the 
heads (or, more commonly, deputy heads) of most ministries and government 
agencies. Many bilateral subcommissions that began as exchanges at the level of 
cabinet ministers were downgraded to deputy ministers shortly after the conclusion 
of their first sessions. The initial objective to establish a regular exchange at the 
highest level of policymaking in almost every sphere of bilateral interaction has thus 
not proven sustainable in the long term. But overall, the institutional channels now 
provide fixed ‘dates in the calendar’ for bringing a large number of Chinese and 
Russian senior officials from almost every ministry or government agency into direct 
personal contact with their immediate counterparts on a regular basis. In each case, 
these are forms of exchange that had never existed between both countries prior to 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Since the institutional network now covers almost every aspect of bilateral 
interaction, most top-level Chinese and Russian officials or their immediate deputies 
– serving as the chairpersons of bilateral subcommissions and working groups – are 
meeting their counterparts at least once a year. The great consistency with which the 
most senior Chinese and Russian foreign policy-makers and officials have 
participated in the regular sessions is an indicator of the importance they have come 
to hold for the administrations of both countries. The proliferation of exchanges 
through bilateral institutions has been further supplemented by China’s and Russia’s 
increasing participation in multilateral organisations (particularly the SCO), which 
now provide additional occasions for frequent and regularised consultations between 
key policy-makers from both states, including the heads of state, foreign ministers, 
and other senior ministry officials. 
According to one analyst of Sino-Russian relations, “[o]ne problem that both sets 
of leaders recognised in the middle of the last decade is the relatively thin nature of 
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political and personal ties between them. Even if personal relations are again very 
good at the very top, there are no longer many middle-level officials who have any 
direct experience of working with counterparts in the other country.”743 This problem 
has largely been remedied today, since the current bilateral institutional network 
provides for regular contacts not only between top-, but also middle-level officials in 
almost every field of bilateral policy-making. According to a leading Chinese expert 
on Sino-Russian relations, the institutional mechanisms have particularly helped 
officials at the level of department heads and section heads in the major Chinese and 
Russian ministries (who, in practice, play the most active and substantial roles in 
coordinating bilateral relations) in establishing a good mutual understanding with 
each other.
744
 A senior researcher at the Russian Diplomatic Academy pointed out 
that, as a result of their involvement in the extensive bilateral institutional framework, 
for Russian policy-makers “China is becoming just a normal country. Before, in 
Russia, it was a mystical, oriental country. […] They never knew what they are doing, 
what they think. […] But now, of course, everyone, every minister, every department 
head knows his counterpart in China, they speak every year, they drink, they 
exchange faxes, so it is becoming a normal and quite important country.”745 The 
network of bilateral institutions and regularised exchanges now also incorporates a 
large variety of influential non-official stakeholders, particularly private 
entrepreneurs. 
 
This institutionalisation and regularisation of personal contacts stands in notable 
contrast to the dynamics of bilateral interaction in the years leading up to the Sino-
Soviet split. Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, for instance, only personally met each 
other twice (in December 1949 and in January 1950), and even during the heyday of 
Sino-Soviet cooperation personal meetings between the Chinese and Soviet leaders 
remained very rare. As pointed out in chapter 2, that Sino-Soviet relations 
deteriorated so swiftly in the early 1960s and remained unabatedly hostile until 
shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union was largely due to a growth of mutual 
suspicions about each other’s military intentions and a persistent lack of mutual 
understanding, exacerbated in no small part by the absence of channels or forums 
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through which lasting contact and exchange between the Chinese and Soviet 
leaderships and the foreign policy establishments in both countries could have been 
guaranteed. The development of a seemingly intractable security dilemma between 
Beijing and Moscow would have been significantly less pronounced if ideological 
differences and misperceptions had not led key policy-makers on either side to 
constantly overestimate the military threat posed by the other. With no effective 
dialogue mechanisms in place between Beijing and Moscow, a number of 
conservative Soviet officials in charge of China policy, for instance, who acted as the 
sole ‘gatekeepers’ of bilateral relations, remained persistently obstructive towards 
any attempts at a de-escalation of tensions and irresponsive to changes in Chinese 
policymaking. Not least for these reasons, reconciliation between Beijing and 
Moscow proved protracted and difficult. 
In contrast to this, current Chinese and Russian policy-makers and officials have 
frequently pointed out the importance of having the opportunity to regularly acquaint 
themselves with the goals and the personalities of their counterparts and to establish 
a really trusting relationship with them through their joint interaction in bilateral and 
multilateral institutions, particularly during times of leadership transition. According 
to the assessment of the former Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin, 
for instance, “[p]ersonal contacts between the leaders of Russia and China played an 
enormous role in the 1990s. The senior executives of both countries met on a regular 
basis, discussed urgent problems via the ‘hot line’, and exchanged messages. The 
friendly and trust-based relationship established between them set the tone for the 
overall atmosphere of interstate and intergovernmental interaction and encouraged a 
more active alignment of partnerships and contacts. Before long, this process found 
its reflection in a number of essential bilateral documents.” 746  Vladimir Putin, 
observing the creation of “a system of dialogue and cooperation which covers all 
levels and spheres” of interaction with China, stated in 2002 that “[i]t is natural that 
such regular dialogue cannot but lead to the formation of good personal relations. […] 
It not only renders our meetings friendly and warm on an interpersonal level, but it 
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also creates a favourable atmosphere of trust for the discussion and resolution of 
inter-state questions.”747  
While such comments cannot necessarily be taken at face value (particularly in 
their emphasis on the formation of trust), they nonetheless appear to be relatively 
accurate depictions of the nature of interaction between the Chinese and Russian 
leaders. Often enough, more than one meeting was needed to establish a basic level 
of mutual understanding between leading Chinese and Russian policy-makers. “After 
meeting Putin for the first time, Jiang Zemin reportedly said that he did not really 
know what kind of a person Putin was or how he thought.”748 The great frequency of 
subsequent meetings appears to have rendered this problem less acute. As a senior 
Chinese academic, who had previously worked as a diplomat in Russia, pointed out, 
the two countries’ leaders, meeting 5-6 times a year, now meet each other more 
frequently than the leading Chinese and Russian academic experts do. As a 
consequence, he claimed, they have come to know each other’s positions and 
outlooks very well.
749
 
Considering the traditional importance of personal relationships between leaders 
in Russian foreign policy-making, the increasing institutionalisation of bilateral 
summits and exchanges appears in particular to have eased the effect of leadership 
transition in China in 2002/2003.
750
 At the critical time of the transfer of power from 
Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao, Vladimir Putin stated that “[w]e have agreed in due time 
with Chairman Jiang Zemin that we will regularly carry out such visits: of the 
Chinese leader to Russia, and the Russian leader to China, respectively. […] One 
year ago, I have also gotten acquainted with the new secretary general of the Party’s 
Central Committee – comrade Hu Jintao, when he visited us in Moscow for a 
working visit. We had the possibility not only to meet personally, but also to discuss 
a range of problems on the bilateral and international agenda.”751 With regard to the 
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process of power transition in China, Russia’s then-ambassador Igor Rogachev 
pointed out in May 2003 that  
President Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao have already developed good personal and 
business contacts which will undoubtedly contribute to the advancement of the 
Russian-Chinese strategic partnership in all fields and to a closer coordination of 
actions of our two countries on the international scene. Hu Jintao first came to our 
country on October 27-28, 2001, in the context of a working visit. At the time, he 
already held exhaustive meetings in Moscow with Vladimir Putin and the Chairman 
of the Government Mikhail Kasyanov. On December 2, 2002, in the context of his 
official visit to the PRC, the Russian President met with Hu Jintao, the newly elected 
general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, and had a long conversation with 
him – for more than one-and-a-half hours. Since then both leaders have already more 
than once communicated by phone and exchanged messages.
752
 
The leadership change in Beijing coincided with the regular official visit of the 
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to China, which reportedly allowed for a close 
coordination of the process between both governments. The Russian Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Aleksandr Yakovenko pointed out in February 2003 that “[t]his 
visit occurs on the eve of important personnel shifts in the Chinese state apparatus 
and will make it possible to promote the maintenance of continuity in the Russian-
Chinese strategic partnership.” 753  Three months later, Yakovenko stated more 
generally that “the regular high-level contacts have great importance for the 
deepening and development of the strategic partnership relations between our two 
countries and the strengthening of the priority and continuity of future Russian-
Chinese relations in the context of the recent transition of power to the following, 
fourth generation of Chinese leaders.”754 
Similarly, when the newly-appointed Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxing 
arrived in Russia for his first official visit and in order to partake in a session of the 
SCO Council of Foreign Ministers in April 2004, he was already a well-known 
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figure in Moscow: As Yakovenko pointed out on that occasion, “[t]his is the first 
arrival of Li Zhaoxing to Russia after his appointment as minister in March 2003, 
although he has repeatedly been with us before, including in his capacity as co-
chairman of the Chinese part of the Joint Working Group on the Fight Against 
Terrorism, and accompanying the chairman of the PRC Hu Jintao during his state 
visit to Russia in May 2003. […] The heads of the foreign ministries of Russia and 
China have known each other for a long time, close working and personal contacts 
with each other were already established during their work as permanent 
representatives of the two countries to the United Nations in New York.”755  
By the time Dmitry Medvedev was appointed to succeed Vladimir Putin as 
Russian President in 2008, he was already well-known to the Chinese, since he had 
acted as the chairman of the Russian organising committee for the large-scale 
cultural events ‘Year of Russia in China’ in 2006 and ‘Year of China in Russia’ in 
2007. Russian officials, in turn, had an opportunity to meet with the then-Vice-
President of China, Xi Jinping, on the side-lines of the eighth plenary session of the 
Sino-Russian Committee of Friendship, Peace, and Development in Beijing in 
November 2009
756
 – already three years before he was appointed President of China. 
In addition, in March 2010 Xi Jinping visited Moscow as the head of the Chinese 
delegation to the second session of the regular Dialogue Forum between the 
Communist Party of China and the ‘United Russia’ Party.757 Ultimately, neither the 
periodic changes of government in China, nor the formal power shift from Vladimir 
Putin to Dmitri Medvedev and back to Putin, have caused noticeable disturbances in 
bilateral relations, and there is some evidence to suggest that the network of frequent 
exchanges has contributed to this. 
The fact that the increasing institutionalisation of bilateral relations has created 
these opportunities for a timely acquaintance and interaction between new 
generations of top-level policy-makers and officials from China and Russia is likely 
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of great significance in two societies, in which personal attachments and loyalties 
continue to have the greatest practical importance for policy-making. The 
institutionalisation of frequent exchanges between top-level officials in China and 
Russia has also likely served as a further reassurance against uncoordinated 
‘maverick’ acts of individual officials, which often characterised Russian foreign 
policy during the Yeltsin era. Among the most notorious such acts was Oleg Lobov’s 
September 1992 journey to Taiwan, where Lobov – a high-ranking Russian 
government official and long-time member of President Yeltsin’s inner circle – 
signed an agreement with the Taiwanese Deputy Foreign Minister to exchange 
representative offices to handle bilateral affairs. This move, which Lobov made 
entirely without the knowledge of the Russian foreign ministry, had to be hastily 
retracted by the Kremlin, following sharp protests from the Chinese government.
758
 
Such uncoordinated individual acts have overall become a rarity under Vladimir 
Putin’s presidency, but the institutional framework does its part to further limit the 
potential diplomatic fallout from any ill-advised statements or acts on the part of 
individual state officials. 
 
 
 
Practical and Policy Impact: 
 
The practical and policy impact of the newly-created institutional links is more 
difficult to assess than their structural development and personnel composition, but 
from the three case studies some relevant insights emerge. The case of the 
Subcommission on Trade and Economic Cooperation provides a mixed picture: The 
Subcommission’s deliberations have often generated regulations and 
recommendations that were subsequently discussed by relevant stakeholders and 
implemented by the competent authorities. The Subcommission and its subordinate 
bodies have initiated various large-scale bilateral economic programmes and 
framework agreements, as well as trade events. They have also regularly coordinated 
and supervised individual bilateral business ventures and provided a separate forum 
for businesses and sectoral authorities to meet and discuss projects and strategies. 
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The large-scale programmes and projects initiated by the Subcommission appear to 
have had some relevance for providing groundwork agreements and establishing 
basic parameters for bilateral interaction in specific economic sectors. Ultimately, 
however, their practical impact has often remained modest and sometimes next to 
nought. A more important function of the Subcommission’s sessions has ultimately 
been to provide a regular forum and catalyst for practical interaction, deliberation, 
and communication between relevant policy-makers and entrepreneurs from China 
and Russia, both in the formal context of the sessions themselves and in more 
informal settings at the side-lines. 
The Energy Dialogue has shown a more significant policy impact. Following its 
establishment, within a short space of time its sessions initiated and finalised 
breakthrough agreements in the energy sphere, although its results did not meet the 
expectations in some sectors (such as natural gas trade). By contrast, the Energy 
Dialogue’s institutional predecessor, the Subcommission on Energy Cooperation, in 
spite of having a well-defined institutional structure and operating with great 
regularity, was conspicuously unsuccessful in promoting practical cooperation in 
most fields of bilateral energy cooperation. Bilateral agreements on energy 
cooperation reached within this format were routinely disregarded and overridden. 
The Energy Dialogue’s relative effectiveness in advancing Sino-Russian energy 
cooperation was mostly owed to personal interventions by influential power brokers, 
rather than the institutional capacity and dynamics of the Energy Dialogue per se. 
As a ‘track-2’ mechanism, the activities of the Academic Trilateral had no direct 
policy impact, but through their formal recommendations and proposals, its 
participants provided some input into official foreign policy-making. The Academic 
Trilateral’s activities have been closely monitored by and coordinated with senior 
foreign policy officials from all three countries, and its participants have actively 
tried to communicate the results of their deliberations to the relevant foreign policy 
authorities. There is some indication that officials have valued the academic 
conferences as an advisory body, and that at least some of the ideas and proposals 
discussed there eventually found their way into official foreign policy-making, albeit 
not nearly to the extent wished for by the participating scholars. At the very least, the 
Academic Trilateral appears to have played an important role in promoting the 
establishment of other, more authoritative institutional forums within the China-
Russia-India trilateral context. Overall, however, the Academic Trilateral’s policy 
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impact – as is to be expected from a mechanism of this nature – has been very 
modest. 
 
The case studies indicate that, while some Sino-Russian institutions have had a 
substantial practical and policy impact, a large part of the policy initiatives and 
regulations advanced within the institutional framework have remained abortive and 
have fallen short of initial expectations. Altogether, the practical and policy impact 
of the institutions under investigation remained more modest than the remarkably 
rapid proliferation of institutional structures would suggest. Looking beyond the case 
studies at the institution-building process as a whole, this picture is further reinforced. 
Bilateral institution-building, appears to have led to few genuine policy 
breakthroughs.  
This notwithstanding, some parts of the expanding Sino-Russian institutional 
network have had a great deal of substantial policy impact, and many of the 
proposals and recommendations generated within the institutions have been adopted 
into actual bilateral policy-making. The former Russian ambassador to China, Igor 
Rogachev, described the activity and importance of the various bilateral institutional 
mechanisms included in the annual prime ministers’ exchange as follows:  
At the annual sessions of these subcommissions and commissions, the basic 
problems of interaction in all specified directions are discussed, priority projects are 
planned and measures for their realisation are developed. The minutes of meetings of 
the Commission on the Preparation of Regular Meetings of the Heads of 
Government are the basis for decisions of the Russian government on economic and 
trade cooperation with China. At the annual meetings of the heads of government, 
central questions of bilateral interaction are being discussed, including in the 
economic sphere, encompassing also approaches for the solution of emerging 
problems. It is no exaggeration to say that the entire current shape of our trade and 
economic cooperation, especially in regard to its main objects, was formed under the 
influence of the agreements reached at this level.
759
 
There has been a steady ‘upward flow’ of policy proposals, draft agreements, and 
recommendations from the bilateral working groups, subcommissions, and 
commissions to the regular summit meetings between the countries’ top officials. 
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One of the factors guaranteeing that much of the information exchanged and many of 
the decisions made in the framework of the various bilateral institutions are 
subsequently transferred to more senior levels of official policy-making in China and 
Russia is the fact that the sessions of the various bilateral subcommissions and 
working groups form the foundation and set the agenda for the annual sessions of the 
Commission for the Preparation of Regular Meetings of the Heads of Government. 
According to the available protocols, at each of the Commission’s sessions, the work 
of the subcommissions and (to a lesser extent) working groups under its remit has 
been discussed in some depth. The Commission, at its annual sessions, also officially 
approves each of the session protocols of its subordinate subcommissions. Based on 
the various recommendations made, it then prepares the annual meetings of the 
Chinese and Russian heads of government – one of the highest bilateral decision-
making forums – which includes drafting the joint communiqués issued at the end of 
the premiers’ meetings.760 
The session protocols of the Commission for the Preparation of Regular Meetings 
of the Heads of Government – as well as those of the Commission on Humanitarian 
Cooperation – are officially signed and approved at each of the premiers’ annual 
meetings. The commissions themselves are formally vested with substantial policy-
making authority. In the case of the Commission on Humanitarian Cooperation, for 
instance, a Russian governmental decree specifies that “[d]ecisions made on the basis 
of the results of the sessions, in accordance with the competence of the Russian 
section of the Commission, shall be binding on all federal executive organs 
represented in it, as well as the organisations that operate under the authority of these 
organs.”761 
According to one of the Chinese academics interviewed for this study, this highly 
structured process provides for a relatively swift and free flow of decisions and 
information from lower levels of the institutional hierarchy to its higher rungs and 
                                                 
760
 See for instance Aleksandr Zhukov & Wu Yi, Protokol Deviatogo Zasedaniia Rossiĭsko-Kitaĭskoĭ 
Komissii (Beijing: Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 5.12.2006), available online at 
http://www.crc.mofcom.gov.cn/crweb/rcc/info/Article.jsp?col_no=32&a_no=30108; see also ‘11-e 
Zasedanie Komissii po Podgotovke Reguliarnykh Vstrech Glav Pravitel'stv Kitaia i Rossii’, Renmin 
Ribao (29.9.2007), available online at http://russian.people.com.cn/31521/6274063.html 
761
 Government of the Russian Federation, Postanovlenie No.919 O Rossiĭskoĭ Chasti Rossiĭsko-
Kitaĭskoĭ Komissii po Sotrudnichestvu v Oblasti Obrazovaniia, Kul'tury, Zdravookhraneniia i Sporta, 
art.4 (Moscow: Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation, 2.12.2000), available online at 
http://www.szrf.ru/doc.phtml?nb=edition00&issid=2000050000&docid=15  
253 
 
eventually to the top leadership.
762
 Another Chinese analyst, however, who had 
previously participated in the work of the Commission on Humanitarian Cooperation, 
stated that in practice, many of its subordinate subcommissions perform little real 
work in the intervals between their meetings and merely rush to produce some token 
‘results’ prior to the Commission’s annual sessions. He also stressed, however, that 
even in so doing, the institutions keep the “machine” of bilateral interaction and 
exchange running.
763
 
 
While some of the institutions created between China and Russia after the Cold 
War remained insubstantial and quixotic in their goals, the majority of new bilateral 
institutions have apparently been designed as pragmatic problem-solving 
mechanisms that cover specific fields of Sino-Russian interaction and address 
particular areas of actual or potential disagreement between both states. The 
pragmatic orientation of these institutions and particularly their efforts at improving 
and solidifying the contractual-legal basis of bilateral interaction have commonly 
been enshrined in their founding documents.
764
 Overall, post-Cold War Sino-Russian 
relations have been characterised by a strong drive towards a legalisation and 
codification of bilateral relations.
765
 An important motivation for this has been the 
wish to prevent a recurrence of the kind of chronic unpredictability and violent 
fluctuations that had afflicted the interaction between Beijing and Moscow during the 
Cold War.
766
 One of the strongest manifestations of this impulse to create a firm 
legal foundation for bilateral relations (an impulse that seemed to be particularly 
pressing for the Chinese side) was the conclusion of the 2001 Treaty of Good-
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Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation between China and Russia. Despite being 
fairly general in nature, this treaty, which was drafted at the instigation of Beijing, 
has often been referred to as providing the central legal foundation for bilateral 
interaction. 
The practical and policy impact of the various Sino-Russian institutional 
channels has been most observable in the development of bilateral groundwork 
agreements and treaties, their subsequent revision, and the monitoring of their 
implementation. In addition to the regularised exchanges between the heads of 
government, which have consistently functioned as the primary venue for finalising 
and signing foundational bilateral agreements and treaties, this also applies to the 
multitude of ordinary bilateral subcommissions and working groups. Since these are 
now active in a large range of diverse policy fields, their activity has contributed to 
creating a foundation of rules and regulations guiding bilateral interaction in almost 
every policy sector (although the process of arriving at these regulations has 
sometimes been lengthy and arduous). As the following two examples illustrate, this 
includes many peripheral spheres of interaction that were previously totally 
unregulated but, in the absence of regulation, had the potential to trigger further 
bilateral tensions in the long run: 
- In September 2006, a bilateral agreement on the regulation of air traffic was 
discussed at the first session of the Subcommission on Civil Aviation and 
Civil Aircraft Manufacturing
767
 and also at the tenth session of the 
Subcommission on Transport. At the latter session, it was announced that 
“[i]n the field of air transport, both sides, at the level of the aviation 
authorities, agreed on the draft of the new Agreement on Air Traffic”.768 
According to the Russian Minister of Transport, Igor Levitin, “during the 
session of the Russian-Chinese Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field 
of Transport this agreement was ‘practically finalised’, and it will be signed 
following further agreement in the Russian and Chinese ministries.”769 At the 
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eleventh session of the Subcommission on Transport in May 2007, both sides 
again discussed the Agreement, noting that “[o]ver the past period, active 
work has been carried out to implement the domestic procedures of 
synchronising the text of the new Agreement on Air Traffic between Russia 
and China”.770 At the 14th session of the Subcommission on Transport in 
August 2010, both sides announced their “readiness to sign the Agreement 
between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of 
the People’s Republic of China on Air Traffic.” 771  Ultimately, following 
many years of negotiations, the Agreement was indeed signed into effect at 
the 15
th
 regular meeting of the two countries’ heads of government in 
December 2010, and has since provided a legal groundwork for bilateral civil 
aviation regulation. 
- The Sino-Russian Commission for the Rational Use and Protection of Trans-
Border Waters was reportedly created with the specific objective of 
implementing the Agreement between the Governments of China and Russia 
on Cooperation in the Protection and Rational Use of Trans-Border Waters, 
and “to ensure the coordination of activities for the fulfilment of the 
agreement, including issues related to the development of joint schemes for 
the use and protection of trans-border waters.”772 The Commission thereby 
serves to regulate a potentially divisive issue that has led to frequent tensions 
and disagreements between both countries in the past. The Agreement – “the 
first Agreement on Cooperation in the Use and Protection of Trans-Border 
Waters in the history of mutual relations between the Russian Federation and 
the People’s Republic of China” 773  – was debated in lengthy bilateral 
negotiations that had begun as early as 1997. But the negotiation process only 
gained momentum in 2005, following a catastrophic toxic spill that 
contaminated a tributary of the Heilongjiang (Amur) River on the Sino-
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Russian border, which led Russia to press for an intensification of the 
negotiating process. The Agreement was eventually prepared in the 
framework of the newly-created Working Group for Monitoring Trans-
Border Waters and their Protection under the Subcommission on 
Environmental Protection.
774
 It was discussed and prepared for finalisation at 
the Subcommission’s second session in September 2007775 and signed during 
the working visit of the Russian Minister of Natural Resources Yury Trutnev 
to China in January 2008.
776
 Since then, major bilateral disagreements about 
the pollution of waterways have been avoided. 
 
In many sectors of Sino-Russian interaction, the bilateral institutional channels 
have performed important work in the development of bilateral groundwork 
agreements and treaties, their subsequent revision and the monitoring of their 
implementation. In so doing, they have promoted the harmonisation of cooperation 
between two states in which principles of legality and contractual obligation have 
traditionally been weakly observed. However, although an important additional 
measure of predictability and accountability was thus introduced in most fields of 
bilateral interaction (particularly those with low political and economic stakes 
attached), in many instances these institutions have proven relatively impotent in 
ensuring that the agreements reached were actually implemented. In the highly 
sensitive energy sphere, for instance, as was illustrated in chapter 6, scores of 
bilateral agreements on bilateral energy projects that were signed in the framework 
of the Subcommission on Energy Cooperation and at similar venues, have regularly 
gone unheeded. As a Chinese analysts pointed out, many of the agreements signed at 
Sino-Russian summit meetings are never implemented in practice, and at the next 
regular meeting both sides merely sign a new agreement that is virtually identical 
with the previous one.
777
 
In many fields of Sino-Russian interaction, what has ultimately perhaps been of 
greater practical importance than the generation and monitoring of bilateral 
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agreements has been the role the newly-established institutional channels have 
played in facilitating a productive interaction between individual officials, 
entrepreneurs, and other relevant stakeholders, primarily by providing a platform and 
regular point of contact where they can conduct separate negotiations and exchange 
plans and opinions in person. As pointed out in chapter 5, this appears to have been 
one of the most vital practical functions of the sessions of the Subcommission on 
Trade and Economic Cooperation. The report on a session of the Sino-Russian 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Financial Sphere in July 2005 provides 
another good example for this. The session was reportedly attended by an 
“impressive” list of participants (including, on the Russian side, managers and 
specialists of banks from Moscow, Siberia, and the Far East, officials from the 
regional offices of the Bank of Russia, representatives of the Russian Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade and the Russian-Chinese Business Council). At 
the session, “[b]oth sides exchanged opinions on the development of the banking 
sectors of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China” and “the 
bankers of the two countries discussed problems of cooperation between Russian and 
Chinese banks, noting the lack of activity in establishing correspondence relations.” 
In the words of Boris Shtejngart, the First Vice-President of the Far Eastern Bank, 
“[o]n most of the issues discussed, the Russian and Chinese bankers succeeded in 
reaching a consensus. We discussed a number of interesting ideas with the staff of 
the Chinese banks that require further elaboration, and we agreed to continue the 
discussions in the near future at the talks in China.”778 Shtejngart further explained 
that “the cooperation with Chinese banks has long been a priority for us, therefore we 
regularly take part in the sessions of the Subcommission”, adding that  
the work of the subcommission is an important aspect of the bank’s consistently 
pursued policy to establish and develop relations with Chinese banks. These 
meetings provide an opportunity to present our own vision of the problems discussed, 
to exchange opinions with other participants and, what is much more important, they 
provide a legal opportunity to lobby for the interests of our clients and, if necessary, 
to adjust our activities by analysing the experiences of other participants in the 
process. As practice has shown, the communication on the side-lines of these official 
events is extremely useful. For example, during a session of the subcommission we 
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complained to the vice president of one of the Chinese banks about the fact that, for 
almost a month, despite their promises, we had not been able to obtain the draft 
treaty on correspondent accounts in Yuan. A single SMS-message with our fax 
number, sent from Novosibirsk, turned out to be sufficient so that within a day the 
staff of the Far Eastern Bank in Vladivostok received the draft of the treaty in 
question.
779
 
Shtejngart pointed out that “the agreement of the text of the Protocol on the 
results of the session was not easy. Over two days of intensive work, the Russian 
participants managed to include a range of clauses into the text of the joint protocol 
that are indispensable for our customers.”780 Shtejngart’s frank assessments indicate 
that one of the primary objectives of the bilateral institutional network in the sphere 
of financial and inter-bank cooperation, as formulated at the 10
th
 bilateral premiers’ 
meeting in November 2005 – “to promote the involvement of Chinese and Russian 
banks in maintaining the investment interaction of the two countries”781 – has at least 
to some extent been fulfilled. Overall, the systematic inclusion of entrepreneurs in 
many of the bilateral institutional channels has also served the purpose of providing 
both governments with greater control and oversight over corporate activities. In the 
opinion of one Chinese analyst, this has, for instance, contributed to decreasing the 
volumes of ‘unofficial’ (i.e. unregistered) trade between both countries.782 
 
China’s and Russia’s increasing interaction within multilateral and regional 
institutions has created additional opportunities for a productive policy exchange that 
the purely bilateral institutional mechanisms lack, but its ultimate impact on 
advancing practical policy moves in Beijing and Moscow has apparently been 
modest. China and Russia cooperate relatively well in many international 
organisations. They have developed a routine of bilateral expert consultations before 
major gatherings of most multilateral organisations like the G20, and prior to votes in 
the United Nations, in order to ‘equalise their watches’ and coordinate a common 
stance. According to a senior Chinese researcher and former diplomat, who 
frequently took part in such consultations, this arrangement has contributed 
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significantly to facilitating the coordination of common positions on many policy 
items in the international arena.
783
 
A coordination of Sino-Russian interaction has been particularly observable in 
the organisation that represents the longest and most consistent link between both 
countries: the United Nations, and particularly the U.N. Security Council. In the U.N. 
General Assembly as well, as Peter Ferdinand pointed out, Chinese and Russian 
voting patterns, as compared to those of the U.S., India, and France, have 
consistently been very close since Beijing joined the U.N. in the 1970s (only the vote 
of the China-India dyad has been even more consistently similar throughout this 
period). Despite a brief drop in voting equivalence during the 1990s (mainly on 
account of the Yeltsin government’s initial pro-Western foreign policy course), “in 
the Putin era, those changes have largely been reversed.” The accumulated voting 
figures “do suggest a converging pattern of voting between Russia, China and India, 
as well as a greater degree of divergence from the US, in the Putin era.”784 
But overall, concrete, tangible cooperation between China and Russia within 
multilateral organisations has been much more limited than at the bilateral level (and 
some of these mechanisms, such as BRICS, ultimately remain of dubious practical 
value). In spite of their close coordination of positions in many international forums, 
China and Russia have rarely succeeded in forming a common front in international 
economic organisations in particular, as was exemplified by their failure to propose a 
joint candidate during the 2011 election for the managing director of the IMF.
785
 
Sino-Russian interaction within the new networks of multilateral organisations has 
not always been cooperative, uncompetitive, and unproblematic. As one analyst of 
Russia’s Asia policy pointed out, 
Russia has joined most of the existing regional organisations and dialogue 
mechanisms in the region, such as APEC and ASEAN, and has been invited to 
attend the East Asian Community Summit (ASEAN plus Six) from 2011, along with 
the United States. Russia still struggles with regionalism in the Asia-Pacific […]. 
One of Russia’s main concerns vis-à-vis China is its predilection for free trade zones 
– in Central Asia and elsewhere. In general, China is perceived as failing to support 
Russia in its attempt to integrate with the Asia-Pacific region. As the Director of the 
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Department for Pan-Asian Issues at the MID, Khakimov, complained: ‘Every 
analyst knows China’s position: “We won’t interfere in your sphere of interests in 
Central Asia but we don’t want you to be active in the Asia-Pacific”’786 
The SCO, as the most significant multilateral institutional link between the two 
countries, has established itself as an important mechanism for the coordination of 
Sino-Russian relations in the Central Asian region, but its practical impact and 
success as a policy-making body have also been limited. The organisation has 
certainly been successful in attaining its founding objectives: the pacification of the 
borders between China and its Central Asian neighbours (including Russia), the 
resolution of disputes about their course, and the implementation of confidence-
building measures along them. Beyond this very significant accomplishment, 
however, the success of SCO initiatives in the various other policy spheres into 
which the organisation has since expanded remains less evident. 
Policy-makers’ assessments of the SCO and its institutions have generally been 
positive, if not necessarily enthusiastic: Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr 
Losyukov, for instance, remarked that:  
The existence of such an organisation is certainly better than its absence. Within the 
context of the SCO we can organise a dense interaction with China and with the 
principal Central Asian countries. Considering the role which Russia and China are 
playing in this organisation, this is a factor guaranteeing stability, it is in our interest. 
[…] Every year, the prime ministers meet, the ministers of defence, the ministers of 
economy, summits are held. This makes it possible to actively coordinate 
positions.
787
 
According to its former Secretary-General Zhang Deguang, “the SCO has 
initiated 120 projects related to [security,] customs cooperation, cross-border 
transportation, harmonization of laws and regulations, energy, and railway 
construction.”788 Even if taken at face value, however, this number reveals nothing 
about the further course, the scope, and the eventual impact of these SCO-generated 
projects. With regard to the important economic dimension of SCO activities, 
analysts have observed that it is still “lagging far behind the security element in 
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terms of practical implementation”.789 In the words of Stephen Aris, its relative lack 
of widespread practical policy impact has primarily been due to the fact that the SCO  
does not have provisions for ensuring its decisions and recommendations are 
enforced. […] The SCO does not have a formal codified procedure of 
decisionmaking, and instead operates on the basis of informal discussion. […] As 
the SCO has no authority to enforce its decisions and policies in national legislation, 
a strong consensus on a decision or programme is required in order for it to be 
approved, because if one government decides not to implement it then the region-
wide format is undermined.
790
 
To complicate matters further, the SCO’s budget remains very limited. As of 
2005, its operating budget was a mere US$3.6 million, half of which was at the 
disposal of its anti-terrorism centre.
791
 The SCO’s practical effectiveness has also 
been compromised by the fact that it overlaps and to some extent competes with 
other regional organisations operating in Central Asia. As pointed out in chapter 3, 
China and Russia are to some extent competitors in Central Asia, and Russia prefers 
to promote the regional multilateral structures it dominates, such as the Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Community 
(EurAsEC) – in the security (anti-terrorism) and economic sectors, respectively. The 
SCO and its institutions are replicating key aspects of these Russian-dominated 
organisations (although recently some half-hearted attempts have been made to 
establish cooperative relations between these bodies and the SCO). 
The SCO’s capacity to autonomously and proactively advance political and 
economic ventures (including those of particular relevance for Sino-Russian bilateral 
relations) has therefore remained limited.
792
 Its strong focus on high-level meetings  
has led some analysts to describe the SCO as a mechanism designed to ensure 
regular government-level interaction between its member states and not much more 
than that, with others noting that cooperation, interaction and contacts outside of the 
yearly summits are not common. Although the organisation has established a 
permanently functioning spine, this does not represent any significant devolution of 
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sovereignty away from its constituent states. […] Although the SCO contains 
elements of low-level cooperation, its framework is based overwhelmingly on top-
level political cooperation, and to a large degree on the pomp and ceremony of high-
level diplomacy.
793
 
As such, the SCO (especially its regular summit meetings) has been a useful tool 
for Beijing and Moscow to further coordinate their respective policies on Central 
Asia. Within its broader multilateral forum, it has provided numerous channels and 
mechanisms of separate bilateral projects and consultations between individual dyads 
of member states, particularly China and Russia. But ultimately, the practical and 
policy impact of Sino-Russian interaction in multilateral institutions, including the 
SCO, has remained modest, and the strongest impact of these organisations has been 
their role in providing additional platforms for the regular exchange between the two 
countries’ leaders and other senior policy-makers. 
 
 
 
Mutual Information Exchange and Reassurance: 
 
Regarding the final criterion of analysis, the case studies once again afford a 
fairly coherent picture. In the case of the Subcommission on Trade and Economic 
Cooperation and its subordinate working groups, there is evidence that a relatively 
open and active mutual exchange of information and reassurances – particularly with 
regard to problems and disagreements arising in bilateral economic interaction – has 
taken place, and that on some occasions common understandings on these issues 
could be reached. The extent to which these deliberations, above and beyond the 
mere exchange of opinions and concerns, led to changes in policy, appears to be 
limited. Nonetheless, since each of the trade disputes and disagreements discussed at 
the Subcommission’s sessions had the potential of causing disruptions or even 
tensions in the further course of bilateral economic interaction, the regular sessions 
apparently offered an opportunity to communicate concerns and defuse them before 
they could escalate into open crises. 
The Energy Dialogue and its institutional predecessor, the Energy 
Subcommission – despite the latter’s conspicuously meagre track record in terms of 
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its practical and policy impact – likewise appear to have served as valuable forums 
for the provision of mutual guarantees, and especially for an exchange of critical 
information, with the aim of enhancing mutual comprehension. This in itself was 
arguably a task of considerable importance for preventing the breakdown of bilateral 
cooperation in the energy sphere, particularly at times when bilateral disagreements 
and tensions ran high, considering the difficulties China and Russia faced in trying to 
gain clarity about each other’s very opaque energy sectors and interests. It was 
apparently very valuable to have a forum where these issues could be discussed and 
negotiated; all the more so, since the Energy Subcommission and Energy Dialogue 
were settings that provided a rare opportunity to gather most of the relevant (state 
and corporate) actors and agencies on either side active in the energy sector and thus 
to provide for more well-coordinated bilateral communication and transparency. This 
notwithstanding, many disagreements regarding bilateral energy interaction remained 
undiminished over the years. 
In the case of the Academic Trilateral, by contrast, there is little evidence that a 
substantial exchange of previously unknown information and reassurances about 
each side’s positions and intentions on specific policy matters has taken place in the 
course of the annual conferences. But this was predetermined by an institutional 
format that has no actual policy-making authority and whose participants are for the 
most part not privy to confidential information. This notwithstanding, the exchanges 
in the format of the Academic Trilateral have apparently played a palpable role in 
enhancing mutual understanding over time, minimising mutual misperceptions, and 
enabling a greater insight into each other’s positions on central international policy 
issues among important ‘track-two’ actors who enjoy a measure of access to relevant 
policy-makers in their respective countries. 
Beyond a relatively open exchange of information and mutual reassurances, the 
case of the Academic Trilateral also provides some evidence that, over the years, 
more lasting informal and personal links have developed between some of the 
Chinese, Russian, and Indian scholars involved in the annual conferences. Out of all 
dimensions of bilateral interaction, the academic sphere arguably provided the most 
favourable circumstances for the formation of informal networks, but in none of 
these cases do these networks appear to have assumed the more substantive form of 
‘epistemic communities’. In the cases of the Subcommission on Trade and Economic 
Cooperation and the Energy Dialogue, there has been very little evidence that a 
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participation in them has contributed to the creation of more durable formal or 
informal networks between Chinese and Russian officials and entrepreneurs, 
although the interaction within these institutions seems to have facilitated the 
communication and collaboration between them. In general, Sino-Russian 
institution-building has apparently not been sufficiently conducive for genuine 
network formation in all but a few peripheral sectors of interaction. 
 
Overall, while the record of the newly-created Sino-Russian institutions in 
making a substantial and lasting practical and policy impact in the conduct of 
bilateral relations has been mixed, there is ample evidence suggesting that they have 
made a substantial contribution to enhancing mutual information exchange and 
mutual reassurance (if not necessarily mutual trust) between key policy-makers, 
officials, and other relevant stakeholders in China and Russia. It can plausibly be 
claimed that this has ultimately been their most significant and lasting function. 
While their impact as practical policy-making bodies has in many cases lagged 
behind expectations, they have played an important role as ‘talking shops’, providing 
a continual forum for the communication of relevant information between two 
powerful neighbouring states whose mutual perception to this day remains deeply 
ambivalent. In the words of one analyst of Sino-Russian relations,  
building trust would not come easily. Hence the painstaking construction of bilateral 
leadership summitry, exchanges at all levels, joint military exercises and assorted 
other diplomatic rituals. Yet the recent upsurge of bilateral trade suggests that these 
efforts have finally flowered. The same patient, meticulous husbandry that cultivated 
bilateral reconciliation in the wake of bitter public polemics and border violence 
during the socialist era seems to have been carried through to a new, ideologically 
uncharted era.
794
 
Chinese and Russian policy-makers have frequently stated that the growing 
network of bilateral institutional channels has played a significant role in enhancing 
mutual information exchange. The Plenipotentiary Representative of the Russian 
President in the Far Eastern Federal District, Konstantin Pulikovsky, for instance, 
remarked that “the top-level contacts, the bilateral intergovernmental and interagency 
cooperation commissions, their subcommissions and working groups constitute an 
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effective means for the rapid exchange of opinions and the coordination of positions 
on bilateral issues and current international problems between the Russian Federation 
and the People’s Republic of China.”795 Chinese and Russian analysts have for the 
most part agreed that one of the primary roles of the newly-created institutional 
network has been the exchange and generation of reliable information.  
While many of these institutions have served as platforms for substantial 
decision-making in their own right, in particular regarding less political, more 
technical decisions, there is a general consensus among Chinese and Russian experts 
that all important policy decisions on Sino-Russian relations (for instance on energy 
cooperation or major economic ventures) are made by the top-level decision-makers, 
outside of the bilateral institutional framework. The bilateral (and, to a lesser extent, 
multilateral) institutions do, however, play a vital role in providing the necessary 
information, analyses, and proposals, on the basis of which these decisions are 
made.
796
 The insights gained during the deliberations within these institutions (for 
instance at the ministerial or deputy ministerial level) are routinely channelled to the 
senior leadership, and while many of them “end up in the waste bin”, those regarding 
strategically important sectors of cooperation, such as oil and gas, arms, and nuclear 
issues, are likely to be considered by senior policy-makers.
797
 One Chinese expert 
pointed out that the institutions’ role in providing informational input for higher-level 
decision-making is of particular relevance due to the diverging interests in different 
layers of the foreign policy bureaucracy, both in China and in Russia: Influential 
policy-making bodies and bureaucracies, such as the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the parallel structures of the Chinese Communist Party, are often at 
cross-purposes or in competition with each other, and they each rely on the bilateral 
working-level institutions to provide them with empirical evidence to substantiate 
their positions.
798
 
In the opinion of a senior Chinese security expert, the biggest single advantage of 
the Sino-Russian bilateral institutional mechanism has been that it provides a forum, 
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a platform for both parties to discuss all relevant issues between them and to inform 
each other about their intentions on specific policy matters. As a result, he claimed, 
mutual comprehension at the strategic level is now quite good, all the relevant actors 
know each other, and they have a very good understanding of each other’s strategic 
intentions.
799
 A former Russian ambassador similarly stated that the facilitation of 
mutual understanding has been the central function of the mechanism of regular 
meetings between China and Russia, in particular insofar as it provides the space and 
time to settle bilateral disagreements at a non-political level, before they turn into 
political issues.
800
 
The discussions in most of the bilateral institutional forums have apparently been 
very open, frank, and sometimes heated. Instances of active mutual information 
exchange and reassurance within the framework of the newly-created Sino-Russian 
institutional channels can be observed very frequently. One of the most visible and 
relevant of these has been the regularised exchange and synchronising of important 
statistical data streams in different domains of bilateral interaction, as the following 
examples illustrate: 
- The bilateral Subcommission for Cooperation in the Sphere of Transport, as 
well as its subordinate working groups, have developed into a forum for the 
regular exchange of statistical data on the volumes of cargo and passenger 
transport across the Sino-Russian border. This remains a sensitive subject, 
due to Russia’s long-standing concerns about Chinese immigration into its 
Far Eastern region, as well as the persistently high rates of unregistered 
‘shuttle’ trade.801 At the Subcommission’s sessions, both sides have regularly 
informed each other about the recorded levels of passenger transport in 
international traffic between China and Russia. Both sides have also 
extensively “exchanged opinions”, on the state and the prospects of air 
transportation of passengers and cargo between both countries and on 
cooperation programmes for its further expansion. At the 14
th
 session of the 
Subcommission’s subordinate Working Group on Border Crossings in July 
2011, the relevant authorities in China and Russia also exchanged 
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information on the progress of plans for the equipment and development of 
checkpoints on the Sino-Russian border.
802
 
- At the second session of the bilateral Subcommission on Cooperation in the 
Field of Environmental Protection in September 2007, an agreement was 
reached to hold consultations on the mutual exchange of information about 
environmental pollution in the border areas and early warning procedures on 
environmental emergencies.
803
 In the course of the Subcommission’s session, 
both sides exchanged data from the joint monitoring of the water quality in 
border rivers, conducted in June 2007, as well as information on national 
regulations and standards in the sphere of the monitoring and protection of 
water quality.
804
 Similarly, at the second session of the Sino-Russian 
Commission for the Rational Use and Protection of Trans-Border Waters in 
October 2009, both sides reached an accord about the regular exchange of 
hydrological information on border rivers.
805
 
- At the first session of the bilateral Subcommission on Customs Cooperation 
in September 2009, both sides discussed the question of improving their 
information exchange in the customs sector. Among the numerous bilateral 
documents and contracts they signed at the session (which were subsequently 
submitted for ratification to the Commission for the Preparation of Regular 
Meetings of the Heads of Government) was an agreement on the prompt 
implementation of a pilot project for information exchange between the 
customs authorities of both countries (which had been worked out at the 
session of one of the Subcommission’s subordinate working groups a few 
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days before).
806
 The Chinese customs authorities declared that they 
anticipated “that thanks to the beginning of cooperation within the framework 
of the pilot project for information exchange between China and Russia, the 
level of customs control will gradually reach a greater degree of 
efficiency.”807 The first session of the Subcommission‘s Working Group on 
Cooperation in the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in August 2011 
likewise led to the conclusion of “a range of agreements, including on the 
exchange of statistical data and specialised information” relating to the 
protection of intellectual property rights, and it provided a planning basis for 
“an exchange of legislatorial information regulating the procedure of the 
protection of intellectual property rights”.808 
As these examples illustrate, the process of bilateral institution-building has 
facilitated the establishment of regular ‘automatised’ information and data exchanges 
in many spheres of Sino-Russian interaction, particularly regarding statistical data 
streams about potentially divisive issues such as immigration, customs, or cross-
border environmental pollution. This has likely been a very important step, since it 
promises to create a situation wherein both sides can routinely draw on the same data 
in the event of disputes in these sensitive policy areas, thus avoiding the emergence 
of irreconcilable differences. 
Overall, through the facilitation of a regular exchange of information and mutual 
assurances, the emerging Sino-Russian bilateral institutional structure appears to 
provide unprecedented opportunities for communicating concerns and defusing 
problems and disagreements arising in bilateral interaction which, if unresolved, 
would have the potential to escalate into open crises. This is in contrast to past 
bilateral interaction, when no such forums for regularised communication and 
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information exchange existed. It is noteworthy, however, that in spite of the 
development of this extensive institutional network grave communication failures 
between both states, leading to occasional crises in bilateral relations, have not been 
entirely averted in recent years. One such incident was the controversy surrounding 
the sinking of the New Star, a Chinese cargo ship, by the Russian coast guard off 
Vladivostok in February 2009, leading to the death of several sailors; another was the 
sudden and unannounced closure of the vast Cherkizovsky market in Moscow in 
June 2009 which deprived thousands of Chinese merchants in Russia of their goods 
and their livelihood.  
In spite of the very extensive and sophisticated mechanisms for dialogue and 
exchange that now exist between China and Russia, both of these events were 
followed by weeks of bilateral diplomatic tension and acrimony. Even in these cases, 
however, the existing institutional channels (particularly the bilateral Mechanism for 
Strategic Security Consultations) appear to have provided a framework for limiting 
the subsequent diplomatic fallout and preventing a more fully-fledged bilateral 
crisis.
809
 Chinese analysts have pointed out that, although the bilateral institutional 
network may not be suitable for preventing ad hoc incidents like the sinking of the 
New Star, it is particularly valuable as an ‘early-warning mechanism’ for foreseeing 
long-term problems between both countries, as well as a framework for discussion 
that helps to minimise the potential of individual incidents turning into open crises.
810
 
 
Mutual information exchange and reassurance also appear to be the most 
important elements of Sino-Russian interaction within multilateral institutions, 
particularly regional organisations in East and Central Asia. While their effectiveness 
as policy-making tools has generally been limited, perhaps the most important 
function these multilateral organisations have fulfilled for Sino-Russian interaction 
has been to provide further forums and occasions for frequent and regularised 
communication and personal interaction between key policy-makers and officials 
from both states, including the heads of state, foreign ministers, and other senior 
ministry officials, on almost all relevant issues in bilateral affairs. The multilateral 
institutional settings now provide an occasion to discuss a wide range of urgent 
matters (which are not necessarily restricted to those policy items that form the 
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official agenda of the organisation in question), as well as the possibility to discuss 
and resolve various specific technical and legal questions in an environment that 
allows for an active search for multilateral consensus.  
According to a senior Russian expert on East Asian regional institutions, the 
routine of inter-personal contacts between policy-makers that has been established in 
these forums (including between Russia and China) can greatly enhance mutual 
understanding:  
there will be complaints that these are all ‘talk shops’ […], which is true only partly, 
because comparing notes and understanding in more detail who is promoting what 
and why is the essential business of diplomacy. And all these multilateral gatherings, 
at a time when Russia was not particularly focused on Asia, exposed our leaders and 
our diplomats in a systematic way to what is going on in Asia, who is standing 
where, and who is going where, and I think in educational terms it was very, very 
useful. […] From time to time I have a chance to participate personally in these 
multilateral gatherings, and I always sense that it is terribly useful to see, not just to 
hear what people are saying, but to see how they say it. All these mannerisms and 
evasions and code-language, all this you should know first-hand.
811
 
In the case of the most important multilateral mechanism operating in Sino-
Russian relations, the SCO, there are particularly strong indications that its most 
substantial and valuable function has been its capacity to act as a forum for regular 
discussion and deliberation between various levels of officials from its member states, 
particularly China and Russia. According to most analysts, “[t]he SCO is, thus, 
defined strongly by informal discussion and contact between the leaderships of each 
member state. [… I]n spite of establishing a solid set of institutional arrangements, 
which provide the SCO with a significant degree of stability, the functional 
utilisation of these structures remains inhibited by the preference of member states 
not to concede control over the levers of state power, and as such, informal 
discussion between the leaderships remains the dominant trend.”812 Those studying 
the organisation have therefore commonly “argued that the lingering mutual 
suspicion between its member states leaves the SCO as little more than a so-called 
‘talking shop’. […] Other accounts highlight a lack of visible integration, arguing 
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that the SCO ‘has yet to prove itself as something more than a forum for high-level 
networking among leaders’”.813 
Even if the SCO’s main line of activities ultimately remains restricted to the role 
of a ‘talking shop’, this would be of some significance in itself. In contrast to the 
relatively sobering track record in its practical work and policy-making, “[a] number 
of scholars have argued that one of the major achievements of regional organisations 
in Central Asia, including the SCO, has been to enable the states of the region to 
communicate with one another and help avoid interstate conflict in the region. […] 
In this way, the SCO has served, to a certain degree, to provide a mechanism 
whereby member states can seek credible information on the mindset and intentions 
of other members and through this reciprocal exchange of information reduce their 
uncertainty about one another’s intentions.”814  The SCO’s subordinate, executive 
agencies, such as the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure or the SCO Business Council, 
have likewise primarily served as hubs for establishing direct contacts and 
communication between relevant actors and facilitating the exchange of relevant 
information and intelligence. The aspect of mutual familiarisation and confidence-
building has been of particular importance for China which, as a relative ‘newcomer’ 
to the region, has sought channels through which to actively communicate and lobby 
for its aims and objectives in Central Asia vis-à-vis its wary neighbours. 
By and large, the SCO has proven to be a valuable mechanism in providing a 
forum and a conduit facilitating information exchange about divisive factors and 
diverging interests between its member states, particularly China and Russia, as 
regards their interaction in Central Asia. Thus, the SCO “has built confidence 
between post-imperial Russia and China in a sensitive region that is wedged between 
the two; and it has served as a platform for broader political dialogue on the Asian 
continent.”815 To some degree the SCO fulfils the role of a Sino-Russian regional 
framework which, duplicating many of their bilateral institutions in its internal 
structure, serves to coordinate relations between Beijing and Moscow within the 
geographic space of Central Asia, while also incorporating the smaller states of the 
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region.
816
 Consequently, much of the SCO’s real political and security agenda is 
about establishing some kind of healthy balance of the Chinese and Russian presence 
in this part of the world.
817
 
A particular form of Sino-Russian interaction that has to some extent been 
‘institutionalised’ is the series of large-scale military exercises that have been carried 
out under the label ‘Peace Mission’ and under the aegis of the SCO. The military 
exercises have not served a singular purpose; rather, the initial exercises had at least 
three separate aims: 1)To send a geopolitical signal to the United States, particularly 
in the face of the American military presence in Central Asia; 2)to allow China and 
Russia (as well as other SCO member states) to get a ‘feel’ for each other’s military 
capabilities and to demonstrate their respective defence capabilities to one another 
(this has been of particular concern for Russia, lest China would ever have designs 
on the Russian Far East in the future); 3)to showcase state-of-the-art Russian 
weaponry to one of its primary arms customers.
818
 Arguably, these military exercises 
have therefore also primarily served as a form of ‘communication’. Already during 
the initial August 2003 exercise, “[a] joint command center staffed by SCO senior 
military officers was set up for the exercise, allowing the individual armed forces to 
share intelligence, launch joint actions, and gain familiarity with one another’s 
command, control, and coordination structures.”819 It can plausibly be claimed that 
“the primary benefit of the SCO military exercises is the generation of greater 
confidence and familiarity among its members, whereby their military establishments 
can be socialised away from viewing one another as threats and towards thinking of 
each other as partners.”820 
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Having assessed the policy impact of the newly-created institutional network 
between China and Russia and the potential for mutual information exchange and 
reassurance it creates, it is worth returning to the question of the symbolic component 
of bilateral institution-building. As stated earlier in this chapter, among the few 
scholars who have commented on the process of institution-building between China 
and Russia, a common assumption has been that the institutions created between both 
states have been relatively insubstantial and more symbolic and ‘decorative’ than real. 
This implies that they may have been conceived primarily to act as symbols and 
façades, providing a false pretence of constructive bilateral relations, when in actual 
fact they may have lacked the capacity to play any substantial practical role in 
policy-making. When senior Chinese and Russian policy-makers are asked to 
publicly comment on the development of bilateral relations in interviews or official 
statements, they frequently refer to the expansion of the bilateral institutional 
apparatus as an ostensible manifestation of the dynamic growth of Sino-Russian 
cooperation, reinforcing the assumption that its symbolic component has been of 
great importance for the Chinese and Russian governments.
821
 
Indeed, the establishment of some bilateral institutions between China and Russia 
appears at least to some extent to have been pursued with non-pragmatic, primarily 
symbolic motives in mind. This certainly applies to some of the first, abortive 
bilateral institutions created in the early 1990s, which had shown conspicuously 
meagre practical results
822
 (although they were of some significance in paving the 
way for the subsequent, more substantial process of bilateral institutionalisation). 
Regarding the current network of institutions created between both countries, by 
contrast, the Chinese and Russian academics and officials interviewed as part of the 
research for this study consensually agreed that it has been overwhelmingly 
functional, with most of the institutions serving their assigned purpose in practical 
bilateral policy-making.  
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This notwithstanding, a senior Russian expert claimed that at least one of the 
newly created bilateral institutional mechanisms, the Sino-Russian Committee for 
Friendship, Peace, and Development, which has been meeting on a regular basis 
since 1997, has an exclusively symbolic significance and does not serve any 
significant functional purpose.
823
 When asked to assess this claim, a Chinese analyst 
(whose institute has regularly partaken in the Committee’s work) pointed out that, 
even if in some institutions, such as the Committee for Friendship, Peace, and 
Development, the symbolic component may have played a determining role, this 
symbolic use should be regarded as having some significance in its own right.
824
 
Considering the importance that symbolism and form have traditionally held in 
Chinese foreign policy-making and diplomacy, even in instances when certain 
bilateral institutional mechanisms have retained a primarily symbolic, non-pragmatic 
role this may nonetheless have been of some practical relevance for the conduct of 
bilateral policy-making.
825
 
The vast majority of bilateral institutions created between China and Russia 
appear to have assumed a genuinely pragmatic, goal-oriented, policy-focused, rather 
than primarily symbolic character. In a few select cases, bilateral institutional 
channels were initiated in response to specific events and incidents, raising the 
suspicion that their creation was at least partially intended as a ‘publicity stunt’: This 
applies in particular to the Subcommission for Environmental Protection, which was 
established in early 2006 in response to a major toxic spill at a Chinese chemical 
plant in the previous year that contaminated a tributary of the Heilongjiang (Amur) 
River on the Sino-Russian border and led to substantial concerns and irritations in 
bilateral relations. Prior to this incident, bilateral cooperation in the environmental 
field – which had always been a sensitive subject in the border region – had failed to 
gain any momentum. In an interview in January 2003, the Russian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Aleksandr Losyukov criticised that  
[u]nfortunately, Russian-Chinese cooperation in the [environmental] field has been 
sluggish in recent years. In particular, the Russian-Chinese Joint Working Group on 
Environmental Protection, stipulated in the intergovernmental Agreement on 
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Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection of May 27, 1994, has not 
begun to operate. Contrary to existing agreements, the bilateral contact group for the 
exchange of information on the organisation of further cooperation in the field of 
water management in the border sections of the rivers Amur and Argun has not been 
formed. For many years, the Chinese side has not responded to our project of an 
intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in the Protection and Rational Use of 
Transborder Waters.
826
  
It took the environmental disaster of 2005, which briefly soured bilateral 
relations, to finally generate sufficient pressure to fully institutionalise Sino-Russian 
cooperation in the environmental field. At the time, it is likely that part of the 
motivation for doing so was merely to reinforce the impression that the Chinese and 
Russian authorities were jointly tackling the undeniable environmental problems and 
to dispel concerns about the recurrence of such incidents in the future. This 
notwithstanding, however, the newly-created Subcommission has since become a 
regular fixture in Sino-Russian relations, has carried out frequent joint analyses in the 
field, and has served as the venue for annual meetings of the Chinese and Russian 
ministers of environment and their staff. External sources have provided mixed 
assessments of the Subcommission’s work.827 Ultimately, its value has likely been 
greatest as a confidence-building mechanism, rather than for the implementation of 
substantial policy measures. 
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Conclusion: 
 
The creation of an extensive bilateral and multilateral institutional network 
between China and Russia has not changed the basic preconditions of Sino-Russian 
cooperation, but it appears to have played a palpable role in promoting and 
expediting bilateral rapprochement by facilitating interaction and furthering mutual 
understanding and predictability. Forming a gradually developing ‘infrastructure’ of 
interaction and cooperation between China and Russia, the newly-created institutions 
have apparently served as important means of facilitating the implementation 
of cooperative bilateral policies and of staying informed and reassured about each 
other’s strategies and objectives. International Relations theory has emphasised the 
importance of the growth of international institutions as one of the most significant 
contemporary global processes and an important contributory factor of continuous 
rapprochement between the world’s great powers. In the Sino-Russian context, this is 
particularly significant in view of the fact that the basic preconditions of Sino-
Russian relations have not been particularly favourable for a lasting rapprochement 
and the development of close cooperation between both states.  
The rapid proliferation of institutional channels between China and Russia and 
the gradual formation of further subordinate functional bodies ‘branching off’ from 
the larger institutional ‘trunks’ of the bilateral commissions and subcommissions 
strongly corresponds to Neo-functionalist notions of institutional ‘spill-over’ and 
‘path-dependence’, which account for the continued, self-supporting growth and 
entrenchment of institutions above and beyond the initial dimensions of 
institutionalisation. A momentum for further institutionalisation and ‘spill-over’ from 
the most central sectors of interaction to various other, more peripheral fields, has 
certainly developed in Sino-Russian bilateral interaction. While the creation and 
extension of bilateral institutional links was pursued as a conscious strategy by both 
the Chinese and Russian governments, there are also indications that in many cases, 
as Neo-functionalist conceptions would predict, the process of institution-building 
developed a momentum of its own. In the case of the SCO, for instance, Russia’s 
President Vladimir Putin claimed in a meeting with foreign academics in 2006 that  
277 
 
[w]e did not plan for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to develop this much 
and gain the reputation it has today. The organisation was established in order to 
resolve the utilitarian question of settling the borders between China and its 
neighbours after the collapse of the Soviet Union. […] As the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation began to function and achieved its first successes, and it did indeed 
play a significant role in settling the border issues between China and the former 
Soviet republics, the organisation began to grow of its own accord […]. [T]his was 
unexpected for me too. I was asking myself why this was happening […]. It seems 
surprising, but it was simply that this organisation turned out to be an instrument the 
world needed.
828
  
While this statement cannot be taken at face value, it broadly corresponds with 
the picture of the SCO’s development process that the available evidence affords,829 
and the same process can be observed about Sino-Russian institution-building at the 
purely bilateral level. Even in cases where the starting premises of institution-
building have been inauspicious (for instance that of the Academic Trilateral, which 
was initially inaugurated as an instrument of trilateral diplomacy, or that of the 
Environmental Subcommission, which was created in an ad hoc manner in response 
to a specific incident), these processes have clearly taken hold, and the newly-created 
institutions have carved out well-defined spaces and functions for themselves. 
Although a few isolated bodies have disappeared again after a while, most others 
have shown remarkable resilience. The rapidity of the SCO’s functional expansion 
into a variety of issue areas beyond its initial focus on border security and confidence 
building is consistent with the rapid and continuous creation of complex institutional 
mechanisms in all fields and sub-fields of Sino-Russian interaction. In more general 
terms, it corresponds to a broader tendency in international relations in recent 
decades, particularly in the East Asian region, of a constant expansion of regional 
institutional links and the gradual institutionalisation of nearly every aspect of 
multilateral inter-governmental interaction. The institutional dynamics between 
China and Russia should be regarded in this wider context. 
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Neoliberal Institutionalist theory, the principal theoretical approach employed in 
this thesis, emphasises the importance of assuring a regularity, consistency, and 
recurrence of interaction within the institutional setting, thus providing a ‘shadow of 
the future’ for bilateral interaction. According to the theoretical premises of 
Neoliberal Institutionalism, institutionalisation is effective insofar as it offers a 
constant or regularly iterated forum for bilateral negotiation and exchange, a 
continuous pattern of reciprocity and mutual monitoring of compliance with 
agreements, ensuring a constant flow of information between governments. 
Institutions that increase the iterative nature of interaction and establish recurrent 
patterns of negotiation between state actors on the same set of issues can make 
mutual commitments more credible. This has been the case in the Sino-Russian 
context, as most bilateral institutions have operated very regularly and attained a 
great operational coherence, although this applies to a much lesser extent to many 
second-order bilateral institutional channels, which have continued to operate in a 
highly irregular manner.  
Institutional structures have facilitated and stabilised the implementation of 
cooperative policies between both countries, but to a more modest extent than their 
vast expansion in itself would suggest. There is evidence that the institutional 
mechanisms have frequently facilitated the development of bilateral groundwork 
agreements and treaties and the subsequent monitoring of their implementation and 
fulfilment (part of their intended role also seems to have been to establish a greater 
measure of state control over private and inter-regional business interaction). 
Regarding the practical and policy impact of Sino-Russian institutions and their input 
into top-level official decision-making, the established institutional mechanisms have 
thus functioned in accordance with central premises of Neoliberal Institutionalism, 
which stresses the importance for institutions of setting and monitoring agreements, 
rules, and standards by which to evaluate behaviour, thereby rendering defection 
from norms and rules easier punishable. Through enhancing the quality of the 
contractual environment, institutions can reduce incentives to change policies in 
midstream and instead raise the costs of deception and irresponsibility, which renders 
patterns of international interaction more certain and predictable, allowing states to 
make credible commitments.  
However, the practical and policy impact of the newly-created Sino-Russian 
institutional network must not be overstated. The institutional network has allowed 
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for the conclusion of groundwork treaties and agreements that now cover virtually all 
sectors of bilateral interaction, putting a legal end to a variety of long-standing 
bilateral disputes. But the adherence to and implementation of these legal 
frameworks has often been patchy. Many of the bilateral agreements, rules, and 
programmes agreed within the framework of the institutional mechanisms have 
remained void and ineffectual in practice. Adherence to the established legal norms 
and processes, although it appears to have been significantly encouraged by the 
institutions and has worked well in certain sectors of interaction, has remained 
relatively feeble in others, particularly those that had the highest political and 
economic stakes attached to them.  
Perhaps the most important function of the new institutional channels has been 
their promotion of an active communication of important information and mutual 
assurances about both sides’ longer-term policy choices and intentions, as well as the 
transfer of this information to senior levels of policymaking. This function has been 
of particular importance due to the problematic combination of deep-rooted Russian 
wariness about China’s growing power and ultimate motives and persistent Chinese 
worries about the chronic unpredictability of Russian foreign policy.
830
 The 
significance of enabling this mutual information exchange and reassurance is in line 
with Neoliberal Institutionalism, which puts an emphasis on the role of international 
institutions in providing policy-makers with critical information and expertise, thus 
creating a favourable informational environment for inter-governmental interaction. 
According to Neoliberal Institutionalists, mutual interaction in institutions can 
provide information about the preferences, intentions, actions, and standards of 
behaviour of other governments. Institutions that regularly provide policy-makers 
with large volumes of high-quality information can stimulate greater inter-state 
cooperation.  
The findings on mutual information exchange and reassurance also to some 
extent reflect Constructivist concepts that examine changes in mutual perceptions 
through the experience of regular interaction in institutional settings. These include 
the so-called ‘contact thesis’, which stipulates that the longer agents reside in contact 
with each other in a particular institutional setting (even if this serves as little more 
than the proverbial ‘talking shop’), the more likely there will be a shift in their 
properties and preferences. They are also reinforced by studies of ‘summitry’, which 
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have stressed the important psychological dimension of meeting physically, of 
personal interaction between individual policy-makers in a one-to-one environment, 
for the resolution of disagreements between state actors.  
Beyond promoting changes in mutual perceptions among policy-makers and 
other relevant stakeholders, however, it is unlikely that the regular deliberations and 
interaction in Sino-Russian bilateral institutions has led to more profound forms of 
mutual ‘socialisation’ among the state agents involved, to changes of long-term 
interests and identity, to the development of genuine forms of common identification, 
or to a pervasive deepening of inter-subjective trust. The occurrence of such 
processes, which many Constructivist theories assume to be a likely consequence of 
institution-building, cannot be ruled out in the Sino-Russian context, but there is no 
conclusive evidence to substantiate them.  
Likewise, evidence that the participation in bilateral institutions has contributed 
to the creation of formal or informal long-term networks of Chinese and Russian 
specialists and stakeholders who have sustained contact among themselves and have 
formulated common claims has been very scant and has generally been restricted to 
low-stakes sectors of bilateral interaction, such as academic cooperation. A Chinese 
academic and frequent participant in some of the institutional forums of bilateral 
interaction, while stressing its capacity to promote mutual understanding and even 
trust, pointed out that the periodic rotation of participating officials (which is more 
frequent in Russian than Chinese agencies) has made the formation of longer-term 
inter-personal links unlikely.
831
 In particular, there has been no solid indication for 
the formation of more substantial ‘epistemic communities’ between the two states. 
 
The bilateral and multilateral institutions operating in the Sino-Russian context 
have, for the most part, involved very senior officials, as well as other relevant 
stakeholders from both countries. By providing for regular ‘dates in the calendar’ for 
them to meet and interact with each other, regardless of the situational context, they 
have allowed for a mutual familiarisation between key actors on either side. This has 
been of particular relevance during periods of leadership transition in China and 
Russia. The involvement of influential power brokers in many of the institutional 
mechanisms indicates that the newly-created institutions have been closely ‘in touch’ 
with official policymaking and in some cases imbued with genuine policy-making 
                                                 
831
 Personal interview with Prof. Yang Cheng, East China Normal University, 17.1.2013 
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authority (although the authority to make key decisions regarding bilateral relations, 
particularly in sectors that are considered strategically sensitive, remains restricted to 
the highest levels of policy-making). The opportunities that have thus been created 
for leadership exchange and perpetuated high-level contacts represent a conspicuous 
change from past decades, when a lack of mutual understanding and communication 
between the Chinese and Russian leaderships had long impeded a normalisation of 
relations, let alone their further development. The institutionalisation of bilateral 
relations has not entirely dispelled mutual concerns and apprehensions, but it has 
apparently mitigated them substantially among high-level policy-makers. 
However, it must be observed that the fact that the facilitation of high-level 
dialogue and communication can be regarded as the most significant contribution of 
the bilateral institutional channels also testifies to the enduring dominance of 
powerful individuals (rather than strong institutions and legal frameworks per se), 
whose interaction ultimately remains at the heart of Sino-Russian bilateral 
cooperation. In this regard, institution-building processes between China and Russia 
have fallen short of the ideal of how institutions should operate, according to 
Institutionalist theory. In the Sino-Russian context, the informal, personalised 
dimension of the institutions’ work has remained of great importance, while their 
formal, legal role has often been constrained by politicking and deal-making. The 
subversion of institutional dynamics by overbearing individuals has remained 
particularly strong in the most strategic, high-stakes sectors of bilateral interaction, 
such as the energy sphere.  
In many less politicised fields, however, genuine institutional dynamics have 
formed: the individuals involved at most levels of these processes have changed 
several times, while the institutional structure has remained intact, operational, and 
largely independent of who holds the respective post. In many cases, however, this 
has come at the expense of effectiveness in their policy impact. Ultimately, the 
impact of Sino-Russian institution-building has been stronger in less central, more 
peripheral spheres of cooperation; certain core sectors of the bilateral relationship 
have apparently remained too sensitive and too strongly dominated by highly 
personalised forms of interaction to be fully regularised, even though 
institutionalisation processes have also begun to take hold in them. 
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Studying the process of institution-building in Sino-Russian relations is of 
general relevance, since the institutionalisation of inter-governmental relations across 
the world has been one of the most characteristic international developments in 
recent decades, particularly since the lengthy bipartite division of the world imposed 
by the Cold War came to an end. The process of institution-building between China 
and Russia should ultimately be regarded as part and parcel of a more general 
process of a persistent expansion and proliferation of formal institutions in 
international and inter-governmental relations, particularly in East Asia. This 
development has now also taken hold of states with weak institutional entrenchment 
of their own, such as Russia, and those who previously tried to avoid any form of 
formal alliance or ‘entanglement’ with others, such as China.  
However, these processes of institution-building can merely mitigate, but not 
eradicate the deepest underlying problems that continue to beset Sino-Russian 
cooperation in the present. Bilateral and multilateral institutions have not in 
themselves been a driving factor of Sino-Russian rapprochement, but they appear to 
have played a significant role in ensuring continuity and averting grave ruptures in 
the bilateral relationship, leading to Sino-Russian relations that are now arguably 
more functional, sustainable, and dependable than they were at any time in history 
(although they continue to be beset by grave problems). In so doing, they have 
altered the nature of cooperation between Beijing and Moscow in a lasting manner. 
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 Appendix 1: The Development of Sino-Russian Bilateral Institutions 
 
 
Sino-Russian Friendship Society  
(formerly Sino-Soviet Friendship Society) 
Headed by the President of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries 
Established in 1949, remains active as of 2011 
 
 
Sino-Russian Joint Commission on Border River Shipping 
At the level of the Chinese Deputy Minister of Transport and the Deputy Director of the Russian Federal Agency of Sea and River Transport 
Established in 1951; 52 sessions by 2011 
 
 
Russian-Chinese Friendship Society  
(formerly Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society) 
Headed by the Director of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
Established in 1957, remains active as of 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sino-Russian Commission on Cooperation in the Field of Fishery 
At the level of the Director (intermittently the Deputy Director) of the Department of Fishery in the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture and the Deputy Head of the 
Russian Federal Agency for Fishery (intermittently the Deputy Director of the Department of Fishery in the Russian Ministry of Agriculture and Food and the Deputy 
Head of the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance) 
First session in 1989; twenty sessions by 2011 
 
 
Joint Committee on Border Prospecting between China and Russia 
At the level of an Ambassador-at-large in the Russian Foreign Ministry (Chinese delegation leader unknown)  
First session in 1992; eight meetings by 1999 
 
 
Sino-Russian Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation 
At the level of the Chinese Minister of National Defence (since 2009 the Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Commission) and the Russian Minister of Defence 
First session in 1992 (estimate), sixteen sessions by 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sino-Russian Commission for Trade, Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation 
(referred to as the Sino-Soviet Commission for Trade, Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation until 1992) 
At the level of the Vice Premier of the Chinese State Council and the Russian Deputy Prime Minister 
First session in 1986; nine sessions by 1996 
  
 
Sino-Russian Committee of Friendship, Peace, and Development 
At the level of the Deputy Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (later the Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress) and the President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (later the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Russian President in the 
Siberian Federal District) 
First session in 1997; nine sessions by 2011 
 
 
 
Sino-Russian General Staff Talks (China-Russia Military Consultations) 
Usually at the level of the Deputy Chiefs of the Chinese and Russian General Staffs 
Established in 1997, twelve rounds of consultations by 2008 (plus additional irregular meetings) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Centre of Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Established (as a PLC) in 1998; headed by the President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (operates only on the Russian side) 
Integrated into the structure of the Subcommission on Trade and Economic Cooperation in 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sino-Russian Commission for the Preparation of Regular Meetings of the Heads of Government 
At the level of the Vice Premier of the Chinese State Council and the Russian Deputy Prime Minister 
First session in 1997; fifteen sessions by 2011 
 
 
 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Transport 
At the level of the Chinese Minister of Railways (in a few cases a slightly less senior official) and the Russian Minister of Transport 
First session in 1997; fifteen sessions by 2011 
 
Working Group on Border Crossings 
First session in 1997 (estimate); fourteen sessions by 2011; headed by the Deputy Director of the Chinese General Administration of Customs and the Deputy 
Director of the Federal Agency for the Development of the State Border Facilities of the Russian Federation 
 
Working Group on Sea, River, and Automobile Transport and Roads 
First session in 1997 (estimate); fifteen sessions by 2011; headed by the Chinese Deputy Minister of Communications and the Russian Deputy Minister of 
Transport (in a few cases a slightly less senior official) 
 
Working Group on Railway Transportation 
First session in 1997 (estimate); fifteen sessions by 2011; headed by the Chinese Deputy Minister of Railways and the Russian Deputy Minister of Railways 
(after 2003 the Deputy Minister of Transport) 
 
 
Subcommission on Scientific-Technical Cooperation 
At the level of the Chinese Deputy Minister of Science and Technology and the Director of the Russian Federal Agency for Science and Innovation 
First session in 1997; thirteen sessions by 2009 
 
 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Power 
At the level of the Chairman of the Chinese Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (later the Chairman of the China 
Atomic Energy Authority) and the Russian Minister for Atomic Energy (later the General Director of the Russian Nuclear Energy State Corporation) 
First session in 1997; fifteen sessions by 2011 
 
Working Group on Scientific and Technical Cooperation 
Date of first session unknown; number of sessions unknown; headed by unknown 
 
Working Group on Issues of Conversion 
Date of first session unknown; fourteen sessions by 2010; headed by unknown 
 
Working Group on the Construction of an Experimental Fast-Neutron Reactor 
Date of first session unknown; eleven sessions by 2010; headed by unknown 
 
 
Subcommission on Trade and Economic Cooperation  
At the level of the Chinese Minister of Commerce (referred to as ‘Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation’ until 2003) and the 
Russian Minister of Economic Development and Trade (referred to as the ‘Minister of Economy’ until 2000) 
First session in 1998; fourteen sessions by 2011 
 
Working Group on Interregional and Cross-Border Trade and Economic Cooperation 
First session in 1998; ten sessions by 2011; headed by the Chinese Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(from 2006 by the Chinese Deputy Minister of Commerce) and the Russian First Deputy Minister of Economy (from 2006 by the 
Russian Deputy Minister of Regional Development) 
 
Coordination Council for Cross-Border and Interregional Trade and Economic Cooperation 
First session in 1998; twelve sessions by 2011; co-headed by the Deputy Governors of various Chinese provinces and Russian 
regions in rotation 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sino-Russian Commission on Humanitarian Cooperation 
(known as the ‘Sino-Russian Commission on Education, Culture, Public Health, and Sport’ until 2006) 
At the level of the Deputy Premier of the Chinese State Council and the Russian Deputy Prime Minister 
First session in 2000; twelve sessions by 2011 
 
 
 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Education 
At the level of the Chinese Deputy Minister of Education and the Russian Minister of Education (from 2003 the Deputy Minister, from 2004 the Director of the Russian 
Federal Education Agency, since 2010 the Deputy Minister of Education and Science) 
First session in 2001; eleven sessions by 2011 
 
 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Culture 
At the level of the Chinese Deputy Minister of Culture and the Russian Minister of Culture (from 2004 the Director of the Federal Agency for Culture and 
Cinematography, later the Deputy Minister of Culture) 
First session in 2001; eight sessions by 2008 
 
 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Sport 
At the level of the Director (later the Deputy Director) of the Chinese State General Administration of Sports and the Chairman of Russia’s State Committee for 
Physical Culture, Sport and Tourism (from 2004 the Director of the Russian Federal Agency for Physical Culture, Sport and Tourism; from 2008 the Russian Deputy 
Minister of Sport, Tourism and Youth Policy) 
First session in 2001; eleven sessions by 2011 
 
 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Health Care 
At the level of the Chinese Deputy Minister of Health and the Russian Minister of Health (from 2004 the Director of the Federal Agency for Health Care and Social 
Development; since 2009 the Deputy Minister of Health and Social Development) 
First session in 2001 (estimate); eleven sessions by 2011 
 
 
Sino-Russian Anti-Terrorism Working Group 
At the level of the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister and the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister (later the Director of the Department for New Challenges and 
Threats in the Russian Foreign Ministry) 
First session in 2001 (estimate); five sessions by 2008, still active as of 2011 
 
 
 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Financial Sphere 
(known as the ‘Subcommission on Cooperation between Banks’ until 2009) 
At the level of the Deputy President of the People’s Bank of China and the Deputy President of the Russian Central Bank 
First session as a Working Group in 1998, status elevated to Subcommission in 2000; twelve sessions as a Subcommission by 2011 
 
 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Energy 
At the level of the Chairman of the Chinese National Development and Reform Committee (from 2010 the Director of the Chinese 
National Energy Administration) and the Russian Minister of Energy (referred to as the ‘Minister of Industry and Energy’ until 2008) 
First session in 1999; twelve sessions by 2010, subsequently disbanded 
 
 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Space 
At the level of the Administrator of the China National Space Administration and the Director of the Russian Federal Space 
Agency (Roskosmos) 
First session in 2000; twelve sessions by 2011 
 
 
Under the Subcommission on Scientific-Technical Cooperation: 
Working Group on Innovation Cooperation 
First session in 2000; five sessions by 2004; headed by the Deputy Head of the Secretariat of the Chinese Ministry 
of Science and Technology and the Head of the Russian Federal Agency for Science and Innovation 
 
 
Under the Subcommission on Trade and Economic Cooperation: 
Working Group on the Exploitation and Processing of Timber Resources 
First session in 2001; nine sessions by 2011; headed by the Chinese Deputy Minister of Commerce and the 
Russian Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade 
 
 
Subcommission on Telecommunications and Information Technologies 
At the level of the Chinese Minister of Information Industry (since 2007 the Deputy Minister of Industry and 
Information Technology) and the Russian Minister (since 2007 the Deputy Minister) of Information Technologies 
and Communications 
First session in 2001; ten sessions by 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Tourism 
At the level of the Deputy Director of the Chinese National Tourism Administration and the Russian Deputy Minister of Economic Development and Trade 
(from 2004 the Director of the Russian Federal Agency for Physical Culture, Sport and Tourism; since 2008 the Deputy Director of the Russian Federal Tourism 
Agency) 
First session as a Working Group in 2002, status then elevated to Subcommission; eight sessions as a Subcommission by 2011 
 
 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Mass Media 
At the level of the Deputy Director of the Chinese State Administration of Radio, Film and Television and the Director of the Russian Federal Agency 
for the Press and Mass Media 
First session as a Working Group in 2002; five sessions by 2007, status then elevated to Subcommission; four sessions as a Subcommission by 2011 
 
 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Cinematography 
First session at the level of the Deputy Director of the Chinese State Administration of Radio, Film and Television and the Russian Deputy Minister of 
Culture (later the Director of the Department of Cinematography in the Russian Ministry of Culture) 
First session as a Working Group in 2002; status elevated to Subcommission in 2007; three sessions as a Subcommission by 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Group on Cooperation in the Field of Archives 
At the level of the Director of the Chinese State Archives Administration and the Director of the Russian Federal Archive Agency 
First session in 2004; eight sessions by 2011 
 
 
Sino-Russian Business Council 
At the level of the Vice-President of the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) and the Chairman of the Russian business association ‘Delovaya 
Rossiya’ 
First session in 2004; five sessions by 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under the Subcommission on Trade and Economic Cooperation: 
Working Group on Standardisation, Metrology, Certification and Inspection 
Control 
First session in 2002; eight sessions by 2010; headed by the Deputy Director of the Chinese General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine and the Deputy Director of the Russian 
Federal Agency for Technical Regulation and Metrology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under the Subcommission on Scientific-Technical Cooperation: 
Working Group on Cooperation between the Russian National Science Centres 
and the Leading Chinese National Scientific Research Institutes 
Date of first session unknown; five sessions by 2007; headed by the Deputy Director of the Department 
for Development Planning for Science and Technology in the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology 
and the Deputy Head of the Office of Federal Assets in the Scientific Sphere at the Russian Federal 
Agency for Science and Innovation 
 
 
Under the Subcommission on Trade and Economic Cooperation: 
Working Group on Investment Cooperation 
First session in 2004; three sessions by 2009; headed by the Deputy Chairman of the Chinese National 
Development and Reform Committee and the Russian Presidential Plenipotentiary in the Far Eastern 
Federal District (later the Director of the Department of Investment Policy in the Russian Ministry of 
Economic Development, then the Russian Deputy Minister of Economic Development) 
 
 
Under the Subcommission on Telecommunications and Information Technologies: 
Working Group on Information Technology 
First session in 2004 (estimate); number of sessions unknown, converted into a Working Group for 
Cooperation in the Sphere of Information Technology and Network Security in 2012; headed by the 
Director of the Department of Electronic and Information Technology in the Chinese Ministry of 
Information Industry and the Director of the Department of the Strategy for Building an Information 
Society in the Russian Ministry of Information Technologies and Communications 
 
Working Group on Cooperation in the Field of Mobile Communications 
Date of first session unknown; number of sessions unknown; headed by the Deputy Director of the Office 
of Telecommunications in the Chinese Ministry of Information Industry and the Director of the 
Department of State Policy in the Sphere of Information-Communication Technologies in the Russian 
Ministry of Information Technologies and Communications  
 
Working Group on Cooperation in the Field of Electro-Communications 
Date of first session unknown; number of sessions unknown; still active as of 2012; headed by unknown 
 
Working Group on Cooperation in the Field of Postal Communications 
Date of first session unknown; number of sessions unknown; still active as of 2012; headed by unknown 
 
Working Group on the Coordination of Radio Frequencies 
Date of first session unknown; number of sessions unknown; still active as of 2012; headed by unknown 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Committee on Cooperation between Russia’s State Duma and China’s National People’s Congress 
At the level of the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress and the Chairman of the Russian State Duma 
First session in 2006 (estimate); five sessions by 2011 
 
 
Committee on Cooperation between Russia’s Federation Council and China’s National People’s 
Congress 
At the level of the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress and the Chairperson (on one occasion the First 
Deputy Chairman) of the Russian Federation Council 
First session in 2006; five sessions by 2011 
 
 
Sino-Russian Working Group on Questions of Migration 
At the level of the Director of the Exit & Entry Administration of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security and the Deputy Director of the Russian 
Federal Migration Service 
First session in 2006; five sessions by 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under the Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Space: 
Working Group on the Subject: “The Study of the Moon and Deep Space” 
First session in 2005; three sessions by 2007; headed by the Deputy Administrator of the China National Space 
Administration and the Deputy Director of the Russian Federal Space Agency 
 
 
Under the Subcommission on Trade and Economic Cooperation: 
Working Group on Questions of Special Economic Zones 
First session in September 2006; four sessions by 2010; headed by the Deputy Director of the European Administration of 
the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (since 2009 the Deputy Minister of Commerce) and the Head of the Russian Federal 
Agency for the Management of Special Economic Zones (since 2009 the Deputy Minister of Economic Development) 
 
 
Subcommission on Civil Aviation and Civil Aircraft Manufacturing 
At the level of the Deputy Chairman of the Chinese Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence 
(since 2008 the Deputy Minister of Industry and Information Technology) and the Russian Deputy Minister of Industry and 
Energy (since 2008 the Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade) 
Converted into a Subcommission in 2006, first session in 2006; seven sessions by 2012 
 
Working Group on Cooperation in the Field of Civil Aircraft Manufacturing 
Date of first session unknown; number of sessions unknown; headed by unknown 
 
Working Group on Cooperation in the Field of Helicopter Manufacturing 
Date of first session unknown; number of sessions unknown; headed by unknown 
 
Working Group on Cooperation in the Field of Engine Building 
Date of first session unknown; number of sessions unknown; headed by unknown 
 
Working Group on Cooperation in the Field of Science 
Date of first session unknown; number of sessions unknown; headed by unknown 
 
Working Group on Materials and Technologies 
Date of first session unknown; number of sessions unknown; headed by unknown 
 
 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection 
At the level of the Director of the Chinese State Environmental Protection Administration (renamed ‘Minister of 
Environmental Protection’ in 2008) and the Russian Minister of Natural Resources and the Environment 
First session as a Working Group in 2003; two sessions by 2003, status elevated to Subcommission in 2006; six sessions by 
2011 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Joint Sino-Russian Border Commission 
At the level of the Director of the Legal and Treaties Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry (later the Ministry’s Director of the Department of 
Border Issues and Maritime Affairs) and the Director of the First Asia Department in the Russian Foreign Ministry 
First session in 2007; nine sessions by 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sino-Russian Energy Dialogue 
At the level of the Deputy Premier of the Chinese State Council and the Russian Deputy Prime Minister 
First session in 2008; seven sessions by 2011 
 
 
Working Group on the Prevention of Environmental Contamination and Interaction 
during Ecological Emergencies 
First session in 2007; five sessions by 2011; headed by the Head of the Department for the Control of the State of 
the Environment in the Chinese State Environmental Protection Administration (later the Director of the Centre 
for the Reaction to Ecological Emergencies in the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection) and the Director 
(later the Deputy Director) of the Department of State Policy and Regulation in the Field of Environmental 
Protection and Ecological Safety in the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment 
 
Working Group for Monitoring the Quality of Trans-Border Waters and their 
Protection 
First session in 2007; five sessions by 2011; headed by the Director of the Department for Environmental 
Monitoring in the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection and the Director of the Office of Water Resources 
and Water Management Regulation at the Russian Federal Agency for Water Resources 
 
Working Group on Questions of Specially Protected Natural Territories and the 
Preservation of Biodiversity 
First session in 2007; six sessions by 2012; headed by the Director (later the Deputy Director) of the Department 
of Environmental Protection and Ecology in the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection and the Deputy 
Director of the Department of State Policy and Regulation in the Field of Environmental Protection and Ecological 
Safety in the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (later the Deputy Director of the 
Department of the Far Eastern Federal District in the Russian Federal Service for the Supervision of Natural 
Resources) 
 
 
Under the Subcommission on Trade and Economic Cooperation: 
Working Group on Cooperation in the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
First session in 2007; four sessions by 2010; headed by the Head of the Legal Department of the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce and the Head of the Russian Federal Service for Intellectual Property, Patents and Trademarks 
 
Chamber for the Assistance of Trade in Machine-Technical and Innovation Production 
First board meeting in 2007; four board meetings by 2010; headed by the President of the China Chamber of Commerce 
for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and the President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs 
 
 
Under the Subcommission on Scientific-Technical Cooperation: 
Working Group on High Technology and Innovations 
First session in 2007; three sessions by 2009; headed by the Deputy Head of the Department of Industrial Development of 
New and High Technologies in the Chinese Ministry of Science (after 2008 the Minister-Counsellor of the Department of 
International Cooperation in the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology) and the Head of the Department of 
Innovation Development and Infrastructure at the Russian Federal Agency for Science and Innovation 
 
 
Under the Subcommission on Transport: 
Working Group on Transit 
First session in 2007; three sessions by 2010; headed by the Chinese Deputy Minister of Railways and the Russian Deputy 
Minister of Transport 
 
Working Group on Air Transport 
Date of first session unknown; number of sessions unknown; headed by the Russian Deputy Minister of Transport (Chinese 
delegation head unknown) 
 
 
In July 2008, the Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Power and the Subcommission on Cooperation in the 
Field of Energy were transferred from the administrative structure of the Sino-Russian Commission on the Preparation of 
Regular Meetings of the Heads of Government to that of the Sino-Russian Energy Dialogue 
  
 
Sino-Russian Commission for the Rational Use and Protection of Trans-Border Waters 
At the level of the Chinese Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (later an Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs) and the Director of the Russian Federal 
Agency for Water Resources 
First session in 2008; four sessions by 2011 
 
Working Group on Integrated Water Resource Management 
First session in 2010 (estimate); two sessions by 2011; headed by the Director of the Department of International Cooperation, Science and 
Technology in the Chinese Ministry of Water Resources and the Deputy Director of the Russian Federal Agency for Water Resources 
 
Working Group for Monitoring the Quality of Trans-Border Waters and their Protection 
First session in 2010; two sessions by 2011; headed by the Director of the Department for Environmental Monitoring in the Chinese 
Ministry of Environmental Protection and the Deputy Head of the Office of Water Resources and Water Management Regulation at the 
Russian Federal Agency for Water Resources 
 
 
Dialogue between the Ruling Parties of China and Russia 
At the level of the Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (later the Chinese Vice 
President) and the Secretary of the Presidium of the General Council of ‘United Russia’ (later the Chairman of the Supreme Council of ‘United Russia’) 
First session in 2009; two sessions by 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under the Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Tourism: 
Working Group on Tourism Security 
First session in 2010; number of sessions unknown; headed by the Deputy Director of the Chinese National Tourism Administration and the Deputy Director 
of the Russian Federal Agency for Tourism  
 
 
Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Youth Policy 
At the level of the Deputy Chairman of the All-China Youth Federation and the Russian Deputy Minister of Sport, Tourism and Youth Policy 
First session in 2011  
 
 
Under the Subcommission on Cooperation in the Field of Health Care: 
Working Group on Traditional Medicine 
First session in 2011; headed by the Deputy Director of the Chinese State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine and the Director of the Russian Federal 
Service on Surveillance in Health Care and Social Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subcommission on Customs Cooperation 
At the level of the Director of the Chinese General Administration of Customs and the Director (later the First Deputy Director) of the Russian Federal Customs Service 
First session in 2009; three sessions by 2011 
 
Working Group on Customs Statistics 
First session in 2009; two sessions by 2010; headed by the Deputy Head of the Department of Customs Statistics at the Chinese General Administration of 
Customs and the Deputy Head of the Office of Customs Statistics and Analysis at the Russian Federal Customs Service 
 
Working Group on Cooperation in the Field of Customs Law Enforcement 
Date of first session unknown; number of sessions unknown; headed by unknown 
 
Working Group on the Enhancement of the Mechanisms for Customs Registration and Customs Control 
First session in 2009; three sessions by 2011; headed by the Head (later the Deputy Head) of the Department of Customs Control at the Chinese General 
Administration of Customs and the Head of the Russian Central Office of Federal Customs Revenues and Tariff Regulation (later the Head of the Central 
Office of Customs Registration and Customs Control at the Federal Customs Service) 
 
Working Group on Cooperation between the Customs Academies  
Date of first session unknown; two sessions by 2011; headed by the Head (later the Deputy Head) of the National Centre for the Training and Retraining of 
Personnel at the Chinese General Administration of Customs and the Director of the Vladivostok branch of the Russian Customs Academy (later the First 
Deputy Head of the Department of Civil Service and Personnel at the Federal Customs Service) 
 
Working Group on Cooperation in the Assessment and Collection of Customs Duties 
Date of first session unknown; number of sessions unknown; headed by unknown 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Group on Cooperation in the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
First session in 2011; headed by the Deputy Head of the Legal Department of the Chinese General Administration of Customs and the Head of the 
Department of Trade Barriers, Currency and Export Control at the Russian Federal Customs Service 
 
Working Group for the Preparation of Proposals for the Minimisation of the Risk of a Breach of Customs Legislation 
and the Improvement of the Efficiency of Customs Control and Registration under the Conditions of the Formation of 
the Customs Union 
First session in 2011 (estimate); headed by the Head of the Analytical Department of the Chinese General Administration of Customs and the Head of the 
Analytical Office of the Russian Federal Customs Service 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
